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A 11 
Amer the battle of Cannae, Hannibal retired to the confines of his camp to 
celebrate the greatest defeat the Romans had ever suffered, and as the future would hold, 
anyone would suffer. 
"Hannibal's officers crowded round him with congratulations on his victory. The 
others all advised him, now that he had brought so great a war to a conclusion, to 
repose and allow his weary soldiers to rest for the remainder of that day and the 
fbllOWM'g night. But Maharbal, the commander of the cavalry, held that no time 
should be lost. 'Nay, ' he cried, 'that you may realize what has been accomplished 
by this battle, in five days you shall banquet in the Capitol! Follow after, I Will 
precede you with the cavalry, that the Romans may know that you are there 
before they know that you are conung! - To Hannibal the idea was too joyous and 
vast for his mind at once to grasp it. And so, while praising Maharbal's goodwill, 
'he declared that he must have time to deliberate regarding his advice. Then said 
Maharbal, 'In very truth the gods bestow not on the same man all their gifts; you 
know how to gain a victory, Hannibal;, you know not how to use one. ' That day's 
delay is generally believed to have saved the City and the empire. "' 
1 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi Vol. V, trans. B. O. Foster, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass-, 1929), 
22.51.1-4. "Hannibali victori cum ceteri circumfusi gratularentur suaderenque ut tanto perfunctus Wto did 
quod reliquum esset noctisque insequentis quietem ei ipse sibi suineret et fessis daret nülitibus, Maharbal 
praefectus equitum minime cessandum ratus, 'Immo, ut quid hac pugna sit actum scias, die quinto' inquit 
'victor in Capitolio epulaberis. Sequere; cum equite, ut prius venisse quam ventunn sciant, praecedain. ' 
Hannibah nimis laeta res est visa maiorque quam ut eam statim capere animo posset. Itaque voluntatem se 
laudare Maharbalis ait; ad consilium pensandum temporis opus esse. Tum Maharbal: 'Non omnia nimirum 
eidem di dedere: vincere scis, Hannibal, victoria uti nescis. ' Mora eius dici satis creditur saluti fuisse urbi 
atque imperio. " 
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Although this picture so vividly portrayed by Livy, may never have happened, the 
point of why Hannibal did not simply crush what remained of the Roman polity and 
people is one that has perplexed historians since the battle itself The passage, however, 
highlights the fact that the war between Hannibal and Rome cannot be understood unless 
Hannibal"s actions and thinking are explained. Our sources inevitably reflect a Roman 
perspective, although some Carthaginian material may have been used, and these sources 
make assumptions about Hannibal's actions, which need to be scrutinized. Little is known 
of Hannibal., the details of his actions, the circumstances of many of his deeds, let alone 
his motivations. As a consequence of this general lack of knowledge, all kinds of 
misunderstandings and myths about Hannibal abound. Further, these misconceptions have 
broader implications for the way in which the war and Carthage are conceived and 
understood during the 2dPunic War. 
The overall objective of this study is to argue that Hannibal did not have a single 
strategy for the conduct of his war with Rome. It will be demonstrated that Hannibal's 
ambition was not driven by one set "grand design", present from the start and 
systematically worked out, but that it changed at least two times, as an evolving process 
of pragmatic opportunism. It will be argued that the Hannibal's thinking should be seen to 
consist of at least three distinct and evolving strategies: 
1) As the war began, Hannibal had no desire to destroy Rome - he 
wanted to subjugate Rome and/or turn Rome into an allied state of 
Carthage. f1is strategy was to isolate Rome through a blitzkrieg raid 
on the Roman Confederation. 
2) After Cannae Hannibal's strategy changed to a defensive rather 
than offensive posture, designed to outlast the Roman military until 
3 
reinforcements could be sent either from Carthage or Philip of 
Macedon. 
After returning to Africa, Hannibal's strategy changed once again 
to become a policy of damage control and, later, as his country's 
political spokesman, to keep Carthage intact. 
In order to prove my theory of multiple strategies, it is my contention that this 
cannot be done unless such an analysis is embedded in an understanding of Carthage and 
Carthaginian society before and during the Hannibalic period. The need is to reconstruct 
Hannibal's strategic thinking and actions in its own terms. The principal problem with 
this is that the surviving sources present matters from a Roman perspective, even when in 
some cases information may have been derived from Carthaginian sources. Hannibal is 
largely presented as the foil of the Romans. Hannibal's strategic thinking is reconstructed 
in the sources primarily to explain Roman actions. However, the second war between 
Rome and Carthage will never be properly understood without attempting to see it from a 
Carthaginian point of view. To achieve this I have concentrated on the primary sources 
rather than modem scholarly work, much of which shares the Roman perspective of the 
sources. Secondly I have sought to reconstruct Hannibal's strategies from his actions, 
because the historicity of many of the passages where Hannibal or others discuss his 
strategies may be doubted, as in the case of the incident with which this introduction 
begins. Finally I have sought to exploit comparative material from a better documented 
war, the American War Between the States, to help with the reconstruction. Such 
material, of course cannot be used to prove my reconstruction of Hannibal's strategy, but 
argue that it suggests ways of understanding the actions of generals and demonstrates 
the certain strategies are possible. 
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Modern scholars have a variety of assessments of Hannibal's actual goal along 
with his strategy for accomplishing that goal. Brian Caven, Nigel Bagnall, John Prevas, 
and John Lazenby all agree that making the western Mediterranean permanently safe for 
the Carthaginians was Hannibal's central goal and that the strategy for accomplishing the 
task first begins with a blitzkrieg attack on the Italian mainland that results in the break up 
, of the Roman Alliance System. 
2 However, these and many other scholars differ as to the 
actual means for breaking up the confederation and most hold Hannibal had only this one 
plan for his war effort. Prevas, believed the alliance would dissolve if Roman authority 
were challenged, causing members states to revolt; with the legions tied up on the 
mainland suppressing insurrections, Hannibal's army would be the catalyst in a reaction 
that would destroy Rome from within- Caven on the other hand stipulates Hannibal 
confidently expected to overthrow the Italian confederatlon. 3 Lazenby maintains 
Hannibal's strategy was based on the hope that he could seduce the allies by fear or 
favour,, if not to fight for him, at least to remain neutral. 4 Serge Lancel adds the 
hypothesis that Hannibal need only play on the multiplicity of status among the Roman 
5 
allies to sow confusion. Yet Bagnall asserts Hannibal's operational airn was to ýdestroy 
the Roman army, which he saw as the cohesive force holding the Italian confederation 
together. 6 Although each hypothesis has merit, the outcome remains the same: Hannibal 
had one plan for conducting his war with Rome; i. e., one strategy of breaking up the 
B. Caven, The Punic Wars (New York, 1980), page 95; N. Bagnafl, The Punic Wars (London, 1990), page 
330; J. Prevas, Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Enigm Re-examined (New York, 1998), page 4; & J. F. 
Lazenby, Hannibal's War: A HistoKy of the Second Punic War (Warniinster, 1978), page 10. 
II Prevas, Hamriibal Crosses the Alpý page 4. 
IF Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page 10. 
ý' S. Lancel, Hannibal trans. A Nevill (Oxford, 1998), page 8 1. 
N. Bagnall. The Punic Wars page 330. 
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Roman Alliance System. Lancel, Caven, and Lazenby agree Hannibal continued the 
policy he had chosen at the outset to destroy the power of Rome through intense 
diplomatic activity in southern Italy, while Baker and Cottrell, conclude Hannibal had no 
conclusive strategy after Cannae and Bradford points to Hannibal's belief that Rome 
should have surrendered after such devastating defeats was a false sense of the conduct of 
war. Overwhelmingly, all believe Hannibal's strategy was flawed. 
Only two scholars, Bagnall and Lancel, indicate Hannibal may have indeed had 
more than one strategy, changing tactically firom. an offensive to a defensive position after 
the first two years of the war, As Hannibal's victories won over an increasing number of 
D- I 
R. ome s allies, Hannibal was forced to wage a defensive strategy in order to protect these 
defecting allies while waiting for Carthage to either send reinforcements or widen the 
area of conflict to include Spain, Sardinia, and Sicily. " I have found no indication that any 
previous scholar thought of Hannibal's return to Africa as a strategy, let alone a third one. 
Most saw it as his being forced to defend the city on the orders of the Carthaginian senate. 
Hannibal based the first strategy on manoeuvrability of his troops to maintain the 
offensive in hopes Rome would agree to a negotiated peace; the second defensive strategy 
included holding the territory and allies gained while reinforcements were brought fi7om 
Carthage and/or Iflyria. Additionally, his objective changed for a second time from 
wanting to reverse the situation arisen from the treaties of 241 and 237 to a strategy of 
actually preserving Carthage's current power in the western Mediterranean- 
S. Lancel, H-annibal, page log; B. Caven, The Punic Wars, page 141; IF Lazenby, Hannibal's Wa'r pages 
y of Rome (New york, 'Ry 
5% -8G. P. Baker, Hannibal (London, 1930), page 144- L. Cottrell, Hannib - al. Eneln 
1961). pages 146-147-, & E. Bradford, ibal (Londorý 1981), pages 125 & 130. 
N. Bagnall. The Punic Wars page 330 & S. Lancel, Hannibal,, page 110. 
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Care has to be taken in the use of primary sources. On the whole the 
reconstruction of Hannibal's strategic thinking is based upon the events described in the 
sources rather than what those involved are supposed to have said or upon the strategies 
which are ascribed by our sources to individual players. The point here is that it is 
--r-ct perfe ly possible for a historian, such as Polybius, to preserve correctly what Hannibal 
may have said on any occasion and to make use of eye-vAtness testimony. But given that 
there is no analytical technique to discriminate with any certainty a remark which was 
actually made from words put in the mouth of the player by the historian, and given the 
propensity of historians to put their own ideas in the mouths of historical characters, it is 
best not to use such evidence in reconstructing actual strategic thinking. For instance, 
despite what Livy and even Polybius imply, I will assert that an attack on the city of 
D- 
Rome never formed a part of Hannibal's strategy. If he had marched on the city in 216 
B. C. he would have departed areas in which he hoped to win allies and entered into the 
heartland of the Roman confederacy. 9 With two legions raised at the beginning of 216, 
Marceflus' 1500 men at Ostia plus the marines he sent to Teanum Sidicinum, along with 
the able-bodied civilians of Rome, it is unlikely that Hannibal would have been able to 
take the city in a daring fi7ontal attack. 'O Consequently, he most certainly would have had 
to engage in a protracted siege, which would have laid him open to the risk of being 
trapped in the vicinity of the city by the overwhelming forces Rome could rapidly raise. 
Although he might have won in the end, this method of warfare was not where his 
strength lay. 11 For these reasons, I propose the wrong question has been asked. 
J. F. Lazenby, "Was Maharbal RightT, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, BICS Supplement 67, 
1996, pages 41-42. 
1 
1" Livy, Ad Urbe Condi 23.14.2 & 22.57.7-8,9. 
"IF. Lazenby. "Was Maharbal Right? ", page 4 1. 
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Much that has been written about Hannibal by the Greek and Roman classical 
writers falls short of what we might consider the "truth" for any attempt to view the war 
from Hannibal's perspective suffers in particular from the utter silence of the 
Carthaginians. We are fortunate to have the writings of the Greek historian Polybius. 
Although his work does not survive in a complete text, he lived in a period of time where 
he could interview eyewitnesses of the war. 12 The sources for his knowledge came from 
first-hand oral reports; personally following Hannibal's route through the Alps as he 
understood it; touring various battle sites; visiting monuments erected by people involved 
in the war; and from official documents seen by him, which would not have been many. 
Against Polybius' word, and illustrating the possibility bias to the Romans, he was a -4z? 
Greek political pnsoner of the Scipio family. As a fiiend and prot6g6 of Scipio 
Aemilianus who led the Romans against Carthage in the third war, Polybius had first- 
hand knowledge. He wrote a 40-volume account of the growth of Roman power from the 
beginning of the first war With Carthage, cuhninating with Carthage's destruction by 
Rome in the third war. The few books'. which survive include his account of the second 
war with Hannibal. After the Romans destroyed the Achaean Federation, Polybius, an 
A, - 
13 
z xvhaean nobleman, was forced into the service of the Scipio family. His connection to 
the family allowed him access to treaties between Rome and Carthage now lost, 14 the 
inscription set up by Hannibal on the Cape Lacinium promontory, 15 and Scipio Africanus' 
12 polybius, The Histories. 3.48.2 & 4.2.2. 
13 E. Bradford, Hannibal, page xvi. 
14 Polybius, The Histories 3.22.7. 
1 r' Polybius. The Histories, 3.3 3.18. 
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letter to Philip of Macedon detailing his reasons for attacking Carthago Nova. 
16 
Additionally, Polybius made use of earlier historians' work, such as Q. Fabius Pictor, 
17 
Philinus,, and Silenus. 
Polybius confines largely his narrative to political and rnilitary events, their causes 
and effects. Although more objective than Livy in his picture of Hannibal and nearer the 
truth of the events than later Roman writers,, he clearly had his prejudices due to his 
association with the Scipio family. yet for the war with Hannibal there is no way that 
Polybius can be any better than his sources. How much can you actually take at face 
value from the average soldier's point of view? For instance, just because an infantryman 
knows where his army deployed and what events took place, it does not necessarily mean 
he knows why the officers requested the implementation of these events. In other words 
what a soldier is told by his leader is not necessarily what is actually taking place. The 
oral histories that played a significant part in Polybius' work were not just personal 
accounts of soldiers, but also accounts of civilians who were in the cities, those who - 
witnessed the passing of Hannibal's army-, would have seen a battle; or would have been 
a resident of one of the cities taken over by him. Subconsciously, as Romans or under 
n- 
Roman rule themselves, ., witnesses may 
have wanted to put as much distance between 
Hannibal and his uniqueness as possible, because he was incomprehensible as a Roman 
figure. Many held strong Carthaginian prejudices for their assessment of him. 
Contemporary perceptions of his barbarism, cunning, or treachery were repeated over and 
over, again, embellished and elaborated until transfigured into fact. Again, it is 
16 Polybius. The Histories Vol. IV, trans. W. R- Paton, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1925), 
11) 10.9.3. 
17 Polybius. The Historics. 3.8.1. 
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problematical to take these facts at face value, for unless he found contradictory evidence, 
Polybius had no real reason to doubt their veracity. 
Of the later Roman historians, Livy is by far the most important writer of 
Hannibal and the 2nd Punic War, or as I prefer to call it, the 2 nd Roman War. An artistic 
client and fiiend of Augustus and colleague of the future emperor Claudius, he wrote an 
annalistic history of Rome beginning with its origins until 9 B. C. Livy's aim in writing 
his 142-volume history - 35 of which survive - was to show the causes and process of 
Rome's rise to its current immmence. 18 Q. Fabius Pictor's influence on Livy is profound 
and can be seen in the far-reaching patriotic inaccuracies detected in his writings. 19 For 
example, his dating of the siege of Saguntum in 219 instead of 218 must have originated 
to minimize Rome's neglect of her "ffiend" by emphasizing the so-caRed suddenness of 
the attack and capture of Saguntum, and by implying that Rome had no time to send help. 
Writing nearly 200 years after the 2nd Roman War, his work is studded with speeches by 
the main characters in each event, ostensibly passages recorded as a historical testimony 
of the event, but actually fictional depictions to make the story more understandable to his 
Roman audience and, perhaps more important at the time, entertaining. Considering his 
_0 -. mend act, Livy designed his authorial commentaries to Virgil's work, The Aeneid, as f 
dignify the subsequent hostility between the two cities and to demonstrate the qualities of 
honour that enabled the Romans to defeat the Carthaginians . 
20 Although Livy would have 
been privy to official records due to his friendship with the emperor, we do not know 
what goals or perspectives his sources had - he rarely mentions them - and he was 
18 E, Bradford, Hannibal, pages xvi - xvii. 
" P. G. Walsh, Liyy: His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge, 1961), page 119, 
2' P. G. Walsh, Liyy: His Historical Anns and Methods page 10- 11. 
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writing his entire history as a glorification of Rome to be presented to that very same 
emperor. 
Although writings from both Polybius, and Livy have been lost, surviving text by 
Polybius covers the early part of the war with Hannibal while Livy's work covers the 
later period. There is some overlap in the middle years, which provides an interesting 
balance between the two. Even though Polybius may not have had access to official 
Roman documents, Livy did due to his connections. Consequently the number of Romans 
killed in battle or taken prisoner should be considered accurate since Livy had no reason 
to make the losses look smaller and may be as reliable as Polybius who had access to 
first-hand accounts. In addition Livy relies on Polybius' earlier work even though he cites 
Polybius by name only once. When individual passages of the two writers are compared, 
it is evident he uses Polybius as a reference as early as Book XXI where Livy records an 
alternate version of the chronology of the siege of Saguntum coinciding with Polybius' 
account . 
21 The statistics for Hannibal's army cited by Livy contain one estimate identical 
with Polybius' account fiom the Lacinium inscription. 22 There are other points in Livy's 
work regarding the Italian and Spanish campaigns, which coincide with Polybius' 
accounts. 23 It is also notable that Coelius Antipater is cited four times in Livy's books. 24 
Coehus and Polybius used the same sources for the 2dRoman War - Silenus for the 
African viewpoint, and Fabius Pictor for the Roman. 25 
21 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.15.3 & Polybius, The Histories, 3,17. 
22 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.38.2 & Polybius, The Histories, 3.33. 
23 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita,, 21.19.2ff & Polybius, The Histories, 3.29,3.107, & 10.7.1. 
24 Livy, Ad Urbe Condi 21.38.7,21.46.10,21.47.4, & 22.31.8. 
25 Coelius' use of Silenus, Cicero, De Re Publi Vol. XVI. trans. C. W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge, Mass.. 1928). 1.24.49-, & Polybius, on Fabius, The ffistories, 1.14.1. 
11 
I 
There was a large number of histories of the war with Hannibal, which directly or 
indirectly could have been, and clearly were, used by surviving sources such as Polybius 
-)1 26 and Livy "Many have produced histories of the events of this war . Of particular 
importance for our purposes would be those written from a Carthaginian point of view. 
Many such works which are alluded to by later writers are either unnamed or are nothing 
more than names - Eumachus of Naples and a certain Xenophon. 27 Even more tantalising 
is the evidence that Hannibal wrote works himself in Greek. Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal, 
13.2 talks of ((a number of books in GreeV, but the only specific work he cites has 
nothing to do with the war with Rome. It was an address to the Rhodians about the 
marauding activities of the Roman general, Gnaeus Manlius Vulso in Asia in 189-188 
B. C. It would be nice to think he wrote military memoirs, but there is no such evidence, 
and, indeed, if there had been anything like this they surely would have been cited. 
However, it is clear that Hannibal, like many Hellenistic kings, included historians in his 
entourage on campaign. Silenus of Kaleakte 28 and Sosylus of Lacedaemon, 29 the latter 
Hannibal's Greek teacher, are stated by NepOS30 as having accompanied Hannibal on his 
campaigns. Sosylus wrote a work of seven books, 31 which was known to Polybius. 
Polybius links Sosylus with another historian, Chaereas, 32 and attacks them both: "in my 
" Cornelius Nepos, Great Generals of Foreign Nations, Hannibal, trans. J. C. Rolfe, LCL (Cambridge, MA, 
1929)13.3. 
27 F. Jacoby, Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker (1923- ) (FGrH) 178 and 179. 
28F. jaCoby, (FGrjl) 175. 
29 F. Jacoby, (FGrH) 176. 
30 Coirnelius Nepos, Hannibal, 13.3. 
1 Diodorus Siculus, The Library of Histo1y, trans. F. R. Walton, Vol. XL Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge. MA, 1957) 26.4. 
F. Jacoby. (FGrH) 177. 
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opinion they rank in authority not with history, but with the common gossip of the 
barber's shop". 33 The context of Polybius' attack is his dismissal of those sources which 
had a full scale debate in the Roman Senate, when the news of the fall of Sagunturn 
reached them, a debate in which arguments were put for against going to war. That debate 
is certainly reflected in the tradition 34 and it is far from clear that Polybius is right to be so 
dismissive of Sosylus and Chaereas. It is worth noting that the only substantial fragment 
of Sosylus to survive seems to be an unsensational and detailed account of a naval 
engagement at the mouth of the Ebro. 35 So at least one of the writers of the war from a 
Carthaginian point of view, Sosylus was in a position to have regular access to Hannibal 
and, perhaps, to have direct knowledge of his thinking and his work may have been less 
fanciful than Polybius reckoned. But, even so, it is impossible to ascribe any bit of the 
claims made in our surviving sources about Hannibal's strategic thinking to any of these 
writers for certain. 
A little bit more can be made of Silenus of Kaleakte. His work may well have 
reflected insider knowledge based upon his presence on campaign with Hannibal. 
Cicero's assessment of him was favourable. 36 Silenus was the source for the famous story 
of Hannibal's dream. The account got into the sources, probably through the Roman 
33 Polybius, The Histories, 3.20.5. 
34 Cassius Dio, Roman HigM, trans. E. Cary, Vol. 11, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 1914) 
Fragment 55. 
35 F. Jacoby, (FGrH) 176 F. 1, on a Wurzburg Papyrus. 
36 , 
... 
he was a very painstaking student of Hannibal's career... ", is autem diligentissime res Hannibalis 
Pp. utus cstý Cicero, De Senectute: De Amicitia: De Divinatione, r-rscc trans. 
W. A. Falconer, Vol. XX, Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge, mA, 1923) 1.49. 
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historian, Coelius Antipater and there are a variety of versions of 
it, 37 But the most 
famous is cited by Cicero. 38 After the capture of Saguntum Hannibal dreamed that Jupiter 
summoned him to a council of the gods, where he was ordered by Jupiter to carry the war 
into Italy. JupiteTgave him one of the gods as a guide. This guide told Hannibal not to 
took back while on the march; but Hannibal, overcome by curiosity, does look back and 
sees a terrible monster destroying everything. Hannibal asks his guide what the monster 
was and was informed that it was the destruction of Italy (vastitatem Itabae). The guide 
told him to press on and not to worry about what happened behind him. Livy significantly 
39 locates the dream just at the point that Hannibal is to cross the Ebro. Some modem 
authorities argue that the significance of the dream was that Hannibal is seen as 
transgressing divine authority by looking back and that the monster is an indication of the 
ultimate fruitlessness of the Italian campaign. 40 But this is a very unlikely reconstruction. 
Livy says that "Hannibal was delighted by his dream". 41 Much more likely Silenus seeks 
to represent Hannibal as a general favoured by the gods with the dream vindicating the 
decision to cross the Ebro and march to Italy. Indeed, it is possible that this favour and 
protection of the gods was a theme in Silenus work. When Polybius attacks the writers 
who exaggerated the problems of crossing the AlpS, 
42 he says that they were like writers 
of tragic plays, whose plots can only be brought to a close by the intervention of a deus ex 
machina- "these writers face the same problem and so invent the appearance of heroes 
37 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.22.5-9, Cassius Dio, Roman HiýWa. 13.56, Silius Italicus, Puni trans. J. D. 
Duff, 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 1934) 3.163ff. 
38 Cicero, De Divinatione, 1.49. 
39 Livy, Ad Urbe Condijýq, 21.22.5. 
E. Mever, Kleine Schrifte 11,1924,369 and F. Jacoby in his commentary on the firagment in FGrH 175. 
41 Livy. Ad _UrbeCondiM 
21.23.1. 
-12 Poiybius, The Histories 3.47.6ff 
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and gods". It is likely that the reference is to Silenus. 43 What can be made of the dream 
story, which significantly Polybius ignores? On the one hand, there is no doubt that 
people in the ancient world took dreams seriously as communication with the gods. So it 
is possible that Silenus is recording an actual dream told to hiirn by Hannibal and to 
suggest that Hannibal at the Ebro was both aware of the likely outcome of his march -the 
devastation of Italy - and was also determined not to worry about the problems of 
securing his lines of communication and supply back to Spain. 44 Indeed, perhaps this was 
the reason for Hannibal announcing that he had had the dream. He wanted to bring an end 
to caution among some of his staff. This involves taking the dream seriously. On the other 
hand, dreams by gýenerals before battles are a constant theme of ancient military 
narratives, compare for example Constantine's dream before the Milvian Bridge, and so 
the account may owe more to Silenus using the conventional embellishments of Greek 
Historians rather than to any fact. So it is possible to get an indication of some strategic 
thinking from this one fragment. But so much doubt surrounds even this. My 
investigation of the possible Carthaginian sources for material about Hannibal"s thinking 
in the surviving accounts does not indicate that there is a fruitful way of discovering what 
Hannibal actually thought, even if some of the material comes fi7om sources that were 
present on campaign with him. 
We learn of what Hannibal or any other Carthaginian said or thought only from 
their enemies, or those sympathetic to their enemies. As seen in the opening passage of 
our introduction Livy liberally makes assumptions about Hannibal and his tactics. How 
did Livy know what had been said after Cannae? The solution is simple - he made it up to 
explain what happened from a Roman point of view. What might the Romans have 
43 This is well argued by K. Meister. "Anrubale in Sileno". Maia 23 (1971) 1-9. 
44 1s this the moral of the "looking back" part of the dream? 
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informers,, known about the Carthaginians? How did they get this information- from spies , 
spoken languageS? 45 Hannibal was educated by a Greek, and influenced in many ways by 
his knowledge of Alexander and Pyrrhus. We cannot be sure what is derived from 
Carthaginian or Greek sources in these Roman texts. The point is if it was not recorded, 
historians had to explain Hannibal's behaviour by fiction. What they made up is not 
necessarily correct. We must go back and use reason to understand what may have 
actually happened. 
For the interpretation behind why Hannibal might have adopted a certain strategy, 
I propose that studying another general in a later time period, close to us in time allowing 
for detailed analysis of his actions, can lay the groundwork for the choices Hannibal 
made. There must be some validity to this theory as generals themselves continue to use 
tactics and strategies successfully executed by cormnanders of earlier ages. In fact, great 
generals do not as a rule repeat what has failed before. The manner in which wars are 
fought will change, but the principles of war will remain the same. Gen. Norman 
Schwarzkopf used Hannibal's tactics on much larger scale during the Gulf War. Gen. 
George Patton implemented Alexander the Great's manoeuvres extremely successfully 
during World War 11, so much so that he believed himself to be the reincarnation of that 
Great Captain. The Battle of Cannae has long held attention and inspiration with 
commanders. During World War 11, for example, Gen. von MoItke accepted Count 
Schlieffen's plan for the Gennan invasion of France in 1914, yet he substituted the "idea 
of a Cannae" - victory through a double envelopment instead of a single one. 46Later in 
the century Field Commander Erwin Rommel was not the only German officer to have 
' 4- Punic must have been fairly well known if Plautus used the language in his play. 
46J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War. 1789-1961 (New York, 1992), pages 155-156. 
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claimed he inflicted a "Cannae" on the enemy. 47 And lastly, Gen. Schwarzkopf declared 
he drew inspiration for his brief and devastating land offensive in Desert Storm from 
Cannae. 48 
It is my theory that you can see into the mind of a general regardless of the time 
and transpose his rationale for certain actions as long as you disregard technology. 
Granted the further technology advances the harder it is to do this for some cultures and 
time penods. For ancient generals, those chosen for comparison should pre-date World 
War 11 certainly and perhaps even World War I due to the numerous inventions added 
during this conflict, each of which had their own impact making it that much more 
difficult to discern whether a general's decision is due to the actions of his enemy, 
himself, or the application of an technological innovation. Essentially I intend to 
reexamine the character and development of Hannibal during this period, which in turn 
requires a theoretical reconsideration of the character of Hannibal himself by looking at 
another general's approach, assessing why he engaged in a similar act to show, "this is 
why Hannibal would have done ." Explaining Hannibal's strategies in the context 
of another general's actions requires a radical revision of what has until now been written. 
This work is that revision. 
By contrast to the lack of surviving sources or materials about the Hannibalic 
period, the American Civil War offers insights usually unavailable to researchers of 
earlier periods, into the social and political atmosphere of another era. Because the 
American CiviI War, hereafter to be referenced as the War Between the States, can easily 
be used to parallel the 2 nd Roman War, I will draw on General Robert E. Lee as the focus 
of comparison for Hannibal as well as the Confederacy and the War as a whole.. The men 
A. Goldsworthy, Canna (London, 200 1), page 180. 
48 A. Goldsworthy, Cannae front cover. 
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of the South who participated in the war were shaped by and operated in a particular 
social and historical setting not unlike that of Carthage . 
49Numerous people kept diaries 
and verbatim accounts of events, many other accounts by cabinet members, governors, 
congressmen, senators, and generals, as well as their wives and aides, offer the kind of 
detail not customarily found in antiquity. This kind of detail allows the careful researcher 
to recover much of the age without distorting the facts of the history. 5() 
As a pre-modern war, the War Between the States was fought in line with the 
same mentality as Hannibal, whose thinking, in many ways, had not been used again until 
the nfid-nineteenth century A. D. CiviliZation had to catch up with Hannibal's thinking. 
The degree to which the American war share the factors that made the 2nd Roman War so 
distinctive provides the primary basis for assessing the quality of the military 
performance of Hannibal. A comparison also sheds light on what chance Carthage had of 
winning by pitting the greater strength of leadership against Rome's larger forces: both 
wars were begun by the political manoeuvring of the enemy to make Carthage/the South 
the aggressor; the rapidity and decisiveness of the early campaigns give way to protracted 
manoeuvres and frequent sieges; and both wars are a multi-faceted blend of traditional 
warfare with early influences of modem warfare, which include both "total" and 
49 1 realize that comparing two or more cultures or polities as evidence for why a certain action was taken 
by its governing bodies, or why social habits may exist, among other potential comparisons, has not been 
researched at all in the field of classics, certainly, and possibly all historical fields. It is, however, an 
integral part of the disciplines of sociology and especially anthropology. I do not use this technique very 
much in this work, but it is a topic which I will return to and do more research on its application in the field 
of history, and classiCs in particular, along with its possibilities and limitations in the near future. 
"' This sort of comparative approach has regularly been used by historians. such as Alan Bullock's work 
Hitler and.. Stalin.. 2 nd Ed. (New York 1998). 
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"classical" elements. But most importantly is the correlation between the three distinct 
phases of strategy followed by the Confederacy as it relates to Hannibal's decisions - 
1) In the first phase of the War Between the States the Confederates 
pursue a straightforward program for asserting control over the 
borderstates and territories, with the Southern armies achieving 
stunning victories. 
2) In the second phase, the Confederates rely largely on a defensive 
posture to hold onto their gains, hoping for reinforcements from 
Europe that never materialize. 
3) The final stage witnesses the Confederacy's most determined 
attempt to mobilize its manpower in an attempt to sap the will of 
the North and bring about a settlement of peace. 
Through the exploration of the generalship of Lee, I will prove Hannibal was, in 
5 fact, a 'grand' strategist. This should not be confused with the use of a 'grand strategy . 
Hannibal, as a 'grand strategist' used several strategies which have been labeled as on the 
level of grand strategies by military historians. He was not a man to set out on such an 
endeavour as attacking Rome without having an ultimate goal in mind, as well as all the 
necessary steps needed to accomplish the end. Since Hannibal's conquests in Italy did not 
come all at once, but in stages during the first two years of the war, when did his 
blitzkrieg offensive change to his second strategy? Was Hannibal's endless marching 
after Cannae merely a response to Roman counterattacks or did he have a master plan? If 
so, what was it? Was he merely fighting a war of attrition? I intend to show that this is not 
the case. Hannibal changed his strategy from an offensive endeavour to a defensive 
position in order to protect the very allies he had hoped to win to his side during the first 
two years of the war. Was it all part of a preconceived plan evident even before 
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Saguntum, or did it form in a more gradual and pragmatic way? Though Carthaginian 
perceptions of the world seem to lack a certain level of complexity fi7om the modem point 
of view, the nature of their understanding of warfare was very focused. This focus reflects 
a certain set of principles and it is here that we should seek what we today call "grand 
strategy' 
On the level of "grand strategy' - whether to undertake the war at all - it is more 
important to determine whether Hannibal was able to discover or predict Rome's long- 
term military plans, or acquire an understanding of their social and political institutions. 
Churchill once remarked, "'When making plans, it is as well to take into account those of 
the enemy. ,51 This truism expresses the fundamental importance of military intelligence 
gathering and evaluation. Likewise as extracted from the writings of Napoleon-. "In 
forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, 
and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of campaign may be 
modified ad infinitum according to circumstances, the genius of the general, the character 
of the troops, and the features of the country. , 52 What made Hannibal's generalship 
outstanding was that his course was determined by the chronology of the war. The 
extraordinary feature about Hannibal is he does not exploit past mistakes or successes; 
instead,, he continually breaks new ground. The picture of the general, which ultimately 
emerges is neither as glorious as his admirers profess, nor as demonic as his enemies have 
tried to propagate. The Hannibal of this account cannot be subsumed in a single grand 
image, but is a more changeable character constantly adjusting to the immediate situation 
before him, and trying to exploit it to his own advantage. IFEs capacity for brilliant 
improvisation on the field of battle is legendary, his adaptations to changing 
" D. G. Chandler, The Milit4a Maxims of Napgleon, trans. G. C. D'Aguilar (NcNýý yoric, 1995), page 87. 
-ý ) D. G. Chandler, The Militg! y Maxims of Napoleon, page 55. 
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circumstances in Carthage are less well known. Hannibal, in his exercise of leadership 
whether in Italy or at home in Carthage, was above all a realist. 
Yet was he naive to think he could win the Roman allies to the Carthaginian 
cause? The ancient sources give us the impression that detailed knowledge of a region 
could only result from direct military knowledge gathered on campaign. If political, 
econon-fic,, and geographical details were largely gathered by the army, what about where 
the army had never been? How much political information was possible for Hannibal to 
obtain? Can we find here traditional elements to his understanding of the world? Again, 
by building on insights into Lee's military leadership, I will explore the causality of 
Hannibal's actions. And in doing so find the question, "What did Hannibal hope to 
accomplish in attacking Rome in the first place? " Then once the reason is identified, what 
method did he plan to use in order to accomplish it? Whatever his enemies may have 
said, it is clear he did not desire the destruction of Rome. Hannibal's plan worked on the 
psychological plane as well as the military and economic plane. This psychological 
element becomes especially evident in his attempts to break the Roman confederation, 
when, like Pyrrhus, Hannibal's initial strategy included the destruction of Roman 
hegemony in Italy. Flis goal included the substitution of a new Italian confederation under 
the nominal leadership of Captia, dominated by Carthage, thus rendering Rome powerless 
while Carthage again assumed leadership position in the Western Mediterranean. Here 
Theodore Ayrault Dodge gives us an interesting insight into Hannibal from the military 
perspective of a mid-nineteenth-century soldier, for as a Lieutenant Colonel M the Union 
Army he served in the New York volunteer infantry during the War Between the States. 
He saw action at Gettysburg, and was decorated for gaflantry and meritorious service. 
Along with his work Hannibal, he wrote several others which include: Ihe Campaign of 
Chancellorsville & The Great Captains: Me Art of War in the Campaigns of Alexander, 
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Hannibal, Caesar Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. It becomes 
not only important to examine the limitations on the information available to Hannibal 
but also to reconstruct in a positive way the traditions that formed his worldview. 
The next line of inquiry builds on the insights of Lee's psychological makeup to 
explore the causality of Hannibal's personality to develop on the framework of tradition. 
It is my view that there were elements in each man that are parallel - that their boyhood, 
parental attitude, cultural history, and education were so different, yet so similar. As their 
separate yet similar histories unfold, it is apparent that Lee becomes a lens through which 
we can better focus on and understand Hannibal. To understand one is to explore the 
other. This study discusses in chapter one Hannibal's boyhood as steeped in Greek culture 
and tradition far more so than either Roman or other ancient historians have 
acknowledged. To presume Hannibal as simply a 'Carthaginian', as most past historians 
have, represents a fundamental error in Hannibal's personal history and is one of the 
reasons for the shroud of mystery that surrounds him As we wiR shaff see the Greeks 
brought intellectual education to the Carthaginians; and, in fact, it was the Greek scholar 
Sosylos of Sparta who taught Hannibal Greek and accompanied him on his march to 
Italy. 53 Consequently, it is safe to say that the Carthaginians were well aware of the 
accomplishments of both Alexander and Pyrrhus as shown in chapter four. We must resist 
the temptation of thinking that there is one vital insight, which provides a conclusive 
answer. It is more helpful to identify the constants in Hannibal's character and actions. 
From the facts of Hannibal"s boyhood, other conclusions become justifiable. 
Reared in Spain, the largest Carthaginian power base in the Western Mediterranean in the 
3 rd century B. C., at the side of a general of great renown - his father - the character of the 
Carthaginian boy was shaped by these experiences for the rest of his life. He could stand 
53 Comehus Nepos, Hannibal, 13.3. 
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apart from his military mindset, but could not run far from it psychologically. As the son 
of a brilliant Carthaginian military leader, his concept of the hegemony of Carthage must 
0 
have been rooted in a strong sense of family honour. A professional soldier by training 
and mentality, Hannibal showed himself to be a man of extraordinary willpower, 
supremely confident in his own abilities, utterly convinced he was doing what must be 
done. Next when we consider the climate of the Carthaginian merchant society, it is 
reasonable to expect economics to be an important concern in the minds of the 
Carthaginian decision makers as well as Hannibal. If Rome and her people were 
destroyed the revenue Carthage would gain from trade with all of Italy would surely 
disappear. Although seemingly obvious, the answer has apparently escaped historians) 
notice. Or, more likely, the modem ideas of capitalism and economics allow us to see the 
war in a way, which was not possible in previous ages, even to the Romans themselves. 
My effort here is not to find the right answers but to ask the right questions. 
Framed properly, and in the spirit of fair-mindedness, the questions can illuminate, reveal, 
and deepen our knowledge of Hannibal. Once found, the questions are relatively easy to 
answer. This work is not intended to be a biography of Hannibal nor an attempt to trace 
his military and political career in narrative terms. While the study retains a basic 
chronological thread, its arrangement is deliberately more topical than narrative. The 
division of a subject into manageable chapters is never an easy task, and in the present 
work it is especially problematic. I will organize the chapters around distinct strategic 
concepts, which I will trace through the various phases of the conflict. 
Since Hannibal was 26 years old when he became general in 218 B. C., we must 
assume that his fundamental character had already formed and that his military career had 
advanced spectacularly enough to make his march across the Alps conceivable in the first 
place. Moreover since the siege of Saguntum marked the beginning of a military power 
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manifested in his personal charisma, it seems appropriate to seek its origins in the 
formation of Hannibal's own personality. Two questions are chiefly at issue here- How 
far had Hannibal's essential character been molded by the various influences of his father 
and his education? And how far had opportunities in Spain assisted his own military 
career? Taken together, the answers to these questions will help to clarify the beginnings 
of his early ambition. To fully understand how Hannibal came to his choices we must first 
look at the relations between Carthage and Rome, Carthage's situation before the war, 
and Hannibal"s family position in Carthaginian society. I begin with a discussion of the 
Carthaginian polity and other factors that influenced Hannibal's childhood and ultimately 
his decisions in later life, using the Lee family history to further examine how issues and 
background play an essential part in determining the character of a general. This chapter 
ultimately demonstrates that without the general - Hannibal - there would have been no 
second war with Rome. 
Since understanding the beliefs and values common to Carthaginian culture, 
particularly ones that shaped Carthaginian attitudes toward Rome, is one of the most 
essential tasks for explaining the causes and factors for the 2 nd Roman War, it is the first 
substantive topic taken up here and forms the second chapter of this work, The causes for 
I 
the 2"dRoman War are discussed from a Carthaginian viewpoint, including the loss of 
Sardinia versus the Ebro treaty as the culminating event. While responsibility for the war 
is arguable, I will assert by claiming a friendship with Saguntum, Rome had no legal 
basis for their ultimatum to Carthage. For new insight, the Confederate attack on Ft. 
Sumter will demonstrate how blame for a war can be manoeuvred to the victim of a 
wrong. Hannibal's strategy, including his plan for the dissolution of the Roman Affiance 
System by a blitzkrieg will be discussed, with particular emphasis on his perception of the 
Roman Alliance System, followed by a close examination of the political and logistical 
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reasons for the invasion of Italy by land. Most problematic is the question of Hannibal's 
grasp of grand strategy. FEs intentions in going to war - and in taking that war to Italy - is 
the heart of the chapter. 
The next chapter presents an overview of events as they unfold from Spain 
through the battle of Cannae. In depth knowledge of the battles at Trebia, Lake 
Trasimene, and Cannae provide the immediate settings upon which any valid analysis and 
interpretation of Hannibal's strategy must depend. Although much of the chapter is laid 
out in a chronological sequence, the narrative context is necessary to see the events as 
Hannibal experiences them and as a result alters his strategy accordingly. Discussing 
'Lee's Masterpiece' at Chancellorsville, proposes a framework for analyzing Hannibal's 
tactical genius at Cannae. To this end I will show how in spite of superior numbers, the 
Union advantage was greatly diminished by the intrinsic superiority of an offensive rather 
than defensive strategy. The logistics of supplying the Confederate army over long 
distances') and the cohesiveness of the borderstates were almost outweighed by the 
charisma and character of one man: Robert E. Lee -a strikingly familiar scenario when 
compared to the odds Hannibal faced at Cannae. As a result of this parity, strategy and 
command become a critical element in determining the course and outcome of the battle. 
These investigations provide the intimate knowledge of the divergence between the 
various elements of the Carthaginian army and Hannibal's remarkable use of each 
group's forte in battle. This is the story behind the campaigns and battles used to explain 
the tactical philosophy that would later form the comerstone of his methods as a high 
commander, expose both his inner motivations of strength and his weaknesses, and the 
character which brought him triumph. 
The manifold problems in writing about Hannibal's mastery of military strength 
begin with his failure to attack Rome after the battle of Cannae. Chapter four embarks on 
25 
the subsequent arguments held by scholars regarding the wisdom for Livy's speech as 
uttered by Maharbal, in his famous criticism of Hannibal. I will emphasize Hannibal's 
enormous strategic ability as I present the reasons why he chose not to attempt the 
impossible and to look at the rationale for changing from an offensive to defensive 
posture once it looked as though the Roman Confederation showed signs of stress. My 
intension is to clarify the turning point for Hannibal's change in strategy by exarnining 
the realization that he must defend his newly acquired allies. Sherman's famous 'March 
to the Sea' wiH be used to scrutinize the use of terror in war and the subsequent 
perceptions' that a given act may have on the participants. Also included in the chapter is 
an assessment regarding Hannibal's plans for a second front opening with the invasion of 
Sardinia, the increased activities in Spain, and a look at his negotiations with Philip V of 
Macedon. With Hannibal's brothers left in Spain against the Scipios, the promise of 
uprisings in Macedonia and Sardinia, and the possibility of Philip supplementing 
Hannibal's forces in Italy, I assert Hannibal must have been confident of a peace 
agreement on the horizon. And in conclusion of this chapter I will examine the 
Confederacy's defensive policy of protecting the Southern states' rights for self- 
determination to assess the non-aggressive policies of the Carthaginian senate in light of 
their defense of Spain rather than supplement Hannibal's campaign. 
The first section of chapter five puts forward a new interpretation of the evolution 
of the discovery of Hasdrubal's plans to meet Hannibal in context of Lee's lost Special 
Order 19 1; and, presents an overview of the debacle culminating with the Hasdrubal's 
death at the battle of Metaurus. Next is an examination of the Roman invasion of Africa, 
and the subsequent change by Hannibal to a third strategy of damage control upon his 
recall to Affica and defeat at Zama. The final section of the chapter presents the last years 
of his life and the decisions he implemented for the continued existence of his country. It 
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shows that Hannibal came to serve Carthage after Zama in a new political role as a pre- 
eminent member of Carthage's ruling body. The study ends with a brief epilogue that 
draws upon the political advantage for post-war Rome to eliminate Hannibal and 
downplay the memory of this great soldier. I propose that the nature of Carthaginian 
society during the Hannibalic period must be reconsidered, and suggest some featurýes of 
such a revised understanding. I have included five maps to reference sites mentioned 
and/or details concerning Hannibal's journeys, with each map placed in the proper section 
to provide the most assistance. 
This study focuses on a careful analysis of Hannibal"s command and strategy and 
will prove that Hannibal, in making his wise strategic choices, astutely balanced political 
and military considerations. Previous studies, and almost all previous explanations of 
Hannibal's actions have transferred conclusions from the Roman societal levels of 
analysis to Hannibal, the individual. Few interpreters have concerned themselves with the 
military aspect of a general's conduct, which is where this study diverges. Further by 
adopting the War Between the States as the standard for an appraisal to present a new 
look at the complexities of the war, I hypothesize that, contrary to common expectation, 
when Hannibal's actions and strategies are interchanged with those of General Robert E. 
Lee, a new clarity emerges. The political context, war aims, and the effects on public and 
official opinion give most campaigns, as well as battles, the bulk of their significance, yet 
a different outcome rarely would change the course of the war. 
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Chapter I 
To understand fully many of the points made in the succeeding chapters, it is 
necessary to illustrate the background against which Hannibal's ultimate decisions were 
made. Carthage was a vast polity controlling an empire larger than any other in the 
Mediterranean area excluding the Seleucid Empire. How this empire was governed and 
the conditions under which Hannibal experienced his childhood are the subjects of this 
chapter. Only those details necessary to understand the attitudes and patterns of 
Hannibal's thinking are dealt with in detail. This chapter will take us to the moment when 
Hannibal is acclaimed commander of the armies in Spain after the death of Hasdrubal in 
219 B. C. 
Who is in Command? 
By the third century B. C., ancient writers sought to interpret Carthage's 
institutions as an example of a mixed form of constitution, which philosophers and 
historians at the time., including Aristotle, had posited as the most stable system. Elements 
of three forms of rule: monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, were, it was claimed, all 
found in Carthage after the I't Roman War and the balance between them resulted in an 
uneasy determination of who controlled the political power of the state. Upon closer 
examination of the Carthaginian constitution, it will be easy to understand how and why 
the Barca family and the Carthaginian senate came to odds. 
Greek observers defined the elements of the Carthaginian constitution as follows: 
the monarchy, represented in the power of the king; the oligarchy, represented by the 
senate and/or One Hundred and Four; and the democracy, represented by the People's 
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Assembly. 54 Aristotle records many of the details of the constitution of Carthage in 
Politics and praises the system as "in many respects ... superior to all others. 
, 55He quotes 
and agrees with the general opinion that "Carthage also appears to have a good 
constitution, with many outstanding features as compared with those of other nations... 756 
Aristotle was not alone in his admiration of the Carthaginian constitution. Cicero writes, 
"Nor could Carthage have prospered so greatly for about six hundred years without good 
counsel and strict training. -ý-)57 Aristotle gives excellent reasons for this superiority, stating, 
64 
and a proof that its constitution is well regulated is that the populace willingly remain 
faithful to the constitutional systern, and that neither civil strife has arisen in any degree 
worth mentioning, nor yet a tyrant. "58 
54 For other descriptions of the Carthaginian constitution and government see N. Bagnall, The Punic Wars. 
pages 12-14; especially S. Lancet, Carthage: A Histoly, trans. A. Nevill. (Oxford, 1995), pages 110-120 & 
B. H. Warmington, Carthage, Revised Edition (London, 1969), pages 138-144. For a comparison between 
the constitutions of Carthage and Rome, see D. E. Hahm, "Kings and Constitutions: Heflenistic Theories", 
The Cambridge Histoly of Greek and Roman Political Thoughl (Cambridge, 2000), pages 457476. 
55Aristode, Politics, Vol. =, trans, H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass, 1932), 2.8.1. 
56 Aristotle, Politics, 2.8.1. 
Tlokup-ucyOoct (5c 6oicouat icou KoLP7,716OVtOt KOLk(j)q K(Xt 7tOkk<X 7MPtTT(J)q 7[pOq TOD; GLkkOUq,... " 
57 Cicero, De Re Publ Book 1, Frag. 3. "Nec tantum Karthago habuisset opum sescentos fere annos sine 
consihis et disciphna. " 
58 Aristotle, Politics, 2.8.1. 
" (T'TJPLEtOV 86 7EOktTCtOCq (TUVTCTOLY49VIjq TO TOV 6TI40V elcolocytov 6taýwvp-tv ev TI, Tocýct Tljý noklma;, 
Mt RTITF- CYTOLCTINI 0 Tt KOCI (XXtOV F-I=tV ycyCVq(; Oat WITC Tupccvvov. "; A. J. Toynbee also mentions the 
effectiveness of the Carthaginian constitution in Hannibal's Legaa: The Hannibalic- War's Effects on 
Roman Life, Vol. I (London, 1965), page 38 as does R-C. C. Law, "North Africa in the Period of 
Phoenician and Greek Colonization, c. 800 to 323 B. C. ", The Cambridge Historv of Africa: c. 500 B. C. - 
A. D. 1050, Vol. 2 (Cainbridgc, 1978), page 122. 
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Aristotle, writing in the fourth century B. C., speaks of Carthage having "kings, , 
59 
and this name as given to the chief magistrate of the city often occurs in history-60 From 
the sixth to the fifth century B. C., Mago and his descendents established themselves as 
rulers of Carthage through the monopolization of military appointments. About a century 
after Himera in 396, the Magonid kings were removed from power and Carthage became 
a constitutional republic. In the same year the aristocracy formed a tribunal of One 
Hundred and Four to rule political life and supervise the generals, subjecting the public to 
the harsh laws of the austere and disciplined rich . 
6' Hanno, who died at Mmera, and 
Hamilcol, son of Gisgo were described in Greek writings by the word BaatA, 6uý- or king. 
Even Hanno, who commanded the exploration and colonization expedition described by 
Pliny the Elder is entitled "king. -)-)62 However, they were not like the kings of the East-, 
they were expressly compared to the kings of Sparta, 
As at Sparta, Carthaginian kings presided over the senate and controlled civil 
administration as well as functioning in a judicial role, though, unlike Sparta they were 
elected, "... Carthaginian kings are not confined to the same family ... the Elders [kings] 
,, 63 are to be chosen from these rather than by age... Although these "kings" were elected 
59 Aristotle, Politics, 2.8.2. VuaOxtc". 
60 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita., Vol. VIII, trans. F. G. Moore, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), 
28.37.2. "sufetes ... qui summus 
Poenis est niagistratus" Trans. "--- sufetes - the highest magistrates among 
the Poeni (Carthaginians)... " 
6' G. C. & C. Picard, The Life and Death of Carthage: A Surv9Y Of Punic Histojy and Culture from its Birth 
to Final Trag (London, 1968), page 123. 
62 Aristotle, Politics 2.8.8. 
63AJriStotle. Politics. 2.8.2. 
KOU BO. Ttov 66 TODq 
POCG0Xtq 471TE KOLTOC TO OLUTO CtVOLI ygVoq,... F-K Tot)T(J)V ()ctpF-Toj)q Pax1ov 11 
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for a one-year term and had roughly comparable powers to the consuls of Rome during 
the Republic, the Carthaginian kings were required to report to and obtain the blessing of 
the Council of Elders and Assembly of the People. As kings they did have broad powers 
in war, religion and government; whereas the Roman Consuls were elected for a one-year 
term with not only complete control of administration, including the appointment of 
military tribunes, they also commanded legions when the army took to the field. An 
example of this system can be seen when Hannibal is elected as suffete for the year 196 
B. C. The Carthaginian word suffete was equivalent to the Hebrew word shophet, 
translated in the Old Testament as "judges. , 64 Their role in Carthage, as in pre- 
monarchical Israel, was probably broader than purely judicial, but differed from Rome in 
C f. having no military function. Walbank proclaims that usually, ... one seems to 
have 
-)-)65 presided over sittings of the council. 
Next in power to the suffetes were the generals,, also elected by the people of 
Carthage. Members of the senate were most likely the only people eligible to "run" for 
office. A suffete did not command an army or a fleet unless he was specificaRy appointed 
to the post. The Carthaginians - similar to the Athenian model - elected generals to 
special theatres of conflict and/or to a specific goal without territorial restrictions. With 
the problems associated with communication in ancient times the Carthaginian method of 
command allowed these generals to make major decisions in the field. Though at times 
KUO Tlktl(t(XV-" Unfortunately the sentence immediately preceding this one has been lost. It is presumed 
that the, "these" refers to the Council of One Hundred and Four. 
64 IF Lazenby. The First Punic War. A MW4ýj Histo (London, 1996), page 20. 
65 F. W. Walbank,. A Historical Conunentgy on Polybius Vol. 1. page 361. It is possible that a suffete 
presided over either the Council or the Committee, or perhaps both. This could explain why therevvere two 
suffetes. One to preside over each "house. " 
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this freedom of command resulted in a negative outcome for the leader if the results 
proved unsuccessful or unsatisfactory. At times a general would be made suffete while he 
was absent on service. After returning from a campaign, a general had to account for his 
actions to the Council of One Hundred and Four at a court hearing. If for some reason the 
Council found him incompetent, he was crucified. Although subject to crucifixion the 
commanders of these mercenary armies proved devoted to Carthage, often serving the 
state for many years. The popularity among the people of Hamilcar Barca and his son 
Hannibal kept both fi7om experiencing the fate of crucifixion. 
Below these officer5 of state came a legislative body, we may call the senate. 66 In 
this senate were two bodies- the smaller body consisted of the most powerful thirty 
67 
members out of the larger body, as a sort of executive committee. The senate was called 
into existence to meet the danger of a monarchy, which sooner or later overtook most of 
the republics of the ancient world. Affluent families filled the 300-member senate, 
exercising control over all public affairs, legislating, and deciding on peace and war. 
Because the senators held office for life, the consistency of the body and its performance 
created a close-knit establishment bound by class interests and social prominence. There 
were no regular changes of government and no passing of power. 68 
66 Polybius, The Histories,, Vol. 1, trans. W. R. Paton, Loeb Classical Library (Cainbridge, Mass., 1922), 
1.21.6. Polybius also uses the word auvr, 8p-Lov at 3.8.4, instead of yspouaux. He does not seem to 
distinguish between the two and both words are usually translated as meaning "senate". See also F. W. 
Walbank, A Historical Commentag on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 76. 
67 it should be mentioned that to the Carthaginians "power' was derived from personal authority due to 
previous offices held, a strong character, and most importantly, wealth. T. A. Dodge, Hannibal (Boston, 
1891) page 
68 Aristotle, Politics. 2.8.1. 
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Several times Livy mentions "factions" at Carthage in connection with the 
Carthaginian senate or its members. Obvious examples of these divisions are shown when 
he alleges the Carthaginians were at odds on the question of going to war (the 2 nd Roman 
War) in the first place, 69 and later quotes that Hanno advocated Hannibal's surrender as 
the Roman embassy demanded. 70 Later Carthaginian envoys sent to Rome claimed that 
the senate and the people of Carthage had never broken their treaty with Rome and that 
71 Hannibal had been acting of his own accord. 
The senate also nominated a panel of inquiry - the court of one hundred and four 
judges "Magistry [Council] of One Hundred and Four. -)-)72 They were probably broken up 
into small groups with jurisdiction over certain types of crime and one of the suffetes 
presiding over the Council. No mention is made of the relationship between the Council 
and the suffetes. This is very unusual since the suffetes were judges as well. It is 
reasonable to assume that the suffetes were the final court of appeal for court cases. Until 
Hamilcar Barca, the Council also remained an important check on the power of the 
militwy. 
The "Boards of Five"73 or Pentarchies were most likely committees having charge 
of various important parts of govermnent, such as finance, trade, and military matters. We 
do know that the Pentarchies elected the members of the Council; therefore, it seems 
logical that the Pentarchies were assigned to sin-iilar areas as the small groups of the 
69 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.9.4. 
70 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.10.4. 
Livy, Ad Urbe CondiM 30.22.1 & 30.42.11. 
72 "stotle, Polifics. 2.8.2. -TfflV GKUTOV KOtt TETTOCPW\"' 
73 Aristotle, Politic , 
2.8.4. ", raq 7mvcapXtaý Kuptu; - 
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Council', although we are not clear as to whether they were divisions of the Council or of 
the senate. 
74 
Although little is known about the general assembly of the people, Aristotle states, 
CC when the kings introduce business in the assembly, they do not merely let the people 
sit and listen to the decisions that have been taken by their rulers, but the people have the 
sovereign decision and anybody who Wishes may speak against the proposals 
. ). )75 introduced... Aristotle goes on to say that the people also had the right of approving or 
disapproving appointments to OffiCeS. 76 The Assembly's power was limited to approving 
or rejecting measures brought before it - all such measures first being considered in the 
senate. 
"The reference of some matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests 
with the kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree unanimously, but 
failing that, these matters also lie with the people; and when the kings introduce 
business III the assembly, they do not merely let the people sit and listen to the 
decisions that have been taken by their rulers, but the people have the sovereign 
decision and anybody who wishes may speak against the proposals introduced, a 
right that does not exist under the other [Crete and Sparta] constitutions. "' 
74 It is worth mentioning that our only source for the Boards of Five is in Aristotle, Politics, 2,8.4. 
75 Aristotle, Politics 2.8.3. 
"6' 0CV MCTýCPOMV OUTOt, OIL) 6tCCK01L)(T(Xt ýIOVOV (X7EO8t6O0LCTt TO) 6TJýjo TOC 80ý()tVTOC Totq (XPXOI)CYtV, 
OCkkOC KUPtOt Kf)tVCIV UM, KOU TO POUkOýIEVO TOtq M(TýCPOýICVOtq OCV-C6t7E61V 6ý6(YTJV ...... 
Aristotle 
claims the people could speak out against the proposals; it is Presumed they could speak in its defense as 
well. Almost certainly, as in nearly all other ancient constitutions which had an assembly of the people, the 
people could not actually amend the proposal. 
-6 Aristotle, Politics, 2.8.5. 
77 Aristodc, Politics, 2.8.3. 
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The people were also lobbied to bolster support for risky adventures such as 
Hamilcar's plans for Spain, and Hannibal's attack on Saguntum. The identity of the 
people aflowed to attend these assemblies is not known. Since the Carthaginians did not 
have a property qualification for entering politics, it seems likely that wealth was a 
factor, 78 and all those who were in the service of the Carthaginian "state" or had any land 
within the city of Carthage's surrounding area, or had any material wealth, were eligible 
to attend and speak in these assemblies. While conditional on property ownership, 
membership of the popular assembly represented modest wealth compared with the riches 
of the senate. 
These were the actual estates of the realm of Carthage: the suffetes, the senate 
with the Committee and the Council of One Hundred and Four, the Assembly of the 
People, and the Pentarchies. It seems likely that in a state where wealth was so important, 
fan-filies could be considered nobility or the upper class, as they would have stayed in 
various offices and in the senate as long as the family continued to have considerable 
wealth. There was no bar of birth, which prevented one from becoming a member of this 
nobility; ability and wealth would pass anyone into it. 79 Aristotle noted that the 
Carthaginian oligarchy allowed the common people a liberal share of trade profits-, 
coupled with the fact that the people were spared the social upheavals of military service, 
they were much happier with the status quo. 
ý4 TOU ýt6V YOLP TO ý16V 7EpOGOCy6tV TO 6C ýLTJ 7[POCTGLYF-tv 7tpOqTOv YTJýLov Ot P()CcTtý, F-tq l(t)ptot ýL6TOt TO)NI 
ygpov, Ccov otv oýtoyvü)ýLOVÜ)Ct ltotvTgg, Gt 89 ktT1, KM TOUTWV 0 811kLOý- ot 8' (XV F-tCyýF-pW(ytV Ot)Tot, ok) 
61OLKOUaOLI ýLOVOV OL7EO45t6OOLCTt TO 6TIpM T(X &)ýOLVTOL TOt; ()LPXOUCTtV, ()LXX(X KUPIOt KPIVCIV CUR, KOLt 
'C(J) poukowwo) Totq cta4$r-POýlCvOtq oLvTEt7mtv Cýcarjv, 07mp EV ToLtq CTP-PUlq 7EOkt-cs , tOLtq OUK SOTIV. 
" 
78 Aristotle. Politics, 2.8.5-7. 
79A, riStotle. Politics, 4.5.11. 
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Aristotle further indicates the offices of state were unpaid. This does not imply 
that they were not lucrative. Instead offices of state brought patronage and opportunities 
for making money. He states that the highest offices - and he names those of King and 
General - were put up for sale. Aristotle sees this as a great flaw in the constitution, "--- it 
is a bad thing that the greatest offices of state, the kingship and generalship should be for 
sale. For this law makes wealth more honoured than worth, and renders the whole state 
avancious... "80 As with any state based on wealth, Carthage inevitably decayed causing 
domination to fall to a few wealthy citizens. " It took a rare combination of the economic 
distress following the I" Roman War and the Mercenary Revolt, along with this 
corruption to alter the balance of power represented in the constitution. 
A democratic revolution occurred in Carthage at the outcome of the I't Roman 
War, and the exact date of 237 B. C. has been put forward. 82 Inspired by a few lines by 
Polybius from the viewpoint of Scipio Aemilianus of the development of political life in 
Carthage after Aristotle's study 
"The constitution of Carthage seems to me to have been originally well contrived 
as regards its most distinctive points. For there were kings, and the house of 
Elders was an anstocratical force, and the people were supreme in matters proper 
to them, the entire frarne of the state much resembhng that of Rome and Sparta. 
But at the time when they entered on the Hannibalic War, the Carthagmian 
8" Aristotle, Politics, 2.8.6. 
"... ýoa)ý, Ovro T(xq ýLýMOL; (, )VtlrcL; Ctvcct -Cow OLPX(JL)V, -cqv -cs PoLut)'EtOLV lCou TTIV a-Cpwc'q-Y-LoL-, '. 
F-VUýLOV YOLf) 0 VOýWq OUTOq ROWI TOV JEý, OI)TOV 400IXOV "ý (XPETTIq KOU TIJV 7EO/ktV Ok'qV ýtkoZp'q 
4(XTOV- 
" Aristotle, Politics, 2.8.5-7. 
82 G. C. and C. Picani Carthage: A Surygy of Punic Mstm and Culture from its Birth to the Final Tragedv, 
trans. D. Collon (London. 1968), pages 208-2 10. 
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constitution bad degenerat4 and that of Rome was better. For as every body or 
state or action has its natural perods first of growth, then of pnme, and finally of 
decay, and as everything In them is at its best when they are in their prime, it was 
for this reason that the difference between the two states manifested itself at this 
time. For by as much as the power and prospenty of Carthage had been earlier 
than that of Rome, by so much had Carthage already begun to decline; while 
Rome was exactly at her prime, as far at least as her system of goverrunent was 
concerned. Consequently the multitude at Carthage had already acquired the chief 
voice In deliberations; while at Rome the senate still retained this; and hence, as 
in one case the masses deliberated and in the other the most eminent men, the 
Roman decisions on public affairs were superior, so that although they met with 
complete disaster, they were finally by the wisdom of their counsels victorious 
over the Carthaginians ill the war. -)-)93 
83 Polybius, The Ffistories, Vol. 111, trans. W. R- Paton, Loeb Classical Library (Cwnbridge, Mass., 1923), 
6.51 "To 6s K(xp)CT18ovto)v 7roktTF-t)parO WV OCVSKaOCV ýWt (30KEt MkO)ý KOCTa 76 TUý OXOO'XEpgtq 
610CýOpCtq CTIDVF-CTTOC(TOal. KOU YOCP PCCCTO. Ctý 71(370CV 7E(Xp' OCUTOtý, K(XI TO Ygf)OVTtOV Etyg T71V OCf)tCTTOKf)OC 
TtK71V SýOUMOCV, KCCt TO lEkTIOOq TIV Kl-)PtOV TOV K(XOTIKOVTO)V (XDT(j)- K(XOOAOU 5C TTIV TOW Ok(j)V 
apiloyljv F-txF- 7rocPanx-natav TTI 'PO)4(xt(j)v Kou AaK68aýIOVWV. KOCTOL 7C ýITJV TOUý KOUPOUý TOUTOUýý 
KOLO' ouq stq Tov'AvvtotaKov P-vFPatvp, noýzýtov, Xstpov Tjv To KapX gjývtow, aw-1vov 5c ro 
TOýLOCIOV. 67CU671 7OLf) 7EOLVTO; K(It CTWPLUTOý KOU ROXUUOCý MI 7Ef)49(f)q 6CYTt Ttý OLIDý11CYtq KOLTOL 
ýýICOL 66 TOLUTTIV OM471, KOLIEFMOL OICFlq, KPOLTIOTOL & OCUTOW C(TTI 7E(XVT(X TOL KOLTOL TTIV CCKýLTJV, 
71OLPOL TOUTO Kou TOTF- 6wýspsv T(I nOý, tTEORUTOL- KOLO' OCTOV 7ap il KapZ'n6ovtcov 7tpoTFpov 
Ical 7EPOTepov F-k)Tuxp-t "q IN41a'L(I)V, Y-OLTOLTOGOOTOVTi ýtEv KoLpXTIýv -q6-9 roTp 
ROLPIJ'KýLCCýCV, IQ 86 TOýL-q ýLOOtGTUTOT' F-tXF- TIJV OLKýLIJV KOLT(X 7S TTIV T-qq 7ro), jTEtoLqgjL)(yr()CG, V. &0 K(Xt 
Tllv IEXE'LICT'MV 61-M)Wtv F-V Totq &OLPouklotq IEOLPOL ýLcv KoLpX, 96oviojý () 6%Loq t,, STI 7E(xp(x 
6p_ 'P(j)ýLat0tý (XKýLT1V StXg'%' 11 (YUYKX7jTOý- (DOEV 7[(X()' Otq ýWV TOW 7EOkXOV P0U? XUOWV(j)V, 7t(Xp' Olq 6F. 
()Lpt(FT(J)V, KOLTtCFXI)F- TOE 'P(JL)P)Ut(J)V &OLPOIAM XGPI TOLq KOtVOtq RPO(oý, 61': 
I. Tj KOU 7tT(Xt(TOLVT6q TOIC: 
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Convened by the suffeles, from the end of the fourth century, the Assembly of the 
People numbered among its responsibilities the election of generals. At least from the 
time of the I" Roman War, Polybjus stresses the preponderance of the Assembly of the 
People's power and he considered it the result of a warping or debasement of the balance 
of power extolled by Aristotle slightly over a century earlier. Polybius further states at the 
time of the 2 nd Roman War Carthage was much more democratic than Rome and 
unhesitatingly sees this political situation as one of the causes of Carthaginian defeat. 84 
The efforts by Hamilcar to bring an end to the social crisis created by the Mercenary War 
enabled him to put an end to the omnipotence of the oligarchy. It was however the 
People's Assembly, directed by the Barcas, who fought to safeguard the independence of 
Carthage, whereas the oligarchs on several occasions set an example of compromise or of 
an equally unworthy consideration. 
We know that in 221 B. C. the Assembly of the People ratified the choice of 
Hannibal to command the Army of Spain. Opposition between the oligarchy who 
opposed the Barcid policies and the Assembly of the People were recurrent throughout 
both Hamilcar's and Hannibal's commands. Although the Barca generals were given 
more independence to develop their own ideas, conflicting priorities between Hannibal 
and the senate during the 2dRoman War may have been a crippling factor in the 
Carthaginian w, ar effort. 
okolý Tffl ßol-)ýZIL)so-OotiL Kotý, 0)g Teloý 7'0ý£ffl "v KotPX118c)vicov. " & F. W. Walbank, 
A Ihstorical CommepIpjy pn Pol bius Vol. 1, pages 735-736. 
84 polybius, The Histories, 1.82.12 & Diodorus Siculus, The LibEM of ljigMý 25.8. F. W. Walbank, A 
Historical Commept4a on Pol3tius Vol. 1, page 146 ment'Ons that this maY not be Hannibal Barca, but 
another Hannibal. 
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There are historical indications of growing power within the Assembly of the 
People, even stronger some years later at the beginning of the second century, after the 
unhappy outcome for Carthage of the 2 nd Roman War. Livy tells how Hannibal, on taking 
charge as suffete in 196 B. C., used the occasion of a disagreement he had with a 
magistrate whom Livy describes as quaestor to settle scores with the powerful ordo 
iudicum [order of judges]. This quaestor [apparently a magistrate entrusted with financial 
duties] who belonged to the faction opposed to Hannibal and was almost certain of 
impunity since on leaving office he was bound to enter the order of judges, a form of 
irremovable magistrates. For' that reason he ignored the suffete's summons. Even so 
Hannibal had him brought by an attendant before the Assembly of the People and took 
advantage of that Assembly 11 s support to put through a law determining that in future the 
judges would be elected each year, and that no one could be a judge for two consecutive 
years. 85 Hannibal, like Caesar, appealed to the common man, which allowed him to 
bypass the senate by petitioning directly to the Assembly of the People. 
Av 
As I shall discuss in detail in the final chapter of this study, generals often made 
strategic decisions without the knowledge or approval of the Carthaginian home 
goverment. Livy's account of a conference between Hasdrubal and his fellow-generals, 
at which time they decide the future disposition and command of the Carthaginian armies 
is a precise example of the policy decisions and control allowed generals in the field. 86 On 
the other hand we might consider at this point actions the senate instigated, such as the 
recall to Affica of Mago and Hannibal in 203.87 Although our sources are limited, which 
makes it difficult to generalize about the division of control between the generals in the 
85Livy. Ab Urbe Condita, Vol. IX, trans. E. Sage, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 33.46. 
86 Livyý Ab Urbe Condita, 27.20.3-8. 
87Lt%ýNý. Ab Urbe Condita 30. lg. 
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field and the Carthaginian senate, the evidence suggests that depending on the 
circumstances the duties were divided. But, who decided the vital issue of 
reinforcements? Who ultimately made these decisions? Though a Carthaginian general in 
the field had a great deal of leeway in his command decisions, the senate held the key to 
conscripts or citizen soldiers from Carthage or from her allies in Spain or Affica. No 
troops could be conscripted without the Carthaginian senate's approval. The mercenary 
forces recruited from the Gauls and Italian city-states were left to the commanding 
general's option. 
What Brought Carthage and Rome Into Conflict? 
A X1. 
After centuries of seemingly peaceful coexistence what were the factors that led to 
the break in the relationship between Rome and Carthage? First we need to examine 
development in the Mediterranean region. 
When Mycenaean society broke up around I 100 B. C., the commercial routes 
linking mainland Greece with the rest of the Mediterranean were severed. From 750 to 
550 B. C. the Greeks began colonizing the shore regions of the Mediterranean and Black 
seas , including sites 
in southern Italy, Sicily, and the southern coast of France. The 
colonies had access to unrestricted native markets and were able to exchange basic goods 
for mainland-fini shed products of olive oil and wine. By 300 B. C. Greek manufactured 
goods were freely circulating to North Affica, Spain, the Rhone valley, the Balkans, and 
as far east as India. 
For centuries Carthaginian merchantmen sailed the eastern Mediterranean, trading 
corn from the Afhca and metals from Spain. Carthage dealt in resin from Lipara, sulphur 
from Acrages, wax, honey, and slaves from Corsica, cattle from the Balearic Islands, 
along with dyes, perfumes, and dates from the many city-states induced to Carthaginian 
commerce. As the leading traders of the day, they served clients as diverse as their 
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commodities. Thus, the scope and complexity of the Carthaginian merchant class 
mounted as rich merchants bought farms with their profits while Greek artisans lived and 
worked in their city. 88 The Carthaginians had colonies in North Africa, Spain, and 
western Sicily with interests extending as far north as Britain and the Baltic to the Canary 
Islands, the Cameroons, as well as the Azores. In the Mediterranean, Sicily, the Maltese 
islands, and the Lipari Islands were Carthaginian key maritime ports. Carthage had grown 
into one of the most thriving cities in the Mediterranean, controlling western trade while 
the Greek states controlled the east. During this period Carthage maintained lucrative 
trade agreements with Sardinia, Corsica, and the Balearic" while Rome steadily 
consolidated its gains on the mainland. 
In Rome's early years the Greek states and Carthage were the two great powers 
and neither had paid a great deal of attention to the Romans. However Carthage, 
considering the establishment of the Roman republic a good northern buffer to Greek 
aspirations in the west just as the Etruscans before them, signed a treaty with Rome as 
early as the sixth century B. C. to regulate their respective spheres of interest. Carthage 
enjoyed good relations with the Etruscans in their day, and had no reason to feel they 
could not find similar good relations with Rome. The treaty limited Rome's ability to 
trade in Africa and Sardinia to only under the supervision of Carthaginian authorities; 
Rome further agreed not to sail west of Carthage. Carthage pledged to forego any colonial 
pursuit within the Latin towns of Italy. 90 
Carthage imposed further trade restrictions in a later treaty, signed in the fourth 
century B. C., which excluded Roman merchants from all of North Africa as well as 
A. Llovd, Destroy Carthage!: The Death Throes of an Ancient Culture (London, 1977), pages 96-97. 
89 E. Bradford, Hannibal. page 4. 
90 J. F. Lazenby, The First Punic War, pages 31-32. 
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Sardinia and Southern Spain. 9' As Rome continued to incorporate most of Campania into 
the Italian confederacy, it plunged into bitter conflict with the Samnites; and, while Rome 
remained preoccupied securing these territories, Carthage continued to advance its 
mercantile dominance. By 306 B. C. Carthage and Rome had signed a third agreement 
further consolidating Carthage's continuing trade monopolies to include Sicily. The 
annexation of Sicily, an obligatory staging area for coastal shipping, made the route 
extremely important to control of trade in Mediterranean. Further, Carthage was 
especially interested in reminding the Romans of their previous treaties in fight of their 
recent victones over the Samnites. 
92 
The invasion of Italy by Pyrrhus in the third century B. C. drew Rome and 
Carthage closer together in a common cause. Both had reasons for this, but most 
importantly, the Romans wanted help. But what did Carthage have to gain by such an 
alliance? The treaty made in 279/8, specifically, denotes, "... the Carthaginians are to 
provide the ships for transport and hostilities, but each country shall provide the pay for 
its own men. , 93 The treaty goes on to say that, "The Carthaginians, if necessary, shall 
come to help the Romans by sea too, but no one shall compel the crew to land against 
their Will. -)-)94 The Carthaginians willingly made such a treaty only if they felt threatened. 
91 H. H. Scullard, "'Carthage and Rome", Cambridge Ancient ffigM, 2dEd., Vol. VII, Part 2 (Cambridge, 
1989), pages 527-528. See F. W. Walbank, A Historical CpMpyýn ý on Po! ybius, Vol. 1, page 346 for a 
detailed listing of the treaty tenins. 
92 Livy mentions that an embassy was sent bearing the gift of a twenty-five pound gold crown. Livy, Ab 
, Vol. 
111, trans. B. O. Foster, Urbe Copdita Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1924). 7.38.2. 
93 polybiUS, The _Histories, 
3.25.4. 
Tot 7r, -5 ^wtoc nccpcXF. -r(t)cr(xv KccpXT*Vl()l KoCt Ctq TTIV 060V KOCI gtý T71V F-ý050V, TOC 5C OYOMOC TOtý 
mmov mcoa6pot. ` & F. W. Walbank, A Histor'cal Commelltaa On P01312ius, Vol. 1, page 351. 
94polybius. The Histories, 3.25.5. 
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The most logical place the Carthaginians felt a threat was in Sicily. Unfortunately, there is 
a major discrepancy in the treaty. Although dismissed by Polybius, the treaty includes a 
Sicily. 95 clause forbidding Carthage from setting foot in Italy and the Romans fTom i 
Polybius dismisses this clause on the grounds that Philinus, one of his primary sources for 
his history, was pro-Carthaginian and could not be trusted. Polybius apparently had no 
recourse other than to use Philinus,, although he did so cautiously as he does with Fabius 
Pictor. 96 
In 278 B. C., upon receiving a request from Syracuse to fight against the 
Carthaginians in Sicily, Pyrrhus proceeded to reduce Carthaginian control over the area to 
the city of Lilybaeum. 97 Faced with the indifference of the Greek Siciliots toward his 
larger plans against Carthage, and having battled to a stalemate at Beneventum, in 275 
Pyrrhus abandoned Sicily and Italy. 98 After he returned to Epirus, he is reputed to have 
said as a parting comment, "My ftiends, what a wrestling ground for Carthaginians and 
Romans we are leaving behind us! "99 Pyrrhus' invasion had steeped Italy in grief for the 
"'Kocpy, T16ovtot 6p- Koct KaTot OocX. (xTTOCV 'P(J)P-atOtq POIJOUTOCTOW, OW XpStOt TI. TOL 66 7EkTjPOýtCCTCC 
ýýius ýtlj&lq OLVOLYKOLýCTG) F. KP(XtVF-IV OMoi)cTtoq. "' & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Cpmmentya on Pol- 
Vol. 1, page 349, where he says that Poly-bius "makes it (the treaty) a renewal of the older treaties with the 
addition of certain new clauses specifically concerned with Pyrrhus. " 
95 Polybius, The Histories 3.26.5-7 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommenIM on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 
355 
96 Polybius, The Histories. 1.15.12 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical ConimepLa! y on Pobj? ius, Vol. 1, page 
67 
97 J. F. Lazenby. The First Punic War, page 34. 
98Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The StruggLe for Power in the Mediterranean (1_, Ondon, 1969), page 78. 
11 Plutarch, Parallel Lives: Pyrrhus, Vol. M trans. B. Perrin, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.. 
1920), 23.6. "Ototv ot7toýzt7i(iýtcv, ö) ýtXot, Kotp-Xilöoviotý Kocl po)ýkoLtolý 
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men killed in battle and Roman bitterness was not diminished by the knowledge that 
Carthage, for all her financial investment, risked the lives of relatively few of her own 
men. And from the Carthaginian point of view, Rome did not render any assistance 
against Pyrrhus in Sicily. ýt> 
D- 
Rome emerged from the war with new status and confidence. The whole of Italy 
from the Arno, and the Rubicon to the Gulf of Tarentum and the Straits of Messina now 
came under Roman control. From this point on Rome became a major power. 100 For a 
state without a sea force the logical extension of the Roman republic was the stepping- 
stone of Sicily - only five kilometers from the mainland of Italylo' - despite the fact that 
the appeal for Rome to venture an interest in the island was perilously at odds with 
Carthage"s long held strategic view of Sicily. The Carthaginians were always prepared to 
reach an accommodation so long as they perceived no threat, but Rome was quickly 
becoming a military and expansionist power. In previous centuries, Rome had seen the 
Carthaginians back down during continued struggles with the Greeks provided their vital 
concerns were not endangered. Although the Carthaginians had no territorial designs in 
Italy, they wished to be left in peace to conduct their trading, it is not surprising that in 
264 B. C. Carthage began the first of three confrontations with Rome in a struggle over 
Sicily and for the mastery of the Western Mediterranean. 
The actual flashpoint for Carthage occurred during an exceptionally absurd 
episode in Sicilian politics- the occupation of Messina by a group of Italian mercenaries. 
Several years earlier a group of Campanian mercenaries, the Mamertines or "men of 
Mars, " had set themselves up in Sicily, hiring out to first one ambitious warlord and then 
another. During this time they found themselves at war with IIiero, the latest "king7 of 
100 Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The Struggle for Power in the Mediteýeajp. page 78. 
101 Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The Struggle for Power in the Mediterraneall. page 82. 
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Syracuse. 102 Seeking assistance against Syracuse, the Mamertines sought help fi7om a 
power outside of Sicily. At that time, "... a Carthaginian fleet happened to be at the Lipari 
Islands, and ... its commander, Hannibal, -approached 
Hiero, ... somehow to 
forestall 
action on his part, 1-) 103 against the Mamertines. "Hiero took no further action and Hannibal 
was then able to persuade the Mamertines to accept a Carthaginian gamson,, whereupon 
Fliero withdrew. " 104 Thus far, nothing seemed out of the ordinary because Carthage 
always considered Sicily within its sphere of influence. However, --shortly afterwards 
the Mamer-tines also appealed to Rome. "'05 Why the Mamertines appealed to both 
Carthage and Rome is full of speculation. Possibly in their "... knowing that Carthage and 
Rome recently had been in alliance against Pyrrhus, they could see no harm in 
approaching both, " and both might see Syracuse as another mutual enemy. 106 
Unfortunately, this was wishful thinIdng and "... the potential for a clash between the two 
powers was now clearly there. " 
107 
Polybius states that the Romans debated this for some time, and even though the 
Senate voted against helping the Mamertines,, 
"... they yet saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, 
but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the 
islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian Seas. They were therefore in great 
102 Polybius, The Ifistories, 1.8.3; F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commeqtary on Polybius Vol. 1, pa-ges, 54- 
55 & Livy, Ab Urbe Condita Vol. XIV, trans. A. C. Schesinger, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1967), Summary of Book XVI. 
103 J. F. Lazenby, The First Punic War, page 36. 
104 IF Lazenby, The First Punic War, pages 36-37. 
105 IF Lazenby, The First Punic page 37. 
106 IF Lazenky, The First Punic War, page -37. 
107 U. Lazenby. The Firg Punic War page 37. 
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apprehension lest, if they also became masters of SICilY, they would be more 
troublesome and dangerous neighbours, hemming them in on all sides and 
threatening every part of Italy. "' 
This perceived threat, and the thought of plunder, won over the people of Rome 
and the measure passed. 109 Rome dispatched an army to Sicily under the command of 
Consul Appius Claudius Caudex in blatant violation of their treaty with Carthage. ' 10 The 
Carthaginian commander was persuaded to withdraw in favour of the Roman guard, 
which set the scene for further escalation. The Roman Senate empowered Appius 
Claudius "... to make war on both I-Eero and the Carthaginians if necessary... ""' If they 
attempted peace negotiations, the negotiations failed and, "... he immediately proceeded 
108 Polybius, The ffistoriesl I- 10 -5 -6. 
11 OIL) 4TIV ()LyvoouvTcq ye Tou'row Ou6Fv, OswpouvTcý 6c Toloq KocpXT16ovtox)q ou ýLOVOV TOC K(XT0C TTJV 
Atpurjv, 00AOC K(Xt TTjq 'IpTlpt(Xq MnKOOC ýXplj IC67EOt'rjW-VOUq, Ut 66 TOW VIJCYO)V WICUROV EYKPOCT&tq 
WMPXOVTOCý TCOV icocToc To I: ap6ovtov Kat TupplIVIKOV X6, OC70q, T17O)Vt(OV, F-I FAKCktOCý F-Tt 
lcoptsucyatcv, ýLq klav Papp-1; rcca ýOPEPOI 76UEOVF-q OCUTOIq IL)7tCLpXOtP-V, Kl-)Kk(j) CTýOL; 7EFPtSXOVTF-q ICOU 
RUM Totý T%, ITOLXtOL; ýtcp6alv FNUKUýLcvot. " Dodge expands this to say the "... real origin of the wars 
against Carthage lay in the jealousy of Rome for the power at sea of the Carthaginians, and her fear lest the 
possession of Sicily by Carthage should become a threat to her own dominion in Italy. " T. A. Dodge, 
Hannibal, page 122. This seems very unlikely as in the case of the first and second wars it was Carthage 
who made the first move and Rome reacted. It was not until Carthage had done some perceived wrong to 
the Romans that a war broke out. See also F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommeRtwy on PolybiUS, Vol. 1, 
pages 59-60. 
109 Polybius. The Histories, 1.11.2 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CompentM on Pol bius, Vol. 1, ge y_ pa 
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to attack them both. "' 12 To eject the Romans, Carthage joined forces with Hiero of 
Syracuse. The culminating point came in 264 B. C. wben the Romans crossed 
reinforcements to Messana on a fleet of rafts,, raised the siege imposed by I-liero and 
Carthage, and marched into Syracuse. In a prudent move, I-liero changed sides., 
contracting an alliance with Rome, which endured for the remainder of his life. His 
defection gave Roman forces control of the east coast of Sicily and further encouraged 
other Siciliots to make terms, leaving Carthage no option other than a mobilization in 
force. 
What Lessons Did Carthage and Hannibal Learn from the First War? 
Even though the culmination of events in the Mediterranean made the I' Roman 
War unavoidable, an investigation into how Carthage changed as the war proceeded and 
what both Hannibal and the Carthaginians learned from the First War will answer 
questions relevant to the central thesis of this study. 
First., each side probably underestimated the strength and resolution of the 
other. 113 Largely fought as a naval conflict, the war involved land campaigns as well. 
Never before had Carthage's reliance on a mercenary army been tested against an enemy 
with so vast a reserve of fighting men and such effectiveness in mobilization- CompeRed 
to adopt a defensive role in their Sicilian strongholds of Acragas, Lilybaeum, Drepana, 
and Panormus until their mercenaries were organized many in Carthage pressed the need 
to develop continental power in North Affica, while Hamilcar Barca consistently stressed 
Mediterranean precedence. Even as the Romans besieged Drepana and Lilybaeum, the 
Carthaginian party led by Hanno, actively pressed for the extension of territory as far as 
112 IF Lazenkv, The First Plinic War, page 3 7. 
113 Polybius, The Historim 1.15 & F. W. Walbank, A ffistorical ConimentM on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 66- 
67 
47 
Theveste on the mainland of Africa. It may have been a prudent policy, but it diverted the 
much-needed resources from Sicily and promoted friction between Hanno and Han-Wcar. 
By the time Hamilcar Barca landed in 247 B. C. the Carthaginians were hemmed 
into a small enclave. He fought tenaciously and with great skill to preserve the remnants 
of the Carthaginian garrisons in western Sicily. Instead of reinforcing the beleaguered 
bases to the west, he secured a headquarters near Panorfnus at Mount Eryx. Eryx was an 
ideal sight from which to harass the Romans; with a sheer approach, its few paths were 
easily defended. Hamilcar waged a three-year campaign of land raids, skirmishes and 
ambushes, while his ships plundered and harassed the Italian coast. In one ambush he is 
reported to have fought 40,000 Roman troops. His strategy was quite new to the 
Carthaginians for he had tied up enough enemy legions to relieve the pressure on 
Lilybaeum without hazarding a single pitched battle. He waged a guerilla war in which 
the Carthaginians held the initiative, mounting surprise attacks and raids from his hill 
base. Hannibal would successfully implement the same tactics as his father during the 
later days of his second strategy in Southern Italy. 
For all his skill in preserving his army from destruction and in keeping the loyalty 
of his men, Hamilcar's achievements between 247 and 243 would have no bewing on the 
outcome of the war. It became clear to Rome they could not win the war on land; either 
the war had to be abandoned or they must fight at sea. The Romans quickly learned the 
all-important lesson - to succeed in the Mediterranean area, you must have command of 
the sea. The Carthaginians brought all the advantages of sewnanship into the naval 
conflict, along with the related advantages of superior ships built by the experienced 
shipwrights of the citys naval arsenal. In the early stages of the war Carthage, with 
centuries of skill behind it, found little difficulty in crushing the Romans in naval 
engagements; however, one of the Roman qualities, which greatly assisted them was an 
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1: 11,1 1 ability to learn from mistakes. Taking as a model a Carthaginian warship that had run 
aground and been captured intact, the Romans built in a short space of time a fleet of 120 
ships. ' 14 Roman historians admitted their ships were slower and clumsier than their 
Carthaginian opponents - though the heavier character of Roman ships was probably 
based on a desire to carry a larger number of troops aboard. As an additional measure, the 
Romans equipped their first fleet with a device called the corvus [raven] a boarding 
bridge that could be winched up to a mast-like post at the bow of the ship, and released to 
fall across the enemy's deck when they made contact- 115 The corvus could be swung 
round to pin an enemy vessel attacking fi7om either side of the bow. The corvus 
undoubtedly had a dual effect, taking the Carthaginians by surprise on the one hand, and 
raising the morale of the Roman troops, inexperienced as they were with sea warfare, on 
the other. With the aid of this very simple invention Rome rendered void the rapidity and 
manoeuvrability of Carthaginian naval vessel. 
To Carthaginian standards, Roman pilots were considered rather poor and the 
great defeats their fleets encountered were due much more to their ignorance of the sea 
than the ability of their enemies. ' 16 What the Romans did have was a first-class infantry, 
and they set out to make full use of it. At Mylae, the overconfident Carthaginians rushed 
into battle without forming up in regular order, resulting in a solid Roman victory. From 
Mylae on, the Romans won all the subsequent major battles except one, and generally 
114 Polybius, The Histories, 1.20.15. "The ship they now used as a model, and built their whole fleet on its 
pattem;... " The preliminary stages of Ecnomus (Polybius, The Histories, 2.37) and, above all Drepana 
(Polybius, The Histories, 1.50-1), shows what the Carthaginian navy could do, given room to manoeuvre. 
See also F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommenLwy on PoIjbius, Vol. 1, pages 95-96,123 and 215-22 1. 
W. L. Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare (Annapolis. MD, 1964), page 275. 
116 J. F. Lazenby. The First Pwaic W page 162. 
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retained the initiative at sea. Truly, Mylae marked the end of Carthaginian naval 
dominance. 
For the Carthaginians, the most dispiriting feature of the Is' Roman War must 
have been their perceived disappointing performance at sea; and second, the sheer, 
incredible persistence of the Romans. The latter lost far more ships in storms than they 
ever did in battle, but every time they lost a fleet, they stolidly built a new one to replace 
it. Although Carthaginian seamen were superior in professional skills and modified their 
tactics to meet the enemy, Rome had shown a willingness to wage battle in their element 
and quickly enlarged the fleet. Four years after Mylae, the Roman fleet solidly 
outnumbered the Carthaginian navy and was ready for the most ambitious foreign 
enterpfise yet entertained- the Romans intended to attack Carthage in Africa. 
The Carthaginians, too, grimly replaced lost fleets, but the cost of the effort must 
have been enormous. The evidence of underwater archaeology indicates that all ancient 
ships were built like cabinetwork, their planks joined by a complex system of mortice- 
and-tendon joints, with the internal frame inserted only afterward as additional stiffening,, 
the resulting construction, which modem aircraft builders would call semi-monococque, 
was extremely strong, but a very labour-intensive process. 117 
As the attrition wore on, the Carthaginians found their naval situation 
progressively worsening. Although they began the war with better ships, better 
commanders, and better ratings and rowing crews, they failed to capitalize on these 
advantages. Even though the Carthaginians successfully routed the Romans in Africa, in 
the end the land operations in Sicily and Africa became almost irrelevant. The decisive 
battle of the war took place off western Sicily; crucial because it rendered unsustainable 
the seven-year hold Hamilcar had on the last of the Carthaginian bases on the island. 
117 J. F. Lazenby. The First punic War. page 64. 
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A LI 
Auer the final climactic defeat at the Aegates, characterized as "... a massacre rather than 
a fight, """ the Carthaginians were no longer able to engage in naval combat at all, and 
sued for peace. 
Carthage's leaders faced not only the direct consequences of defeat, but also the 
long-term affect of having lost the maritime superiority they enjoyed since the battle of 
Alalia more than two and a half centuries earlier. Plus, the prospects of recovering their 
advantage remained poor. Even though Carthage remained a great port, with ample access 
to seamen, the mere operating experience should have restored the skills of its naval 
officers and ratings. Nevertheless, Carthage learned they could not count on maintaining 
naval initiative and superiority in any future confrontation with Rome. Even if Carthage 
enjoyed those advantages at the outset of a campaign, they faced the fact that Rome could 
once again build, lose, and replace however many fleets it took to gain the upper hand at 
sea. The Carthaginian failure at sea had the most profound consequences for its future. 
The Carthaginians had been a naval power for centuries, and their fleet equal to, if not 
better than, any in the Mediterranean. When the Romans began the war they had no fleet 
at all. "9 By all logic, the Carthaginians should have won. In short, so long as Carthage 
remained primarily a maritime power, the nature of the relationship between civil and 
military authority was fundamentally different than republics that lay potentially at the 
mercy of their own armies. Carthage feared neither its mercenaries nor their commanders. 
The implications of the situation reached beyond military strategy. Ancient 
republican states faced the problem of ensuring the reliability of their military forces in 
loyalty and effectiveness. The loyalty of troops remained a danger. A successful 
118 T. A. Dorcy and D. R. Dudley, Rome Against Cartha (London, 1971), page 25. 
119 Poivbius, The Histories. 1.20.9-12 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentm on Pplybius. Vol. 1, 
pages 73-74. 
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commander could attempt a coup and set himself up as a tyrant. With the soldiers as 
mercenaries rather than citizens, the danger compounded. Since they would have no 
particular loyalty to the home city, mercenaries might be more interested in surviving to 
collect their pay than in giving their lives in battle. Even though historians frequently 
point out the shortcomings of mercenaries, the Carthaginians seem to have had little 
difficulty with theirs. 120 The defeat of Regulus by the Spartan mercenary captain 
Xanthippus and the victorious resistance of Hamilcar at Eryx proved that mercenary 
soldiers were not necessarily inferior to the legionary. Right through the end of the I" 
D- 
xxoman War, Carthaginian troops fought as bravely and stubbornly as their enetnies, nor 
were Carthage's heterogeneous armies overwhelmed by the more unified and disciplined 
enemies. Militarily, Carthage had performed weR. Thanks to the continuity of command - 
as opposed to the annual changes of leadership under the Roman consular system -a 
factor Hannibal used to his advantage for much of the Second War. Carthaginian 
commanders, chosen fi7om the ranks of the city's nobility, did not combine their 
commands with civil magistracies and were kept in command of armies for prolonged 
periods. This had all the advantages of allowing commanders to gain experience, and of 
forming a stronger bond with the troops they led into battle, but it opened up the danger 
of Caesarism. Why then did Carthage escape the double hazards of employing mercenary 
armies and successful generals? 
Perhaps the answer is that in Carthage the senior service rested in the navy rather 
than the army as the ultimate repository of the armed might of the state. Had a renegade 
general marched against Carthage, his only hope would have been to take its formidable 
defenses by storm. If besieged, the city could suPP1y itself by sea. From the sea also came 
the resources needed to hire more armies, and the navy itself was a repository of seasoned 
120 J. F. Lazenby, The First Punic War, pages 29-30. 
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fighting men. Carthage used mercenaries, but was not ultimately dependent upon them; 
the final repository of armed strength lay in its fleet. Although we do not know how the 
Carthaginian navy was recruited, at least a part of the crews in the fleet were 
Carthaginian. 121 It is likely that Carthaginians made up a substantial proportion of the 
crews. The captains of the naval vessels were certainly Carthaginian and most likely of 
the wealthier citizens. The trust given to the captain of a ship would have been too 
valuable to risk giving to someone of non-Carthaginian origin. Carthage utilized almost 
every useful Greek innovation; one being the z-pu7pqpXoc, "... which involved the 
'trierarch' in actuaffy being the captain of a trireme ... and 
in maintaining it for a 
year... 1-)122 This would have not only made all of the captains Carthaginian, it also 
reduced the state expenditure needed for a large fleet, because the -rpt77pqpXo,; was a 
civil obligation of the wealthier citizens. The wealthy citizens of Carthage supported the 
system because they had every reason to want a strong navy protecting their shipping 
lanes and ports for the transportation of their goods. Other naval recruits probably were 
drawn from the various other Phoenician derived settlements along the coasts of Affica 
and Spain, men who though not Carthaginian at least shared a kindred heritage. Ifistory 
gives very few examples of seizures of power by admirals. What has been said of 
medieval Venice was probably true of Carthage as well. 
'Navies have always been less liable than armies to organize coup detat, 
presumably because mi gomg ashore ties of disciplme customarily -- and almost 
necessarily -- dissolve. Sailors fresh from long weeks at sea have other things in 
121 IF Lazenby. The Firg Punic War page 26. 
"2 J. Thorley, Athenlan DemoqLaM. Lancaster PamPhlets (London, 1996). page 46. 
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mind than seizing power on behalf of their commanders; an army, already 
being, need march to the seat of power. ý-123 
The natural unit of loyalty at sea is the ship's company, not the fleet as a whole, 
the captain looms larger in the minds of the crew than the commander-in-chief If, as is 
probable, Carthaginian ships normally had a substantial contingent, if not an absolute 
majority, of native Carthaginian crewmen, the crews as a whole almost surely acquired a 
Carthaginian identity. 
The conflict between Rome and Carthage lasted twenty-four years and robbed 
Carthage of the cornerstone of her northern strategy. Pofitically, the I" Roman War 
brought the Romans to a new maturity. For most of its previous five hundred years, 
Roman expansion had been gradual and local, consolidating the city's position and 
influence at the expense of the Etruscans, Oscans, Sabines, and Samnites, fighting 
Dierrilla wars, razing noncompliant towns, and only occasionally risking a pitched battle. 7- 
As the tribes or towns on the Italian mainland were conquered by Rome they became 
allies in the confederacy of Latin states. With the peace settlement Carthage lost all the 
islands between Sicily and Africa, including Malta. The Lipari Islands to the north of 
0 
Sicily, which dominated the north-south trade routes of the Tyrrhenian Sea were ceded to 
Rome. But most importantly the struggle with Carthage changed the Roman pattern of 
alliances. Initially, much of the Sicily was overseen by Fliero's Syracuse, but at some 
point a Roman praetor was appointed to govern the western part of the island, creating 
Rome's first province. 124 While the Latin allies in Italy retained a certain amount of 
autonomy and paid no monetary tribute to Rome supplying instead men and materials for 
123 W. H. McNeill, Venice: The Hinge of EqMW, 1081-1797 (Chicago, 1974), page 251, note 63. 
12" A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London, 2000), page 129-130 & Rich, J.. "The Origins of the Second 
Pimic War-. The SecondPunic War. -. A Reappraisal, BICS Supplement 67 (1996). 
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the army, the communities within the Roman province had an obligation to pay a tax 
rather than supply soldiers for the army. From Sicily the importation of grain in form of 
taxes rapidly became a major source of food for Rome itself 
125 
The treaty ending the I" Roman War signed between Hamilcar Barca and Lutatius 
. prohibited 
Carthage from demobilizing the thousands of troops around Lilybaeum 
immediately. With Hamilcar's resignation of command, the repatriation of his 
mercenaries fell to Gisco, the governor of Lilybaeum. Gisco carried out the task wisely by 
organizing staggered departures of small groups of men in order to give the Carthaginian 
government time to settle the back-payment ; of its debts to the mercenary soldiers and 
their subsequent return to their various countries. However, the senate allowed the 
mercenaries to amass in the city, miscalculating that once they were all together it would 
be easier to persuade them to accept a reduction in pay. 126 The next section of this chapter 
investigates the consequences to Carthage and the gains for Rome from this lack of 
foresight. 
How Did the Mercenary War Contribute to the Causes for the Second War with 
Rome? 
By the end of the I" Roman War, Carthage's sea power gone, the treasury 
exhausted, and the mercenary troops restive, the situation in Carthage grew increasingly 
volatile. The senate persuaded the commanding officers to empty the town of the 
mercenaries along with their families and to concentrate them near Sicca in the interior. 
In 241 B. C. the military governor and commander of Carthage's army in Affica, Hanno, 
addressed the troops assembled at Sicca. Explaining Carthage's financial problems, he 
proposed a settlement lower than the rate agreed upon by their contract. 11is speech was 
125 G. Rickman, The Com Supply of Ancient Rome (oxford, 1980), pages 12-13,32-33.37. 
126polybius. The Histories 1.66.5. 
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not well received, allowing two mercenaries: Spendios, a semi-Greek fugitive slave; and 
Matho, one of the Libyan ringleaders, to begin a reign of terror. They pillaged the 
Carthaginian coffers, seized Gisco and held him captive. 127 By taking this irrevocable 
step, the mercenaries committed themselves to a "truceless war". 128 This crisis known as 
the Mercenary War provided the setting for the sole major work of literature set in 
Carthage, Gustave Flaubert's Saidmmbo. 129 
During the I't Roman War, the senate put pressure on the Affican territories in 
order to meet the expenses of the conflict: a demand of double tribute from the city-states-, 
one half of all harvests of rural inhabitants. These payments, Polybius singles out, caused 
thousands of men to join the mercenanes. 130 Hanno, who had distinguished himself 
during the I"' Roman War as the general who had captured large African territories and as 
one of the architects of the confiscations, was unacceptable to the mercenaries and 
Africans as a negotiator. The resulting groundswell of support for the mercenaries shook 
the polity and was revealed by a genuine solidarity between the despoiled Afficans and 
the mercenaries rising up against Carthage. City by city the Affican women en masse 
gave up their personal possessions and jewelry to feed the rebels' war fund. Matho, and 
Spendios extracted enough to give the mercenaries their back pay with enough left over to 
finance the rebellion. 131 With nearly seventy thousand men added to the thirty thousand 
127 Polybius, The ffistories 1.69.12 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commcplga on Polybius Vol. 1, page 
135 
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mercenaries, Mathos and Spendios divided the men into several corps: some to reinforce 
Utica and Bizerta; others to sweff forces encamped near Tunis. 132 
The senate appointed Hanno to crush the rebellion. He raised an army composed 
of mercenaries recruited overseas and citizens old enough to bear arms. Along with his 
contingent of one hundred elephants he quickly attacked near Utica with great success, 
unfortunately, he did not pursue the enemy and celebrated his victory prematurely. The 
better-disciplined mercenaries rallied, disbanding his army, which narrowly escaped total 
destruction. Again the senate acted and recalled Hamilear from exile to assist Hanno. 
However, the ill feeling between the two generals became a turning point in Carthaginian 
military policy. The Carthaginians decided to allow the army to choose which general 
would remain commander-in-chief. Polybius indicates that it was the Assembly of the 
People, which took this decision, affirming the growing political importance of the 
Assembly of the People. 
133 
Hamilcar was quickly able to reverse the situation. He re-organized the citizen 
troops, brought in new mercenaries, and started a program of psychological pressure 
against his former veterans. He cut off the mercenaries camped before Carthage, driving 
them into a state of famine. Using Carthage"s navy, Hamilcar was able to obtain supplies 
by sea, which forced the besiegers to lift their stranglehold. 
A 0- 
After Matho and Spendios formed the mercenaries along with the Affican 
contingents commanded by the Libyan chief, Zarzas into an army of 50,000 Men, 134 
Hamilcar's experience and skill in manoeuvring led the two armies in a southerly 
132 polybiUS, The Histories,. 1.82.11 & 1.73.7. 
133 polybius. The Histories, 1.82.5. 
134 Polybius. The Histories, 1.84.3. See F. W. Walbank, A Historical Conmientary on PoIjbius Vol. 1, page 
146 where he states this is an exaggeration, and is likely to "have been no more than 20,000. " 
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direction toward the promontory of Cape Bon. There he managed to attack nearly 40,000 
men in a gorge, which Polybius says "occurred near the place called the Saw; it got its 
name from its resemblance to the tool so called. " 135 The trap was sprung. When the 
rebelling troops ran out of food, they were forced to eat the flesh of their prisoners and 
then some of their slaves. Their leaders, Spendios and Zarras soon came to terms with 
Han&ar. Learning that their principal leaders had surrendered to Hamilcar, the AfHcans,, 
who were not privy to the pact, believed they had been betrayed. They rushed Hafnilcar 
who in turn had them trampled to death by his elephants. 136 Matho, however, still held 
Tunis. 
At this time the senate attempted reconciliation between Hanno and Hamilcar, 
once again obliging them to act together, possibly indicating a temporary return of 
strength to the Carthaginian oligarchy and allowing Hanno to remain as the leader of the 
anti-Barcid faction for the next thirty-five years. 137 It is possible that the reconciliation 
forced Matho into a decisive battle and defeat. The revenge Carthage exacted upon Matho 
and his African troops were used as a symbol of Carthaginian mastery over all its African 
subjects who had enjoyed short-lived freedom. 1313 With this act of barbarity, a of Africa 
submitted allegiance to Carthage. It is true that Hamilcar is attributed with re-establishing 
the peace throughout Afhca; even so, he also managed to extend the boundaries within 
135 Polybius, The Histories 1.85.7. 
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the African state. 139 Even with these territorial expansions, the consequences of the 
Mercenary War resulted in a tremendous loss of influence for Carthage. Additionally, 
Rome, probably, concerned about Hamilcar's rise to power in Carthage at the expense of 
Hanno who represented the oligarchic party, hoped to inflict damage on his prestige. '40 
Even while Hamilcar was busy fighting Spendios and Matho in Affica, the 
mercenaries serving the Carthaginian garrison in Sardinia mutinied, murdering their 
officers. Later they persuaded the punitive expedition sent by Carthage against them to 
repute the military and join the mutiny. Together the mercenaries soon gained control 
over the entire island and attempted to make an alliance with Rome. At first the Roman 
Senate refused instead respecting the protection offered to each sides' allies set down in 
the treaty of 241. While additional Carthaginian troops were sent to besiege the garrison, 
Italian traders provisioned the mutineers with food and arms. Perhaps the most significant 
step in escalation came when the Roman Senate sent a commission to Carthage following 
reports that Roman traders dealing with the rebels had been arrested or killed. 141 pol y bjuS 
attributes Carthage's eventual loss of Sardinia as compensation for the capture of these 
Italian traders during the Mercenary War. 142 Since the merchants had merely been 
imprisoned and the Carthaginians agreed to their return, this seems an unlikely excuse. 
In 237 the mutinous mercenaries were expelled by the native population and again 
approached the Roman Senate. This time ignoring the treaty signed between the two 
139 Cornelius Nepos, Great Generals of Foreigg Nations,. Hamilcar,, 2.5. 
140 G. C. & C. Picard, The Life and Death of Carthage, pages 208-209. 
141 Polybius, The Histories 1.83.5-11 & F. W. Walbank A Historical lybius Vol. 1, page CommenLaly on Plol 
146. 
142polybius. The Histories. 3.28.3 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commept4a on Polybius, Vol. 1. page 
3-56. 
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states, Rome made an expedition ready to assist the Sardinians; Carthage sent an embassy 
to Rome in hopes to recover their possession of the island, whereas the Romans 
considered Carthage's actions a hostile act against Rome. 143 Despite opposition from the 
native Sardinians, the chance to secure the area was more than Rome could resist. Using 
the pretext that Corsica as well was a threat to Italy, Rome proceeded to annex both 
Sardinia and Corsica. When Carthage ventured to protest, Rome declared war and then 
increased the amount that Carthage was to pay in return for a humiliating peace. 
Weakened by over three years of war against the mercenaries, Carthage ceded Sardinia 
and Corsica. Rome required the payment of an extra indemnity 1,200 talents as a 
144 
stipulation in additional clauses to the treaty of 241 . 
How the Loss of Sardinia Affected Carthage and Hannibal 
Sardinia enters the history of Carthage in the middle of the sixth century B. C. in a 
defeat suffered by the Carthaginian king Malchus on the island. 145Because Sardinia was a 
key factor in domination of the western Mediterranean, Carthage began military action 
there again toward the end of the sixth century. By 535 B. C. the Carthaginians and 
Etruscan allied victory against the Phocaeons at Alalia. in Corsica secured Sardinia against 
Greek expansion. Although at this time Corsica came under the control of the Etruscans, 
it is clear the island became a neutral territory more under Carthage's influence until the 
consequences resulting from the Mercenary War. In Polybius' text regarding the first 
treaty between Carthage and Rome he states "The phrasing of this treaty shows that they 
1-13 Polybius, The Histories, 1.88.10-11, & 3.10.1-2 and F. W. Walbank, A Historical Conunentqa o 
Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 149-150 & 313-314. 
144 Polybius, The Histories. 3.27.7 & F. W. Walbank, A I-fistoncal ComnientM on PoMius, Vol. 1. page 
355. 
14 5, S. Lancet. Carthage: A Histo! y pages 111-112 & B. H. Warmington, Carthage pages 4245. 
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consider Sardinia and Libya as their own... " 146 In fact, in the treaty of 509 Carthage 
appeared to be the sole guarantor for commercial transactions on the island of Sardinia 
and by the fourth century Carthage had extended its control over the entire island. The 
second treaty, signed in 348, reaffirms "No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia 
and Libya 
The seizure of Sardinia highlighted Carthage's current weakness and created a far 
greater legacy of bitterness and resentment towards Rome than their initial defeat at the 
Aegates in the I" Roman War. Additionally, the annexation of Sardinia and Corsica re- 
ignited the fears Carthage had for the possibility of future hostilities between the two 
republics. Because these islands lay on the trade routes to the West they were strategically 
necessary to Carthage's military, as well as being sources of timber, ore, and additional 
trading stations. " 
146 Polybius, The Histories 3.23.5. "6K 6p-, rouU(OV'TO)V CrUVOTI'KO)V R&PI ýMV YOLP60VOq KUt Atow1q... " 
147 Polybius, The Histories, 3.24.11. 
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The Barea Family and Spain 
Prior to the Mercenary War, the Carthaginian oligarchy believed officers chosen 
from among the aristocracy could lead its mercenaries, however, they consistently 
destroyed their commanders' prestige by exercising the most rigid supervision. Four of 
these nobles suffered crucifixion during the war for having sustained defeat- Carthage 
only realized its mistake when Regulus threatened the city. Delegating command to a 
foreigner, the Spartan Xanthippus, saved the republic. The ensuing revolt by the 
mercenaries almost immediately showed it impossible to re-establish the old military 
system. Thus, Hamilcar's skill as a general, coupled with his talent in diplomacy led to 
his growth as the leader of Carthage's popular party. 
The immediate emergency of the Mercenary War ended with Carthage facing still 
the longer-term problem of re-establishing her power and prosperity. The peace at any 
price party, concerned solely with seeing its mercantile fortunes revive, was prepared to 
conspire against Hamilcar with the Roman enemy. The Roman Senate regarded the 
policies advocated by Hanno as advantageous to Rome and those of Hamilcar as a threat. 
Hanno's political popularity rested on his domination of the North African tribesmen 
from whom he exacted high taxes. Representing the landholding interests of Carthage, 
Hanno's policy included the expansion of North Affica and the consolidation of 
Carthaginian powe Ir in the continent. 149 This policy developed in the century when a 
political crisis caused crushing defeats in Sicily combined with an unfavourable trade 
balance creating an econon-k crisis that drove the Carthaginians to rely on their own 
150 
resources. 
149 T. A. Dorey & D. R. DudleY- ROMP A-gainst Carthage, pages 29-3 1. 
150 G. C. & C. Picard, Daily Life in Carthage: At the Time of Hannibal, trans. A. E. Foster (London, 1961). 
pages 122-127. 
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After the annexation of Sardinia it was clear to Hamilcar together with a number 
of members of other ruling families that Rome could not be trusted. With much of the 
Mediterranean now fim-dy in their control, together with their newly established 
command of the sea, it would only be a matter of time before they made another attempt 
into North Affica. Therefore, Hamilcar offered an alternate solution to Hanno's - the 
extension of the policy that had been followed more than two centuries earlier after the 
disaster of f1imera. In that crisis, the Carthaginians recouped their losses in Sicily by 
transforming their loose hegemony over their tribal neighbours in North Africa into a 
territorial state. Hanfdcar now set forth to do the same on a much larger scale in Spain. "' 
Carthage already maintained trading ports along the coasts, had conscripted some of her 
best troops from Spain's tribes, and established settlements such as Gades on the Atlantic 
coast, where neither Greek nor Roman had yet penetrated. Although remote, Spain 
presented great strategic potential for Carthage. On the eastern coast were natural 
harbours fi7om. which, in conjunction with Balearic and Affican bases, they might still 
control an important part of the western Mediterranean. More importantly, without naval 
power, it would still be possible for Carthage to operate offensively against Rome ftom 
the peninsula by way of Gaul. In short, the acquisition of Spain would give Carthage the 
military advantages which had served Rome so well -a vast and accessible reserve of 
fighting men, and an overland route to their objectives. 
Hamilcar and his associates were a larger more powerful group who saw clearly 
the fate of Carthage without bold guidance. This turned the foreign policy of Carthage 
into a completely new channel. Rather than accept the isolationist strategies of Hanno, 
Hamilcar planned an expansionist policy of here-to-fore unparallel scale. For centuries 
151 polybius, The iistories, 2.1.5-9 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommeptM on Pol3tius, Vol. 1, pages 
151-153. 
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the power of Carthage had rested in the oligarchy, but with his political victory it moved 
into the hands of the people and the Barca clan. By abdicating its authority to Hamilcar, 
the Carthaginian oligarchy resigned itself to recognizing a personal power freed from all 
control, For the next forty years Hamilcar Barca and his family, known as the "Barcine 
Faction, " 152 controlled the government and Spain became most crucial to Carthage's rise 
in power. 
153 
Despite the fact that some members of the oligarchy that ruled Carthage learned 
little from their first war with Rome other than a reluctant willingness to entrust the fate 
of their empire to Hamilcar - the Romans learned a great deal. The aspirations of the 
Romans, who had expanded into a confederation of small Italian states, had been 
completed transformed by their struggle against a mercantile and maritime power like 
Carthage. The taste of victory on a wider domain than the land led to a change of attitude 
that would continue to torture the proud character of Hamilcar. For he maintained the 
Carthaginian senate surrendered Sicily in a hasty loss of hope, and that the Romans 
wrongly appropriated Sardinia and Corsica - and even imposed an indemnity on them - 
in the midst of their Mercenary War. 
While the Barca family's policies in Spain were suggestiVe of Macedonian 
imperialism rather than previous Carthaginian endeavours, when Hamilcar assumed 
power he developed a plan to make up Carthage's losses. Nevertheless, to be profitable, 
the conquest of Spain must be rapid and total. Previously it had taken Carthage centuries 
0 
152 Livy, Ab Urbe C294ka-, Vol. VI, trans. F. G. Moore, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 
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to conquer their territory in Africa. Therefore, every circumstance forced Hamilcar to 
replace the traditional methods of Carthaginian generals by those which enabled 
Alexander to conquer the Persian Empire in merely ten years. In 237 B. C. he and his son 
Hannibal arrived in Spain and for eight years, Hamilcar battled his way east then north as 
Cl- -- tar as Alicante. Intimidated by his brilliance an increasing number of native chiefs joined 
him. The relationship between the Carthaginians and their Spanish allies is an interesting 
one. First, the Carthaginians had a superiority in metal-working techniques and secondly, 
they came from an old and civilized race, inheriting from centuries of warfare, a 
knowledge of strategy, tactics, and discipline when in combat. The Iberians of southern 
Spain, partly of Berber stock from Africa, were incapable of withstanding either the 
horsemen or the organized infantry the Carthaginians brought against them. 
Through his policies of military and diplomatic means, Hanulcar established 
control of the east coast south of Cabo de la Nao and the Baetis Valley, 154 "subjugating 
Spain to the CarthaginianS.,, 155He set forth to transform what had been a loose hegemony 
into outright control, and did so in a series of campaigns lasting from 23 8 or 23 7, until he 
drowned crossing a river following a military reverse in 229.156 Not only did Hamilcar 
support his endeavours in Spain, in addition "... the yield of the mines was greatly 
increased under the direct Punic exploitation... " with the effect that, "... the finances of 
Carthage were soon restored to prosperity. -)ý 157 Ms successful efforts furnished the much- 
154 Polybius, The Histories 2.1.7 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommepLaff on PoLd? ius, Vol. 1, page 
152 
1 ss Polybius, The Histories, 2.1.6. "Tqv'IpTlptccv npocyýtauc Totq KotpX, 98ovtotq. 11 
156 B. Caven. The Punic Wars, page 78. 
15' M. Cary & H. H. Scullard, A Histog of Rome: Down to the Reig ILI Of Constantine 3r' Ed. (London, 
1975), page 124. 
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needed wealth lost in the war with Rome and further accelerated the growth of internal 
political discord at Carthage. 
158 
The rule of the Barca family, passed by Hamilcar to his son-in-law Hasdrubal and 
then to his son Hannibal, lasted for nearly fifty years. From 247 until 201 B. C. the fan-fily 
bore the principal burden of responsibility for the wars against Rome and the constant 
criticism of Hanno and his peace party. It is important to note that Hamilcar's life work 
was a constant, unremitting effort to prepare Carthage for war, then to make war on its 
archenemy, Rome. As I shall argue in a later chapter his hatred for Rome became a family 
purpose, rendered only more so by the internal opposition of Hanno's faction. It is 
important to this discussion that nothing of what the Carthaginians may have recorded 
about the Barca family survives, for the destiny of the Barcas lay in Carthage's greatest 
struggle against Rome for the wealth and control of the Mediterranean area. 
To understand how the Carthaginians might have progressed, a look at the 
American colonies will bring into focus the pattern of development. We know that 
completely different cultural groups settled the American colonies with the well-bred, 
upper classes from the south of England moving into Virginia and forming the basis of 
the Southern landed gentry of Virginia and the Carolinas. "Descendants of gallant knights 
and ladies fair, southerners became the last society to embrace the remnants of old 
European traditions of the Middle Ages, when a man's word was his sacred pledge, and 
the sanctity of womanhood was defended with near religious fervor. " 159The South for 
example, was a distinctive society of large landowners, closely connected by blood, 
marriage, and fiiendship much in the same manner as the Carthaginian elite. 160 The 
1,; "ý T. A. Dodge, Hannibal page 144. 
'59 M. A. Grissom Southern by the Grace of God (Gretna, LA, 1990), page 3 1. 
160 P. C. Nagel, The Lees of Virginia (New York, 1990), page 7. 
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plantations were both homes and business enterprises for the southern privileged, They 
were the largest, most commercialized, and most efficient specialized agricultural 
enterprises of their day, producing the bulk of the South's staple crops of tobacco, cotton, 
sugar, rice, and hemp. Their proprietors were entrepreneurs who aspired to and 
sometimes, after a generation or two, achieved the status of a cultivated landed 
aristocracy. Many distinguished themselves not only in agriculture, but also in the 
professions, in the military, in government service, and in scientific and cultural 
endeavors. They were wealthy, prestigious, and powerful, often the political as well as the 
economic leaders of the society. 
Even though the Southern planters were ambitious to augment their wealth, they 
became an important driving force in the economic and political development of new 
territories and states in the Southwest. Their commodities accounted for more than half of 
America's exports, and the plantations themselves were important markets for the 
products of northern industry. In short, they played a crucial role in the development of a 
national market economy. Carthage, as seen in the following illustration by B. H. 
Warmington, suggests the interaction and sway of the aristocracy of Carthage could have 
developed quite similarly to the South. 
"The same must be said of the wealth of the anstocracy, but what form their 
participation in trade took can only be conjecture, for lack of evidence. It is to be 
presumed that the nobles financed, or more probably owned, numbers of ships 
engaged in tirade. and took their profits from the voyages, the most profitable no 
doubt being those to the west. It is not to be supposed that the Hanno of Plautus 
was numbered among the senators of Carthage, even though he is described as 
rich and noble. It is also possible that some wealthy Carthaginians had interests in 
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Carthaginian industry. But after the conquest of the northern part of Tunisia there 
was another source of wealth, land. -3il6l 
It is on this Southern foundation that we can build the character development of 
Hannibal as a member of the elite aristocracy of Carthage since both the Lees and the 
Barcas were wealthy landowners and both belonged the aristocracy of the day. 162 Henry 
Lee, known as "Light-Horse" Harry, advanced to the rank of major and commanded three 
companies of infantry in the American Revolution; he became the post-Revolution 
governor of Virginia, as well as close fiiend of the first American President George 
Washington. 163 Robert was the fourth child of Harry Lee and Ann I-Ell Carter. Later 
Robert would marry the First Lady's niece, Mary Custis, in an unprecedented match. 
We must consider at this point Hamilcar's immediate relations to understand the 
passage of family rule in Spam. Hamilcar, by his first wife had three daughters whose 
names we have no record. The eldest married Bomilcar, admiral of the Carthaginian navy 
from 215 to 212. They produced a son named Hanno who served under his uncle, 
Hannibal at the battle of Cannae. Hamilcar's second daughter married Hasdrubal the Fair 
before Hamilcar and Hasdrubal departed for Spain. She must have died shortly after their 
departure because Hasdrubal later married the daughter of an Iberian king. His third 
daughter was promised to Naravas, a Numidian chief who assisted Hamilcar in the 
Mercenary War. 164 Hamilcar's fourth child and first son, Hannibal 'he who finds favour 
with Baal' was bom in 247, the year he was sent to Sicily. His other sons followed within 
161 B. H. WarmingtOn, Cgqka&e, page 137. See also, A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pages 28-29 & G. C. 
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a few years- Hasdrubal, and Mago. All of Harnilcar's sons were bom and trained for 
battle against Rome. 
Hamilcar's intense hatred of Rome became Hannibal's lesson from the first and 
his education was chiefly directed to the accomplishment of war. Nothing demonstrates 
this better than Polybius' supported view of Hamilcar's motivation by recounting an 
anecdote which Hannibal related while he was at the court of Antiochus M in the 190s. 
Just before leaving to take up his new command in Spain, Hamilcar Barca placed a 
sacrifice at the altar of Zeus. After he received a favourable omen, he called his nine-year 
old son, Hannibal, to his side and asked the boy if he would like to accompany him to 
Spain. Hannibal responded enthusiastically, begging permission to go. Hamilcar placed 
the boy's hand on the sacrifice and made him swear an oath "never to be a friend to the 
Romans. " 165 Hannibal supposedly told this story to convince Antiochus of his allegiance. 
In later Roman works the oath's wording becomes stronger, with Hannibal swearing to be 
always an CC. enemy" of Rome. 
166 
Hannibal remained in his father's Iberian camp, constantly in the field, for nine 
years. One tradition claims Hamilcar deliberately sacrificed himself to save his young son 
in an ambush by a Celtiberian tribe known as the Oretani in 229 B. C. 167 Another source 
describes Hamilcar as exhibiting exemplary courage I in the battle just outside of Helike 
165 polybiUS, The Histories 3.11.7. "... tp-pa)v oýivuvat ývn8cao-rsPwýiatotq suvoqap-tv. " & F. W. 
Walbank, A Historical Commenta1y on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 315. 
166Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 21.1.4 . ..... 
bind himself with an oath that so soon as he should be able he would 
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where he is killed. 168 Hasdrubal succeeded Hamflcar as commander of the army in Iberia 
and Hannibal returned to Carthage to continue his studies. Educated by a Greek tutor, 
Sosylus, Hannibal spoke Greek, Latin, Phoenician as well as his native Punic. 169 "le 
Carthage borrowed much from the Greeks, including their military tactics, Dio Cassius 
states that Hannibal studied all the Greeks could teach. Yet again in our correlating 
assessment, Robert E. Lee also followed in his father's military footsteps graduating 
second in his class from the prestigious United States Military Academy at Westpoint. 
Upon Hamil, car Barca's death, his son-in-law, and chief naval officer, Hasdrubal 
becomes his successor. 170 It is unclear whether the home government authorized or 
merely acquiesced the decision; however, the implications of his selection represented a 
giant step toward making Carthaginian Spain a quasi-hereditary principality. Nor is the 
form of his appointment known; it is only plausible speculation to suppose that 
Hasdrubal's officers selected him, and then perhaps he was acclaimed by the troops. 171 
ly 131? ý 168 Polybius, The Histories'. 2.1.8; F. W. Walbank A Historical CommepLta on Po ius Vol. 1, page 152-. 
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The ancient sources give us the impression that Hasdrubal was more an 
administrator and diplomat than strictly a general. It is nevertheless true that he was a 
good soldier, but for the most part he seems to have been still greater as a ruler. By 
pleasing manners and political dealing with the native tribes and friendships formed with 
their petty chiefs, he furthered the cause of his country more than by force of arms. 172 
Until his death, assassinated at the hands of a Celtiberian tribesman, he followed a policy 
of consolidation, securing his hold on southeastern Spain. 173 He struck coins with his 
image and founded a new capital for the province,, to which he gave the same name as 
Carthage itself, the Romans later called it Carthago Nova, and it survives today as 
Cartagena. Under his leadership the area subject to the Carthaginians was extended ftom 
Gades in the west to Carthago Nova in the east, and northwards as far as Castulo- This 
fortress city dominated the Sierra Morena, which now provided the Carthaginians with a 
rich source of silver. It was on the basis of this area of conquest that Hasdrubal proceeded 
to expand. Domestically, he supported the cultivation of salt, established a fish-curing 
industry, and encouraged the production and exportation esparto grass. Militarily, he 
recruited and trained Spaniards as mercenaries and formed alliances with Spanish chiefs. 
In 224 B. C., at the age of twenty-five, Hannibal returns to Spain as the 
commander of Hasdrubal's cavalry. Livy, in the following passage, envisions the most 
dominant portrait of the young Hannibal to be written by an ancient historian. 
"Hannibal was sent to Spain, where he was no sooner come than he won the 
favour of the entire anny. The old soldiers thought that Hamilcar was restored to 
them as he had been m his youth; they beheld the same lively expression and 
piercing eye. the same cast of countenance and features. But he soon brought it to 
172 Livv, Ab Urbe CondiuL 31.2.5. 
17 3 B. Caven. The Punic Wars, pages 9-84. 
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pass that his likeness to his father was the least consideration in gaining him 
support. Never was the same nature more adaptable to things the most diverse - 
obe&ence and command. And so one could not readily have told whether he were 
dearer to the general or the army. When any bold or difficult deed was to be done, 
there was no one whom Hasdrubal liked better to entrust with it, nor did any other 
leader inspire his men with greater confidence or daring. To reckless courage 
incurring dangers he united the greatest judgment when in the nudst of them. No 
toil could exhaust his body or overcome his spirit. Of heat and cold he was 
equally tolerant. His consumption of meat and drink was determined by natural 
desire, not by pleasure. His times of waking and sleeping were not marked off by 
day or night: what time remained when his work was done he gave to sleep, 
which he did not court with a soft bed or stillness, but was seen repeatedly bý' 
many lying on the ground wrapped in a common soldier's cloak amongst the 
sentinels and outguards. His dress was in no way superior to that of his fellows, 
but his arms and horses were conspicuous. Both of horsemen and of foot-soldiers 
he was undoubtedly the first - foremost to enter battle, and last to leave it when 
the fightMg had begun... he served for the space of three years -under Hasdrubal, 
omitting nothing that should be done or seen by one who was to become a great 
commander. 
174 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 21.4. "Nfissus Hannibal in HisPaniam pirimo statim adventu omnem exercitum in 
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This influential image survives today as the persistent representation of Hannibal. 
FoHowing Hasdrubal's death, the troops in Spain chose a new commander-in- 
chief, with no intervention by Carthage. At the young age of twenty-six, the succeeding 
Barca was Hamilcar Barca's son - Hannibal. Spain gave the Barcas and Carthage a 
formidable military force and the wealth to support it. Carthaginian recruiting officers had 
long been hiring Spanish mercenaries and the Barcid province brought a large part of this 
pool of military manpower directly under their control. It was this resource that allowed 
Hannibal to prosecute the war so effectively. In Polybius' version of the oath against 
Rome, Hannibal inherited the war with Rome from his father. The conception of the plan 
no doubt began with his father, but Hannibal truly gave the project its iMpetUS. 175 
Hannibal's father and later his brother-in-law were responsible for laying the foundation 
upon which he was to build. There can be little doubt that the drearn of using Spain as a 
base from which to attack the Romans was always present in Hamilcar's mind, although 
difficult to prove. 
Apparently, the Political relationship between the new 'Barcid Empire' in Spain 
and the metropolitan government of Carthage was fraught with ambiguities. On one hand, 
neither Hamilcar nor either of his successors ever engaged in outright Caesarism, and 
when they marched it was not on Carthage, but toward Rome. To all outward appearance 
desiderio naturali non voluptate modus fmitus; vigiliannn somnique nec die nec nocte discriminata 
tempora; id quod gerendis rebus superesset quieti datum; ea neque molli strato neque silentio accersita; 
muiti saepe militari sagulo opemm humi iacentem inter custodias stationesque militum conspexerant. 
Vestitus nihil inter aequales excellens; artna atque equi conspiciebantur. Equitum peditumque idem longe 
primus crat, princeps in proelium ibat, ultimus conserto proelio excedebat... trienMO sub Hasdnibale 
imperatore meruit nulla re quae agenda videndaque magno futuro duci esset praetermissa. - 
175 For an interesting depiction of familial devotion, see Plautus, Poemijus trans. P. Nixon, Loeb Classical 
Library. VOL IV (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), pages 2-11 and 95-143. 
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the Barcas ruled Spain as the loyal proconsuls or viceroys of Carthage. Yet, at least after 
the initial campaigns, the effective control of the government of Carthage over the Barcas 
remained uncertain at best. Hamilcar raised his own armies, which were surely loyal 
personally to him, and their loyalty to the Barcas continued through their subsequent 
selection of Hasdrubal and Hannibal. Their natural attachment was to their commanders 
rather than to a distant civil authority in Carthage, which most of the soldiers had never 
seen. To Hannibal's policies, Hanno led a small group of political enemies of the Barcas 
into opposition. They declared that Hannibal acted without the authority of the 
I government of Carthage and this ' ... was accepted as true by Fabius Pictor and passed 
into the historical tradition. " 176 In a later age, Roman arnfies made up of Roman citizens 
proved loyal to their commanders rather than to the Republic; the same must have been 
true a fortiori of the Barcid arn-iies in which very few Carthaginians served. The Barcas 
depended on Carthage itself for nothing because they had their own sources of pay and 
supply for their troops. Regardless of the actual facts had any of the Barcas chosen to 
sever their relationship with Carthage and set up an independent Barcid kingdom in 
Spain, there is no evidence to support that Carthage could have done anything to prevent 
it. 
"Fabius, the Roman annalist, says that besides the outrage on the Saguntines, a 
cause of the war was Hasdrubal's ambition and love for power. He tells us how, 
having acquired a great dominion in Spain, he arrived in Africa and attempted to 
abolish the constitution of Carthage and change the form of government to a 
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176 T. A. Dorey & D. R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage page 3 1. 
177polybius, The Histories, 3.8.1-2. 
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But Fabius' perception cannot be completely trusted as fact. 
"On the events of his own tune, the struggle with Carthage, Fabius wrote more 
carefully, but the apologetic nature of his work, the desire to unpress the Greek 
speaking world, led to grave distortions of fact; Polybius outspokenly compares 
his affection for the Roman cause with that of a lover. "'7' 
Nevertheless, it is clear from what information remains that the successive Barcas 
preserved all the outward forms of loyalty to Carthage. Carthage in turn seems to have 
been unwilling to put their loyalty to the test. From the point of view of the government, 
there might have been little to gain and much to lose in attempting to do so. Whatever the 
potential significance of founding Carthago Nova, the Barcas had given no overt offense 
or cause for complaint. On the contrary, Han-filcar and Hasdrubal had more or less single- 
handedly restored Carthage's international position; having lost its old maritime dominion 
in the Western Mediterranean, Carthage now commanded a new land dominion in Spain, 
with all the wealth, power, and prestige that implied. 
Moreover, to recaH any of the Barcas and send some other commander in his 
place was to take a double risk. First, the threat of dismissal or worse might be just the 
goad that led to a breach, and either the loss of the empire in Spain or the march of the 
'Aa6poupou nkcov6ýtow'KOU ýLkOLPXIOLV OLtutocv yew-aGatcou K(xT''AvNtoav noýxýLou. 6KF-tvov yap 
W-, yoLk, ylv ave0alýo-ravqv 8uvoL(TTSIoLv EV Cotq KOLT, 
lpTjptoLvro7EOLq, ýt&Tm TOWTOL 7EOLPaYF-Vowvov F-RI 
Atow1v F. 7EIP0LkS(500Lt KWCOLkUCFOLVCoLCOUý VOýIOUq Stý P-OVoLPXI()LV 7MPUTMI90LI TO RoktTgUýtoLTWV 
Kapy,, 96oviov-- It is interesting to note that Aristotle in Politics mentions that Carthage was never 
subjected to the threat of a tyrant. Polybius goes on to state in 3.8.10-11 that he disputes Fabius Pictor's 
version of the story. See also F. W. Walbank, A Historical COrflmePLM On PO-lAb-ius, Vol. 1, pages 310-311 
312. 
"s P. G. Walsh, L Livy, page 118. Polybius' statement can be found in 1.14.2 where he places Philinus in the 
samc case. but for the Carthaginians. 
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army on Carthage itself Secondly, if the viceroy loyally obeyed, there could be no 
guarantee that any commander sent in his place would be able to command the loyalty of 
his troops or the obedience of the conquered subjects. The dominion in Spain, if placed in 
inexperienced hands, might be lost even more rapidly than it had been won. Thus, the 
Carthaginians had little apparent reason to meddle with a situation that had worked out 
very well for them. However, in doing so, they mortgaged their own future to the policies 
and ambitions of the Barcas. This became evident when, under Hannibal, Barcid policies 
and ambitions in Spain drew Carthage into the second war against Rome. 179 
To further understand the cultural differences between the opposing factions 
within Carthage we can study the evolution of the northern and southern population as 
they developed as a basis for the enmity between the two groups. In addition to the upper 
class from England who emigrated into Virginia and formed the basis of the Southern 
aristocracy of Virginia and the Carolinas, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
population of the North consisted of a far greater number of new inunigrants. The 
struggles between these two populations included many clashes of interest and issues 
quite apart from those concerning morals and contrasting labor systems. But an even 
more far-reaching aspect was that their commercial interests had come into conflict, as 
those between Rome and Carthage. 
Polybius, The ffistories 2.35; F. W. Walbank, A fhstorical Comme4! M on Polybius Vol. 1, page 3 10- 
312 & Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 21-3.1. For more on Carthaginian Spain, see A. Goldsworthy, The Punic 
Wars, pages 136-138; S. Lancel, Carthage: A Histoly, pages 376-380; S. Lancel, Hannibal pages 2543, 
G. C. & C. Picard, The Life and Death of Cqqhage, pages 209-222; J. Prevas, Hannibal Crosses the Alps: 
The Enigma Re-examined, pages 3 9-46; 1 S. Richardson, HisM4iae: Spqjn and the Development of Roman 
Impgrialism 218-82 B. C. (Cambridge, 1986), pages 18-20, J. S. Richardson, The Romans in Spain (Oxford. 
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The North had built up a large and extensive manufacturing economy, and to 
foster that enterprise it demanded a protective tariff, the burden of which fell on the South 
in two ways. First, because Southerners were large consumers of manufactured good from 
their robust economy and, second, as agriculture producers and exporters, it was essential 
for their commerce to be able to exchange their cotton and tobacco for manufactured 
goods in Europe. Otherwise the merchant ships would have to return home empty, and the 
Southern exporters would have to be paid in hard cash for their commodities, meaning 
lower profits for the South. When these same exporters chose to import European goods 
this meant a high tax , increasing the cost to the Southern consumer and enriching the 
federal coffers at the expense of the South, to benefit the Northern interests. 
The point is that there exists, in spite of obvious differences, a disquieting 
suggestion of similarity between the two crises and the pattern of their development. In 
America the Puritan conception of broad trade and industry control by a central 
goverment, which was at odds with the Southem view of a state's nght to detemiine its 
own market is what the War Between the States was fought over. And because the South 
was too large for the North to merely assimilate, only by winning the war would the 
Northern conception of government, based on a culture alien to the South, be imposed on 
every state. Using this idea we can recognize that Carthage had created a feudal empire 
with no sense of 'central' loyalty, whereas Rome, had forged a confederation of states, 
which held together even when gravely threatened. Once more, Carthage remained too 
large for Rome to absorb, only by defeating Carthage could Rome control with authority. 
They refused to treat Carthage as an equal. Sardinia was just the first blatant example of 
Rome's attitude toward Carthage, which continued with Rome"s repeated interventions in 
Spain. Since Carthage's tribute to Rome should have been completely paid by 220, there 
was no reason for Carthage to behave as a subordinate to Rome. Although weakened by 
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their defeat in the I" Roman War and later the mercenary rebellion, Carthage remained a 
large and wealthy state with extensive territories in Africa and Spain and its citizens must 
have felt they were Rome's equal. The Carthaginian desire to reaffirm its independent 
power was a natural occurrence however threatening it might have been to Rome. Both 
Rome and Carthage had ample resources for making war and were militarily suspicious 
and even hostile to each other. The Carthaginian military increase in Spain was a 
defensive measure in order to protect against such arbitrary Roman actions as the theft of 
Sardinia. 
Before 219 B. C. the Carthaginians had consistently backed down to Roman 
demands, and it is probable the Roman Senate expected them to do so once again when 
the legation demanded Hannibal not attack Sagunturn. Hannibal, a young nobleman and 
head of a powerful army, was already assured of his ability to command. Although some 
at Carthage opposed Hannibal and hoped for peace, there was certainly a majority among 
the aristocracy who saw no reason for the Carthagmian state to submit to Rome) s arrogant 
demands. 180 
Hannibal's Involvement in the Instigation of War 
The question of who was morally responsible for the war - Rome, Carthage, or 
Hannibal personafly - has been a subject of debate since the outbreak of the 2ýdRornan 
War. Why did Hannibal choose to ignore Rome's warnings about Saguntum? Why did 
Rome make an issue of Saguntum? Why did Carthage back Hannibal's decision over 
Saguntum? These questions all ask for an explanation and the answers contribute to who 
bears ultimately responsibility for the war. 
18() Livyý Ab Urbe Condita. 21.5.1-2. 
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If we are to believe as polybius intimates Hannibal merely acted on the need for 
revenge; 18 ' however, in reality the necessity for Carthage to establish control in Spain as 
firmly as possible was essential for their continued prosperity. If Hannibal had backed 
down over Saguntum, Roman interference in Spain would surely have escalated. Even if 
Carthage had backed down as they had over Sardinia, any Spanish community who felt 
threatened by Carthage would have sought Roman protection thereby ending 
Carthaginian domination in Spain. Perhaps Hannibal's defiant position proved too 
popular with the people of Carthage. Rome may have assumed the time right to confi7ont 
Carthage - their commander in Spain was so young and largely unknown in Rome. In 
addition no Roman thought the war would be fought on their home ground. As we shall 
investigate in the next chapter, the Southern attack on Fort Sumter and the complicity in 
which Lincoln manoeuvred Davis into that position leads to a very compelling argument 
that Rome did the same. 
At this time Hannibal began a series of operations by which he dictated the course 
of the war until his recall to Affica by the Carthaginian senate. He planned to cut off 
Rome's supply and strength at the source by taking the war to Italy. Carthage's only 
course of action precluded using the enemy's own resources against him. His chances of 
reaching Italy must have seemed insignificant to Rome, land routes were lengthy and 
difficult through wild and unfiiendly territory and the dominance of the Roman fleet 
protected the sea. Additionally Hannibal had learned fi7om the I't Roman War that outside 
of Italy the Romans proved nearly irresistible. 
Rome felt with their superiority at sea, they could choose the field of battle, 
embarking with one army to Spain and another to Sicily. Rome had at least two hundred 
181 polybius, The Histories 3.17.5-6. 
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and twenty quinqueremes in commission in 218 B. C., 182 of which sixty accompanied 
Consul P. Cornelius Scipio as far as the mouth of the Rh6ne then embarked on to Spain 
with his brother. The remaining one hundred and sixty went straight to Sicily under the 
command of the second consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus. 
In contrast Carthage had fifty quinqueremes based in Spain. However, eighteen of 
these were unmanned. 183 Livy states twenty more ships were sent to raid Italy, 184 while 
thirty-five were sent on to western Sicil Y. 
185 There is also evidence Carthage probably had 
more ships operating in the waters off Sicily in 219, since Polybius indicates Carthage 
sent an additional seventy ships to Sardinia in 217.186 These figures indicate that Carthage 
had between fifty and one hundred fewer warships than Rome in 218 B. C. Livy points out 
that Rome knew of their decisive naval superiority, 187 and considering Hannibal's 
dispositions to protect Spain and Aftica, he must have known it as weff. 
The omission of a strong navy where Carthage had until then considered essential, 
may be the reason Roman historians have thought Carthage deliberately withheld support 
Jr- - tFom Hannibal. However, Hannibal decidedly renounced naval warfare by virtue of the 
very principles of his strategy. He dared not risk his invasion fleet being intercepted at 
sea; therefore, the Carthaginian navy did not enter into his immediate strategic plans. He 
felt Rome, a land-based power, could only be conquered on land, but this assumption was 
only valid where a victory could be obtained rapidly. Coupled with his perception that he 
182 Polybius, The 4istories, 3.4.1.2. 
183 polybiUS, The Histories 3.33.4. 
184 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita 21.49.2. 
185 Ad Urbe Condit& 21.49.4. 
186 polybiUS, The Histories, 3.96.8. 
187 Ad Urbe Condita, 21.17.8 & 21.214. LiN, y,, 
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would find allies among the Celts in northern Italy upon his arrival, Hannibal's decision 
to invade Italy by land can be seen as based on sound strategic thinking, while his 
preparations bear all the hallmarks of careful planning. 
Hannibal took sole responsibility for attacking Saguntum - the catalyst for the war 
-a decision, which the Carthaginian senate approved by accepting its consequences. 
Margaret Thatcher correctly stated, "Consensus is the absence of leadership. " 188 A 
decision made by taking a vote alone or making a compromise until consent is achieved 
lacks true leadership. Although the senate's approval may have had a critical bearing on 
Hannibal's thinking, he bore the ultimate responsibility for the outcome. Even if the 
Carthaginian senate preferred to fight a defensive war in Spain or to back down and not 
fight at all, Hannibal, due to his family's conquests, knew successful wars needed to be 
fought offensively and the time was right to begin the endeavour. Carthage only saw the 
political and economic situation while as commander Hannibal witnessed the big picture 
on the front lines of the conflict. Still, it was Hannibal, with the backing of common 
people, who brought the war to Rome. Further proof of Hannibal's lead and Carthaginian 
acceptance is seen when Hannibal concludes the alliance with Philip V of Macedonia in 
216 B. C. 
Yet, what would have been the outcome for Carthage if Hannibal had never lived? 
Without Hannibal Carthage would have controlled only a portion of southern Spain, 
Saguntum would never have been an issue, and all conflicts with Rome would have been 
fought defensively in Spain, almost certainly followed later in Affica. Rome would have 
taken Corsica then Spain. When Rome attacked Macedonia, Carthage most likely would 
have sided with Philip V and the catalYst would have opened for Rome to attack Carthage 
188A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robert E. Lee: Leadcrship Lessons for the Outaimned. Outnumbered, and 
Underfimnced (Paramus, NJ, 2000), page 67. 
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on its homeland. The consequences would have been similar, but the outcome worse for 
Carthage. With the battles fought on the African homeland, instead of in Italy, the 
devastation to Carthage doubtless would have been much greater. Most of al-I there would 
have been no Hannibal to pull the people together after the defeat at Cannae, no reforms 
to the goverment, and perhaps, an earlier destruction of Carthage. 
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Chapter 11 
Now that we have considered the cultural envirom-nent and conditions surrounding 
Hannibal's youth, it is possible to see how, and where, he intended to focus his attention. 
At first he set his sights on the continued conquests in Spain and the fbrther consolidation 
of Carthaginian control on the peninsula. Due to the agreement made between Hasdrubal 
D- 
and Rome, Hannibal was very careful to extend that authority no farther than the Ebro 
river in the northern part of Spain. He planned once all of Spain had been subjugated to 
Carthaginian control - or at least those parts that could benefit the Carthaginian people - 
to set his sights on fighting the wrongs imposed on his family and his city by Rome. 
Once thought-out, an important observation becomes obvious: Hannibal did not 
cause the second war with Rome. But for the most part Rome did so by the imposition of 
unfair additional terms upon Carthage at a time when she could do nothing to prevent 
them. Because of this Hannibal's personal animosity towards Rome did increase the 
desire of the Carthaginian people to act against growing Roman power in the Western 
Mediterranean. However, the evidence suggests that he did not allow his personal 
emotions to outweigh the rational decision to attack Rome. 
First,, understanding that Saguntum was a "friend" of Rome, if not an actual ally, 
could be used to his advantage. The Ebro treaty specifies that the Carthaginians may not 
travel farther north than the Ebro river "under arms,, " 189 but makes no such statement 
about the Romans going farther south. The assumption that such a restriction was placed 
on both Carthage and Rome has been the popular view taken by historians and is in fact 
189 Polvbius. The Histories, 2.13.7. 
KoLkouýwvov 'lpq pa noTocýtov ouK &&t KccpX7j8ovtouq sat noýxpk )) 8t(xpoLtvFtv ...... & F. W. 
Walbank, A Historical Conunentary on Polybius, Vol. 1. pages 168-172. 
83 
in error. 190 Although it is true that the Carthaginians may have seen the Ebro treaty in the 
same light as historians, the term, to them, may have been implied not specified. When 
the Romans used the Saguntines as a tripwire for further military advances by Carthage, it 
could have been seen as a possible slight to them and to Hannibal personally, as it was his 
family who had command and near autonomous control over the Iberian Peninsula. 
To rectify the situation and to take advantage of an unforeseen situation, that of 
both Rome's consuls being sent on campaign in Elyria, Hannibal attacked Saguntum 
knowing the Romans could offer no effectual assistance. He also knew attacking the city 
would oblige Rome to help their "friend"' or leave them to the fate of being conquered by 
Carthage. If they provided no help, Rome could expect its international standing to 
honour fhendships to be viewed in the same light as the Native Americans eventuafly saw 
treaties made by the United States government - they were worth only the paper they 
were written upon. 
Thus, the Roman embassy's choice to the Carthaginian senate was not a choice at 
all: surrender Hannibal or face war. The Carthaginian people chose war. Now that the 
war was official, Hannibal set in motion his plans and strategy to gain control of Rome. 
First and foremost he knew that the war must be taken to Rome's doorstep in Italy if it 
had any chance of being won. The end result was a brilliant strategy to attack the Roman 
Alliance, by land, in a lightening quick strike therefore subjecting the Romans to military 
defeats the like of which they had never seen in order to break up the Afliance and force 
Rome to submit to the will of Carthage. 
This chapter looks into the causes of the War and then into Hannibal's strategy. 
All of the details which Hannibal would have needed to undertake and understand before 
190 j. pich. "The Origins of the Second Punic War", pages 20-2 1. 
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setting out on such an outlandish plan will be discussed, particularly the Roman Alliance 
System, which he intended to break up and eventually failed to accomplish. 
The Causes for the 2 nd Roman War 
Although most historians credit Hannibal's attack and capture of the Iberian port- 
city of Saguntum in 219 B. C. as the immediate cause for Carthage's second war with 
Rome, it merely marked the formal outbreak of hostilities between Carthage and Rome. 
By using accounts of the South's attack on Fort Sumter on the 12'hof April, 1861 we can 
understand how Saguntum actually symbolizes the commencement rather than the reason 
for the conflict. After a brief, thirty-four hour bombardment, where not a single human 
life was lost during the fighting, the small Union garrison surrendered a position of 
questionable military value to either side. However, it is Fort Sumter's association with 
the War Between the States first and foremost,, as does Saguntum with the 2nd Roman 
War, which gives both their symbolic dimension and far outweighs either's military 
significance. Even though the attack on the fort was the first notable clash of arms 
between the newly formed Confederacy and the Union, the battle served as a catalyst just 
as Saguntum. did and marked a transition from the period of precarious peace that 
accompanied the initial secession of seven Deep South states from the Union to the four 
protracted years of bloodshed and devastation. Seen in this context it is easy to 
extrapolate the ensuing development between Carthage and Rome after Saguntum. 
D- ') 
Rome s behaviour towards Carthage in the years following the peace settlement of 
the I' Roman War sowed the seeds of hate and fanned the flames for revenge. Although 
Roman demands to end hostilities in 241 B. C. included the loss of Sicily and an 
enormous indemnity of 4000 talents at once and an additional 2,200 talents over ten 
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years, 191 Rome's actions in the three years following the end of the I" Roman War 
prompted the Barcas' undying em-nity. 
Apparently, Rome looked at the strategic value of Sardinia as a threat to her deep- 
water shipping lanes and added a clause to the existing treaty with Carthage, requiring the 
Carthaginians to evacuate Sardinia and pay Rome additional reparations In the amount of 
1,200 talents of silver, 192 in what I perceive as an effort to further cripple Carthage's 
ability to recover economically. To show this we need to take a look at the consequences 
when the United States Congress passed a stiff protective tariff law in 1828 to levy duty 
on all imported manufactured goods. As long as the Southern states enjoyed free trade 
with Europe, unhampered by tariffs and duties, the fledgling industrial economy of the 
Northern states suffered. The contention being that if tariffs made it too costly for 
Southerners to purchase European goods, they would be forced to deal with the industrial 
complex of the Northern states, causing a situation where Europe would buy less of the 
South's raw materials, and in turn crippling the Southern economy. 
When Rome seized Sardinia from Carthage, technically breaking the peace treaty 
of 241 that ended the I't Roman War, Carthage tried to reoccupy the island, resulting in 
an ultimatum by Rome. Because of the Carthaginians weakened state, Rome immediately 
followed with a new addition to the treaty, possession of Corsica. Polybius understood the 
Carthaginians had no options and were forced to agree "contrary to all justice, and merely 
because the occasion permitted it, were forced to evacuate Sardinia and pay the additional 
191 Polybius, The Histories, 3.27.1-6. 
W. V. Harris. War and ImMrialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B. C. (Oxford, 1979), page 191 & 201 
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sum. "193 He asserts that Rome had shown its hostile intent with the seizure of Sardinia 
and the harsh tribute terms placed on Carthage, for which "it is impossible to discover any 
reasonable pretext or cause. ,, 
194 But it is clear that Polybius thought the causes of the 
second war most likely rested with Rome in stating the following: 
"rherefore, if we take the destruction of Saguntum to be the cause of the war we 
must allow that the Carthaginians were in the wrong in beginning the war, both In 
view of the treaty of Lutatius, in which it was stipulated that the allies of each 
should be secure from attack by the other, and in view of the convention made 
with Hasdrubal., by which the Carthaginians undertook not to cross the Ebro in 
arms. If, however, we take the cause of the war to have been the robbery of 
Sardinia and the tribute then exacted, we must certainly confess that they had 
good reason for entering on the Hannibalic war, since having yielded only to 
circumstances, they now availed themselves of circumstances to be avenged on 
those who had injured them. "19' 
193 Polybius, The Histories 3.28.2. 
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The second item in the preceding passage is especially interesting in view of the 
fact that it confirms Sardinia along with the annexation of Corsica to be the primary cause 
of the second war with Rome. Rather than accept the idea of Carthaginian hostility at 
Saguntum, Sicily along with Sardinia and Corsica turned out to be the very foundation for 
Rome's overseas empire. 196 The Romans persisted in their need to control these strategic 
land bases because merchant vessels escorted by warships needed to be able to beach or 
enter a harbour at short intervals. Control of beaches and harbours along an intended 
route allowed uninterrupted and unmolested movement of the fleet. The addition of 
Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica created Roman domination over the beaches and harbours 
from Spain to Italy and Africa to Italy. Rome now controlled the strongest naval fleet in 
the Mediterranean area and her shipping lanes were unopposed. These overseas territories 
had served Carthage's commercial interests, allowing them to control the terms under 
w. c they and other traders operated. The loss would have been a grievous blow to their 
economy as well as their pride. The Carthaginian people now collectively shared 
Hamilcar's anger and determination, which reflects as Polybius insists that the Barcas and 
the Carthaginian community were in agreement in their attitude towards Rome and the 
renewal of the war. '97 
Pkaxpav-raq. " & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Conunegtwy on Po , Vol. 1, page 358. See also, I Rich, 
"The Origins of the Second Punic War", page 8. 
196 N. Bagnall, The Punic Wars, pages 123-125. 
197 Polybius, The Histories. 3.32.7 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentaly on Polybiu , Vol. 1, pages 
360-361. 
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The Ebro Treaty and Sardinia vs. Saguntum'98 
As discussed in chapter one the Carthaginians selected Hamilcar Barca to bring 
Carthage back to its previously status in the Mediterranean. We are told he proceeded to 
conquer a substantial empire in the valley of the Baetis (Guadalquivir) and along the coast 
east from Gades. Cassius Dio notes the Roman Senate sent an embassy to Hamilcar to 
CC ext icaraowozei' in 231 B. C, though they apparently decided no direct action needed 
to be taken. 199 But even the embassy determined Hamilcar's activities were not 
fraudulent, the fact that Rome sent a delegation at all is clear argument that they were 
concerned by Carthage's expansionist activities as early as 23 1. 
With the death of Hamilcar, Hasdrubal the Fair continued to consolidate 
Carthaginian interests upon taking command. Although Rome remained indifferent to the 
increasing military strength under Hasdrubal, the city of Massilia became highly 
suspicious of Carthaginian expansion due to its own economic interests in Spain. 200 As an 
19" For a similar view on the following, see J. S. Richardson, The Romans in Spain (Oxford, 1996), pages 
16-24. For ftu-ther details on the Ebro treaty, see I. S. Richardson, Hiýpaniae, pages 20-28. For a view of the 
causes ftom a distinctly Roman point of view, see I Briscoe, "The Second Punic War", The Cambrid y,. e 
Ancient History: Vol. VIII Rome and the Mediteffancan to 133 B. C. 2 nd Edition, A. E. Austin, et al. eds. 
(Cambridge, 1989), pages 44-47. 
199 Cassius Dio, Roman HisIM, Vol. 11, trans. E. Cary, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1914), 
Book 7, Frag. 48. "spy out", N. J. E. Austin and N. B. Rankov, Eploratio: MjUt M and Political Intelligen 
in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople (London, 1995), page 91 & J. 
Rich, "The Origins of the Second Punic War", page 2. 
200 MaSSilia Very likely prompted both the 231 and 226 embassies; Massilia was the greatest trading city of 
the northwestern Mediterranean andregarded as one of the best inforjued. See Livy, Ad Urbe Condita 
27.36.1-2. 
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ally of Rome Massilia made such intelligence available to Rome '20' and 
it was probably 
in response to their warnings that Rome intervened in 226 to limit his advance northward. 
The subsequent treaty implies the Gallic invasion of Italy was imminent when the treaty 
was concluded and that invasion took place in 225, so the treaty was probably concluded 
in 226 or early 225.202 
The only provision of the treaty mentioned by Polybius is that the Carthaginians 
were not to cross the Ebro for war,, and in his first reference he states, "... in which no 
mention was made of the rest of Spain. ). )203 If the primary function of the Ebro river in the 
treaty between Rome and Carthage was to act as a line cutting across the peninsula, then 
it was merely an attempt by the Roman Senate to separate the Carthaginians from the 
Gauls. There is no reason to believe the treaty described by Polybius was anything other 
than a limitation on the movement of the Carthaginian army; and, Rome's intention of 
keeping Carthage separated from Gaul proved to be correct tactic. 204 
The implications of the treaty neither claimed the area north of the Ebro as 
belonging to Rome, nor control of the territory south of the river to Carthage. 
Nevertheless, Polybius is explicit in his assessment that the only provision relating to 
Spain was the prohibition on the Carthaginians crossing the Ebro for war; they were not 
restricted from crossing the Ebro for commerce and nothing was said about their position 
20' Later, the Massaliots confmned Hannibal had crossed the Pyrenees and was raising troops in Gaul. See 
Polybius, The ffistories, 3.15,1-2. 
202 Polybius, The Histories, 2.13 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commeplqly on Polybius Vol. 1, pages 
167-172. 
'03 Polybius, The Historics, 2.13.7. "ev oLtqrqv ýLcv (xkkTjv'lpnpt(xv napeutonow", F. W. Walbank, A 
Histori al C ýnmentarv on PoMius, Vol. 1, pages 168-172 & IS. Richardson, fliýpaniae, pages 25-26. 
2o-i polvbIUS attributes the co-operation of the Gauls with Hannibal reaching Italy and conducting the war 
there. See Polybius, The Histories 3.34.4-5. 
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in Spain south of the Ebro. Further, no restriction was placed on the Romans in respect to 
Spain- Other later sources give us the impression that the treaty in which the ban on 
crossing the Ebro applied to both sides, but these versions also include a guarantee for 
Sagunturn, which is clearly inaccurate . 
20' A provision prohibiting one party from crossing 
a specific fine was a common feature in Roman treaties. For example, the Romans had 
accepted such restrictions themselves in their first two treaties with Carthage and they 
imposed them on the other party in their peace treaties with the Illyrians in 228.206 
Hasdrubal may have thought it would do no harm to agree to the terms of the 
treaty since the choice of the Ebro only makes sense in terms of the interests of Massilia 
and would have protected Massilia's two colonies in Spain north of the Ebro, Emporion 
207 
and Rhode., from Carthagini'an attack. However, the Romans would never have agreed 
to terms of a treaty that did not benefit their interests by restricting the Carthaginian 
military's advance in Spain. Virtually all scholars believe the Romans exacted the 
restriction that the Carthaginians would not cross the Ebro under arms because they were 
afraid Hasdrubal might combine with the Gauls in their imminent invasion. Thus, the 
treaty shows Roman distrust of the Barcid family" s expansion in Spain, rather than the 
establishment of a Roman presence south of the Pyrenees. Polybius was right about what 
prompted the Romans to conclude the treaty: concern about the growth of Carthaginian 
power. As his account suggests, the foundation of Carthago Nova with its potential as 
205 Livy, Ad Urbe Coodi ýta, 21.2.7; 18.9; Appian, Roman Histoly: The Wars in Spain, trans. H. White, Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1912), 7.11 &I Rich, "The Origins of the Second Punic War", page 
2. 
206polybius.. The Histories. 2.12.3 & 3.22.4-7 and F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commeataly on Polybius. 
Vol. 1. pages 165 & 341-34-3. 
207 J. S. Richardsm WwWae page 27. 
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both a n-fflitary and naval base may have been the catalyst for the treaty. And although the 
treaty did not prevent the carthaginians, from consolidating their power south of the Ebro, 
it did prevent them from expanding north to the Pyrenees where either on their own or in 
concert with the Gauls they might constitute a direct threat to Rome. 208 
If Carthage had no plans to expand beyond the Ebro, then Carthaginian interests 
were not affected by the treaty; however, Rome by forming a link with an Iberian 
community south of the Ebro indicates an altogether different matter, Polybius tells us the 
people of Saguntum had positioned themselves as a "friend" of the Roman people by 226. 
Though it is possible since Sagunturn was an ally of Massilia who indeed was a "friend" 
of Romel the "friendship" with Saguntum may have been implied by way of Massilia 
rather than a factual fiiendship between the two cities of Saguntum and Rome. If they 
established the association as early as 226 it might explain the Carthaginian acquiescence 
as long as Rome did not use the relationship to further interfere in Spain. Nevertheless it 
is clear the opportunity proved too tempting for Rome to resist. Through their friendship 
with the Saguntines, the Romans used Saguntum as a forward position to watch over 
Carthaginian expansion in southern and eastern Spain. The connection with Saguntum did 
not involve a breach of the Ebro treaty, however, it did escalate the tension between 
Rome and Carthage. It seems the Saguntines sent several warnings about Carthage to 
Rome without actively eliciting a response until Hannibal succeeded command in 
Spain. 209 
After the assassination of Hasdrubal in 221 B. C., the Carthaginian senate quickly 
confirmed Hannibal as his successor, and the next generation of the Barca family 
208 Livy. Ad Urbe Condita, 18.4.2 & 50.8-9. 
2og polybius, The Histories 3.15.1-2 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentýjy on PoMius, Vol. 1. pages 
319-320. 
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continued the path towards war with Rome. "From the day on which he was proclaimed 
commander-in-chief, " Livy alleges "as though Italy had been assigned to him for his field 
of operations and he had been instructed to make war on Rome ... [Hannibal] resolved 
upon attacking the Saguntines. "210 Although this statement is clearly open to question, it 
is evident he did in fact immediately set out to extend Carthaginian influence in Spain by 
bringing the neighbouring tribes under his control, and in doing so he rapidly advanced 
north towards the Ebro. As previously noted Hannibal could not help but be influenced by 
the wrath (Ovpoý) felt by his father against Rome; consequently, his determination to 
renew the conflict when a suitable opportunity arose is beyond speculation. 211 
In 220 B. C. he initiated a series of attacks on the Vaccaei - inhabitants of the 
middle stretch of the Duero. After capturing Sadmautica and Arbucale, he was attacked 
on his return to Carthago Nova by the Carpetani, who occupied the very center of Spain 
around Toleturn on the Tagus. After withdrawing across the Tagus he slaughtered the 
Carpetani using forty elephants along with his cavalry. He appears to have crossed the 
Sierra Morena by both the Valdapenas Pass and the Penarray Pass. With his victory 
against the Carpetani, except for Saguntum and the territory held by the Celtiberians on C) 
the upper portion of the Douro and Tagus, Spain belonged to the Carthaginians up to the 
Ebro. 
21 0 Livy, Ad Urbc Co !, 21.5.1. "Cctcrwil cx quo die dux est dcclaratus, velut Italia ei provincia decreta 
hA lumque Romanum mandatum esset, Sa guntinis infcffc bellum statuit. "' The term provincia is used by 
Livy in the Rom= cOlItext of a sphere of command. See also, K. Lomas, Roman Ltal 338 B. C. -AD 200: A 
SourccbQok (London, 1996). page 22. 
211 polybius, The I-listories 3.9.6 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommentM on PoLybius Vol. 1, pages 
312-313. 
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Saguntum was of extreme strategic importance to Hannibal's growing power, for 
he could not ignore the hostile Saguntines if he intended to advance past Saguntum up the 
narrow coastal plain to the Ebro . 
212 This approach offered Rome the chance to restrict 
Carthage's expansion by imposing a lin-fit on their coastal advance at Sagunturn, nearly 
150 km south of the Ebro. And according to Polybius, Hannibal regarded Saguntum in 
this light; and because of this, carefully avoided any interference with the city while he 
expanded his control of the central areas of Spain south of the Ebro- 213 By contrast in 
strictly military terms, Fort Sumter scarcely merits attention; however, in psychological 
terms the value of the fort proved to be the culmination of the North's attempt to collect 
import tariffs on the state of South Carolina. Having declared their state and independent 
republic, the South Carolinians resented the presence of a foreign flag in their harbour 
and looked upon Major Robert Anderson's December 26,1860 move to Fort Sumter from 
Fort Moultrie as an act of aggression. 214 Surely the only city South of the Ebro in Roman 
hands would have not only been resented by Hannibal but seen as Roman encroachment 
on Carthaginian terfitory. 
In the winter of 220/219 a serious dispute broke out in the city of Saguntum 
between a faction favouring support fi7om Rome and another preferring Carthage. The 
pro-Roman group caRed upon the Roman Senate to arbitrate the dispute and dispatched a 
delegation to Italy with warnings of Hannibal's threat to the security of the area. When 
'12 J. Rich, "The Origins of the Second Punic War", pages 27-28, For a counter argument to the importance 
of Saguntum for the Carthaginians, see W. V. Harris, War and IMMrialism in Republican Rome 327-70 
B. C. pages 200-205. 
ý on P-ffiius Vol. L page 213 Polybius. The Histories, 3.15.9-10 & F. W. Walbank, A Mstorical CommenLan 01 
323 
21 4R. N. Current The Confedepa (New York, 1993), page 224; W. & B. Catton, Two Roads to Sumter 
(New YoTk. 1963). page 278. 
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Rome responded to their pleas by sending a group of Roman ambassadors to mediate, a 
number of pro-Carthagmian citizens were executed. When the Confederate government 
established early on a policy with regard to the two principal forts remaining under 
Federal control in the seceded states, the retention of these forts became a test of 
credibility to the defenders of the Union, while their acquisition became essential for the 
Confederacy to claim the full rights of a sovereign nation. 215 On February 15,1861, the 
Provisional Congress in Montgomery resolved, "Immediate steps should be taken to 
obtain possession of Forts Sumter and Pickens ... either 
by negotiations or force. , 216 For 
that reason, President Jefferson Davis sent three peace commissioners to Washington 
D. C. to negotiate with the Lincoln administration. While the month of March dragged on 
Justice Campbell reported to the Confederate peace delegation that Secretary Seward had 
assured him of the president's intention to evacuate the fort, but the delegates noticed an 
increased military buildup in Washington. 217 
In the same manner, a Roman delegation, possibly the same ambassadors sent to 
Saguntum, arrived in Carthago Nova with demands that Hannibal forego intervention into 
I 
the internal affairs of Saguntum and abide by the treaty of 226. Hannibal indignantly 
asserted that pro-Carthaginian citizens had been killed, obliging him to uphold the justice 
of their cause. He lectured the ambassadors on the Carthaginian tradition of taking up the 
causes of victims of injustice, stating he would continue to honour that tradition in 
Spain; 2 "' and followed that Saguntum would not be protected by their friendship with 
21S R-N. Current, The Confede , page 524. 
'16 R. N. Current, The Confede , pages 224-225. 
217 M. A. Grissom, Southern by the Grace of pages 102-103. 
'18 Polybius, The Histones. 3.15.7 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on PoLybius, Vol. 1, page 
322 
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Rome as long as they continued to persecute those under the protection of Carthage. 
While both the North and South waited for a resolution of their standoff, President 
Lincoln sent a political ally to Charleston to determine the attitude of the people. Not 
surprisingly he found the Charlestonians solidly opposed to the Federal government and 
that they would look upon any effort to send military provisions to Union troops at Fort 
Sumter as an act of war. Because of this, historical evidence points to the conclusion that 
it was Lincoln's intention for the war to start at Fort Sumter, and we can postulate it was 
D- 219 
Rome s aim for the war with Carthage to begin at Saguntum. 
A rk 
Auer hearing Rome's ultimatum in the winter of 220/219, Hannibal sent for 
instructions from the Carthaginian senate. Polybius criticizes Hannibal's request to 
Carthage for instructions in dealing, with Rome on the grounds that the Saguntines were 
attacking Carthaginian subjectS, 220 which took little into account of the practicalities of 
the situation- 
"Being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent anger, he did not 
allege the true reasons, but took refuge in groundless pretexts, as men are wont to 
do who disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion. How much 
better would it have been for him to demand from the Romans the restitution of 
Sardinia, and at the swne time of the tribute which they had so unjustly exacted, 
availing themselves of the misfortunes of Carthage, and to threaten war In the 
event of refusal! But as it was, by keeping silent as to the real cause and by 
inventing a non-existmg one about Saguntum, he gave the idea that he was 
219 M. A. Grissom, Southern -by 
the Grace of page 103. 
220 As Harris states, "Rome may in fact have encouraged the Saguntines to behave aggressively. " W. V. 
Harris, War and IMMrialism in Roublican Rome 327-70 B. C. page 202. See also, N. Bagnall, The Punic 
Wa-rs, page 151; T. A. Dorcy and D. R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, , pages 
33-34 & J. F. Lazenby, 
Hannibal'ý -W8T, page 
25. 
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entering on the war not only unsupported by reason but without justice on his 
Side. )1221 
Whether fact or not, theoretically the Roman delegation left Carthago Nova 
convinced Hannibal could not be reasoned with and war an inevitable outcome. In their 
subsequent report to the Senate, the Roman ambassadors described Hannibal as obsessed 
by his hatred for all Romans and they found him to be in a state "full of martial 
ar ouf". 222 Hannibal's perverseness must have been comparable to Davis when Lincoln 
rebuffed the Confederate peace negotiations by announcing that twelve vessels with a 
force of 285 guns and 2,400 men had sailed for Fort Sumter. 223 Davis received word from 
President Lincoln that "provisions would be sent to Sumter peaceably, otherwise by 
force. -)-Y224 In much the same way the Roman envoy presented the Carthaginian Senate an 
equally unacceptable alternative-. Hannibal and his staff were to be sent to Rome for trial 
221 Polybius, The HistoriesY 3.15.9-11. 
"KOLOOkOU 8' IJV TCktjpljý; Uk(Yytaý KOUL 01)ýIOU PVXI. OV" 810KOUTOUL; Pf-V UkTIOWOU; OUTIM; OXYK FXPYI'CO, 
KGCT6+F-UYC 6' Stq 7tpO+UCFEtq OUXO'YOUý- OCIM() 6t(j)O(X(Tt 7tOt6tV Ot 610C TOCq 7Ef)OE7KOC07jPCV(Xq OCUTOtq 
op4()Lq oktyo)poj)VTSý'rOl-) MXOTIKOVTOý. ROCKO 7(XP IJV ()4t6tVOV Otp-oo(Xt 6Etv 'P(qtatouý ocno6ouvoct 
Gýtut Y, (XP60voc rcoct Touq F-nt'ToLXOF-VUoLq oLýLa TOCUTIJ ýOpoul;, ol-)ý Tolq K(Xtpolq, cTl)vF-71tosýIFVOI 
71"F, POV CC8tK(üý 7rOtf)'(X1)TfflV P-2, (XßoV- Fr, 5s ýt-q, ýavott 7roýzgllcyFtv; VI)v ö& TTJV WV 01-)Gav ott'tt(XV 
0601OWnV 7EOtPCC(Yt(j)7EWV, TTIV 6' OUX U710CPXOUCYaV Mpt ZOLK(XVOOCtO)V RkaTTO)V, OU 40VOV OCkOYO)q, 
, xy on 
67EI & 4010V OL61KO); KOLT(XPXFtV F. (50KFt'UOU WkE40U. " & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommeAta 
Polybius Vol. 1. page 323. 
222 Polybius, The Histories, 3.15.6. "o 6''AvvtpUq, UTZ VF-Oq 49V WV, 7tk'npTlq 66 7EOkF-ýItK'qq OP47lq 
F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommepLaa on Poj3tius, Vol. 1, pages 321-322. See I Rich, "The Origins of 
the Second Punic War", page 5 for an argument against the Roman delegation even being sent to Hannibal. 
223 M. A. Grissom, Southern by the Grace of page 104. 
114 R. N. Current, The Confederacy, page 224. 
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thereby accepting that Hannibal had attacked Saguntum of his own volition . 
225 If 
Carthage disowned Hannibal, they would not declare war. 226 In the subsequent quote Livy 
sets the stage for a dramatic scene between the Roman ambassador and the Carthagiruan 
senate, creatively confirming the time for diplomacy had passed - 
'I'hen the Roman, gathering up his toga into a fold, said 'We bring you here both 
war and peace; choose which you will! ' When he had said these words, they cried 
out with no less truculence that he might give them whichever he liked, and on 
his shaking out the fold agam, and announci that he gave them war, thev all Ing 
replied that they accepted it, and in that same spirit in which they accepted it were 
resolved to wage it . 
-)-)227 
There were two opinions on the question of war within the Carthaginian senate. 
Hanno led a minority faction representing the oligarchy Livy speaks of "A few, and these 
included nearly all the best men, supported Hanno, 1-)228 who opposed the war as they had 
opposed Hamilcar's expansionist policies in Spain. He proposed a compromise where 
Hannibal would be removed from command and banished, further admonishing the senate 
that Hamilcar Barca possessed the son and so long as one Barca liVed there would be no 
peace with Rome; and in fact, at that very moment Hannibal was leading them toward 
225 See G. de Beer, Hannibal: The Struggle for Power in the MeditegaAean, pages 108-114 and T. A. Dodge, 
Hannibal, pages 157-162 for a synopsis of the siege of Saguntuni. 
226LiN-Nr, Ad Urbe Condita, 2 1.10. 
227 Livy, AdUrbeCondi 21.18.13-14, "Tuni Romanus sinu ex toga facto , -Iic, inquit 'vobis bellum et 
pacem portamus: utruin placet sumite! ' Sub hanc vocem haud minu-s ferociter, daret utrum vellet, 
succlamatum, est-, ct cum is iterum sinu efluso bellum dare dixisset, accipere se omnes responderunt et 
quibus acciperent animis iisdem se gesturos. " 
I's - Livv. Ad Urbe Condita, 21.4.1. "Pauci ac fertne OPtimus quisque hannoni adsentiebantur-. 
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war. 229 He further admonished, "Your armies now invest Saguntum, which the treaty 
. ))230 forbids them to approach... But this supposed provision in the treaty as we have 
discussed is fictional and more than likely helped Livy's allegation of considerable 
opposition to Hannibal in Carthage. 
The opposing faction, a more populist-majority party, supported Hannibal's 
antagonism towards Rome largely due to what the Barcas had accomplished in Spain and 
gave their verbal support to deal with the problem as he saw fit. In a later diplomatic 
exchange - the final one - an unnamed Carthaginian senator refers to earlier Roman 
violations, furiously concludes, "Cease then to prate of Saguntum and the Ebro, and bring 
forth at last the thought with which your mind has long been in travail ! 1, -)231 In 
Montgomery President Davis and his cabinet met to decide on a course of action prior to 
the arrival of the armed Union fleet at Charleston. Their dilemma was twofold: if the 
Confederates demanded surrender and had to take the fort by force, history would record 
that the South started the war; if they took no action until the massive fleet strengthened 
the fort, an extensive battle would ensue. Weighing the matter heavily, President Davis 
opted for the plan to avoid the most bloodshed - he ordered General Beauregard to take 
the fort as quickly as possible. Davis did not wait for the arrival of Lincoln's expedition 
but, instead, risked the burden of firing the first shot. Once we scrutinize the situation 
objectively no choice was left for the Confederacy or for Carthage. 
Polybius reproduces what he calls the Roman reply to the arguments, which the 
Carthaginians had presented to the embassy, "a reply indeed which they did not make at 
-9 Livy, Ad Utýýndýi 2 1.10. 
230 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.10.5. "Saguntum vestri circumsedent exeTcitus, unde arcentur foedeTe-,... " 
231 Livy, Ad Urbe Copdita, 21.18.12. "'Proinde omittite Sagunti atque 1-hberi mentionem facere et quod diu 
parturit animus vester aliquando pariat! "' 
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the time owing to their indignation at the loss of Saguntum, but it has been given on many 
,, 232 occasions and by many different people at Rome. Erroneously this statement 
maintains that the Carthaginians were bound by the Lutatius Treaty that extended 
protection to Saguntum as a friend of Rome. 233 Yet, upon closer examination we can be 
consider that Polybius in truth viewed the causes to be in the immediate aftermath of the 
I' Roman War and it was the Romans who had wronged Carthage over Sardinia and 
Corsica, causing the Carthaginians quite properly to retaliate when circumstances 
permitted. 234 When scholars investigate the Confederate government's accountability at 
Fort Sumter, it is Lincoln's decisions and motives that have been most closely scrutinized 
for it is obvious that Lincoln was not committed to a peaceable resolution of the crisis. If 
the President truly sought the most peaceable course possible, he would have let Fort 
Sumter go. Since Fort Sumter had no military value, Lincoln could have justified his 
withdrawal on the grounds of military necessity, blaming the previous Buchanan 
administration for handing him the fort in an indefensible condition. Even in sending the 
Sumter expedition, Lincoln could have announced his purpose without also stating that he 
would attempt to reinforce the fort if the provisioning were resisted. When compelled to 
232 Polybius, The Histories, 3.29.1. 
" TOL 6' MEO T040CIOW ýXYOýWWX VIOV F-POUýISV' Otq TOTE ýMV OUK EXPTICTOWTO 6t(X TOV 67CIT71 
Z(XKCLVOCLtO)V OLMAZIOL OUýLOV- kqF--EOLI 156 ItOkkOLKtq KOLI WEO 7COkk(x)V 7EoLp' ()L%), rotq. " & F. W. Walbank 
A Historical Commeptaly on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 356. See I Rich, "The Origins of the Second Punic 
War". page 19 and especially N. J. E. Austin and N. B. Rankov, Ex]ploratio, page 91 for further evidence that 
the Romans did not usually offer military assistance to cities requesting immediate aid. 
233 Polybius, The Histories 3.30. 
234 Polybius, The Historic 3.29.1. Polybius had to be careful how he worded his assertion as his patron was 
a Scipio and his audience was the Roman people. 
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235 fight, Americans claim the high moral ground of defending against aggressors. The 
possibility that either the Lincoln or Davis administrations initiated the war challenges 
long-establi shed and strongly held cultural assumptions; therefore, it was necessary for 
Lincoln's actions to deliberately fix the onus for starting the war on the Confederacy. 
If it was recognized that the war with Rome was merely a response to their seizure 
of Sardinia, it could be seen that the Carthaginians were in the right- 236 However, 
Hannibal had only himself to blame for the fact that Carthage had come to be regarded as 
in the wrong for he himself had rested his case on Saguntum and on that issue Rome had 
the moral advantage since Rome's actions were essentially defensive, in the sense that 
they were prompted by the wish to curb Carthaginian expansion just as Lincoln 
acknowledged the possibility that his policy at Fort Sumter risked conflict. Lincoln 
developed a "strategy of defense", by which he would hold federal property by means 
that would be considered defensive, not coercive. Thus, despite his cabinet's almost 
unanimous approval to withdraw from Sumter, Lincoln formulated the idea of sending in 
provisions and of providing advance notice to the South Carolina government. 237 
In the twentieth century, a critical view of Lincoln's actions gained a wide 
audience through the writings of Charles W. Ramsdell and others. According to 
Ramsdell, the situation at Sumter presented Lincoln with a series of dilemmas. If he took 
action to maintain the fort, he would lose the border South and a large segment of 
235 A. de TocqueNrille, Democlaa in Vol. 11, trans. P. Bradley (London, 1945) originally published 
in 1835 & 1840, pages 264-270. 
236FOr the formality used by the Romans to take Sardinia, see W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in 
Republican Rome 327-70 B. C.. pages 167-168. See also, B. H. Warmington, Carthage, pages 190-191. 
237 K. W. Stampp, IMMriled Union (New York, 1980), pages 163-88 & R. Cuffent, Lincoln and the First 
Shot (New York. 1963). pages 188-194. 
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northern opinion which wanted to conciliate the South. If he abandoned the fort, he 
jeopardized the Union by legitimizing the Confederacy. Lincoln also hazarded losing the 
support of a substantial portion of his own Republican party, and risked appearing a weak 
and ineffective leader. He could escape these predicaments only if he could induce 
southerners to attack Sumter, "to assume the aggressive and thus put themselves in the 
wrong in the eyes of the North and of the world. , 
238 By sending a relief expedition, 
ostensibly to provide food to a hungry garrison, Lincoln turned the tables on the 
Confederates, forcing them to choose whether to permit the fort to be strengthened, or to 
act as the aggressor. By this "astute strategy"., Lincoln manoeuvred the South into firing 
the first shot 71239 just as the Romans pressed the Carthaginians into attacking sagUntUM. 240 
If the Carthaginians had been content to accept the loss of their first overseas 
empire and remain primarily an African power as Hanno's supporters wished, the course 
of events would, possibly, have been that Rome and Carthage would have co-existed for a 
few years longer. Carthage - or at least the faction of the Carthaginian senate who 
supported the Barcas - had not accepted the verdict of the I" Roman War. With the loss 
of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, the new empire in Spain was to equip Carthage for the 
eventual renewal of the conflict. In submitting to Hannibal's judgment, the senate was 
fully cognizant that they would choose to oppose Rome's demands - indeed they could 
hardly do otherwise. They understood that for Carthage to acquiesce to Rome in this 
matter would provide them with a precedent to justify future interference in Spain, which 
238 C. W. Ramsdell, "Lincoln and Fort Sumter", Behind the 
_Lines 
in the Southern Cqnf dera ý, W. H. pý 
Stephenson ed. (New Orleans, LA, 1998), page 286. 
239 C. W. Ramsdell, "Lincoln and Fort Sumtef', pages 259-88. 
2.40 Though it should be noted that the Romans probably did this without knowing the consequences as did 
Lincoln. 
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was as unacceptable to them as to Hannibal. The notion of an embittered and 
economically revived Carthage living in peace alongside a dynamic and expansionist 
D- 
Roman state was as unthinkable as the co-existence of an economically sound 
Confederacy living alongside the expansionism of the Union. 
By exploring President Davis' position it is an easy leap to think Hannibal 
considered the Roman intervention a break of faith not to be ignored regardless of the 
treaty issues involved in the siege of Saguntum. President Davis took the position that the 
Confederate goverment had shown great "forbearance", 241 in trying to reach an equitable 
settlement with the Federal government; however, Lincoln destroyed these efforts by 
sending "a hostile fleet', 242 to Sumter. "The attempt to represent us as the aggressors, " 
Davis argued, "is as unfounded as the complaint made by the wolf against the lamb in the 
familiar fable. He who makes the assault is not necessarily he that strikes the first blow or 
fires the first gun. , 243 If we take into account the Roman policy at this period of time was 
consistently designed to weaken powerful rivals, and once weakened to subject them to 
D- 244 
Roman rule, it is easy to understand why at Saguntum Hannibal decided 'now' not 
'later' to be the time to fight Rome by taking the war to Italy. He was in the prime of 
manhood, a proven tactical leader, and had at his disposal a superb military machine. 
Further, the invasion had to be timed to prevent a Roman invasion of Africa. From Davis' 
241 1 Davis, The Rise and FaH of the Confederate Goverrune Vol. 1 (1990, New York) originafly 
published in 188 1, page 289. 
242 1 Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Govcrnmený Vol. 1, page 290. 
243 1 Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. 1, page 290. 
2-14 A Strong case can be made for this statement, see I. Moms, "Forward, The Ancient Econo , M. I. 
FinleNI, Updated Edition (Berkeley, CA. 1999), page xxiii and M. Fredcriksen. "Theory. Evidence and the 
Ancient Economy", Journal ofRoman Studies, VOL. 65 (1975), pages 164-17 1. For a counter-argument, see 
W. V. Harris, War and Impgrialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B. C. page 192. 
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Point of view, to permit the strengthening of Fort Sumter, even if done in a peaceable 
manner, meant the continued presence of a hostile threat to Charleston and the rest of 
South Carolina. Further, although the ostensible purpose of the expedition was to re- 
supply, not reinforce the fort, the Confederacy had no guarantee that Lincoln would abide 
by his word. And even if he restricted his actions to re-supply in this case, what was to 
prevent him from attempting to reinforce the fort in the future? Therefore, the attack on 
Fort Sumter was a measure of "defense". 245 To acquiesce in the fort's relief, even at the 
risk of firing the first shot, (. would have been as unwise as it would be to hesitate to strike 
down the arm of the assailant, who levels a deadly weapon at one's breast, until he has 
actually fired. )-)246 
Polybius and Livy are inexact about dates-, Livy left uncertain the year of the 
Saguntine campaign, whether 220 or 219, though he finafly opts for 2 19.247 Hi s reason 
for doing so is a fact on which he and Polybius agree, that the siege of Saguntum lasted 
about eight months . 
248 Accepting this duration as valid, Hannibal would not have 
assembled his army and moved against Saguntum in midwinter; therefore, the siege 
cannot have begun before the spring of 219. It then dragged on until the end of the year, 
possibly into early 218. If the siege began in April, it lasted until about November; if it 
did not begin until July, it must have lasted into January. After the city fell., he led his 
army back to winter quarters in Carthago Nova, consistent with this estimated dating. He 
245 W. & B. Catton. Two Roads to Sumte page 278. 
246 1 Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Goverment, Vol. 1, pages 299-295. 
24' Livy, Ad Urbe Condita 21.5; amended in 21.15. 
248 Livv, Ad Urbe Condita, 2.3-15.2,21.7.4-9, & 21.15; Polybius, The Histories, 3.17 & F. W. Walbank, A 
Histori4 Commentar on PoL)tius, Vol. 1, pages 327-328, EY -- 
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almost immediately dismissed the Spanish troops to home leave . 
249 And, Livy, in a 
speech given by Hannibal to his troops, creates a depiction of the upcoming long 
campaign: 
" 'My allies, I doubt not that you yourselves perceive how., having conquered 
every tribe in Spain, we must either bring our campaigning to a close and disband 
our arnues, or shift the seat of war to other countries. For these nations here will 
enjoy the blessings not merely of peace, but also of victory, only if we look to 
other nations for spoils and glory. Since, therefore, you are on the eve of an 
expedition that Will carry you far afield and it is uncertain when you will see 
aggain your homes and what there is dear to each of you, if any of you desires to 
visit his friends, I grant him furlough. Be at hand, I charge you, with the first 
signs of spring, that with Heaven's good help we may begin a war that shall bring 
us vast renown and booty. ' 
-17250 
Hannibal divided the treasures of Saguntum between his soldiers and sent a large 
portion, along with a contingent of defeated citizens as slaves back to Carthage. When the 
senate saw the wealth from the plunder of Saguntum they were disposed in favour of 
249 Polybius, The Histories,, 3.35.1 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommegIM on Polybius Vol. 1, page 
366 
2'0 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita 2 1.2 1.3 -6. "' Credo ego vos, ' inquit 'socii, et ipsos cernere pacatis omnibus 
HispanJac populis aut finiendani nobis militiain exercitusque dinüttendos esse aut in alias terras 
transferendum bellum; ita enim hae gentes non pacis solum sed etiam victoriae bonis florebunt, si ex aliis 
gentibus praedam. et glonam quaeremus. Itaque cum longinqua a domo instet militia incertum que s1t 
quando domos vestras at quae cuiquc ibi cara simt visuri sitis, si quis vestrum suos inviscre volt, 
commcatum do. Primo vere edico adsitis, ut dis bene iuvtibus bellum ingentis gloriae praedaeque futurum 
incipiwYlus. ", 
105 
Hannibal, thus ensuring their support for his next step. As an astute political, Hannibal 
was intent on beginning the war with the full support of the Carthaginian senate. 
As Hannibal marched from Carthago Nova to Saguntum, the Romans sent two 
consular armies to Illyria . 
25 1 The Romans must have concluded the most immediate 
danger to their interests came from Elyria, rather than Hannibal in Spain. It may be that 
the Romans found themselves with no good options - unwilling to abrogate the affiance 
with Saguntum because of the implied concession to Hannibal, yet unable to reinforce it 
because of over-commitment in Myria. From the Roman point of View, failure to support 
an ally in practice may have been a lesser even than formally abrogating the alliance. This 
position militates against larger objectives by Rome since one does not manufacture a 
pretext for war when unable to act on it. 
Polybius, in his thumbnail sketch of the war in Elyria, indicates the Romans 
undertook the war partly as a preclusive measure to clear the decks for a war against 
Hannibal: "Consequently, the Senate ... 
decided to secure their position in Myria, as they 
foresaw that the war would be serious and long and the scene of it far away from 
home. , 252 If So , they seriously miscalculated the necessity to comn-fit resources in this 
secondary action instead of securing their base against Hannibal. This is especially true in 
the lines immediately preceding those just quoted, where Polybius points out that the 
251 For details of the Illyrian expedition, see N. Bagnall, The Punic Wars., pages 135-141. 
252 Polybius,, The Histories. 3.16.1. 
"AtO K(Xt 7Ef)Oq TOCV)" %? (4)90ý0ýWN'ot TIJ N' 1)7EOOC(YtN' q CYI)YKXIITOq CKf)tVEV OVTýUXUYWTOOCI TOC KOCT(X 
TTIV TO-I)Pt6a 1WT4aT(Y-ý 71POOPOýW-Vl 
6IOT1, PL-YoLq UYTOCI KOU 7EO?, X-)XPOVtOq K(XI ýLUKPOLV OCRO Vjý 
otl. cctocý 0 n0440q. - & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Pol-vbius, Vol. 1. pages 324-325. 
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Romans "supposed they would fight in Spain with SagUntum for a base. 
-)-)253 While Roman 
resources were conunitted to Illyria, they lost that much needed base. If they intended to 
wage war against Hannibal in Spain, the Romans misjudged the situation very badly 
indeed. 
The Illyrian coast offered a perfect sanctuary for pirates who used the Adriatic as 
their personal hunting ground. Although substantial numbers of Roman merchants had 
been killed or captured into slavery, these activities brought little attention to the Roman 
Senate until after the I" Roman War when the complaints became too numerous to 
ignore. Perhaps more importantly, after the Is' Roman War the rapid expansion of 
territory by Elyria indicated a new and potentially hostile state that could become an ally 
of Macedonia. These two dangers were cited by the ancient sources as the principal 
reasons for the Romans to declare war against Illyria in 229 B. C. When Elyria sought 
peace with Rome in the spring of the following year, Queen Teuta lost all her 
southernmost possessions and a number of cities along Illyria's northem coast- Rome 
restored the Greek general Demetrius to his hereditary domain at Pharos with his territory 
formed as a minor state under their protection. By having Demetrius monitor Elyria to the 
west, Rome maintained domination over the coast to the south and established Roman 
authority in the southern Adriatic, thereby erecting an obstacle to Macedonian expansion 
into the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. 
Peace endured for ten years until Demetrius extended his borders, withdrew fi7om 
Rome's protection, and entered into a treaty with Antigonus, King of Macedon while 
Rome concentrated on a war with the Gauls. At the same time Rome sent a stem warning 
'53 Polybius, The Fhstories, 3.15.13. 
-... OLX, V F-V 'Ipllf)tOL9 X()TIM(YOOLt 
& 7[f)Oq TOV 7EO)ý640V Of)47IT71()t() TTI ZoL'c()tVOOctWv 710ýEt-" & F. W. 
Walbank. A Histoncal Commentag on Polybius. Vol. 1. page 324, 
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to Hannibal regarding Saguntum, Demetrius invaded, along with his ally Scerdilaidas, the 
territory of the Atintanes, also under the protection of Rome. After he failed to take the 
Greek port city of Pylos, Demetrius ravaged the Aegean coastline. The Roman response 
was devastating. In 219 two consuls, Lucius Aemilius Paulus, and Marcus Livius 
Salinator, attacked along the Illyrian coast with 20,000 troops. With Rome busy in Elyria, 
Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum. The logistics of sending troops across the Adriatic to 
Illyria is probably the defining reason for Rome's slow response to the Saguntine plight. 
Hannibal's I" Strategy: The Dissolution of the Roman Alliance by Blitzkrieg 
Strategy, narrowly defined, means "the art of the general" (from the Greek 
uTpaz-q, voý). In warfare strategy is the science or art of employing all the military,, 
economic, political, and other resources of a nation to achieve the object of war. In its 
military aspect, the term has to do with stratagems by which a general sought to deceive 
an enemy, with plans he made for a campaign, and with the way he moved and disposed 
his forces in war. Often defmed as the art of projectingand directing campaigns, military 
strategy came to preempt almost the whole field of generalship, short of the battlefield 
itself Strategic intelligence, however, aims at acquiring information that affects the 
conduct and direction of a whole campaign in a region or theatre of war. Its scope extends 
beyond the purview of the purely military. In an attempt to wage a war effectively a 
commander must have knowledge of the enemy that extends into the social, political, and 
economic structure that condition the way his opponents will act in the field as well as 
weaknesses he might exploit to his own advantage. 
254 
Hannibal planned his famous campaigns far ahead and because of this should be 
singled out as a forerunner of the modem art of grand strategy. As important as 
-, 4 N. J. E. Austin & N. B. Rankov, -Exploratio, page 
12. 
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Hannibal's attention to strategic considerations in war and especially to strategic 
approaches to the battlefield may have been, his efforts to probe for Rome"s 
psychological weaknesses and the moral ýdefects of her leadership and less on the physical 
aspects explains why Polybius so admired him. Polybius makes it clear, as does Vegetius, 
that a really experienced and responsible general, HannibaL simply does not move into a 
region which he knows next to nothing about without first obtaining thorough and 
detailed geographical and political intelligence. 
255 
An analysis of the strategic information needed for background planning can be 
ascertained in the parameters given by Caesar for his invasion of Britain in 55 B. C. He 
needed the geography, the harbours and approaches, plus the nature of the inhabitants - 
information then on levels that were both physical and psychological. He further clarified 
this loosely defined list when he brought in people who conducted trading activities 
across the Channel. He asked them about the ethnic divisions,, size of tribal populations, 
techniques of war, social, and political institutions, as well as the location of harbours 
suitable for a substantial number of shipS. 
256 Caesar's discussion covers almost every 
aspect needed prior to launching a battle and demonstrates if detailed information on all 
of the areas can be fulfilled it would represent and ideal situation. Following this example 
we see how any why General Lee sent General J. E. B. Stewart on a mission, L... to gain 
intelligence for the guidance of future operations, " further stating, "You are desired to 
Polybius, The Histories,. 3.48 & in particular Vegetius, LEpitome of Nfililm Science, trans. N. P. Nblner. 
2'd Ed. (Liverpool. 1996), 3.6; also, N. J. E. Austin & N. B. Rankov. ELcploratio, page 13. 
256 Caesar. Gallic War, trans. H. J. Edwards, Loeb Classical Library (Camb dg ,s, 1917), 4 20 & ri e Mas . 
Suetonius, The Dei-fied Julius, trans. J. C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), 58.1. 
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make a secret movement to the rear of the enemy ... with a view of gaining 
intelligence of 
his operations, communications, etc.. . 
"257 
The ancients' use of undercover agents is well know in history; Livy reports of a 11 
Carthaginian spy at large in Rome two years before his capture in 217. Because his hands 
were cut off rather than his being executed suggests he may have been a Roman citizen in 
the pay of Carthage. 258 However, literary evidence suggests that the Romans did not 
usually initiate action in response to intelligence against the enemy; instead they took 
action only in reaction to incidents after they occurred. This seems true throughout the 
history of the Republic and Principate. A deeply ingrained belief existed that Rome might 
loose the occasional battle, but the war would inevitably be won and Roman forces were 
adequate to deal with any military problems that might OCcur . 
259 
To a considerable extent battles - often short and furious - held the centre of the 
military stage. Hannibal's advance planning and bold strategic maneuvers from Spain 
across the Alps and Italy showed an appreciation of strategic problems most extraordinary 
for his time. This broadened scope of strategy has tended to blur distinctions customarily 
drawn by earlier writers between strategy and statesmanship and between garden varieties 
and higher, or "grand, " forms of strategy. Despite the fact that there is still no agreed 
definition of the precise meaning of the term strategy, few students of the subject any 
longeraccept the earlier narrow definition. 
It Is a likely assumption that Hannibal used Saguntum. to set his plans for the 
invasion of Italy in motion. The timing of the invasion in relation to the events leading up 
to it suggests that Hannibal contemplated invasion ftom the outset, and had taken 
2s-, A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robert E. Lee page 192. 
-; 8 Livy, Ad Urbe_Condita. 22.3 3.1. 
, rq - N. J. E. Austin & N. B. Rankov, EVIoratio, pages 12-13. 
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preliminary steps to prepare for it. Saguntum's capture was necessary for Hannibal could 
not leave a pro-Roman city as an unconquered bridgehead deep in his rear. Saguntum 
itself was situated about one mile from the coast on a high plateau reaching out to the sea. 
The surrounding rich agricultural land was under intense cultiVation, which represented 
-I- an abundant source of supply for Hannibal's army. With Saguntum's fall he had 
established a secure base with a plentiful supply of natural resources to maintain his hardy 
troops, plus it allowed him to guarantee support in Affica if Carthage needed it. Hannibal 
was setting Spain in order prior to initiating his main push the following year. He also 
must have been aware that to have the conflict begin in Spain encouraged the Romans to 
believe Spain would be the major theatre of the war. Before proceeding to consider the 
evidence in favour of this interpretation, we must consider the range of possibilities 
involved. 
In forcing a crisis over Saguntum, Hannibal accepted a confrontation with Rome, 
but this need not imply that he assumed or expected all-out war. He might well have 
believed, or at least hoped, the Romans would back down at some point, Polybius 
indicates that the Saguntines had been warning Rome of Carthaginian activities for some 
time. ) but "The Romans, who 
had more than once paid little attention to them. 
, 260 
Likewise, the Romans may have believed that simply by re-affirming their friendship 
with Saguntum they would force Hannibal to back down. That is to say one side or both 
may have entered the game for limited stakes, only to find themselves drawn into more 
than they had planned for, though it becomes obvious by Hannibal's later actions that he 
knew full well what result would come of the attack. 261 Although Lincoln probably 
260 polybiUS, The Histories,, 3.15.2. "'Po)ýUXIOI 8G. IEýZOVOLKtq UOTOW nOLPOLKIIKOOTCq ...... & F. W. 
Walbank. A Historical Commenta! y on Po! ybius, Vol. 1. page 320. 
'61 N. J. E. Austin & N. B. Rankov, Exploratio, page 12 & T. A. Dodge, Hannibal page 163. 
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realized the probability that the Fort Sumter expedition would be attacked, he surely 
assumed it possible that the South would acquiesce- If the expedition ended in battle, it is 
likely Lincoln did not -anticipate a protracted and bloody war. He may have expected a 
brief contest, which would lead to the quick restoration of the Union. In accepting the risk 
of conflict, Lincoln could not have envisioned the war that actually came to pass. 262 
Wars have often expanded far beyond the initial objectives or intentions of either 
warring parties, and had conseýquences out of all proportion to the issues that supposedly 
gave rise to them. Such incidents lead to war when the two sides already view one 
another as potential enemies, and thus regard war as likely if not inevitable. Motives for 
escalation are well illustrated by the Roman Senate's debate over the Mamertine, crisis, 263 
an episode within living memory and certainly known to Hannibal. It is precisely the 
refusal to back down in the face of a perceived rival, which causes incidents to be viewed 
as provocation, and provocation to escalate into war. Turning to the War Between the 
States we see the strategies of the North and the South rooted in different political 
objectives. The objective of the North was to prevent the Southern states from seceding 
from the Union; that of the South was to attain independence. 264 The dual purposes of the 
Confederate strategy were to convince the North that forcing the South to remain in the 
Union was not worth the cost and to bring about foreign intervention in favour of the 
262 D. M. Potter, "Why the Republicans Rejected Both Compromise and Secession", Lincoln and His Ragy 
in the Secessign Crisis (New YOrk, 1979), pages 107-113. 
263 Polybius, The Histories, 1.10 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommeRtM on E013tjus' Vol. 1. pages 57- 
58 & 62-63. 
264 J. L. Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. LPe and the Making Of SOuthcM StratM, 1861-1862 
(Ohio. 1998) page 5. 
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South. 265 In this context Rome may have been prepared to go to war over Sagunturn, 
nevertheless they probably did not view war as imminent, and did not involve themselves 
in Saguntine affairs with the specific intent of provoking Hannibal to war. Instead, they 
viewed it at most as an opportunity to strengthen Roman influence within Spain at the 
expense both of Carthage and the Barcas. The fact is the Romans, having reasserted their 
alliance with Saguntum and their right of involvement in its dispute with Hannibal, failed 
to take any direct measures to defend or support the Saguntines, instead leaving them to 
their own devices and ultimately to their fate. The Romans may have been cynical about 
Saguntum for its own sake, but even if they did not care what happened to the Saguntines 
themselves, Rome could hardly be indifferent to the cost of its fall to their own reputation 
within Spain. The message sent to the rest of Spain by the fall of Saguntum could hardly 
have been clearer as when Livy puts it in the mouth of a spokesman for the Volciani at 
the time Rome came to seek allies for a campaign in Spain: 
" 'With what face, Romans,, can you ask us to prefer your friendship to the 
Cwthaginian, when those who did so have been more cruelly betrayed by you,, 
their allies, than destroyed by their enemy, the Phoenician? You must seek allies, 
in my opinion, only where the disaster of Saguntum is unknown. To the Spanish 
peoples the ruins of Saguntum will constitute a warning, no less emphatic than 
deplorable, that none should trust to the honour or alliance of the Romans, 
265 A. Jones, Civfl War Command & Strategy: The Process of VjqM and Defeat (New yor k, 1992), pages 
128-136. 
266Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.19.9-10. "'Quac verecundia est, Romani, posMare ponamus, cum qui id 
, fecerunt crudelius quam 
Poenus hostis perdidit vos socii prodideritis? IN quaeratis socios, censeo, ubi 
Saguntim clades ignota est. Hispanis populis sicut lugubre ita insigne documentum Sagunti ruinae ertmt, ne 
quis fidei Romanae aut societati confidat. "' 
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Even though Livy shaped the tone of the scene, the Roman Senate did not have to 
read the Sibyfline Books to know in advance how the fall of Saguntum would be viewed 
in Spain. Rome would be exposed as a "paper tiger". Any Spanish town council or tribal 
chieftain could draw the obvious conclusion that Livy attributes to the Volciani: alliance 
with Rome conferred no protection. It would be a poor footing on which to launch a war 
a gainst Hanni al and Spain. Z"D 
Cisalpine Gaul had only lately been pacified, and rebellion was always possible, 
and indeed erupted the next year, fueled by the powerful inducement of Hannibal's 
invasion army. With Rome embrofled in Elyria, they faced the prospect that the war 
might serve as pretext to draw in Macedonia. 267 It was no opportune time, then, to 
dispatch a consular army to Spain to reinforce Saguntum. Why, then, did the Romans 
choose to assert their alliance with Saguntum, if they were not Prepared to back it up with 
legions? First, the Romans may have assumed they would not actually have to do so. 
They were bluffing; trusting that the mere assertion of the alliance would lead Hannibal to 
back down, and thus strengthen their sphere of influence in Spain by the sheer power of 
their reputation. Intimidation based upon a bluff had succeeded with Carthage before, in 
the case of Sardinia, and was the essence of their policy with the Carthaginians. They 
were then caught when Hannibal called their bluff, besieged Saguntum and took the city 
before Rome could move troops from Illyria to reinforce them. 
By taking the Sagunturn Hannibal solidified his own position in Spain and 
weakened that of Rome. If Rome backed down, he would have discredited them in Spain 
at no cost to himself beyond that of taking position against them. Hannibal was aware of 
Rome's other commitments and embroilments and knew Rome could not take active steps 
ý67 polybius. The Histories, 3.16 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommeptM on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 
324-327. 
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to defend Saguntum even if it chose to do so. He might have reasoned Rome would view 
diplomatic retreat as preferable to asserting an alliance they could not actively support. 
He might further have assumed the Saguntines, knowing Roman military support could 
not be immediately forthcoming, would yield quickly. 
Why then did Hannibal choose to bring the war to Italy? It is clear Hannibal never 
entertained a defensive war against Rome, for this would have been fundamentally 
opposed to the primary motivation of the Barcas in the event of a new conflict with 
D- 
Rome. The fundamental aim of Carthage and the heart of Hannibal's strategy were 
simple: to reverse the outcome of the I" Roman War by placing Rome in subjugation to 
Carthage. A defensive strategy where Carthage allowed Rome to seize the initiative and 
dictate Spain as the main theatre of war would not accomplish this goal. Hannibal must 
have determined the only means for Carthage to triumph over Rome were to defeat Rome 
on her home ground; or by taking the war to Italy, to cause the Romans such devastation 
and discord with her allies she would be forced to sue for peace . 
26" The timing of events 
offers reason to conclude Hannibal chose this course fi7om the time he succeeded 
command in Spain. 
To ascertain Hannibal's objectives we need to closely examine Davis and Lee's 
views on offensive operations. After the war President Davis denied that the Confederacy 
had ever undertaken offensive military operations, in 1861 we see Davis and Gen. Robert 
E. Lee with similar views regarding the proper conduct of the war. Joseph Harsh in 
Confederate Tide Rising describes Davis as supporting the idea known as "carrying the 
26" A. Goldsworthy. The Punic Wars pages 155-156. 
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war into Africa. )-)269 In agreement, Lee eagerly anticipated an offensive operation . 
270 He 
had no illusions about conquering the Union state. The Confederacy certainly lacked the 
necessary resources to do that; but if he could stage a swift, massive, and punishing raid 
well into Northern territory, perhaps he could demolish the Union's will to continue the 
fight and thereby force a favourable negotiated peace . 
27' He was convinced that only 
quick and decisive battlefield victories would prevent the North from eventually defeating 
them with its overwhelming advantage in men and materials. He further believed the best 
way to realize these objectives was to carry the war into the North and to defeat the Urnon 
armies in their own tenitory. 
272 If the South were to win its objectives, it had to win a 
short war by striking swiftly using an offensive blitzkrieg strategy just as Hannibal 
decided with his advance into Italy. 
The Political and Logistical Reasons for a Land Invasion of ItajY273 
Surely the ill success of the fleet in the I' Roman War influenced Hannibal to 
concentrate the war effort on his army, thereby making it necessary for him to attempt the 
invasion of Italy by land. As discussed in the previous chapter Hannibal rejected the 
269Harsh explains that this pbrase originated with Punic Wars as an expression of the Roman belief that 
Carthage could not be defeated in Italy but only on its home ground in northern Africa, J. L. Harsh, 
Confederate Tide Risin , page 19. 
2'0 A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strate , pages 11-26. 
. 
27 1 B. Davis, GM Fox: Robert E. Lee and the Civil War (Short Hills, NJ, 1956), pages 107-128. 
272 Dodge states, "A bold attack is always the surest defense; and aware that war must be mainly waged on 
land, - for Carthage had no fleet to cope with Rome, - Hannibal saw that to carry it into Italy would do much 
to keep it away from Carthage, as well as put the waste of maintaining the struggle on the enemy's soil. "' it 
must be noted that Dodge was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Union Army and served at the battle of 
Gettysburg. T. A. Dodge, Hannibal, pages 163-164. 
-27i 3 For more on this discussion, see J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's Aamr, pages 29-3 2. 
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alternative of a sea borne invasion even though a sea crossing would have had the 
immense advantage of minimizing the wear and tear on his troopS. 
274Direct 
sea transport 
of his vast army also would have required an enormous transport fleet. Livy alleges that 
Hannibal needed 400 transport ships to take his men to Italy by sea. 275 If his assumption 
is correct, Carthage could probably have put at least this number of ships at his disposal 
since six years later in 212 they scraped together 700 vessels for the relief of Syracuse. 276 
The worry of transporting his war elephants and horses should not have been a factor in 
weighing the decision toward a land invasion. Elephants were transported to Hannibal at 
Locri from Carthage in 215 ; 277 and Mago received horse and elephants fi7om Carthage . 
278 
Livy asserts that Mago took horses with him from Nfinorca to Liguria in 205 . 279 therefore, 7 
there is little reason to believe the war animals could not have been transported by ship. 
Even given the restrictions of the number of transport ships needed to carry the troops, 
animals, and supplies entirely by sea, there remained the alternative of a coastal march 
with a supporting fleet of supply transports and escort warships. 
A coastwise march offered the best of both worlds. Ships could transport the 
army's baggage-train far more efficiently than could pack animals, and reduce if not 
eliminate its dependence on local supplies along the line of march. The quantity of 
shipping required would have been far less than for direct physical transport of the whole 
army, and could surely have been provided by Carthage itself even if sufficient shipping 
274 See W. L. Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare, pages 308-322 for a description of all naval 
positions and actions from the end of the V Roman War to the beginning of Hannibal's march. 
275 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita 29.26-3. 
276 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita 25.27.4. 
277 Livy. Ad Urbe Condita. 2 3.4 1.10. 
278Livy, Ad Urbe, Cgndita, 29.4.6. 
279 Livy, Ad Urbe Condi M, 28.46.7. 
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was not available in Spain. Moreover, while this route of march would pass along rugged 
sections of coast, and requIre crossing the Ligurian Apennines to reach Hannibal's target 
destination of the upper Po Valley, a primarily coastal route would avoid the more 
difficult passage of the Alps required by the inland route that Hannibal chose. However, 
the route up the Durance Valley and over the Col d, e Montgenevre -- probably the route 
Hannibal originally intended to take -- was much easier than the coastal route. Traveling 
along the coast and not turning north into the Alps, his army would have to pass through 
Massilia's territory, the threat of which Rome would have assuredly sent troops Mi its 
defense. 
The question, then, is why he elected to forego the advantages of either sea 
transport or a coastwise march with a supporting fleet. Two possible answers may be 
ventured. First, either of these options would have heightened his dependence on 
Carthage for maritime support, and second - not unrelated - it would inevitably have 
involved him in a naval as well as a land campaign. 
Once war came, Livy describes some rather desultory naval raiding by the 
Carthaginians, 280 while Polybius does not allow for that much. Certainly, there is no 
indication of a full mobilization by Carthage in support of Hannibal's war plan. Based on 
the texts by Livy and Polybius, by 217 B. C. there is reason to believe Hannibal and 
Carthage were concerting plans since a fleet slipped through from Sardinia to Pisa to meet 
him. 281 Had Hannibal's plans made him dependent on aid ftom Carthage in the form of 
ships - transports and warships - he might have found himself stalled by endless 
dithering and promises of support that failed to materialize. Worse, a demand for large- 
280 Livy, Ad Urbe C, ondiM 21.49-5 1. 
"' Polybius, The Histories, 3.96.8-10 & F. W. Walbank, A Histoncal COmmeP-tM 01, PoLybius, Vol. 1, page 
431 
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scale active support nýiight have tipped the political balance within Carthage toward 
Hanno and the antiwar party. Thus, Hannibal seems to have determined from the outset a 
plan of campaign dependant almost entirely on Spanish supplies and reinforcements 
executed with Barcid resources, and asked nothing of Carthage but limited endorsement. 
Such a plan limited Hannibal's maritime resources to those available in Spain. 
The defensive forces he left to his brother Hasdrubal included fifty quinqueremes, two 
quadriremes, and five triremes. 282 At Ecnomus in 256, each Roman quinquereme is said 
to have had 3 00 rowers and 120 marines, 283 and the Carthaginian ships are implied to 
have had the same. There is some reason to believe that 40 was the normal complement 
of marines,, but the figure 300 for the rowers is usually accepted - 32 quinqueremes 
would have required ý9600 rowers, and at least 1280 marines - but must have been in the 
range of 250 to 300 rowers and 100 to 200 marines, sailors and supernumeraries; the 
crews of triremes and quadriremes would have been in proportion. The total manpower 
required to fufly man the fleet was thus on the order of about 14,000 to 17,000 men. This 
is a sizable number, but not an enormous one, particularly when compared to the size of 
Hannibal's invasion army. Moreover, the fleet was only partly manned, only thirty-two 
quinqueremes and the five triremes having fuH crews provided. 284 The fleet was thus 
below full manpower strength by as much as a third. It is true that men committed to the 
fleet were more or less unavailable for land service, but it may also be that skilled 
282 polybiUS, The _I-fistories, 
3.33 & Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21-10-22.4. 
283 Polybius, The Histories 1.26.7-8 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentply on polybius, Vol. 1, page 
86 
284 Polybius, The Histories, 1.26.7 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Cornmentaly on Polvbius, Vol. 1. page 
86 
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personnel for working the ships were lacking, and that this placed the critical limit on the 
number of ships that were manned for service. 
Even if seamen were available to fully man the existing ships, these were not 
enough for a sea borne operation on the scale Hannibal contemplated. ScIpio the elder 
required a slightly larger naval force of sixty quinqueremes to transport by sea a consular 
army of two legions, 14,000 allied infantry, and 1,600 allied cavahy, or some 25,000 men 
and 2,000 horses; the quinqueremes probably serving in a transport role, since active 
285 Barcid naval opposition was not anticipated. The proportional requirement for supply 
and support of a coastwise march would have been smaller than for direct transport; in 
any case calling for a substantial additional commitment of resources to the sea 
component- Those resources, unless provided by Carthage itself, had to be taken away 
from the land army. 
This diversion of resources might seem sufficient reason in itself to reject a 
coastwise advance. Diversion of material and human resources was not, however, the 
only consideration Hannibal faced. A sea borne movement, or even a combined-forces 
advance with a naval component, inevitably meant some division of focus- it meant 
fighting a naval war as well as a land war. To commit resources to a fleet, and to 
incorporate that fleet in one's plan of campaign, was to make that plan hostage to the 
fleet's success. 
Had Hannibal transported his army by sea, he would have had to fight the Romans 
at sea, and against a much more powerful fleet than Scipio's. At the same time Scipio was 
dispatched to Spain with his sixty quinqueremes, the Romans assigned no fewer than 160 
quinqueremes to Sempronius for operations against Affica. 286 In the face of a sea bome 
28' 5 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.27. 
286 Livy, Ad Uirbc Cqpd4 21.27. 
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invasion by Hannibal, the Romans obviously would have assigned a far greater naval 
component to Scipio. Hannibal would have required a naval force adequate to meet it, and 
with everything in the balance, would have had to fight and win at sea before he could 
engage the Romans on land. 
A coastal advance with a covering fleet would have reduced but not eliminated his 
dependence on naval action. A coastal march would surely have brought him into direct 
contact with Scipio, who undoubtedly would have landed his army, as he did while 
Hannibal was crossing the Rhone to help defend Massilia from the perceived threat. Had 
the armies fought, there is every reason to assume that Hannibal would have won. The 
fruits of victory could still have been lost, however, if the Romans won a naval 
engagement between the respective escorting fleets. Even an inconclusive outcome at sea 
might leave Hannibal unable to advance, his supply ships bottled up and his seaward 
flank exposed. With the ever-present Roman sea power, which had been strongly 
maintained ever since the end of the I" Roman War, Hannibal could not consider an 
amphibious landing on the coast of Italy. 
Apart from the immediate hazards of battle, introducing a naval component to the 
operation meant in effect opening a new theatre of war, and with it a whole range of new 
strategic requirements and constraints. Galley fleets were heavily dependent on bases and 
could not operate freely far from their own, especially in the presence of a hostile base 
sheltering an enemy "fleet in beingý'. In his actual inland march, Hannibal simply skirted 
and ignored the pro-Roman Greek city of Massilia; a coastal advance might well have 
compelled him to take that city - at what cost in time and effort? - in order to eliminate it 
as a Roman fleet base athwart his own fleet's line of advance. Once he reached Italy, he 
would again be faced with the implicit need to secure a base for his fleet, and the further 
need to shape a strategy that assigned a usefal role to it. The alternative would be to send 
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it back to Spain, losing the effective use of it after having invested great resources and 
ýeffort in it. 
287 
Hannibal had no reason to have confidence in either a Carthaginian home fleet or 
a Barcid fleet. Carthage might have a maritime and naval tradition, but Hannibal himself 
came from a family of soldiers, and what he surely heard from childhood was that it was 
Carthage's navy, not its army that had fallen short in the Is' Roman War. He himself, as a 
general who regularly used terrain to his advantage, might have seen only disadvantages 
in fighting at sea, where terrain was not a factor. 
Given all these considerations, it is understandable that Hannibal rejected both a 
sea borne operation and a combined-force advance along the coast with the quasi- 
maritime strategy the latter implied. He thereby avoided a variety of risks and 
uncertainties. He had no need to build a fleet or depend on Carthage to provide one, or to 
risk it against a Rome fleet that had won most of the battles in the previous war, Or to add 
the complications and distractions of a maritime component to his plan of campaign- 
Hannibal believed that by following a land route he would avoid the logistical 
problems his father encountered in Sicily during the first war. Hamilcar had been isolated 
in Sicily, dependent on Carthaginian ships for reinforcements and supplies. The 
Carthaginian navy had Wed Hamilcar due to a combination of natural disasters, poor 
strategy and the sheer strength of the Roman fleet. This, coupled with the lack of support 
by the Carthagiman senate, had caused his ultimate defeat. Hannibal would not allow his 
forces to be dependent on supply by sea or the good will of the senate. He would take a 
new initiative and control the land route as Rome had done in the first war. Hannibal 
concluded that this war could not be fought like the first if Carthage were to succeed. The 
2" ; N. B. Rankov. "The Second Punic War at Sea", page 55. 
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jor combatants; therefore new war must involve a reversal of roles among the ma 11 
Carthage must be on the offensive and invade Italy by land. 
To identify the reasons for Hannibal's offensive de, cision, an exanunation of Lee 
provides us with umatched insight. Lee's penchant for offensive strategy and tactics has 
come under heavy attack from historians over the past two decades. The Army of 
Northern Virginia suffered heavy casualties in its celebrated triumphs during 1862 and 
1863, and various scholars have argued that a more defensive conventional strategy or a 
guerrilla strategy would have conserved manpower, thereby enabling the Confederacy to C; P-, 
prolong the war and perhaps exhaust Union will. Such analysis overlooks the fact that 
Lee's strategic and tactical aggressiveness suited Confederate expectations and countered 
superior Union numbers. Civilians hungered for news of aggressive success on the 
battlefield, which conveyed a sense of progress toward independence. Their morale 
required the type of victories Lee supplied from the Seven Days through Chancellorsville, 
and without which the Confederacy almost certainly would have collapsed sooner. This 
example offers us a strong association as to how Hannibal could have seen the eventual 
incorporation of the Carthaginian empire by Rome if an invasion was not launched. 
With all the necessary preparations in place, Hannibal set forth on his long march. 
Before we follow him it is necessary to first look at the preparations Rome had made for 
the pending war with Carthage. With their naval superiority and secure shipping lanes, 
the Romans surely felt the second war would merely be a replay of the first. Their plan of 
attack entailed a two-pronged approach. one against North Affica, one against Spain. 
They intended to transport their troops from Italy to Spain, controlling the sea while the 
Roman legions defeated Hannibal on land. With Hannibal's defeat, . 
Spain would become 
anýother addition to Rome's empire. After establishing naval and ground superiority over 
Hannibal, they would then invade Carthage itself What they did not anticipate was that 
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Hannibal would succeed at accomplishing the impossible and bring the war to Rome 
itself They never suspected that Hannibal planned to attack Italy; they assumed that he 
would not risk a sea invasion because of their naval superiority. They further reasoned the 
formidable barriers of the Pyrenees and the Alps, coupled with the inhabitation of these 
areas by the savage Celts, would preclude a land invasion. As we will soon discover, the 
Romans were ill prepared for a war against Hannibal. Livy points out how unaware they 
were of the impending situation as follows: 
"Ile Sardinians and Corsicans, the Hstrians and Illyrians, had provoked but had 
hardly exercised the Roman arms, while against the Gauls there had been 
desultory fighting rather than real war. But the Phoenician was an old and 
experienced enemy, who in the hardest kind of service amongst the Spanish tribes 
had for three and twenty years invariably got the victory; he was accustomed to 
the keenest of commanders, was flushed with the conquest of a very wealthy city. 
and crossing the Ebro and drawing after him the many Spanish peoples which he 
had enlisted, would be rousing up the Gallic tribes - always eager to unsheathe 
the sword - and the Romans would have to contend in war with all the world, in 
! o288 Italy and under the walls of Rome. 
All of the ancient authors are interested in Hannibal's choice to move his army 
against Rome via the Alps, but no one is certain when he first decided on this particular 
28" Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.16.4-6. "Sardos Corsosque et Histros atque Illyrios lacessisse magis quam 
exercuisse Romana arma et cum Gallia tumultuatum verius quam belligeratum: Poenum hostem veteranum, 
trium et viginti annOrWn militia durissima inter hispanas gentes semper victorem, duci acerrimo adsuetum. 
recentem ab excidio opulentissiinae urbis, Hiberuin transire, trahere secum tot excitos Hispanonim populos. 
conciturum avidas scmper annorum Gallicas genies; cum orbe terranim bellum gerendum in Italia ac pro 
mocnibus Romanis essc. " Of course these are UVY's words, Rome was unaware that Hannibal was on his 
way 
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plan of invasion. Nonetheless Hannibal must have anticipated a continued delivery of 
supplies and manpower from Spain as shown by Cornelius Scipio's discovery in 218 of 
large amounts of cash and materials left by Hanno at Cissa. 289 In a very real sense the 
success of the plan hinged on the Celtic tribes' support of him logistically, both locally 
and in an open route fi7om Spain. In view of the fact that anxiety about food and material 
dominated much of Lee"s strategy, we must presume logistics to have been of great 
concern for Hannibal as well. Fresh from victory at Chancellorsville, he began to lay bold 
plans for taking the war to the North in hopes of relieving the Union offensives against 
Richmond and the pressures off war-torn Virginia, which might further improve the food 
situation for the coming year. Southern resources were beginning to show the strain of 
war and another campaign in Virginia would be disastrous to the farmers of the area 
because they could neither plant nor harvest their crops. 290 His grasp of strategy extended 
rar beyond the borders of Virginia; he recognized that Vicksburg, last of the Confederate 
strongholds on the Mississippi River, would in time fall. Lee understood the significance 
of what Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was accomplishing in the west; and that if he began an 
offensive strike into Northern territory, many of those western-based Union troops would 
be moved east. Meanwhile, he developed his plans further: he intended to spread his 
troops over the rich farms of central Pennsylvania, reaping a rich harvest . 
291 As a result it 
was with decided relief that the returning envoy from the Po Valley in early May brought 
him the welcome news of the Celts intended cooperation and that they, in fact, eagerly 
awaited the arrival of the Carthaginian anny. Magilos, a Celtic chieftain of the Boii, met 
289 Polybius, The Histories 3.76.1-7; Livy, Ad Urbe Con 21.60. 
290 A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy, pages 124-127, 
29' A. A. Nofi. The Get! ysbuTg Campaign, june-Luly 1863 3rd Ed. (Conshohocken, PA, 1996), pages 47 & 
50-51. 
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Hannibal at the Rhone therefore it is safe to presume that the envoys traveled as far as 
292 Bologna, the main centre of the Boii Additionally, his agents reported that while 
passage across the Mps for a large army would be very difficult, it was nevertheless 
possible. Although crossing the Alps would grant Hannibal the vitally important element 
of surprise, there can be little doubt he fully appreciated that his army would suffer 
tremendous losses as it made its way through the treacherous mountain passes. Then 
again, he did have sound reasons for believing that many of the losses he would 
necessarily incur in getting his army to Italy would be made good by recruiting the 
Cisalpine Gauls as his allies. Leading up to his campaign- 
[Hannibal] had informed himself accurately about the fertility of the land at 
the foot of the Alps and near the nVer Po, the denseness of its population, the 
bravery of the men m war, and above all their hatred of Rome ever smce that 
former war with the Romans ... 
He therefore chenshed high hopes of them, and 
was careful to send messengers with unlimited prOMIses to the Celtic chiefs both 
on this side of the Alps and in the mountains themselves, thinking that the only 
means of carrying the war against the Romans into Italy was, after surmounting, 
292 Polybius, The Histories 3.34.4. 
11 GCLýoq YOLP SýTITOMFil KUITTIV CLPEMqv Til; x-)no -EoL; 'Ak=t; KoLt impi, Tov floL8ov novxWv Xop(x; -K, 3t,, 
TO lEkIIOOq 7EOXF, 401)q TWV OW6P(I)VTOkýLOW, KOU TO P, 6r0`TOV TIV t)IEoLPXOI)(37(XV 61)GýL6VEtOW OCUTOtq 6K 
TOU 7CPOYCYOVOTOý RACýLOID 7(f)Oq'P6)PL(XtO'L)ý, 071CP 01) 6t'nX00ý1EV 71ýXtq EV TTI RPO TOCUTTIq OL)OX(j) 
xotplv 'rou Cylowmp*mToau To")q FV-Cuyxocvovu()L;, Eotq VI)V ýIck,? ý, OUCT-L kFYF-GO()LL. 610-7w-p F,. LXFTo 
T(XI)TOLq'rll; 6JU60q, IKOU 71OLV'D7ltCrXVStTO, 
&CLMýInOýW-VOq MllptkO); 7EPOý TOO; 6OV(XaTot; T(I)X, 
icoct -rouq gatra& icoct TOuq Sv (XVr(xtq 'roctq 'AX7tcatv CVOtKOI)VTOLq, ttov(j)q OW 07EO/^W+tP(XV(J)N' 
F, N, 'IToCktot (71)(7TTICTOLGOOLI TOV 7Ef)Oý 
'P(jopatot)q 7EofXqjOV, F-t 6UN'TjOStq &OUCCpljýWVoj)ý OLýtKCCTOOLI 
, j. ýLSVIIv "lpo)L-qv.,, T07EOIL)q KOLI (: T%)VEPYOtq 
KOLI CWýLpaýOtq XPTIOoLiaOoLt Kekroiq P-, Lq T71V 7EpOKF 
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if possible, the difficulties of the route, to reach the above country and employ the 
Celts as co-operators and confederates in his enterprisc. 
, 2-93 
As I shall argue three factors are crucial in assessing the sound strategic thinking 
Hannibal used in his decision to invade Italy by land- 
1) An alternative to his strategy would have been to stand on the defensive and resist 
D- 294 
Roman attacks in Spain and Affica. From the preparations he took to safeguard 
Spain and Africa, it is clear that he expected such an attack. He must have calculated 
that a defensive war would have fallen into a pattern similar to the I" Roman War 
with Spain taking the place of Sicily. He might defeat the Roman armies, but he must 
have known that the Roman resources were such that they could easily replace their 
losses and continue to fight on two fronts until Carthage was exhausted. While he 
himself, on the other hand, could not be in two places at the same time. Hannibal must 
have known that over half the manpower at Rome I) s disposal came from her allies in 
Italy and many had fought bitterly against her encroachments; therefore, if Carthage 
was ever to defeat Rome, this alliance must be broken. A war in Spain and Aftica 
could never be expected to do more than wear down the allies; but if a Carthaginian 
army invaded Italy, Rome's allies might be induced to desert her cause and some 
might even become active in Carthage's SUpport. 
295 
296 2) The problem of Roman sea power was paramount . 
Rome had a least 220 
quinqueremes in commission in 218 - 297 60 under P. Cornelius Scipio's command as 
'93 polybius, The Histories 3.34.2-5. 
294 C. G. Starr. The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient FfigM (New york, 1989), pages 57-58. 
'95 J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, pages 29-30. 
See L. Casson. The Ancient Mariners, page 15 1 for the results of Roman naval dominance. 
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- and 160 far as the mouth of the Rhone, then on to Spain under his brother, Gnaeus7 
under the command of T. Sempronius Longus in Sicily. Carthage had 50 
298 
quinqueremes based in Spain, although 18 of these were unmanned. Livy states that 
20 more were sent to raid Italy, 
299 35 were sent to Sicilyl, 
300 
and later on 70 went to 
Sardinia . 
301 If these figures are correct, Carthage had at least 50 - 100 fewer warships 
at the beginning of the war than Rome had in conu-nission. In 212 B. C. of the 700 
transport ships Carthage sent to Syracuse, only 130 were warshipS. 302 Hannibal's 
dispositions to protect Spain and Africa reflect that he also knew the Roman fleet far 
outnumbered the Carthaginian war-fleet. He dared not risk an invasion fleet's being 
intercepted at sea by a superior Roman fleet. 
303 
3) The knowledge that he would find allies in Northern Italy. From 225 - 222 the 
D- 
Romans fought a war against the Celts of the Po Valley with the Romans defeating 
the Boii, crossing over the Po to defeat the Insubres and take their capital in 
Mediolanum in 222. In 220 Roman forces were again operating as far as the Alps and 
had founded the two new Latin colonies at Placentia and Cremonia. Hannibal had sent 
envoys to the Celtic chiefs of the Alpine region through which he intended to pass and 
297 polybiUS, The ffistories 3.41.2 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Conunentary on Polybius Vol. 1, page 
377. 
298 Polybius, The Histories 3.3 3.4 
299 Livy, Ad 'rbe Condi , 
21,4 9.2, 
300 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita. 21.49.4. 
301 Polybius, The Historics, 3.96.8-12 & F. W. Walbank, A ffistorical CommenLaly on PoLybius Vol, 1. page 
431. 
302 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 25.27.4. 
3o3 IF Lazenby. Hannibal's War, page 3 1. 
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even into northern IWy in early 218.304 It was, therefore, reasonable to assume that 
both the Boii and Insubres would give his arrival a friendly reception. 305 
The Roman Alliance System 
Hannibal made two crucial decisions regarding the impending war with Rome 
long before he ordered a single Carthaginian soldier across the Ebro- he accepted a 
confrontation with Rome and determined from the outset on an offensive policy of taking 
the war to Italy. While there can be no doubt as to Hannibal's confidence in his own 
military ability, he was too much a realist to rely on this alone. f1is military action was 
above all directed toward the realization of a political aim. By invading Italy, Hannibal 
sought to undermine Roman power by destroying the political confederation that linked 
the Republic and its allies, for it was this political entity that provided Rome's vast 
manpower advantage. If he could detach their political alliances or induce them into a 
policy of neutrality, he would make a tremendous impact on the Roman military might. 
This could be achieved if he convinced the allies the power and credibility of the Roman 
army had been shattered beyond repair through repeated defeats at his hands. It is my 
view that Hannibal must have drawn intelligence from a variety of sources on the political 
mood in Italy that led him to believe more than a few allies needed little incentive to 
defect from the Roman Alliance. Once in Italy he took every opportunity to declare his 
fight to be with Rome, not the allies and showed this as described by Polybius: 
"Hannibal, who was wintering In Cisalpine Gaul, kept the Roman prisoners he 
had taken In battle m custody, giving them just sufficient to eat, but to the 
prisoners from the allies he continued to show the greatest kindness, and 
304 polybiUS. The Histories, 3.44.5 & F. W. Walba* A Historical Commepjým on PoLybius, Vol. 1, page 
379. 
305 polvbius. The 14istOries, 1.17.4 & 1.4-1,4. 
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afterwards called a meeting of them and addressed them, saying that he had not 
come to make war on them, but on the Romans for their sakes and therefore if 
they were wise they should embrace his ftiendship, for he had come first of all to 
re-establish the liberty of the peoples of Italy and also to help them to recover the 
cities and territories of which the Romans had deprived them. Having spoken so, 
he dismissed them all to their homes without ransom, his aim in doing so being 
both to gain over the inhabitants of Italy to his own cause and to alienate their 
affections from Rome, provoking at the same time to revolt those who thought 
their cities or harbours had suffered damage by Roman rule. , 306 
At a point these defections would so denude their power, Rome would be forced to sue 
for peace. Moreover, he must have assumed that operations undertaken to break up the 
alliance system would either render a siege unnecessary, or improve the prospects of 
success in a siege at some later date sufficiently to justify the expenditure of time and 
effort in a preliminary campaign against the alliance system. I base my assertions on 
306 Polybius, The Histories, 3.77.3-7. 
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Lee's crucial decisions. He determined that since the Army of the Potomac could not be 
brought to action under favourable circumstances in Virginia, he needed to transfer the 
field of operations to Northern soil where a victory promptly followed up with another 
would a give him possession of Baltimore or Washington. Additionally, a Confederate 
thrust north might relieve pressure on Vicksburg since Northerners might demand 
garrisons in their cities, which would withdraw troops from the west. Finally, if England 
and France witnessed an aggressive and victorious South, they might enter the war on 
behalf of the beleaguered Confederacy, or at least give the Union reason to pursue 
peaceful settlement with the South before they took an active interest in the war . 
307 "In 
short,, an offensive could well win the war. r)308 In case President Davis would not consent 
to a bolder offensive,, he could at least clear Virginia of the enemy, a necessary 
preliminary to an invasion of the North. At worst if Lees gamble failed, the Confederacy 
would lose its principal army and, with it, the war, yet that could also happen without a 
Northern invasion. 
The question is why Hannibal and Lee may have so miscalculated at the outset 
and why their decided courses of action failed to provide either with the gains they 
needed. First, Hannibal had a theory of the Roman Alliance System from which he drew 
conclusions about the potential lack of cohesiveness when under attack. Whereas Lee, 
seeing the North become increasingly despondent over the progress of the war with the 
repeated failures of the Northem armies and their extremely high casualties, believed he 
could build momentum for the growing Northern peace movement by shifting his army to 
Northern soil. Yet both theories proved incorrect. The Roman Alliance held firm and 
30 j' A. A. Nofi. The Getlysburg Campaign, June-July 1863, pages 17-23. 
a 30'8 A. A. Nofi, The Gellysburg Campaign, June-Jul, 1963. page 18. 
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subsequent Union victories encourage the North's sagging morale, causing the peace 
movement to loose its momentum. 
Hannibal as well as Lee's ultimate failures do not prove that their strategic 
theories were defective. Suppose that when Hannibal appeared before Neapolis and 
309 defeated its cavalry, the Neapolitans had opened their gates to him. They had every 
reason to do so; Hannibal was plainly on the ascendant. Rome's armies were smashed and 
the Neapolitans lacked the strong emotive ties to Rome that a Latin city might have felt. 
Had Neapolis gone over, other cities might have followed, in addition to those like Capua 
that actually did change sides. With a major seaport secured, Hannibal could have secured 
direct reinforcements from Carthage, or at least have opened a naval front to further 
stretch Rome's resources. The overall balance might have swung inexorably toward 
Hannibal and Carthage, and against Rome. 
None of this happened; the gates of Neapolis remained firmly shut and Hannibal 
had to move on. Yet a decision by a handful of leading Neapolitans might have changed 
the outcome with incalculable results. That Hannibal's strategy failed in the event does 
not prove that it was foredoomed to fail. Yet, the fact is the gates of Neapolis remained 
shut to Hannibal, in spite of all the logical reasons to open them. The unavoidable 
imPlication is that the Roman Alliance System had greater resilience, overall, than 
Hannibal had counted on. The questions arise again: what did Hannibal expect, and why 
was he wrong? 
Even though there is no direct evidence for Hannibal's analysis of the Roman 
Alliance System, he more than likely knew of Rome's alliances through Pyrrhus' attack 
on Rome. Hannibal considered Pyrrhus to be the second greatest general of all time and 
Pyrrhus wrote books on strategy and tactics, which may have contained information on 
309 Livv. Ad Urbe Condita. 23.1.5-7. 
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how to confront the Romans. 310 it must be remembered that the manipular tactical system 
was unique to Rome. What we do know is that the dominating political institution of the 
Mediterranean cultural world, of which Carthage remained a dominant force, was the 
city-state. 
In most of the Mediterranean world the normal and proper state of affairs was for 
city-states to be sovereign, independent entities. Although nearly all leagues and 
federations had weak central institutions that impinged minimally on local city-state 
supremacy, a combination of several small city-states into one large polity, such as the 
Aeolian and Achaean Leagues, were successful, but these were in the minority. So much 
was local independence the norm that even conquerors rarely imposed any form of direct 
administration. The usual practice with a subjugated city, unless it was destroyed outright, 
was to establish some fiiendly local faction in power, or to make the city a subject-ally in 
an unequal alliance, or some combination of the two. The characteristic most relevant to 
Hannibal's politico-military strategy was this very strong tradition of local independence 
and local patriotism. Neither Polybius nor Livy spells out Hannibal's politico-military 
strategy, possibly, because they regarded it as obvious due to the commonality in the 
ancient world of the tradition of local patriotism. 
Whatever Hannibal knew about the specific characteristics of the Roman system, 
he was surely farailiar with the general pattern in antiquity of subject-alliances as the 
predon-finant means by which one city-state established its dominance over others. He A 
was likewise doubtless aware that these unequal alliance relationships tended to be 
fragile, unstable, and insecure. The fragility of these relationships was inherent in the 
localism that, if not precisely an ideology in the modem sense, was so central to the value 
31 0 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 35.14.5ff & Plutarch, Parallel Lives: Flamininus trans. B. Perrin, Loeb Classical 
Libran, (Cambridge, Mass., 1921), 21.3. 
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system of city-state culture; subordination of one city to another was viewed as a rather 
unnatural state of affairs. A city-state subjected to some other power, whether another 
city-state or a dynastic king, could almost automatically be expected to rebel if the 
opportunity arose. 
311 
Internal factionalism exacerbated the fi7agility of subordinate alliances to which 
individual city-states were characteristically prone. The dominant partner placed a 
friendly faction in control of the subordinate partner often reinforced a subject-alliance 
relationship. 312 Such a practice almost guaranteed the existence of rival factions, whose 
readiness to revolt was amplified by their desire to topple the faction in power and take its 
place. Even where social or class divisions were not a factor, factional rivalries were 
common, for example among rival aristocratic families or clans, providing nuclei for 
possible rebellion within a subject-ally. 
Two conditions, if present, alleviated or at least reduced the general readiness for 
revolt by subject-alfies- a great disparity between the unequal partners, particularly if they 
were geographically close. The dominant city then emerged permanently over the subject- 
ally, an inescapable fact of life even if a revolt should be momentarily successful or a 
strong traditional tie between the partners, especially ethnic ties. In the extreme case, 
classical Sparta had nothing to fear from the c 7r, 6PO, ICOj-)313, the other communities of 
Laconia under Spartan dominance probably took place before local sentiment in the other 
"' The Seleucid Empire began to collapse from city-states rebelling against its authority, beginning during 
the time of the 2d Roman War. 
312 An example being the rival alliance systems in the Peloponnesian War, in which the Athenians tended to 
support democratic factions within their subject-allies, while the Spartans upheld oligarchic factions within 
theirs. 
313 'Neighbours ý- 
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communities had ossified into city-state patriotism. The same applies to the more extreme 
case of Attica; whether the cynicism of Athens was handed down from Mycenaean times, 
as the Theseus legend implies, or - perhaps more likely - took place in the archaic period, 
all Atticans regarded themselves simply as Athenian, towns like Marathon or Eleusis 
having no political identity to speak of In less extreme conditions, a breakaway was 
always possible. Plataea, though a Boeotian city, broke away from Theban dominance 
and aligned itself with Athens. Even the presence of a powerful and markedly foreign 
common enemy was no guarantee of stability in subject-ally relationships; Syracuse never 
rested easy in its dominance of Greek Sicily, in spite of the hostile presence of Carthage 
controlling part of the island. More often than not, Syracuse was the aggressor in any war 
with Carthage. 
A third cause of restraint on local city-state independence is noted in the cities 
founded by Alexander and his successors in the Hellenistic east. These cities generally 
accepted their subordinate role; they might be passed from one kingdom to another in the 
course of the successors' wars, and enjoyed broad autonomy in their internal affairs, but 
did not attempt to gain full independence. They were a special case, however. Founded by 
royal patronage, these Greek or Hellenized cities existed as islands in a culturally alien 
sea, and perhaps felt dependent on the security provided by Seleucid or Ptolemaic 
monarchs. 
The examples given are all Greek, and indeed Greek localism and particularism 
seem to have been particularly marked. There is little indication that Carthage ever had 
much difficulty with the other Phoenician-derived communities in North Africa, such as 
nearby Utica, although Utica and Hippo Arca joined the mercenaries in the Mercenary 
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Wa? 14 and the instance of Tyre versus Alexander and his successors. Shared ethnic 
background, the disparities in size with Carthage itself, hostile inland tribes, and isolation 
may all have minimized the prospects of revolt. 
In Italy, city-state particularism had in the past been strong, if not quite at the 
Greek level. The Etruscans had never formed a permanent federation, but remained I" 
independent city-states frequently at war with one another. 315 Even the Latins, who shared 
ethnic identity with the Romans, had a distinct political identity, and joined in opposition 
against Roman dominance. 316 By 264 B. C. Rome had completeýd the conquest of the 
whole Italian peninsula, including the Greek cities of the South and now controlled the 
area with the help of a well-linked network of colonies and allied states. Although under 
Roman dominance,, the Italian peninsula remained part of the city-state world, not in any 
sense a "nation, " but a collection of associated communities that had some form of 
subject-partner relationship with Rome. The composition of the Roman Alliance included 
the Latin colonies and at least 120 allied communities having treaty relations with Rome. 
These communities consisted of marked language and ethnic divisions yet at this time it 
was acceptable for a man to have two loyalties - one to his ownpatria and one to Rome. 
Integration with Rome was easy for some Latin cities such as Tuscillum and 
Lanuvium. Their citizens became fully privileged Romans with their lands included in 
Roman territorial districts. Even though they retained their local community life, 
314 polybiUS, The Histories, 1.82.9. 
315 polybiUS, The -listories, 2.17.1 F. W. Walbank, A Historical Conimeptary on Polybius Vol. 1. pages 
181-182 & Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 4.37.1. For Capua and Nola see Velleius Paterculus, The Roman 
y, trans. F. W. Shipley. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1924), 1.7.24. Higor 
316Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquitie , Vol. 
11, trans. E. Cairy, Loeb Classical Library 
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politically their future lay as Roman citizens. Other Latin communities, not so easily 
recognized, received only the private fights of Roman citizenship; i. e., those concerned 
with intermarriage and commerce. Again, these communities continued an almost 
autonomous local life, yet they were obliged to supply troops to Rome for joint defensive 
purposes. The partnership with the Latins familiarized Rome with defending its allies or 
friends". 
Likewise many of the highland communities became municipium, a limited class 
of citizenship with public duties, including military obligation. Often full citizenship was 
awarded after a period of probation, as happened to the Sabines. The Etruscan and Greek 
cities of southern Italy were granted the status of soch Italici. Although they too were 
required to contribute their own contingents in case of war, they received no forin of 
Roman citizenship. Already there was a pax Romana in the Italian mainland, opening up 
new prospects for commerce and development. 
How much if anything Hannibal knew about the particular historical events 
mentioned above is uncertain, but it was scarcely necessary that he be familiar, with 
specific instances. He, himself a loyal son of Carthage, was steeped in the city-state ethos, 
as aware of it as a modem soldier-statesman would be of the force of patriotism. 
All these considerations must have given Hannibal every reason to suppose the 
Roman Alliance System to be vulnerable. The towns of Latium might be overawed by the 
size and nearness of Rome., and feel bound to it by ethnic ties, but these would not apply 
to the cities of Etruria, or those of Capua, and perhaps least of all to the Greek cities of 
southern Italy. Unlike the Sicilian Greeks, the Italian Greeks had no tradition of regarding 
Carthage as an enemy. Some individual Italian cities, like Capua or Tarenturn, were 
ancient foundations not far short of Rome itself in size, wealth, and potential power. 
Given the opportunity they might well be eager to throw off the domination of an upstart. 
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Again, if we review a similar situation in the South, we find Robert E. Lee's assessment 
that the Confederacy had much to gain by winning over the Border States to their cause. 
These states, which included Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, could 
potentially add forty-five percent to the white population, meaning more able-bodied 
soldiers, as well as more industrial output and military supplies. Their location, especially 
Maryland, would have had tremendous strategic value. Maryland, in particular, was 
vitally important because it would have enclosed Washington, D. C. on three sides, putting 
a tremendous squeeze on the political power center of the North. 
In the best case, Hannibal might hope the simple arrival of his army in Italy would 
be like throwing a match into a tinderbox. He was by no means dependent on an 
immediate and spontaneous reaction, and was rightly confident of beating Roman armies 
in the field. He surely knew these armies were made up of as many allied as Roman 
troops, if not more. We know from Polybius that in the third century the Italian allies 
could mobilize 360,000 men of military age on Rome's behalf with the allies 
outnumbering the Romans three to two. 
317 It would not take many defeats, Hannibal 
could surmise, before the allied soldiers would be less than eager to lay down their lives 
for Rome, or for the allies themselves to tire of providing, and losing, troops to maintain 
their own subjection to Rome. Even if their current ruling circles were pro-Roman, 
Hannibal could anticipate that rival factions existed, equally eager to supplant the current 
rulers and shake off the Roman yoke. However, his pose as liberator often fell short 
because he and his army were foreigners in a way Rome was not. 318 In 213 Roman 
soldiers are said to have asked the people in Apulia why they were fighting old allies on 
317 Polybius, The Histories, 2.24 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommentM on Polvbius,, Vol. 1, pages 
196-199. 
319 IF Lazenby. Hannibal's W. page 88. 
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behalf of "foreigners and barbarians", 319 and trying to make Italy a tributary of Affica. 
Livy further states that Varro tried to persuade the Campanians to remain loyal to Rome 
rather than see Italy become "a province of Numidians and the Mauri. -), )320 
In a strikingly comparable move to Hannibal Lee published a secession invitation 
to the citizen's of Maryland on September 8,1862, as follows: 
"The government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers - your 
Legislature has been dissolved and by the unlawful arrest of its members - 
freedom of the press and of speech has been suppressed - words have been 
declared offenses by an arbitrary decree of the Federal Executive - and citizens 
ordered to be tried by rMlitary comimssions for what they may dare to speak. 
Believmg that the people of Maryland possess a spirit too lofty to submit to such 
a goverment, the people of the South have long wished to aid you In throwing 
off this foreign yoke to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of 
fteemen, and restore the independence and sovereignty of your state. In 
obedience to this wish our anny has come among you, and is prepared to assist 
you ... 
Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and 
speech ... 
It is for you to decide your destiny... -)1321 
Hannibal first made tentative approaches to the city of Capua after his resounding 
victory at Lake Trasimene, and after Capua had been in turmoil with Rome for over a 
year. Livy states the only deterrent to her secession was the ancient marriages between 
Campanian and Roman nobility, plus there were 300 young Campanian men of noble 
31 9 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 24,47.5. "aliertigenisac barbaris" 
-32') Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 23.5,11-13. -NunÜdarum ac Maurorum pati provinciam esse" 
321H. S. Commager, The Civil War Archive: The Histojy of the Civil War in Documents (New York, 2000), 
pagcs 601-602. See also B. Davis, GLay Fo page 135. 
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birth fighting for Rome in SiCil Y. 322 Not unlike Capua at first it seemed that Maryland 
might join the South's position, for a strong pro-Confederacy attitude developed there 
shortly after the fall of Ft. Sumter when, on April 19,186 1, a Massachusetts regiment 
passing through on its way to Washington, D. C., shot several civilians after being 
attacked by an angry mob in Baltimore. Many considered the Baltimore Riot to be the 
first bloodshed of the War Between the States. With twelve civilians dead, scores injured, 
and thousands of dollars in property damage, Maryland officials demanded that no more 
Federal troops be sent through the state. And just to make sure their message was clear, 
the mayor and police chief of Baltimore approved the destruction of key rail bridges to 
prevent Union troops from entering the city. At the same time, secessionist sympathizers 
tore down telegraph wires to Washington. Nevertheless, on May 13, Federal troops 
occupied Baltimore and declared martial law. Federal forces would present an occupying 
presence in Baltimore for the duration of the War. 
323 
In order to forestall a situation such as in Baltimore, Hannibal agreed to the 
following provisions in order to obtain an alliance with Capua: no Carthaginian should 
have jurisdiction over Campanian citizens; no Campanians should be forced to serve 
Carthage against his wifl, Capua retained its own government, and the 300 Roman 
prisoners handed over to Capua would be used in exchange for the 300 Campanian 
noblemen in SiCily. 
324 This agreement was definitely advantageous to Capua since under 
Roman rule Campanians, as Roman, citizens were subject to the jurisdiction of Roman 
magistrates'. but not allowed to vote at Roman elections or stand for office, plus military 
322LiA"%,, Ad Urbe Condita 23.4.7-8. 
123 B. Catton. The Civil War, pages 33-34. 
324 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 23.7.1-3. 
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service in the Roman army had become increasingly burdensome. 325 The reaction from 
the Campanians was so positive that Livy recorded Hannibal's welcome as rapturous. 326 
The only city of any size to quickly go over to Carthage was Tarentum, and this 
was done through treachery. 327 In most towns the upper classes remained loyal to Rome. 
Livy mentions this in connection with Nola in 216 and later with Croton, where he sites 
class division as; "One malady, so to spýeak, had attacked all the city-states of Italy, that 
the common people were at odds with the upper class, the senate inclining to the Romans, 
the common peoplýe drawing the state to the side of the Carthaginians. , 32" However, this 
statement was not the case in Locri, Arpi, and Tarentum where the commoners favoured 
329 Rome and the aristocracy Hannibal . 
In this regard note may be taken here of a pattern. nearly as pervasive in the 
Mediterranean city-state world as the republican city-state itself social tension and class 
conflict. Revolutions and civil wars within city-states were as common as wars between 
city-states. Of those cities whose histories we know in any detail, few were wholly 
exempt from it. Certainly Rome itself had its share of such internal disorders '330 and there 
is some indication that Carthage did as well. 
Part of the reason for the Latin loyalty was undoubtedly because they knew they 
could become Roman citizens simply by immigrating to Roman territory. Indeed many 
325 Livy, Ad Urbe C 23.7.1-2. 
326 Livy, Ad Urbe Co ý 23.10.13. 
32' 7 J. F. Lazenby. Hannibal's War. page 86. 
328Livy, Ad UrbeCondita, 24.2.8. "Unus velut morbus invaserat omnes Italiae civitates ut plebes ab 
optimatibus disscntirent. senatus Romanis favelret, Plebs ad Poenos rem trahcret. " Also, Livy, Ad Urbe 
Condita, 23.14.7. 
329 Livy, Ad Urbe-condita, 23.30.8,24.47.6, and 24,13.3. 
330 Such as the repeated secession of the plebs at times when they felt, or were, Oppressed. 
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Latins appear to have been descendants of Roman citizens who had presumably been 
prepared to join a Latin colony in the hope of a fresh start in a new home. 
Further, Rome regularly supported and upheld oligarchies among its allies, which 
. is not surprising since Rome was oligarchic. 
331 It is a notable fact, then, that Hannibal 
seems to have made little or no effort to exploit the potential for generating internal 
dissension within Rome's allies - if not in Rome itself - by actively promoting 
democratic or populist factions, or by offering measures such as land reform that might 
play on social tensions. The failure to do so is perhaps more remarkable since there is 
evidence that the Barcas were associated with populist sympathies within Carthage - in 
one dispute there, Livy speaks of a minority including "A few, and these included nearly 
A the best men, supported Hanno, -), 
332 
who were opposed by a pro-Barcid majority. 
Hannibal might well have seen more to lose than to gain from such a radical 
political strategy. In the first place it would be difficult for the commander of an invading 
army to act on such a strategy. Local dissident aristocrats usually led ancient populist 
movements, and it would have been difficult, from a distance, to identify and make 
contact with potential dissident leaders. Moreover, Hannibal's political strategy relied 
upon allies voluntarily breaking from Rome - and the allied cities were themselves 
dominated by oligarchies. Even members of local "Lout" factions would for the most part 
be concerned with their own status and estates; if Hannibal identified his cause with 
social revolution he might only succeed in driving the oligarchic class throughout Italy 
into common cause with Rome. A social-revolutionary strategy, while potentially 
powerful, was both difficult to implement and highly risky. Given the apparently good 
33 ' Even though Rome nught have been oligarchic, the plebs cerWnly had great power collectively. 
332 Livy. Ad 'rbe Condi 2 2.4.1. "Paici ac ferme optimus quisque Hannoni adS; Cntiebantur, .. .- 
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chance of breaking up the Roman Alliance System without resorting to such a strategy, 
there was little reason for him to consider it. 
To understand fully the unexpected strength of the Roman system, it becomes 
necessary to discuss the people who created it. In coming to grips with the Rome 
Hannibal fought, and the still earlier Romans who created that Rome, the Romans' self- 
projection of themselves as sturdy, rather plodding farmers creates a most misleading 
image of themselves and their city at the time of the 2" Roman War. The impression left 
on the modem reader is that a much earlier Rome must have been hardly more than a 
village of rude huts. Thucydides devoted the better part of two books to the Athenian 
Sicilian expeditions without once mentioning Rome. According to Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, the first references to Rome were by Hellanikos of Lesbos and Damastes 
of Sigeion, both younger contemporaries of Thucydides, but this was only in connection 
with the wanderings of Aeneas. 333 It was only towards the end of the fourth century that 
Greek writers apparently began to take a serious interest in Rome. It is thereby surprising 
to discover that the Rome of the sixth century B. C., a Rome still ruled by its semi- 
legendary kings, was already one of the larger and richer cities of the contemporary 
Mediterranean world -- not perhaps to be compared with Periclean Athens a century later, 
but still a sizable town with a cosmopolitan, sophisticated culture. "' 
The clearest indication of the international political status of this early Rome 
comes from a source strikingly relevant to the 2d Roman War: the first treaty of 
333 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiguities, Vol. 1, trans. E. Cary, Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge. Mass.. 1937), 1.72.2, see also notes 4 and 6, page 237. 
334 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities. 3.1.5. 
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friendship between Rome and Carthage as reported by Polybius. 335 That treaty, contracted 
at the very beginning of the Republic, is more precisely the first known treaty between 
Republican Rome and Carthage. If Etruria dominated Rome in the latter part of its 
monarchy, Carthage may have made a treaty with the superior partner, in this case 
Etruria, and ignored Rome. While it is possible that only now did Carthage see any need 
to establish relations with Rome, it seems far more probable that they simply sought to 
reconfirm with the new republican government a relationship already established, 
whether by formal treaty or informally, with the previous kings. 
The existence of a treaty does not make sixth-century Rome an equal to sixth- 
century Carthage, however it establishes an approXimate lower limit for the power and 
influence of Rome: important enough that the Carthaginians thought it worth while to 
explicitly establish or, more probably, maintain friendly relations, and define mutual 
rights and restrictions. 336 Such relations are not entered into with an obscure village or 
small town. 
Of particular interest were the regulations concerning Roman and allied ships, 
which could not to pass beyond the "Fair Promontory" except if driven by storm or 
enernies, and if driven into port in the restricted area were to purchase only what they 
needed for repairs or sacrifices. 337 Contrary to the image of the Romans as people who 
335 Polybius, The Histories 3.22 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommeptM on Polybius Vol. 1, pages 
337-345. 
336 Polybius, The Histories 3.22; Li, %,, v, Ad Urbe Condita, 7.27.2 & Livy, Ad Urbe CQn ta, Vol. IV, trans. di- 
B. O. Foster. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1926) 9.43.26. 
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knew nothing of the sea until forced by the I' Roman War, these regulations clearly 
presume that the Romans had a sIgnificant foreign trade, carried in Roman ships. 
The Carthaginians agreed not only to respect Roman territory, but also concede 
Rome a degree of protectorate over Latium as a whole. 338 Carthaginian armed forces, 
their warships, were not to stay on Latin territory overnight, nor to seize any Latin city; 
but, in a slightly contradictory term, if they did capture one, they were to hand it over 
intact to the Romans. The overall picture offered by the treaty was of Rome as a 
substantial regional power whose dominance over the coast opposite the Carthaginian 
route between their holdings in Sicily and Sardinia was amicably acknowledged, and as a 
trading partner whose merchants enjoyed reciprocal rights to those of Carthaginian 
merchants in Rome. Since no alteration of previous relations was indicated, it may be 
inferred that the status of relations with the Republic remained essentially unchanged 
from that which had been maintained with the later kings. 
Thus, Rome under the kings was already a rather large and cosmopolitan city of 
its time and a substadtial regional power. This must be doubly stressed because of the 
widespread assumption that has grown up in modem times that, previous to the Republic, 
Rome was under Etruscan rule., dominance, or at the least it was the predominant cultural 
influence 
. 
339 This assumption is based in part on the fact that the material culture of the 
Romans at this time., as indicated by archaeological finds, was identical to that of the 
338 Polybius, The Histories 3.22.11-13 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentaly on Polybius, Vol. 1, 
pages 344-345. 
339 T. J. ComcU, The Beginýngs of Rome: Italy and Rome ftom the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000- 
264_B. C. ) (London. 1995), page 15 1. Rome had a tendency, similar to Carthage_ but more so, of taking 
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Etruscans, in part on the evident Etruscan background of the Tarquinian kings, and in part 
on the presumption that in some way the Etruscans were the dominant power in central 
Italy in this period. However, the theory of an "Etruscan Rome" exaggerates the 
significance of these points, and flies squarely against the Rome's own later traditions. 
That the material culture of the Romans matched that of the Etruscans is clear, but by no 
means so clear that this implies Etruscan cultural dominance, and still less overt political 
dominance. Etruscan influence on earlier Roman life may not have been any greater. 
Indeed., the Romans may not have so much borrowed Etruscan elements as been co- 
sharers in a material culture that was spread through much of Italy, and it had many 
borrowed, notably Greek, elements. 340 Later Roman tradition provides no support for the 
notion that Rome was ever under Etruscan rule. The fall of Tarquinius Superbus is 
portrayed in Roman tradition as the overthrow of a domestic tyrant, not as a war of 
independence from foreign rule. To be sure, the historicity of the traditional account is 
uncertain; it is circumstantial and plausible, and has the flavour of a romanticized version 
ofrealeventS. 341 
In whatever context the Roman monarchy actually began - the further back we go 
the more legendary the flavour of what we are told - there is a possibility that by its later 
stages the kingship had evolved toward "proto-republican" lifetime magistracy. "' Several 
features point in this direction, its non-hereditary and quasi-elective character, and 
in, stitutions such as the formal interregnum between reigns. Toward the end, especially 
with the last king, Tarquinius Superbus, the kingship took on the character of a 
'40 T. J. Comell. The Begin-nings of Rome, pages 163-165. 
34' Tacitus. The Histories, trans. C. H. Moore, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1925), 3.72. 
342 T. J. Comell. The Begýýno of Rome, page 238. 
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contemporary Greek tyranny-extra constitutional, popular anti-aristocracy, asserting itself 
with dramatic public works and an aggressive foreign PofiCY. 
343 
Whatever exactly led to Tarquinius Superbus 3 ouster, the kingship was abolished 
and an oligarchic republic set in place. Since the Romans never had a written constitution, 
their form of government, especlafly from 287 B. C. with the passage of the lex Hortensia 
has been a favourite topic of discussion and argument from Polybius to the present day. 
Polybius' interest lay in its approximating the ideal of a "mixed" constitution or balanced 
blend of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, 344 though the mix was heavily slanted 
toward oligarchy. Many of its features resemble those of other republics, but the most 
striking feature of the Roman political system was its flexibility. They achieved this 
flexibility through accretion. Polybius believed this system culminated in the Valeno- 
Horatian Laws of 449 B. C. From that moment, Polybius tells us, the Roman political 
system continued to progress, until it reached perfection at the time of the 2 nd Roman 
War . 
345The Romans did not respond to new situations and requirements by wholesale 
restructuring of their basic law, as exemplified by the Athenian constitutional reforms of 
Solon and Kleisthenes; instead, new institutions were added as needed, and the role of 
existing ones altered. A system of checks and balances evolved under the impetus of a 
struggle between two social classes, the patricians and plebians, occurring primarily 
during the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. Thus, the comitia curiata, an ancient body 
343 T. J. Comell, The Beginnings of Rome pages 145-146. 
344 polybiUS, The ffistories 6.3.5-8; F. W. Walbank, A Mstorical CommegtM on Rolybius, Vol. 1. pages 
638-641 & A. Lintott. The Constitution of the Roman Roublic (oxford, 1999), pages 16-26 and 214-219. 
3-15 pol,, bius. The Histories. 6.11.1. 
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dating back to the regal period, survived in vestigial form into the late republic; 146 the 
347 
tribunate of the plebs, originally the result of a sort of general strike , evolved 
into one 
of the regular institutions of government. In essence the Roman form of government 
roughly parallels the American division of executive, legislative, and judicial branches, 
although the Senate does not fit neatly into any of these categories. 
The evolution of the Roman Senate is even more notable. Initially a shadowy ad- 
amilies, it evolved into an hoc body of advisors composed of the heads of patrician f 348 
effective governing assembly composed of 600 magistrates and ex-magistrates who 
served for life unless expelled by the censors. Although technically an advisory body, in 
effect the Senate was the chief governmental body because it controlled public finances 
and foreign affairs, assigned military commands and provinces, and debated and passed 
decrees that would be submitted to the assemblies for final ratification . 
349As 
the only 
permanent governing body and the only body where debate was possible, the Senate had. 
by far the greatest social prestige. The hereditary nature of the Senate led to the 
perpetuation of factional interests, represented by three powerful family clans: the Fabii, 
the Claudii; and the Aemilii. The Fabii maintained a policy of cooperation with Carthage 
in favour of northern expansion, while. the Claudii regarded Carthage as a rival halting 
Rome's expansionism in the south that should be eliminated. The AemiIii were less 
discriminate in their overseas expansion policies. 
346 A. Momigliano. "An Interim Report on the Origins of Rome", Journal ofRoman Studies. Vol. 53 
(1963). pages 12-14 and A. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Rqpublic, page 49. 
34' T. J. Comcil. The Bpginnin-gs of Rome,, page 265. 
348 T. J. Comcil, The Bcginnings of Romp, pagc 247-248, 
349 polyb- LS iu The Histories. 6.13-16. 
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The legislative branch was made up of three citizen assemblies that included the 
entire electorate. Although the assemblies were theoretically composed of all males who 
were full Roman citizens, individuals had to attend in person in order to vote. No debate 
from the floor was possible and votes were counted in groups rather than individually. 
The earliest assembly, comilia curiata, became obsolete as a legislative body and had 
mostly ceremonial functions while the comitia centuriata became the most important. 
These elected 193 centuries, based on wealth and age,, elected censors and magistrates 
with imperium. (consuls and praetors), declared war, passed some laws, and served as the 
highest court of appeal in cases involving capital punishment. The comitia tributa, 
composed of thirty-five tribes originally determined geographically then passed on by 
birth, formed initially for election of the lower magistrates (tribunes, aediles, and 
quaestors) and eventually became chief law-making body. 
The executive branch of the Roman government consisted of the elected 
magistrates. Once the founders of the Republic had rid Rome of the Tarquins, Livy 
indicates the kingship was replaced with a curious institution of "collegiality" in which 
two men shared supreme power as consuls. 
350 Polybius had written that L. Junius Brutus 
and M. Horatius were "the first consuls, after the expulsion of the kings, and the founders 
of Jupiter Capilotinus. , 351 He further indicates the date was thirty-two years from the time 
Xerxes crosses to Greece. 352 If Polybius is referring to the crossing of Xerxes to Greece as 
LLI. year of Salamis in 480/479 B. C., this would date the first consuls to 512/511 B. C. the 
3 50 Lh-ý Ad Urbe Condita, 3.55.12. 
35ý 1 p018, bius, The Histories. 3.22.1-2. 
352 poijbiUS, The _Histoiries. 
6.11.1. 
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The consuls elected by the comitia centuriata, held office for a one-year period. 353 
As the chief magistrates they convened and presided over the Senate and assemblies, 
initiated and administered legislation, served as generals in military campaigns, and 
represented Rome in foreign affairs . 
354 They were however accountable fior their 
Ct x1f ,%r , YL ,,. dship on leaving office. Moreover, being a pair, they were subject to one another's 
veto even in times of battle. Consuls could appoint or serve as dictator for up to six 
months in times of emergency. Often when a consul completed his term of office, he 
governed a province as a proconsul, most often ruling provinces requiring a large military 
force. 
Other offices of the executive branch include eight praetors, two censors, four 
aedfles, and ten tribunes. Praetors served primarily as governors, administering the civil 
laws of Rome- they also served with military commands. Ex-practors governed less 
significant provinces as propraetors. Censors, elected every five years, conducted census, 
enrofled new citizens, and reviewed the roll of the Senate and equestrians. 355 For 
supervision of religious festivals, public games, temples', upkeep of the city, regulation of 
marketplaces, and the grain supply for the city of Rome, the aediles were elected. Two 
were required to be plebeians, and the other. two, could come from either order. All of the 
ten tribunes had to be plebeian since the office was established to protect the plebeians 
from arbitrary actions of magistrates. They could veto the act of any magistrate or stop 
any official act of administration. 
356 
353 Livy, Ad Urbe Condi 2.1.8. 
354 Polybius. The Histones. 6.12. 
55 Polybius,. The Histories. 6.17. 
356 Polybius. The Histories, 6.16. 
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The evolving Roman constitution is a demonstration of Roman flexibility and 
creativity in the development of their system of political control throughout Italy. 
Although its general form resembled other systems of domination through unequal 
alliances, its distinctive features contributed to a resilience that Hannibal failed to 
appreciate- To grasp those distinctive features it is necessary to give a very abbreviated 
account of its development. 
The Roman kings had exercised predominance throughout Latium, as indicated by 
the terms of the first republican treaty with Carthage, which simply reconfirmed the prior 
relationship. The turbulence that surrounded the change of regime in Rome, though, 
encouraged the Latins, or some of them, to attempt to shake off Roman domination. By 
the time things settled down, however, Rome had re-established a limited predominance. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes the terms agreed upon by the Romans and the 
Latins and ratified by oaths and sacrifices: 
" 'Let there be peace between the Romans and all the Latin cities as long as the 
heavens and the earth shall remain where they are. Ut them neither make war 
upon one another themselves nor bring in foreign enemies nor grant a safe 
passage to those who shall make war upon either. Let them assist one another, 
when warred upon, with all their forces, and let each have an equal share of the 
spoils and booty taken in their common wars, Let suits relating to private 
contracts be detennined within ten days, and in the nation where the contract was 
made. And let it not be pennitted to add anything to, or take anything away from 
these treaties except by the consent both of the Romans and of all the Latins. " ý1357 
357 Dionysios of Halicarnassus. Roman Antiquities, Vol. IV. trans. E. Cary, Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 6.95.2. 
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A Latin League, although it did not include Rome, was tied to Rome by an alliance. 358 
They annexed conquered territories and made new Latin states or Latin colonies settled 
by a mixture of Romans and Latins . 
3'9 Although the system was not very different from 
many other systems of unequal treaties and local ethnic leagues by which powerful cities 
dominated their immediate co-ethnic neighbours, while the Latin League remained in 
being, Rome - though by far the leading city of Latium - did not become a member of it, 
and was free to enter other treaties and alliances not involving the Latins. 
Wbile Philip H of Macedonia was expanding his empire, war in Italy erupted on 
the plains of Campania, near Neapolis. When the Samnite warrior-herdsmen invaded the 
inhabitants of the plains, the plains inhabitants sought help from Rome, resulting in war 
between Rome and the Sanmite hill people - the First Samnite War. The war lasted two 
years, ending with Roman victory in 345; however, the Samnites display of military 
weakness encouraged Rome's Latin allies to make forays against them. When the 
Samnites called for Rome to control its allies, some Latins resented Rome's interference; 
others were convinced Rome intended to dominate all of Latium. Member states within 
Rome's Latin League demanded equality with Rome and a share in governing Rome 
TE Kou 7-q T71V OL")"v CYTOLatv Excoat. Kat "T f OL"Tot lrokqIZI, 'rO)aoLv ltpoq oLkxTjkouq plT, OLkk()OP-V 
7EOkCýLIOUq CltOLYC-CO)aOLV, ýLTJMTOtq P-lt*POUGI ROýXýLOV 0601)q 7EOLPCXC'rO)aOLV Uaý()OXtq, 
pollOntTOCTOW TE Totý 7roxcýLol)ýIcvotq OMOCUTI 6UVOCýWt) X(XýDPWV Tf- KOCt X6t(Xq T71q SK 7COXE: WV 
Kotv(j)v TO t(50V kocYXOCVCT(J)a(XV ýtcf)oq cKcaspot- T(ov -r& t6t(x), rtKo)v cyt+Pokoctow oct Kptmiq P-v 
7l4Zf)(Xtq YtYVCCTO(J)(TOCV 8CK(X, 71OLf) ' Otq (" 7EV11TOCt To (71)40; ýOCtOV- ToCtq 66 Cyt)VoIIKOCtq TOMTUlq gJ166V 
SýCCTTO) 71PO(3OCtVOCt ýLTJ& 0*ý'F-tv (17E' ()L"T'v OEt ()tv 9TI 'POWUOK Ts Koct Aa-rivou, OCROCCrt 60icil. "' 
See also, K. Lomas, Roman lWy 338 B. C. -AD 200: A Sourcebook, pages 42-43. 
358 Livy. Ad Urbe Condita 2.33.9. 
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itself In 241 many of the Latins rebelled against Rome -a sure sign of the instability of 
alliance systems and not the first time vanous Latins had done So. 
360 
A decisive turn came with Rome's victory. After the Romans put down the 
rebellion, they instituted some modest changes that proved to have sweeping effects. 
They abolished the Latin League; henceforth the Latin states had treaty relations only 
individually with Rome, which provided a variety of reciprocal rights for citizens of each 
party -- but not with each other. Soon, the Romans began to make treaties granting the 
same reciprocal rights to other cities who became "Latiif ' regardless of ethnicity. Other 
treaties granted varying status to the partner state and its citizens, until in effect the 
D- 
Romans had a series of gradations of status available in their relations with various 
36 362 
allies. ' Because all of these treaties, like the new Latin treaties, were with Rome only, 
the Roman Alliance System was not encumbered with any leagues or federations whose 
collective assent might be required for, and thus restrain, action on Rome's part. At the 
same time, the gradations of status provided a system of rewards and punishments that 
Rome could hold out to its allies. A rebellious city that failed in its obligations, stood the 
risk of being degraded to a less favourable, status; a city who stood by Rome in a tough 
spot had the opportunity to be rewarded with a more favourable status. 
D- 
Rome now dominated all the Latins, and controlled an area from just north of 
Rome southward almost to Neapolis. This was a heavily populated area for ancient times, 
and the base from which Rome would spread its power and influence over the whole of 
Italy. 
360 Liw. Ad Urbe Condita, 6.21.2. 
361 Ad Urbe Condita, 8.11.16,8.13.8. and 8.17.11, 
Rome's allies were not typically pernutted to make treaties . Nith foreign powers or even with each other. 
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Hostilities resumed in 327 between the Samnite hill people and the inhabitants of 
Campania's plain. Once again the plain's inhabitants sought Rome's assistance, and once 
again Rome went to war against the Samnites. After a Roman and allied force un 
surrendered at Caudine Forks,, the war staHed for five years. As Rome waited for the war 
to resume, the military strengthened through increased recruitment. And in 320/319, the 
D- 
Romans returned for revenge against the Samnites and defeated them in what Livy 
describes as one of the greatest events in RoMan history. 
363 Although peace was 
established between Rome and some Samnite towns, the war dragged on with others until 
311, when the several Etruscan cities joined the Samnites in a showdown against Roman 
power. The war subsequently became a contest for the dominance over much of Italy. 
Between 311 and 304, the Romans and their aflies won a series of victories against both 
the Etruscans and the Samnites. When the Samnites sued for peace, the Romans 
demanded inspections for assurance, which lasted until 298. 
At the turn of the century, the Samnites tried again to thwart Rome's domination 
of Italy by organizing a coalition that included the Etruscans and Gauls. Again the war 
began again on the plains near Neapolis. When the Romans saw the Etruscans and Gauls 
in northern Italy joined by the Samnites they were alarmed. Previously, the Romans had 
benefited from a lack of coordination among its enemies, but now Rome faced them all at 
once. Some relief came with a victory in the south, but the crucial battle for Italy took 
place in 295 at Sentinum, a town in Italy's northeast, where more troops were engaged 
than any previous battle in Italy. At first Rome gave way before an attack by the Gauls 
then rallied, crushing both the Samnites and the Gauls. Afterwards the war slowly wound 
down, coming to an end in 282 with Rome dominating all of the Italian peninsula except 
363 LIN-v, Ad Urbe COndita. 9,1-14. 
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for the Greek cities in Italy's extreme south and the Po valley, which was still occupied 
by the Gauls. 
In 280 B. C. as the war was winding down, the Greek city of Tarentum, on Italy's 
southern coast, became disturbed by a colony that Rome had established just eighty miles 
to its north. Tarentum had its own sphere of influence in the south. It had a democratic 
constitution, the largest naval fleet in Italy, an army of 15,000, and wealth enough to buy 
a good number of mercenaries. It had ignored the opportunity to join the Etruscans, 
Gauls, and Samnites in their war against Rome, but belatedly decided to fight Rome. 
Tarentum gained the backing of the Epirote king Pyrrhus, who agreed to command the 
combined troops of Tarentum and other Greek cities in Italy, along with his own troops. 
When Tarentum requested his help, the opportunity to extend his authority over 
Italy as Alexander had planned was too great to pass. However, Pyrrhus underestimated 
Rome. In 280, he landed 25,000 troops in Italy, including some 3,000 horsemen, 2,000 
archers', and the first elephants brought to -Italy. When he engaged the Romans in battle at 
Heraclea, he used the elephants to drive through Roman lines, creating panic among the 
Roman soldiers. Although Pyrrhus won many battles against the Romans, his victories 
-) 364 came with enormous casualties, giving rise to the expression "Pyrrhic victory' . 
Pyrrhus also tried to win over some of Rome's allies, without success; Rome's 
manpower proved too much for him. Hannibal, aware of Pyrrhus' strategy and tactics 
during his campaigns against, Rome, assumed he could accomplish what Pyrrhus had 
been unable to do - cause a break in the Roman Alliance System, by absolute crushing 
victories. 
364 pý, rrhUS- famous remark in Plutarch of, "'If we are victorious in one more battle with the Romans. we 
shall be utterlY destrOYed, "' rcflects this sentiment. Plutarch, Parallel Lives, Pvrrhus, 21.9 and P. 
Garoufalias, pMhus: King of Epirus (London, 1979), page 93. 
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By 275 Rome defeated Pyrrhus. He returned to Greece and was kifled in 272, the 
same year Tarenturn surrendered to Rome. Rome treated the defeated city with leniency, 
allowing Tarentum the same local self-rule it allowed other cities. Tarentum in tum 
recognized Rome's hegemony in Italy and became another of Rome's allies, while a 
Roman garrison remained in the city to insure loyalty. Rome now became undisputed 
master of the lower three quarters of the Italian peninsula. 
The social makeup, the oligarchic bias of the system contributed to its 
cohesiveness. Under ancient conditions an extended political order was easier to construct 
on an oligarchic foundation because the rich tended to have greater geographical horizons 
and wider connections than the poor, and individual legal rights provided for in the 
various forms of alliances became relevant. A small farmer in Capua, was unlikely to be 
interested in rights of trade with Rome or intermarrying with a Roman, rights he would 
unlikely ever wish to exercise. A large landowner, however, raight want to do both - and 
would find it easier to enter such relations with Romans than with other Campanians from 
a different city. 
Add to these factors the openness of Rome itself The tradition of Rome as a 
mixed community open to outsiders was as old as the city itself, as conveyed by the "rape 
of the Sabine women"'; indeed older, at least in retrospect, as embodied in the myth of 
Aeneas 
. 
365 In this the Romans were opposite to the traditional exclusiveness of the 
Greeks. 
A further attribute of the Roman system, one of particularly immediate concern to 
Hannibal, was that it was a system geared for war. The Roman confederacy consisted of a 
variety of states bound to Rome through over 150 differing treaties and afliances with one 
36 -5 T. J. Cornell, The Bcginnipgs of Rome, page 430, note 27 & Livy. Ad Urbe Condita, 1.9 for a full 
account. 
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common requirement. to supply men or supplies for Rome's army. The availability of 
Italian manpower gave the Roman state vast military potential, plus the capacity to absorb 
heavy losses. This meant Rome could use war as an instrument of policy with little risk. 
Since the alliance had a purely military function, they were only valuable to Rome during 
times of war; therefore, the Romans needed to engage in warfare if they wanted to keep 
the system intact. Momigliano observed that the Romans- 
passed from war to war without giving thought to the very metaphysical 
nuestion of whether the wars were meant to gain power for Rome or to keep the 'I- 
allies busy. Wars were the very essence of the Roman organisation. The battle of 
Sentinum was the natural prelude to the battle of Pydna - or even to the 
destruction of Corinth and the SoCial War. "366 
It follows that the Roman conquest was the result of efficient exploitation of the 
resources of the allies. The allies had to bear the burden of the wars of conquest, and a 
substantial share of the risks. In particular, they incurred a proportion of the cost, since 
they were obliged to pay for their contingents out of their own resources. 367 In this way 
the Romans were able to tax the allies without imposing a direct tribute, and to fight wars 
at a relatively low cost to them. For their part the allies were evidently prepared to accept 
this state of things, and remained consistently loyal to Rome. 
The Romans could count on the support of the propertied classes in the allied 
states, who turned naturally to Rome whenever their local interests were threatened. On 
several occasions Rome intervened with military force to defend local aristocracies 
against popular insurrections. In return they received the cooperation of the ruling classes 4: ) 
166A. Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Heflenization (Cambridge, 1975), pages 45-6. 
367 Polybius. The Histories,, 6.21.4 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommepimD1, pI bius, Vol. 9-Y - 
1, page 
701. 
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of the allied states -- an arrangement that insured their continuing loyalties even in times 
of CriSiS. 
368Additionally 
as military partners with Rome they gained a share of the profits 
of successful warfare. This was a standard clause in all treaties and applied to confiscated 
land as well as tangible material, which Rome shared equally between with her allies as a 
matter of course from defeated enemies. They used confiscated land for colonization and 
distribution to individuals- Land allotments included non-Roman Italians, Latins and 
allies, as well as Roman citizens. 
369 
Many of the affies had been defeated in war then compefled. to join the Roman 
Alliance. Future allied participation in the settlement of conquered territories was directly 
connected with the Roman's practice of confiscation of land from conquered states. 
Through joining a large and efficient operation, while sacrificing their political 
independence, Rome's Italian allies obtained security, protection and profit. The Roman 
Alliance System has been compared to a criminal operation, which compensates its 
victims by including them in the gang and inviting them to share in the proceeds of future 
robberies. 3 70 Rome drew no tribute ftom its subject-allies fighting men and supplies for 
troops, the direct source of income the system provided, the seizure of land from defeated 
enemies, was also dependent on war. In the words of Cornel 
"For most of its history the Roman Republic was constantly at war, and a very 
high proportion of its citizen manpower was committed to military service. Its 
368UN-v. Ad Urbe Condita. 10.3.1-2ff. 
369 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 34.42.5-6. 
370 E. J. Bicherman and M. Sinith, The Ancient H'StOly Of Westem Civilization (New York, 1976), page 
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institutions were military in character and function, and its culture was pervaded 
by a warlike CjhoSý-,. 
371 
The same characterization could be used to describe Sparta, yet while the Spartans 
were constrained by their system, theirs multiplied the Romans' fi7eedom of action. As the 
price of exceptional capacity for war the Spartans cut themselves off from the larger 
worlds, and both their society and their power base proved incapable of growing beyond 
narrow limits. In contrast the Romans opened themselves to the world - and began 
successfully to absorb a growing portion of it. Rome, like Athens in its richness and 
variety, had something more to offer than the mere security of subjection. 
The Roman system and the attitudes infused by it were in place for some four 
generations prior to the outbreak of the 2dRoman War. Over time, its effect must have 
been to gradually break down city-state particularism across Italy without undermining 
the city-state identity of Rome itself Ultimately, by the time of the Social War, the 
process had gone far enough that the allies revolted not to restore their ancient 
independence, but to demand fuller rights from Rome. 
As noted previously in this chapter, Hannibal sent scouts and envoys into Gaul, 
and even across the Alps into Cisalpine Gaul, to prepare his line of mark; however, he 
underestimated the impact when Rome granted citizenship to those allies who did not 
rebel, or to those who abandoned the rebellion . 
372EXCept for RoMan colonies, the people 
in other parts of Italy did not at all think of themselves as Romans. Yet it is probable that 
enough personal ties had been formed between Rome and members of the elite in other 
cities to form an invisible brake against rebellion. People who had fiiends or relations in 
Rome were less likely to turn or make common cause with an alien intruder for the sake 
37 1 T. J. Comell, The Beginnings of Rome, page 36-5. 
3 72 L. Keppie. The Making of the Roman AjDy: From the Rqpublic to Epjjpýire (Nc-vN- York, 1994), page 68. 
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of a traditional independence. Plus we are given no evidence that he actively collected 
any political intelligence about Roman Italy itself Even if he did so, the sort of 
intelligence he would have been able to gather might not have been sufficient. The full 
resilience of the Roman system perhaps could only be appreciated by extensive personal 
experience in Italy. 
373 
Long established, the Roman system proVided rewards for loyalty as well as 
punishments for disloyalty, and fostered the growth of personal ties that tended to 
gradually weaken city-state particularism. Such particularism was by no means extinct, 
and some cities did rebel, but the centripetal force acting to encourage a breakup of the 
D- 
Roman system was weaker than Hannibal must have anticipated, and the cohesive forces 
holding it together were stronger. In choosing a politico-military strategy of breaking up 
the Roman Alliande System, Hannibal chose a more difficult task than he anticipated. 
Disposition of Hannibal's Troops Before the March 
The landlocked interior of the Iberian Peninsula situated on a high plateau, known 
as the Meseta was originally inhabited by people of mostly Celtic origin. Upon 
encountering them as a contingent in Hannibal's army, the Romans named them 
Celtiberians, meaning 'Celts who live in Iberia. Hamilcar transformed the Celtiberians 
into excellent troops, further expanding the political power of the Barcas in Spain. In 
areas under Barcid control native recruits were conscripted into the army; in outlying 
areas they were enticed to join with the promise of payment. Supplementing his Spanish 
forces with seasoned African ground troops and horsemen, Hamilcar established an 
However. it is possible Hannibal did understand all there was to learn from spies and simply 
underestimated the Romans in their tenacity. It is known that a Carthaginian spy had been operating in 
Rome for at least two years when he was caught in 217 B. C.. Li-vv, Ad Urbe Condita, 22.33.1 and NIE. 
Austin and N. B. Rankov, ExSploratio page 93. See also, T. A. Dodge, Hannibal page 164. 
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unprecedented Carthaginian army. They were able to remain virtually independent of the 
political control of Carthage; eventually, the troops in Spain owed their aflegiance to the 
Barca family rather than Carthage itself This allegiance gave Hamilcar and upon his 
death his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, the ability and power to pursue their own cause. The 
stability and strength of their rule from 238-221 B. C. resulted in virtual independence 
from Carthage, establishing an unopposed succession of Hannibal in 221 B. C. 
374 
Many of the older generation remembered the Roman invasion of Carthage during 
the first war with Rome and feared another assault on their homeland. To alleviate their 
fears, "these troops were to be a garrison for Carthage, a part to be distributed through the 
country" by posting 15,000 cavalry and infantry recruited from Spanish tribes in 
exchange for an equal number of African soldiers. 375 From Aftica, he brought 11,850 
Libyan infantry, supported by 2,550 cavalry, together with a force of 300 Ligurian 
targeters, 500 Balearic slingers and 21 elephants to Spain and placed them under his 
brother, Hasdrubal's command. In addition to this land force he also left Hasdrubal a 
substantial navy as described previously. Hannibal purposely sent recruits from the 
Spanish tribes to guard Carthage and African troops to guard Spain, thereby minimizing 
the chances of revolt among the soldiers. 376 With these strategic plans he secured Africa 
and Spain and could concentrate on preparations for his invasion of Italy. 
To fully comprehend the task before Hannibal, a look at the Confederacy's troops 
prior to the outset of the War Between the States and Lee's actions are especiafly 
pertinent. Upon taking command of the Army of Northern Virginia, General Lee 1) s first 
374 Polybius, The Histories 2.1 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommcntM on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 151- 
153 
37 5 Ad Urbe Condi 21.21.13 & Polybius. The Histories. 3.34.1. 
376 Livy. Ad Urbe Condita, 21.22. 
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task was to prepare Virginia to repel an invasion by the Union army. Knowing a rapid 
mobilization was essential he established a training camp and an artillery school. As 
officers resigned from the U. S. army and reported for duty, he assigned them to command 
the new units in preparation for battle. In a matter of months he built an army from 
nothing. A. L. Long gave this description of Lee's accomplishment: "Such was his 
wonderful talent for organization that in the space of two months he was able to equip for 
the field sixty regiments of infantry and cavalry, besides numerous batteries of artillery, 
making an aggregate of nearly 50,000 men7 377By staying focused and disciplined both 
Hannibal and Lee made sure their men were properly trained and equipped and were able 
to bring their armies to maximum performance rapidly when required. 
Hannibal's sound strategic preparations bear all the characteristics of careful 
groundwork. Hannibal sent envoys to Gaul to secure passage; he took the precaution of 
sending Spanish troops to Africa and Afficans to Spain; 378 he entrusted the protection of 
Spain to his brother during his absence . 
379With Spain safeguarded and his agents 
returning from Italy with favourable reports, he began to reassemble troops from their 
winter quarters in the last weeks of May. When he heard the news of the Carthaginian 
senate's response to the Roman ultimatum that he and his officers be surrendered '38() he 
was able to use their support to his advantage. In 218 B. C. Hannibal left Carthago Nova 
for Italy with an army of nearly 100,000 men - 90,000 foot and 12,000 cavalry from 
37' A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robert E. Lee page 142. 
378 This is precisely what the Romans did during the Empire to prevent troops ftom rebelling. 
379 j. Peddie. Hannibal's W, page II&J. Prevas, Hannibal Crosses the Alps pages 54-55. 
390 p0IVbUS. The _Histories 
3.34.8. 
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381 382 Africa - plus, a contingent of thirty-seven war elephants with their handlers. There 
were loyal veterans who had served with Hannibal, as well as Hasdrubal; however, the 
majority were mercenaries who owed allegiance to no one. They were men who fought 
for plunder; the prospect of unlimited spoils the only tie that bound them. It was a mixed 11 
force of many races and languages . 383 Hannibal's ability to mold these disparate troops 
into a disciplined, loyal fighting force is by far one of his crowning achievements. The 
following chapter will more closely examine the complexity of Hannibal's troops 
beginning with their departure fi7om Carthago Nova through the battle of Cannae and 
further explain the breakdown and failure of his first strategy. 
381 Pff Polybius, The Histories, 3.35.1 & F. W. Walbank, A ffistoirical Commeqt, on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 
366 
382 Appian, Roman Histoq: Hannibalic War trans. H. NVhite, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 
1912), 1.4. 
383 A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars pages 153-154; IF Lazenby, Hannibal's Har, pages 32-33 & L. 
gh interestingly he lists, "heavy, unwieldy siege engines, battering Cottrell, pages 25-28. thou 
rams and storming-towers" as being brought on the March to Ital-Y. This Is incorrect as Hannibal did not 
take any sicge equipment of any kind, except the elephants themscl-ves. 
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Chapter III 
As the march from Spain to Italy unfolds through the battle of Cannae, this 
chapter will discuss the events, which provide indications of Hannibal's strategic and 
tactical thinking. In order to highlight the changing aspects to Hannibal's thoughts as he 
responds to the situation on the ground the chapter proceeds chronologically. 
In many cases, the practical applicability of Hannibal's strategic placement of 
battles has been somewhat neglected as a potential source of information. As the war 
progresses, it becomes blatantly obvious that occasionally Hannibal risks battle at all 
costs while at other times he will go to great lengths to avoid such. Clausewitz, for 
example, writes in his book, On War: 
"If therefore we hear about Hannibal having offered battle to Fabius m vain, that 
tells us nothing more as regards the latter than that a battle was not part of his 
plan, and in itself neither proves the physical nor moral superiority of Hannibal; 
but with respect to him the expression is still correct enough in the sense that 
Hannibal really wished a battle. 
!, -694 
It is clear from what information remains that the placement of the battles 
Hannibal desired is significant because it demonstrated his ability to defeat the Romans 
while protecting any allies who might come over to his side. For example, why did he not 
wait in Umbria and give battle with the Romans there in terrain of his own choosing? 
Instead he wages the battle of Lake Trasimene after a march through a marsh and after 
crossing the Apennines. First, if he had a large victory in the area of Etruria those cities 
might then come over to his side and present an immediate threat to the Romans; whereas 
the Umbrians were merely a distant threat with a small populace and little potential 
384 C. von Clausewitz. Qn War, trans. JI Graham (LOndOn- 1982), Originally published in 1832, page 328. 
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military Might. 
385 Next, he could exploit any weaknesses the Roman consuls may have by 
taking the offensive stance rather than a defensive posture; always insuring he took the 
battles to them and not vice versa. Perhaps because, "to probe for the weaknesses of one's 
opponent, "' according to Polybius,, with "less emphasis on the physical aspects and more 
on the psychological and moral defects of the enemy leadership. Those are the 
weaknesses which lead to mistakes being made by an opponent during a campaign and 
the efficient and imaginative commander can turn them to his own advantage. , 386 This is 
especially true of Hannibal for he accomplishments undeniably turned the enemies 
weaknesses to his advantage. 
On the other hand, it can also be seen that Hannibal's actions prior to the battle of 
Lake Trasimene is drastically at variance with those after the Battle of Cann, ae. We shall 
investigate his movements after Cannae later in this chapter. The theoretical element 
behind the information covered in this section of the study will be used to demonstrate 
how Hannibal came to believe ultimately that his initial strategy would not work and a 
new one, which would be very different, was needed. 
Manpower387 
. A. S. the study points out in the previous chapter, Hannibal sought to undermine 
'D - Rome's military might by destroying the political confederation linking the Republic with 
385 This did not occur, but 10 years later it is known many of the Etruscan cities were on the verge of 
changing sides. 
386 N. J. E. Austin & N. B. Rankov, EXploratio page 14; Polybius, The Histories 3.81 & F. W. Walbank, A 
Historical Commentary on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 413. 
387 For more on the troops available to Harniibal before the March, see L. Cottrell, Ham[libal pages 20-30 & 
J. F. Lazenby, _Hannibal's 
War, pages 29-34. For an excellent comparison Of the available troops to Hannibal 
and Rome, see D. Head, Annies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars 359 B. C. to 146 B. C. (1982), pages 33- 
41. 
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her Latin allies. But how did he imagine the defection of Rome"s allies might benefit his 
ultimate goal? The idea that he could never muster the quantity of manpower available to 
D- 
-Rome through the allied treaties that provided Rome with mifitary units is fact. He had 
planned before ever leaving Spain to greatly diminish Rome's vast manpower advantage 
by detaching these allies from their political allegiance. It is important to note that 
Hannibal needed to replenish his troops from the local population and the defection of 
Rome's allies was crucial to his strategy. 
The total population of Carthage at the start of the 2nd Roman War is estimated at 
one million people, while Polybius cites Rome's military strength in figures of more than 
700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry for service in 225 B. C., with 250,000 allied citizens - 
available for infantry and 23,000 for the cavalry. Similarly by 1860 the Union states were 
far more populous than the Confederate states with over 22 million people recorded. Of 
these 22 million the Union held over 4 nfillion men of combat age. According to carefully 
kept government records, the Union army consisted of 2.2 million soldiers with almost an 
equal number of men to call on in reserve . 
388The Roman numbers show "... what a great 
power it was that Hannibal ventured to attack.. 1-)389 Yet attack he did in spite of the 
knowledge that Roman strength in terms of manpower closely matched Carthage's total 
population. A look at the complexity of Hannibal's army, the numbers involved during 
the course of the war, and the subsequent allied troops who joined him as the war 
proceeded through the Battle of Cannae will show just how well he accomplished his 
goal. 
388 A. Jones, ýCivil War Command & Strategy, page 8. 
389 polybius, The Histories,, 2.24.1, 
T(OV p-plfo)V ljktKtOý 'Avvtp(xq CT(AýLTJGE 7EPa7P-acylv 67ttOP-aut [ýLcTa 66 Taxyral... " & F. W. Walbank, 
A Historical CommepLa! y on PoIjbius Vol. 1, pages 1%-igg. 
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Hannibal was certainly one of the most remarkable military geniuses in history 
and not least remarkable as a leader of an overwhelmingly mercenary army. Carthaginian 
armies were composed essentially of mercenaries commanded by professional officers, 
usually native Carthaginians. While historically the army displayed an amazing diversity 
of nationalities,, Hannibal led an army cons'sting of at least half a dozen nationalities, 
each with its own distinctive way of fighting,, language, customs, and character. He knew 
the strengths and weaknesses of each group and turned these undisciplined and 
individualistic tribesmen into effective units capable of fighting in coordination with 
troops of other nationalities. Throughout the war Hannibal showed remarkable skills in 
understanding his opponents' psychology, concern for his own troops, the ability to use 
different troops to his best advantage, and the readiness to use unusual tactics. 390 
Although some historians claim that mercenary armies were necessarily less committed 
and less cohesive than citizen militias, there is little evidence for it. In fact Hannibal 
exploited the diversity of his multiracial army to defeat the homogenous citizen and allied 
forces of his enemy. Later as the war wore on Rome even had problems with twelve of 
the Latin colonies supplying their required contingents. 391 
The evidence suggests of Hannibal's African troops, the Libyphoenicians (the 
term first used to mean Phoenician settlers in Libya, later it was used for half-breed 
Libyans who had adopted the Carthaginian culture) formed the most important element 
among the infkntry. He drew these from Carthage's Aftican provinces and they formed 
the phalanx, which was the core of the striking force of the infantry. It is more than likely 
that they were pikemen and carried lighter lance-like weapons. The Celts and fberians 
'90 S. Yalichev. Mercenaries of the Ancient World (London, 1997), page 235. 
391 Livy. Ab Urbe CondiLa, 27.9. The twelve colonies were: Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium. Alba, Carseoli, Sora, 
Suessa. Circeii, Setia, Cales, Namia, and Interamna. 
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formed the bulk of the infantry at Cannae, with the Celts coming into Hannibal's army in 
218. Their quality was variable; although individually brave, they were generally found 
unreliable. 392 The ancient sources give us the impression that Hannibal used them as 
pilum fodder. Apparently the Spanish tactics were much like those of the Roman infantry, 
they discharged a shower of throwing spears and then foflowed up with their short 
swords. One of the most critical of Hannibal's light troops was the Balearic slingers, who 
armed with three types of sling for employment at different ranges, were capable of 
inflicting a great deal of damage to the enemy and deemed more useful than archers. 
Nevertheless it is clear that Hannibal's cavalry led by the Numidians - the most 
remarkable light horsemen of ancient times - and the Spanish proved to be the 
dominating feature of his army. 393 The Nun-fidians led remounts into battle and changed 
horses when one tired, while the Spanish heavy cavalry commonly rode two men to a 
horse with one rider dismounting to fight on 
foot. 394 Hannibal often used the Numidians' 
idiosyncratic fighting methods to engage the Romans and draw them out as at Trebia. At 
Cannae, he groups the Celtic and Spanish horse, recruited among the nobles and their 
retainers. By the time of battle it is clear that Hannibal had succeeded in welding together 
these disparate horsemen into a highly trained body of cavalry. 
For an indication of how the effective use of cavalry can assist in the planning and 
execution of a military offensive, we need to consider the use of cavalry during the War 
Between the States. Just as Carthage had an overwhelmingly superior cavalry when 
392 See L. Rawlings, "Celts, Spaniards, and Samnites: Warriors in a Soldiers' War", The Second Punic War: 
.4 Reappraisal, 
BICS Supplement 67,1996, pages 86-92 for a description of the Celtic and Spanish mindset 
in battles. 
393 D. Head. Amiies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars 359 B. C. to 146 B. C., pages 34-36, 
39" A. Lloyd, DestrPY-CarthaWN. Page 136. 
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compared to Rome, for the first half of the War Between the States, the Confederate 
cavalry proved infinitely superior to the Union. 395 Early on the Confederacy organized 
their cavalry into an independent autonomous unit. Given this structure, they were able to 
introduce new tactics into the European cavalry tradition - making large-scale mounted 
raids, and putting cavalry into battle to fight dismounted as the Carthaginian heavier 
Spanish horsýe. The common cavalry tactics of the day held they were best suited for 
scouting, covering the army's flank, charging infantry formations, and to cause confusion 
during a retreat. The most notable change to these practices was the large-scale mounted 
raid. 396 Additionally, the Confederates were better led by such legendary cavalry officers 
as: Wade Hampton, the fearless South Carolina horseman; John Hunt Morgan; Joseph 
Wheeler, this author's great-great-great uncle; Fitz Lee, Robert E. Lee's nephew; Nathan 
Bedford Forrest, whose lightning raids on enemy camps made him one of the war 5s most 
feared commanders; and the flamboyant J. E. B. Stuart. 
397 
Stuart and his regiment helped turn back the Union army at First Bull Run. During 
the Peninsular campaign, he led 1,200 men behind George McClellen's army to 
reconnoiter the Union flank. He provided Robert E. Lee with invaluable information 
regarding McClellan"s troops by making a complete circuit of the Union forces over a 3- 
day period. Stuart captured 300 prisoners, arms, and additional valuable booty ftom 
Pope's headquarters' tent including books revealing Federal strength and details of 
Pope's poSition. 
398The information he obtained helped Lee win the Battle of Gaines Mill, 
395 S. Carter 111, The Last Cavaliers: Confederate and Union CavalTy in the Civil War (New York, 1979), 
page 6. 
396 R. N. Current, The Confedqj! a, pages 86-90. 
"- B. Cation, The Civil ar, pages 149-150, 
398B. Davis, GM Eoýj, page 119. 
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changing the role of the cavalry in the American war and establishing Confederate pre- 
eminence. After Gettysburg the Federal cavalry began to operate as the Confederates had 
from the beginning, just as Scipio later duplicates Hannibal's success using his horsemen 
to take out the Carthaginian wings and as a final stroke to engage the rear of the 
infantry_399 On June 9,1863, by the narrowest of margins Gen. J. E. B. Stuart defeated the 
Union cavalry led by General Alfred Pleasonton in the largest cavalry engagement in 
American history - the Battle of Brandy Station, Virginia. 400 For the first time in the war 
the Union riders demonstrated themselves equals to the Southerners. Though Pleasonton 
retreated from the field it proved a moral victory for the North. Imbued with a sense of 
confidence they became a formidable force for the remaining years of the war. 401 
Both Polybius and Livy agree Hannibal started out with a very large army: 90,000 
infantry, 12,000 cavalry, 
402 
and 37 elephants, 
403 
comprised of men from Carthage7 
Numidia, Spain, and the Balearic Islands. 404 Although the Confederacy encompassed a 
tremendous area, the population density was sparse with only 9 million people. Of these 9 
n0ion Southerners, only the 5.5 million whites could supply men for a total of 
approximately 1,140,000 men of combat age. Statistics are not readily available regarding 
the size of the Confederate army because many records were destroyed in the final days 
399 A. Lloyd, Destrgy Carthage page 140. 
4y page 7 1. 00 R. N. Current, The CQ-n-federac 
401 B. Davis, Gray Fox, pages 211-213, 
402 Polybius, The Histories 3.35- F. W. Walbank, A Historical C2PIPIe-n-IM on Polybius Vol. 1, pagcs 366- 
367 & Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.22. 
403polybius, The Histories, 2.42. 
"' T. A. Dorey and D. R- Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, page 38. 
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of the war; however, generally accepted estimates range from 850,000 - 1,000,000 
men. 
405 
We might consider at this point the disposition of the troops prior to Hannibal's 
departure for Italy. Even as the plans for his campaign progressed, he left 11,850 Libyan 
infantry and 450 horse as the Carthaginian standing army left in Spain, while he took 
20,000 Affican infýntry with him on his march to Italy. 4D6Apparently as described by 
Polybius: 
"He dismissed at the same time an equal number of troops to their homes, with 
the view of leaving them well disposed to himself and encouraging the hope of a 
safe return In the rest of the Spaniards, not only those who were serving with him, 
but those who remained at home, so that if he ever had to caH on them for 
reinforcements, they might all readily respond. With the rest of his force, thus 
lightened of its impedimenta and consisting now of fifty thousand foot and about 
nine thousand horse,, he advanced through the Pyrenees towards the crossing of 
the Rh6ne, having now an army not so strong in number as serviceable and highly 
trained owing to the unbroken series of wars in Spain. 
-)A-07 
405 A. Jones. Civil War Command & SIKate y, page 8. 
_qntM on 
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bius, Vol. 1, pages 366- 406 Polybius., The Historim 3.35-ý F. W. Walbank, A Historical CoMD ql a 
367 & Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.22. Whether the Libyans were technically mercenaries or subject 
conscript troops has been debated. 
407 polybiUS, The bstories, 3.35.6-7. 
11 clq 6C Tll%,, OIICCtOLV (VECkOCTS TOI)q t(TOUq TOtq 7tf)OP-tpTjýjCVotq, POIA410ýICVOq OLUTOUý TETOUTOU; 
COVOOq OC7[0kt7E6lV, TOlq TE 
kolltolý "7Eo6CtKVt)('OV '-: ýknt6a T71q Clq OVKOV 6ROW060t), KUI Totq 4&0' 
GUOTOU ýLF-V (7TPoCTf-UO[LCVOtq, OV)X'nTTOV 
69 Kat TOtq PV OtKO) ýWVOUatr(OV IIPIIPWV, tVOC 7E()001)pfj); 
F-ýOppxoat 7EOLVTcq, OLV lc'OIIF-ý lIq CTCIKOUPULý xpctoL'YF-vllroLl Imp, oLur(, )V. -rnv & ), O. Lnnv Crupcc. C. LoLv 
avotý-OCPOV cuý(Ovov, lccý00ý PEV MVTGLKICTpUpjoUý, t7t7E6tq 
& 7CPOq F-VVCCKt(TXtktOL)q TlyP- 6toL'r(j)V 
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Because the security of the region was of great importance to Hannibal" s overall strategy, 
it is not surprising that he detached a sizeable force of infantry and cavalry under the 
command of Hanno. The detachment could maintain a watch over the pro-Roman Greek 
colony of Emporium on the coast further guarding the sea passage across the Straits of 
Gibraltar. 408 Although Livy asserts this reduction in Carthaginian strength had already 
been compounded by 3,000 desertions from among the less reliable Spanish levies, it is 
more probable that Hannibal dismissed the additional 7,000 Spanish troops whose 
reliability he questions rather than see the morale among his other troops affected by their 
desertions. 
Livy provides a probable account of the "dismissal" reported by Polybius. He 
maintains that as Hannibal's army crossed the Pyrenees- 
(Q 
and more definite rumours had spread amongst the barbarians that the war 
was to be with Rome, three thousand of the Carpetanian foot turned back. It was 
understood that they were influenced not so much by the war as by the long 
march and the impossibility of crossing the Alps. To recaH them or to detain them 
forcibly would have been hazardous, for it might have roused resentment in the 
savage bosoms of the others. And so Hannibal sent back to their homes above 
seven thousand more, whom he had perceived to be chafing at the service, 
pretending that he had also dismissed the Carpetani. "' 
'j)V Ot)X , y( 
FlUp'nV0Ct(0V ýXYOýLSVOW OPWV 6711 "V TOIL) 'PO60tVOU K0CkODPZVOj)'9OToCpOt) (5toCp()tCytV, F 
OUTO)q ROWIV 6UVOL4tV rj)q XpnCylRTIV ICOLt 76704VOLCVILF-VTIV 61()*-()OVTWq SK T71q (TIDV&X6toLq T(j)V KOCTOCP 
lp, nrt(y. v ()cy(j)v(, )v. " & F. W. Walbank, A ffistorical CommentM on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 366-367. 
408 Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal-s March (London, 1967), pages 26-27. 
409 Livy, Ad Uft Condita 21.23.4-6. "... nimorque per barbaros manavit certior de bello Romano, tris 
milia inde Carpetanorum peditum iter averterunt. Constabat non tam bello motos quam longinquitate viae 
insuperabilique Alpiun, tramitu. Hannibal, quia revocare aut VI retinere eos anceps erat- ne ceteromm etiam 
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Nevertheless, Livy's version of this mass desertion, followed by an additional 
"dismissal" of desertion risks, is definitely credible since it was a last-chance barrier for 
would-be deserters; beyond the Pyrenees, a deserter had a fast-dwindling chance of ever 
making his way home. It would be the least of surprises, then, if the impulse to desert 
reached something of a peak as the army reached the Pyrenees. Hannibal could improve 
morale both in the army and among the Carthaginian subjects in Spain by aflowing these 
men to turn back. Having crossed a psychological barrier as well as the physical barrier of 
the Pyrenees, the men who remained would be all the more committed to going on. 
But regardless of the actual account of the desertions and/or dismissals by the time 
he left Emporium in late August he had lost no fewer than 20,000 infantry and 1,000 
cavalry since leaving Carthago Nova. Viewed in this context, Polybius' mysterious 
discrepancy of 20,000 infantry becomes understandable. The army that entered Gaul may 
indeed have been much smaller than the one that left Carthago Nova,, but surely the army 
entering Gaul was a much better one. The initial leg of the march through Spain had 
served the purpose of basic training. The unfit and disaffected had been weeded out; those 
who remained had marched, camped, and welded into a cohesive force. Ahead of them 
lay the wealth of Italy and the plunder of Rome. 
As the army moved deliberately against a number of pro-Roman tribes they were 
involved in heavy fighting between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. IFEstorians suggest 
Polybius exaggerated Hannibal's troop strength at this point because he claims another 
12,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry are lost. Although a few Celtic tribes contested his 
march, there is no suggestion by the ancient sources that Hannibal suffered great losses 
during this process. Other potential sources of infonnation such as archeological 
feroces aillini inritarentur, supra septem milia hominum domos remisit- quos et ipsos gravari militia 
senserat. Carpetanos quoque ab se dimissos simulans. ^ 
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evi ence supports the theory that these troops were actually detached by Hannibal to 
establish and maintain garrisons to protect his fines back to Spain. Carthaginian control 
of the region was necessary in order to secure the lines of commumcation fi7om Italy 
back to Spain. With his army now at its peak of efficiency and numbering 50,000 
infantry and 9,000 horse, as well as 37 elephantS, 410 Hannibal crossed the Pyrenees and 
headed for the Rh6ne. 
411 
The March from the Rhone to the Po ValleY412 
By the end of September Hannibal reached the Rh6ne at a point four days' march 
from the sea, about 50 miles fi7om the mouth of the river. 413 It is clear from what 
information remains that their arrival was facilitated by the agreement with the Celtic 
tribes of the region allowing the Carthaginians safe passage. In all probability these 
tribes were on the one hand eager to have the army move on as quickly as possible while 
on the other happy to reap the profits from the sale of supplies. 414 Apparently even 
41('For more on why Hannibal believed elephants could cross the Alps, see H. H. Scullard, The Elgphant in 
the Greek and Roman World (London, 1974), pages 154-159. 
41 1 T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage page 39. 
"' For a concise narrative of the March, see H. H. Scullard, A Histojy of the Roman World 753 to 146 B. C. 
4 th Edition (London, 1980), pages 203-207. See also Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The Struggle for Power in 
the Mediterranean, pages 120-182; J. Briscoe, "The Second Punic War", The Cambridge Ancient Histo! y: 
Vol. VIII Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B. C. 2rdEdition, page 47; B. Cavcn, The Punic Wars, pages 
98-106; A. J. Church, Carthage, or the Empire of Africa (London, 1888), pages 185-194; L. Cottreli, 
Hannibd, pages 31-84, T. A. Dodge, Hannibal, pages 163-237; T. A. Dorey and D. R- Dudley, Rome 
Aggfinst Carthage-, pages 38-45; A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pages 158-166; S. Lancel, Hannibal 
pages 57-80; J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War -48 & J. Peddie, Hannibal's War (Stroud, 1997), , pages 34 
pages 9-32. 
413 T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudlpy, Rome Against CaOage, page 39. 
414 T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, page 39, 
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though Hannibal"s prior diplomatic measures had not fully won over all the Gallic tribes 
along the line of march, his army met no serious difficulty with them up to this point. 
But for whatever reason, the tribe occupying the territory on the opposite side of the 
river proved hostile. Whether it was influence from Rome's ally, Massilia or just an 
unfiiendly adversary, Hannibal now faced the difficulty of a river crossing in the face of 
hostile resistance. 
415 
Rather than meet the enemy head on Hannibal dispatched a detachment under the 
leadership of Hanno, son of Bomilcar, the suffete who staunchly supported Hannibal 
against Rome"s demands for his surrender during the Saguntine crisis, with orders to 
cross the river approximately 25 miles upstream, then to attack the enemy from behind. 
Using this time Hannibal completed preparations for crossing the Rhone. The following 
day as Hanno set fire to the Volcae's camp, Hannibal attacked the confused and 
disordered Gauls who broke and fled. Here the ancient historians provide evidence of 
Hannibal's tactical astuteness as the Volcae are driven off and he successfully moves his 
army across the Rh6ne, all without serious loss or delay. 
416 
During the opening stages of the war with Carthage, the Roman Senate formulated 
a strategy based on the assumption that the war would be fought with Hannibal on the 
defensive in Spain. The Senate ordered Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain with a 
force of 25,000 to stop any Carthaginian advance. The second consul, Tiberius 
Sempronius Longus, they dispatched to Sicily with orders to establish a base for the 
415AIthough polybius does not name theseGauls, Livy identifies them as the Volcae. Polybius, The 
Histories. 3.42-43-, F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentaly on Eplybius, Vol. 1, pages 377-379 & Livy, 
Ad Urbe Condita, 21.26.29. 
-116 T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthagc, page 37. 
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invasion of Africa. 417 Unanticipated events in Northern Italy changed these plans and 
caused the Romans to divert their attention from Hannibal. Roman expansion into 
Cisalpine Gaul after their victory at Telamon in 225 B. C. and the establishment of two 
new Roman colonies at Cremona and Placentia provoked two Celtic tribes, the Boii and 
Insubres. We might consider at this point whether or not Hannibal arranged for the Celts 
to revolt at this time; the outcome of the events was decidedly to his advantage. Even if 
this is not the case when his agents arrived in the territory of the Boii and Insubres in 
early 218, they were unquestionably given a sympathetic hearing. As the Celts attacked 
the 6,000 Roman colonists, the Romans abandoned Placentia and Cremona and retreated 
to Mutina,, followed by the vengeful Celts. When Manlius, the Roman commander of the 
region of the Po Valley, brought up his legion to relieve the town he was ambushed, 
causing the survivors to withdraw into the settlement of Tannetum to await relief In the 
absence of any reserve units, the Romans had no choice but to draw upon those 
conscripted by Scipio for service in Spain, which caused an advantageous delay for 
Hannibal in Scipio's departure. 418 
By the time the Roman army under Scipio's command finally moved westward to 
Spain by sea "-.. coming to anchor off the first mouth of the Rh8ne, known as the 
Massaliotic mouth.., )A19 Hannibal sent out a cavalry force of 500 Numidians to find out 
the size, position, and intentions Of the Roman army. Shortly after he landed, Scipio also 
417 Polybius, The Histories, 3.40 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commepta1y on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 
374-37T 
418 j. Prevas. Hannibal Crosses the Alp5, page 89. 
419 Polybius. The Historif--,,, 3.41.5 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Conunentary on Polybius Vol. 1, page 
377. 
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sent out a force of 300 horsemen to scout around the area of Massilia . 
420 The subsequent 
skirmish between these mounted forces represents the first armed clash between the 
principals in the 2 ndRoMan War. 42 1 The Romans drove back the Numidian cavalry with a 
loss of more than half their number. At the same time the survivors arrived in great 
disorder. 
,, a 
delegation led by King Magalus from the Boil (the Celtic tribe fighting to 
Romans in the Po Valley) arrived in Hannibal's camp to inform Hannibal of the war their 
tribe had begun with Rome. Having just crossed the Alps, Magalus reinforced Hannibal's 
decision to avoid a battle with Scipio and to proceed directly toward his main objective - 
Italy. With the Boii as guides the Carthaginians were safe to assume they would find a 
direct route through country well stocked with supplies. Hannibal broke camp at once. 
0 
Three days later Scipio arrived to find Hannibal and his entire army had gone. 422 
Here we see Livy's depiction of Hannibal's assurances to his troops prior to 
breaking camp, from which he quotes: 
"They might fancy them higher than the ranges of the Pyrenees, but surely no 
lands touched the skies or were unpassable to man. The Alps were indeed 
inhabited, were tilled, produced and supported living beings; their defiles were 
practicable for anmes. Those very ambassadors whom they beheld [from the 
Cisalpine Gauls] had not crossed the Alps in the air on wings. Even the ancestors 
of these men had not been natives of Italy, but had lived there as foreign settlers, 
420 j. Prevas, Hannibal Crosses the Alps page 90. 
421 Polybius, The Hi 13.45. 
-... KM KUOfflUCOF-lý 71POý TO ItpOL)TOV GTOPXX 10k) 'POÖUVOIL), TO M(XCTCY(X/ý-ICOTIKOV XPOCOCY0pEU0 
& F. W. Walbank, A Histofical CommepjAg on Polybius Vol. 1, pages 379-380. 
422 almt Carthage page 41 and I Prevas, Hannibal Crosses the T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudley, Rome A&! - 
Alps. pagc 97. 
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and had often crossed these very Alps in great companies, with their children and 
their wives,, in the manner of emigrants - 
"423 
He might put it this way, the Alps "indeed were inhabited, " however this provided 
no unalloyed benefit to Hannibal" s army. Here we see what sort of situation Hannibal had 
faced up to this point. So far he had avoided serious difficulty with the Gauls, partly 
through prior diplomacy and partly through bluster effectively backed by his large army. 
Even the Volcae had given him little difficulty in crossing the Rhone, and he managed to 
dodge Publius Scipio's army. But now in the Alpine passage, the army had to contend 
with the rigors of crossing the mountain passes in autumn as weH as resistance by the 
local Gauls, the Allobroges. 
424 
Here we see the appearance of Scipio at Massifia forced Hannibal to abandon his 
original plans to follow a direct and easy route through the Alps. Instead through 
necessity he moved his army further north along the Rhone River and followed a more 
difficult route. 425 Thus Hannibal contemplated a plan not to engage the Roman army even 
though he heavily outnumbered it. Why did he leave the way open for Rome to carry on a 
counter-invasion of Spain by not engaging Scipio in battle? If he clashed with Scipio's 
army now he would have been a distracted from his strategic objective. Even if he had 
won a decisive victory, the losses to his army in addition to a delay were more than he 
423 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.30.7-8. 
424 pojybiUSý The Histories -53 & F. W. Walbank A Historical CommeppM on PoW? ius Vol. 1, pages , 3.50 
388-390. 
12 -' Livy, Ad Urbe. Condita 2 1.3 1. "Fingerent alti0fes PYrenaci iugis: nullas profecto terras caclun-I 
contingere nec inexsuperabiles humano generi esse. Alpes quidem habitari coli gignere atque alere 
animantesl pervias fauces esse exercitibus. Eos ipsos quos cernant legatos non pinnis sublime elatos Alpes 
transressos. Ne maiores quidem eonim indigenas sed advenas Italiae cultores has ipsas Alpes ingentibus 
saepe agminibus cum liberis ac coniugibus "grantium modo tuto transmisisse. - 
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could afford. Hannibal must have surmised Scipio now knew the invasion of Italy to be 
his objective; he had to cross the Alps quickly before the Romans had time to assemble 
426 their forces and prepare for the invasion or the weather made the route impassable. 
A 
. 92L Mier marching for four days along the Rhone, Hannibal reached a piece of land 
called the "Island"427 inhabited by a large tribe on the verge of internecine warfare. Basýed 
on evidence by Polybiusl Hannibal sided with the elder brother, Brancus. This was 
perhaps partly because in return for helping Brancus drive his younger brother and his 
supporters from the area, Brancus showed his gratitude by giving Hannibal new weapons 
to replace those damaged or lost in the recent fighting, warm clothes and boots suitable 
for the mountains, plus guides and a cavahy escort as far as the foothills of the AlpS. 
428 
For ten days Hannibal marched up the Isere River covering nearly 100 miles where his 
escorts departed. From the point where the escorts turned back almost to the summit, the 
Allobroges harried Hannibal's column as the army began to advance into the more 
difficult country. The Allobroges began to shadow the column fi7om the heights above the 
fiverbed, 429 attacking the marching column from above inflicting heavy casualties on both 
men and animals as they fell to their deaths. 
430 
426 j. Prevas, Hannibal Crosses the Alps, pages 99-103. 
42' Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.31.4. "Insulaa'; also Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal. The Struggle for Power in the 
Mediterranean pages 131-140. 
428 Polybius, The ffistories 3.49; F. W. Walbank, A Ffistorical Commentuy on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 382- 
388 & J. Prevas, Hannibal Crosses the Alps, page 105. 
121 j. Prevas, Hannibal Crosses the Alps pages 101 & 110 and T. A. Dorcy and D. R. Dudley, Rome Agp&st 
Carthage, page 42. 
430 The rivers offer the only passable way for an anny to njake its way through the Alps because they afford 
reasonably level footing. ample supplies of water, and eventualIN- lead to passes over the high peaks. 
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The Celtic scouts reported they suspected the tribesmen only shadowed the 
column during the day and returned to their villages at night. 43' When the tribesman left 
their positions and withdrew to the nearby villages for the night, Hannibal placed a force 
in the spaces they had just left. The next day as the main force of the army wound its way 
along in a slow moving line the Allobroges attacked the baggage train. The wounded and 
terrified animals and the troops fell over the edge to the depths below. "During this 
interval a good many of the horses which had broken away in terror and a number of 
those sumpter-animals which had thrown off their packs returned strangely enough, 
having followed the track of the march, and came into the camp. ), 
432 Hannibal did what 
he could to stop the disaster by attacking from above, but the turmoil of the fighting 
caused even more confusion until the Allobroges broke and fled. While the baggage train 
and cavahy made their way on to safer ground, he rallied the men and attacked the 
neighbouring village the tribesmen had been using as a base. Here he found horses and 
enough com and cattle to feed his army for two to three days. 
A Al. 
Aner repeated attacks the tribesmen agreed to a truce, only to use it as cover to 
ambush the army as they passed in particularly difficult terrain. The next battle took place 
near Modane. The inhabitants of the area sent hostages with offers to provide Hannibal 
with guides; however, they suddenly attacked in full force as the army passed through a 
gorge. Once again Hannibal's expert tactical skills emerge as Polybius points out that 
only his prudent suspicion of the peace-offer and equally far-sighted disposition of his 
431 Livy, Ad Urbe Cgnfta, 21.32. According to Livy the scouts spoke the same language and listened in on 
some of the conversations to gain valuable information. 
-132polybius. The Histories., 3.53.10. 
oupw movsPil 7toXXo%-)q ýw-v tn7EOl)q TOW ()E7MnTOnRCV(J)V, 7EOX? WL 6' UjroýUyLOL -[(ý)V (Xn6pptýOTCOV (0 Ic 
Tot ýOmoc nccpa6oý(, )ý ocvoc6pocýLctv TOK CFTIPOI; FUEOýLCWX KoCt CTIOVOCkpOtt 7[()Oq TnV 7EOCPCgpo, ý'nV. " 
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troops saved his army from disaster. 433 Not trusting their truce, Hannibal sent the more 
vulnerable part of his force, the cavalry and the baggage-train, on in front so the solid 
mass of his heavy infantry were placed between them and the expected direction of 
attack. From this point on Hannibal had little trouble with the Gauls other than sporadic 
attempts to piflage. They reached the head of the pass just nine days after they began the 
ascent. 434 In any attempt to relate the march it is difficult to separate the events from the 
man. 
Having survived the Allobroges, the army pressed on through the higher passes - 
the exact route remains a matter of dispute with both ancient and modem historians - and 
since it requires very specific familiarity with the geography to even attempt to resolve, 
this study wiU not address the question. It is sufficient for me to express that Polybius' 
description of the conditions faced seems nearly as severe as those of the earlier writers 
against whom he had leveled his strictures- "... for the summits of the Alps and the parts Z70 
near the top of the passes are all quite treeless and bare owing to the snow lying there 
continuously both winter and summer, but the slopes half-way up on both sides are grassy 
and wooded and on the whole inhabitable. , 
435 
433 Polybius, The Histories, 3.53 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Conlmentqry on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 390. 
434 T. A. Dorcy and D. R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage , page 43. 
435 Polybius. The Histories 3.55.9. 
Tov -t(xp 'Ak7m(ov Ta ýwv aicpa Kat ra 71POý ToCq U=()pOkOCq OCVIIKOVTOC Tf-ýX(j)ý ()c6CV6poC K(Xt ytkoC 
7EOLN'T' F-'CFTI 61()L TO (TUVCX(oq F-7E4W-VF-t-l' TTIV XtOVa Kal 
06POI)q KOLI XF-Ipf, )VOý, 'r()L 6' U7to ýW-CT-QV TTIN,, 
7l0C()(J)Pf-toC"' 8ý (40011''Cow WPOtV IA00POL Mt 660POýOPU KOLI TO OkOV OjKjJCrtýL'F, (TTtV. " 
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Conditions were not made easier by the season, Polybius reports that the crossing 
was made " -, -)436 --- close on the 
[dawn] setting of the Pleiades... the earliest of which 
would be the end of October, and more probably early in November. 437 Livy disagrees 
438 
and a modern note to his text identifies the date as about the 20th of October. Even if 
Livy is correct, Hannibal cut his timing very fine, had he delayed to give Scipio battle, he 
surely would have found conditions in the Alps even harsher than they were, perhaps to 
the point of rendering them impassable. 
Polybius writes that the most difficult portion of the entire march came as they 
descended from the final high-level crossing: 
"The descending path was very naffow and steep, and as both men and beasts 
could not tell on what they were treading owing to the snow, all that stepped wide 
of the path or stumbled were dashed down the precipice. This trial, however, they 
put up with, being by this time familiar with such sufferings, but they at length 
reached a place where it was impossible for either the elephants or the pack- 
animals to pass owing to the extreme narrowness of the path, a previous landslip 
having camed away about one and a half stades of the face of the mountain and a 
further landslip having recently occurred, and here the soldiers once more became 
disheartened and discouraged. "' 
436 Polybius, The Histories, 3.54.1. 
6ý_C, qq 
8C 
XtOVOq'n67l 7C6pt TOUq OLKPOUq OLOP01ý0REWIq (310C TO C7UV(X7ET6tV TIJV T71q nk6taý60q, 61jytV 
& F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commepi4ly on Polybius Vol. 1, page 390. 
437 D. Piroctor, Hannibal March in I-liggg (Oxford, 197 1), pages 40-5, 
438 Livy, Ad Urbe Condi , 
21.35 and note I on page 102. 
439polybius, The Histories, 3.54,5-7. 
-lc()C(77rot; .. 01)(Til; YOLf) CMVT]q KOU KOCTG)ý6f)0Uq 
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In one complicated instance we see what sort of situation tested Hannibal's 
reasoning skills and can assess the unconventional methods he used to solve the problem. 
At first he tried to detour around the landslide, but the soft newly fallen snow gave way 
easily and underneath stretched a hard layer of ice. The soldiers' feet slipped 
uncontrollably and once they lost their balance the steepness of the slope sent them 
plummeting headlong with no chance to save themselves. The mules and horses struggled 
as they fell, cutting through this lower level with their hoofs they became trapped in the 
ice. Realizing a detour impossible, Hannibal pitched camp on the mountainside and 
prepared to rebuild the road. He made the huge boulders easier to move by lighting fires 
closely around them and pouring sour wine over the hot rocks to split and crumble them. 
At the end of the day's work a road had been made wide enough to pass the horses and 
pack animals down to a camp below the snowline; however, it took three days of 
unremitting toil before the road was wide enough to take the half-starved elephants. After 
another three days he reached the plains. 440 
Polybius estimates,, "The whole march from Carthago Nova had taken him five 
months, and he had spent fifteen days in crossing the Alps, and now, when he thus boldly 
TCLUTIJV ktEV 1)7rF»ýfPC)V TIJV TOLý, Ott716)ptOCV, (ITE (: Yl)VT109tý OVTEý 11811 TOtý TOtOUTOtý K(XKOIý- 0(ýLU 86 TO) 
7COCPCCY6V6CTOOLt 7Ef)Oq TOtOV)TOV T07COV3, OV oing -rotq Ollptotq OuTs -cotq ulcoýuytotq 8uv()LTOV Jjv 
7E("koF, tv 6toc Tqv CYT6VO'C71-coc, (TX660V 6nt Tpt' TlgtCFTOC6tOC'rTIq CC7COpp(j)yOq KOCt 7EPOTOU 116V OUCMq, 
TOTE 66 KOLI ýWtkkOV STI 7Ej7)0Gý0LT(J)q Wmppolyl-)"(Xqý F-VT(Y-*L)O()L 71(1ý-Iv (X0I-)ýLTjCT0tt KOU 6tOLTf)()L7tllV(xt 
auvF. Pil To nkTjOoq. - & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommepIM On PO! 3i)iuS, Vol. 1. page 391. 
440 Polybius, The Histories, 3.54. 
6c T71v ýýv notcyotv nopetow &K Kaiv7lq nOýXO)q &V 7MVT6 RTJCYI 7EOUJCTOCýýVoq, -C71V 66 TG)V 
'Ak7m(o'%' IMWO-; kll%ý TWENtq 
6cK()t7C6VT6, KOLTYIPC 7Wý-471ffOq Ctq TOL 7CPpt TOV nOL60V 7E66t(X Mt TO TOW 
qvcroýtppo)v P-Ovocý ...... & F. W. Walbank, A Historical COmInentpjy on PoMius, Vol. 1, pages 390-391. 
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descended into the plain of the Po and the territory of the Insubres... "441 He concludes the 
total length of the march to be 9,000 stades, or about 1 1) 100 miles; 
442 therefore, the 
average progress was seven to eight miles per day. Using these calculations on average 
Hannibal's army made a full day's march every other day, not accounting for river 
crossings, skirmishes, or crossing the Alps-443 It is fair to say that over a five-month 
period, Hannibal's army set a demanding pace. The unfit would have literally fallen to the 
wayside. 
In citing the Lacinium inscription Polybius paints a grim account of the numbers 
surviving the march, "-- -his surviving forces numbered twelve thousand African and eight 
thousand Iberian foot, and not more than six thousand horse in all., as he himself states in 
,, 444 the inscription on the column at Lacinium relating to the number of his forces. But as 
P- 
-- far as Hannibal had these numbers inscribed on a bronze tablet and placed on a 
promontory at Capo Calonne, they are probably the most accurate figures we have. If 
accurate, he had as noted above lost nearly half the army in the fifteen days it took to 
441 Polybius, The Histories,, 3.56.3 & F. W. Walbank, A fhstoncal Commentgry on Polybiu , Vol. 1, pages 
391-392. 
442 Polybius, The Histories 3.39 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Com-niep! M on Polybius Vol. 1, pages 
371-374. 
443 A typical day's march for an army on foot is perhaps fifteen miles; rather less for Roman armies with 
their elaborate daily encampments. 
444 Polybius, The Historiesl 3.56.4. 
Dv -ro 6tacyü)'oýwVov ýWpoý TTlý ýtgvr(ov AlßU(OV 8UVOLýIF-Wý 7M Ot)ý ýLUPLOUý KM 81Crýlý, tO1)C, -... sý(ý 
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TOU Rk 
A HistorIcal Commenjigy on Polybius Vol. L. pages 391-392. 
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cross the Alps. 445 The only other figures of similar reliability is Cincius Alimentus' 
alleged statement that Hannibal told him he lost 36,, 000 men crossing the Alps. 446Livy 
may have ri-ýsunderstood or misreported this if the figure he gave was for the losses 
between the Pyrenees and Italy, it is not much different from those Polybius cites as 
59,, 000 at the Pyrenees, 26,000 in Italy. Of Polybius' implied losses of 34,000 between 
the Apennines and Italy, most must have been suffered in the Alps. 
Hannibal exacted an enormous human toll for his decision to march by an inland 
route; he subjected his army to a level of attrition that might be expected to totally destroy 
morale. The idea that infantry, at least, would have been reduced from as much as 70,000 
after initial detachments and desertions or dismissals to as little as 20,000 after crossing 
the Alps, is an attrition rate of about seventy percent. The earlier attrition of the army as it 
left Spain had not been a morale factor. No one misses deserters, but the loss of sixty 
percent of infantry strength and forty percent of cavalry strength - mostly in the two- 
week passage of the Alps - would prove far graver. These were men who had become the 
survivors' comrades in arms. Not the least of Hannibal's qualities as a general is his 
'M 1, ability to maintain, or quickly restore, the morale of his army after this harrowing 
experience. What Hannibal lacked in numbers he managed to retain in quality. He 
possessed in his Africans and Spanish infantry and markedly superior Numidian cavalry 
the core of a highly effective army. The next section of this chapter investigates the nature 
of the conflicts once Hannibal and his army arrive in Italy. 
445 polVbiUS, The Histories, 3.55 & Livy. Ad Urbe Condita 21.38. 
446 Livy. Ad Urbe Condita, 21.38 
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Descent from the Al PS447 
Luckily, we shall see just a Hannibal's army descended fi7om the Alps into the 
North Italian plain, war broke out between two tribes of Cisalpine Gauls - the Taurini 
and the Insubres - which provided Hannibal with an excellent opportunity to forcibly 
engage the attentions of the Gauls. 
"... when the Taurini who live at the foot of the mountains quarreled with the 
Insubres and showed no confidence in the Carthaginians, [Hannibal] at first made 
overtures for their friendship and alliance, but on their rejecting these he 
encamped round their chief city and reduced it in three days. By massacring those 
who had been opposed to him he struck such terror into the neighbouring tribes 
that they all came in at once and submitted to him. '-44' 
The diplomatic manoeuvrings that underlay this affair are obscure. But for the 
most part it seems as though Hannibal originally made overtures to the Taurini, and only 
44' For a brief narrative of the events from Hannibal's arrival in Italy to the conclusion of the Battle of 
Cannae, see H. H. Scullard, A 1-hqM of the Roman World 753 to 146 B. C, pages 207-211. For more on 
Hannibal in Italy before the Battle of Ticinus, see J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's Aar, pages 49-52; before the 
Battle of the Trebia, see A. J. Church, Carthne, pages 195-198. 
448 Polybius, The Histories, 3.60.8-10. 
ý6 6p- Tocum, 7EPO(Tom-6,11ý, otaq il6, rl Tijý 8uv(xW-coq,, r(ov ToLuptvcov, ot rx)7X(xvouat 7tpoq -ml 
7EOCPWPEIOC KOLTOtKOI-)VT6q, MOVYtOCýOVT(J)V ýWV 7tPoq TOt)OV(TOýLPPOCq, OC7EtCYTOUVTrj)V & TOtq 
KotpX, q8ovtotg To ýtsv 7EPWTOV ()C, )TOI)q F-tq ýtXtOCV 71POIL)KOXtTO Mt CTUýLpLaXtOCV- OUX J)JEOcKoiL)OVT(j)V 
66,7E6PtaTPOCTOR666UG()Cq TTIV POLPI)TOCT71V 7EOXtV PV'rpt(ytV TIWf)OLtq 6ý67COAlopIC11(y6. KGCT(X(yýý()Cq & 
Tot)q F-VOLMOOEVUX; OCUTO) TOtOUTOV F-VFtMoL(TU-To 
ýOPOV TOtq CTUVMUq KOCTOtKot)(Yt T(j)N? P(Xf)P(Xp(j)\- 
(t)o'rC 7EOLVTOLq CIC 
ýCtPO; 7EUPOLYWESOOR, 616ovcaq 011)'cO"q ELq "v 7E"Lmtv. " & F. W. Walbank, A 
Historical Comment; py on PoIjbius, Vol. 1. page 395. 
186 
after these were rejected did he attack and storm their chief town. 449For argument sake it 
may be the Taurini were the stronger of the two tribes, and Hannibal initially preferred an 
alliance with them, and attacked them only after their equivocal response to his overtures. 
Alternatively, he may have called on both combatant tribes to set aside their local dispute 
and join forces with him against Rome. Yet another possibility is Hannibal simply looked 
for any opportunity to make an object demonstration of his army's strength to dispel any 
impression the Gauls may have formed of its haggard condition so soon after crossing the 
Alps. It perhaps may simply have been the bad luck of the Taurini that they were slow to 
respond favourably to his offers. 
Dp 
Regardless of the actual reason, the result is clear. - the Cisalpine Gauls became 
aware that Hannibal had a formidable army, and some - presumably the Insubres, whom 
he had aided, but probably others as well - came over to his side. There was, however, no 
general uprising of the Gauls. Polybius hints that more would have come over to 
Hannibal had they not already been constrained by the presence of a Roman army- "The 
remaining Celtic inhabitants of the plain were impatient to join the Carthaginians, as had 
been their original design, but as the Roman legions had advanced beyond most of them 
and cut them off, they kept quiet, some even being compelled to serve with the 
RoManS. ')')450 Livy agrees with Polybius' assessment and makes the same point; the 
D- 
Romans "... had not the consul taken them by surprise, appearing unexpectedly whilst 
449Livy, Ad Urbe CondiM 21.39. 
450 polybiUS, The Historics, 3.60.11-12. 
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they were looking about them for a pretext to revolt. 
-)-)451 He goes on to suggest the 
attitude of the Gauls was equivocal and opportunistic, ready to throw with the side that 
seemed more likely to win, or at least with the army that was most immediately at hand 
and so in a position to overawe them. "Hannibal, too, moved forward from the Taufini,, 
being persuaded that the Gauls, uncertain which side they had best adhere to, would 
attach themselves to those who were on the Spot ..,, 
452 Later, Hannibal ravaged the territory 
of tribes allied to Rome as a goad to force the Roman army into an imprudent battle at 
Trebia. 453 Obviously, the uncertain attitude of the Gauls pushed both Hannibal and the 
Romans into an early battle; each side could, by a quick victory, even if a non-decisive 
one,, hope to solidify its own position in Cisalpine Gaul. 
Ticinus 454 
Once Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio placed his army under his brother Gnaeus 
with instructions to continue on to Spain, he returned to Italy. Landing at Pisae, he 
451 Livy, Ad Urbe Co 21.39.5. "... ni cos circumspectantes defectionis tempus subito adventu consul 
opprcssisset. " 
452 Livy, Ad Urbe C 21.39.6. "Et Hannibal movit ex Taurinis, incertos quae pars sequenda esset 
Gallos praesenteni secuturos esse ratus. " 
453 Polybius, The Histories, 3.69 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on PoL)tiýus, Vol. 1, page 403. 
454 See Sir G. dc Beer, Hannibal: The StruggJe for Power in the Mediterranean pages 184-186; J. Briscoe, 
"The Second Punic War", The Cambridge Ancient Histojy: Vol. VHI Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 
B. C., 2 nd Edition, page 49; B. Caven, The Punic Wars, pages 106-108; L. Cottrell, Hannibal pages 85-91; 
A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pages 169-173-, S. Lancel, Hannibal pages 82-85 & IF Lazenby, 
Hannibal's War. pages 52-53. For a discussion of the tactics used by both sides during the 2dRonian War. 
see D. Head. Armies of the Macedoman and Punic Wars 359 B. C. to 146 B. C. pages 54-61. For the types 
of troops used by both sides, particularly the archaeological Mdence, see T. Wise, Armies of the 
Men-At-Arms Series No. 121 (London, 1982). 
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crossed the Apennines to take command of the northern Roman army already in place. 455 
Although each general was surprised at the swift and sudden appearance of the other ) 
456 
both were eager to test the enemy. As soon as Scipio received news of Hannibal's arrival 
in Cisalpine Gaul, he departed Placentia and, having bridged the Po, marched into the 
territory of the Insubres. Throwing a second bridge across the river Ticinus, Scipio and 
Hannibal met in combat. As the armies drew close, both sent forward their cavalry. 
That the Roman cavalry must have been heavily outnumbered is all we know. 
We do know from the earlier discussion in this chapter that Hannibal had at least 6,000 
cavalry who survived the march from Spain. It is unclear, for example, how many of the 
Gallic cavalry had joined the Carthaginians. Scipio may have had as few as 2,000 
cavalry -- perhaps somewhat more, since Polybius refers to Gallic cavalry in his force as 
well, suggesting he had more than Sempronius brought from the south. 457 Nevertheless, 
the persistent image presented is that Scipio's cavalry was badly outnumbered, which 
may explain why he included light infantry in his force. Though faster-moving than 
legionaries, they could scarcely keep up with a cavalry move and were more vulnerable 
to a cavalry attack than a well-formed heavy infantry. Scipio may have reasoned that 
even light infantry, if well disciplined, could stand against the sort of cavalry he was 
accustomed to, armed at most with a light spear. What followed proved him wrong. 
The Romans advanced slowly, probably limited by the marching speed of the 
infantry. The leves along with the Gaulish cavalry made up Scipio's front line, with his 
455 poi. ybiUS. The Histories 3.49 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentga on Polybiu , Vol. 1, pages 
382-388. 
45 6 Polybius, The Histories, 3.61 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Conmuenta! y on Polybius, Vol. 1. pages 
395-397. 
457pollojus. The Histories, 3.65 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommentM on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 399. 
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other cavalry in the rear. Hannibal placed his heavier, brIdle-using cavalry in the center, 
with the fight Nun-Mians on the wings. As the forces closed, the Roman leves dropped 
back and the two cavalry forces charged. "The cavalry met front to front and for some 
time maintained an evenly balanced contest, the engagement being both a cavalry and 
infantry one, owing to the number of men who dismounted during the progress. )-)458 The 
implication seems to be that the heavy cavalry on both sides used their horses largely for 
mobility, ftequently dismounting to fight. 
"When, however, the Numidians outflanked the Romans and took them in the 
rear,, the javelineers on foot who had first escaped from the charge of the cavalry 
were now ridden down by the numbers and force of the Numidians, while the 
cavalry, who from the outset had been facing the Carthaginians, after suffering 
heavy loss and inflicting still greater on the eneiny, being now attacked bv- the 
Nurnidians also in the rear, broke into flight, most of them scattering in every 
direction but a few gathering closely round the Consul. "49 
458 Polybius, The Histories 3.65.8-9. 
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459 Polybius, The Histories, 3.65.10-11, 
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The skirmish at the Ticinus bears all the attributes of a classical Hannibalic battle 
in miniature. The Romans held their own center. 460 The task of the center was only to 
hold the Romans long enough for the wings to swing around and take them In flank and 
rear. Once the flanking attack ensued, the Roman force disintegrated. Scipio himself was 
badly wounded in the action; Livy asserts only the quick thinking of his son, the 
seventeen year old Scipio "Afficanus", saved him. 
461 
Why did Scipio, a careful and capable general, engage in this high-risk operation? 
In his speech before the battle, as reported by both Polybius and Livy., he describes the 
weakness of Hannibal's army, and calls attention to the ease with which the cavahy in his 
previous command, now under Gnaeus in Spain, had defeated Hannibal in the skirmishes 
near the Rhone. 462 While Scipio's pre-battle speeches are a surprisingly boastful 
prediction of an easy victory, a general addressing his troops before a battle - especially a 
general having newly taken command of that army - is likely to give a pep talk, not a 
cool analysis of possible risks. Additionally, we are told on this same occasion Hannibal 
arranged a series of single combats between Gallic prisoners taken in the Alps; the 
intended lesson to his army being they must conquer or die. 463 In Scipio the historians 
want the reader to imagine an encouraging upbeat leader while in Hannibal they present a 
callous brute. 
Hannibal may have drawn that section of his battle line down to a prudent minimum, in order to put as 
much of his strength as possible into the wings. 
461 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 21.46. Polybius recounts the same story much later in his work, though he 
makes no mention of it in his account of Ticinus, see Polybius, The Histories,, 10.3 & F. W. Walbank, A 
Historical Commen-tmy-o-n-POAYW-us, Vol. II (Oxford, 1967), pages 198-199. 
462- Polybius. The Histories, 3.64 & F. W. Walbank, A ffistorical CommejjtM on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 
397-399. 
463polybius. The Histories, 3.63 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentaly on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 397. 
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In all probability Scipio genuinely underestimated the capabilities of Hannibal's 
army, particularly his cavalry. It indeed must have seemed to Scipio that Hannibal's 
cavalry had been thrown back with relative ease, while the entire Carthaginian army 
apparently retreated, refusing to engage a Roman army that before the passage of the Alps 
they had heavily outnumbered. Scipio could not have been privy at that time to 
Hannibal's actual strategy, which was specifically to avoid a battle in Gaul as a diversion 
from his objective of getting his army across the Alps to Italy. Perhaps the simplest 
explanation of Scipio's brash cavalry advance at Ticinus is, as Polybius suggests, that 
both he and Hannibal were carrying out a reconnaissance in force. 464 The only way to 
detern-fine the capabilities of Hannibal's army in combat was to test them directly. By 
making an advance with his cavalry and, light troops, Scipio could do so without throwing 
his main battle force - his legionary and allied heavy infantry - into action against an 
enemy whose measure he had not yet taken. By personally commanding the 
reconnaissance action, he could gain this information firsthand, as well as show himself 
in action to his own troops who were not yet used to him. Given the results of the Ticinus 
action, it is clear that Scipio had underestimated the capability of Hannibal's army. 
Nevertheless, as a reconnaissance ýnission it achieved its objective - though at a 
considerable cost to Rome. 
I have discussed the action at the Ticinus at length because it demonstrates so 
many of the crucial features of the battles that followed. For Scipio it must have been a 
rude awakening; for Hannibal it was a successful first test of his tactical methods against 
the Roman army. The victory, though limited in scale, also brought him reinforcements- 
the Cisalpine Gauls who previously had wavered now came over to Hannibal's side in 
464polvbius. The ffistories 3.65 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Vol. 1, pagc 399. 
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much larger numbers, amounting to several thousand each of infantry and cavalry. 
46' 
POIYbius reports one mass desertion of 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry who went over to 
Hannibal in body. 466 Because of this by the time Hannibal Bought his first major 
engagement at the Trebia, his army strength had increased substantially. 
Trebia 467 
Following his ill-fated reconnaissance action, Scipio fell back across the Po, and 
retreated along it to the river Trebia. There he camped and concentrated on recuperating 
himself and his forces until he was reinforced by his co-consul for the year, Tiberius 
Sempronius Longus. We must consider at this point faced with Hannibal's invasion, 
Sempronius had been recalled from Sicily and sent with his army to the northern theatre, 
at least doubling the strength on hand there. 4680wing to SciPio's weakness after being 
wounded - and perhaps to the army's lack of confidence in a general who had after all 
been defeated in his first action - Sempronius now became the dominant figure in shaping 
the Roman course of action. While Scipio "... considered that their legions would be all 
465 pol y bjUS, The ffistories 3.66 & F. W. Walbank, A ffistorical CoMMentar Ijbius, Vol. L pages Ltm On Poj _ 
399-401. 
466 Polybius, The Histories 3.67 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CoiiunentM on Pplybius, Vol. 1, page 402. 
467 See Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The Struggle for Power in the Mediterranean, pages 186-189; J. Briscoe, 
"The Second Pumc Wax", The Cambridge Ancient ffiýý: Vol. VIII Rome and the Mediteffanean to 133 
B. C., 2nd Edition, page 49, B. Caven, The Punic Wars, pages 108-114; AJ. Church, Cartha e y, pages 198 
205; L. Cottrell, Hannibal, pages 92-98, T. A. Dodge, Hannibal, pages 266-277; A. Goldsworthy- The Punic 
wars. pages 173 -18 1; D. Head, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars 3 59 B. C. to 146 B. C., page 76; 
S. Lancel. Hannibal pages 85-88 & IF Lazenby, Hannibal's War, pages 55-59. 
468 LiNry. Ad Urbe Condita, 21.59.1-9. 
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the better for a winter's drilling. - ., 
"469 Sempronius was determined to seek early battle - 
perhaps to win the glory of a victory before his time in office as consul ran Out. 
470 An 
apparently successful cavalry skirmish only increased Sempronius' eagerness for action. 
What he failed to realize was that Hannibal had called back his forces because as 
previously examined he wished to choose the time and circumstances of battle, not be 
drawn into one by the sheer force of events. 
471 
We also see that Hannibal had made an accurate judgment of Sempronius' 
attitudes and intentions. It is possible that he had direct intelligence brought by Gaufish 
deserters from the Roman camp, as implied by Livy. 472 The other possibility is he may 
have formed his opinions simply by observing the Romans' conduct. With the two forces 
encamped in close proximity, Hannibal, mindful of the fickle allegiance of his Celtic 
allies, chose now as the time to offer battle and set out quite deliberately to draw in the 
Romans. Knowing of their sensitivity to ambush amid woods, he enticed them to fight on 
ground where they would hardly suspect him to stage a trap- Having seen an area of flat 
terrain between the two encampments and the rivers Trebia and Luretta devoid of woods, 
ostensibly he would agree to accept battle in a place of Rome's choosing. 
Once he had selected an equal force of 1,000 cavalry and infantry, Hannibal 
placed them under the command of his youngest brother, Mago, with strict instructions to 
hide and only emerge from cover to ambush the Romans at a crucial moment of the 
469 polybius, The Histories, 3.70.4. 
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470 polybiUS. The Histories, 3.70 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commeptaly on Pol bius Vol. 1, pages 
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471 polybius. The Histories, 3.69 & F. W. Walbank. A Historical ConinjeqtM on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 403. 
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battle. 473 Having set his ambush force in place, Hannibal ordered his Numidians to cross 
the Trebia and stage a dawn attack against the Roman camp with the specific intent of 
goading Sempronius into a hasty response. 474 They accomplished exactly that. After first 
sending out a limited force to drive off the Numidians, and although this could have 
severe negative consequences to Rome, Sempronius proceeded to deploy his entire army, 
"... thinking that the mere sight of them would decide the issue, so much confidence did 
his superiority in numbers and the success of his cavalry on the previous day give 
him. "475 
The role of human factors in ancient infiýntry warfare is shown with exceptional 
vividness in the battle of Trebia that followed. Both Polybius and Livy make specific 
contrast between the physical condition of Hannibal's troops and their Roman opponents. 
The action of Hannibal's direction further illustrates another strategic problem for the 
Roman army: his care for the men in his command as detailed in the following passage by 
Polybius: 
"Ilie time of year was about the winter solstice, and the day exceedingly cold 
and snowy, while the men and horses nearly all left the carnp without having had 
their morning meal. At first their enthusiasm and eagerness sustained them, but 
when they had to cross the Trebia, swollen as it was owing to the rain that had 
fallen during the night higher up the valley than where the anmes were, e 
473 Polybius, The 1-fistories 3.71 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommeA(4a on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 404. 
47.1 polybius, The Higories, 3.71 & F. W. Watbank, A Historical Commeptaa on PqL, ýýius, Vol. 1, page 404. 
47 4; Polybius, The Histories 3.72.2. 
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& F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Pol bius Vol. 1, pages 404-406. 
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infantry had great difficulty in crossing, as the water was breast-high. The 
consequence was that the whole force suffered much from cold and also from 
hunger, as the day was now advancing. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, who 
had eaten and drunk in their tents and looked after their horses, were all anointing 
and arming themselves round their fires. ý, -A76 
The Romans nevertheless advanced in good order; even after making their way 
through the river, they were still reported to advance "... on the enemy in imposing style 
marching in order at a slow step. , 477 In the battle itself, in spite of all the physical and 
psychological difficulties they laboured under as compared to their enemies, the troops in 
the Roman front lines more than held their own: 
'The heavy-armed troops on both sides, who occupied the advanced centre of the 
whole formation, maintained for long a hand-to-hand combat with no advantage 
on either side... [But after the flank and ambush attacksj while the rear of the 
Roman centre was suffering heavy loss from the attack of the ambuscade, those 
476 Polybius, The Histories 3.72.3 -6. 
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in the van, thus forced to advance, defeated the Celts and part of the Afticans, and 
after killmg many of them broke through the Carthaginian line. "47' 
So steady were the Roman troops in a straight frontal assault that it was the front 
lines, men who had been longest in action, who made up the largest proportion of Roman 
survivors. Cold, wet, and weary though they were, these men succeeded in breaking 
through Hannibal's infantry front and fought their way free in a body, at least 10,000 
getting safely to Placentia . 
479 The Roman heavy troops probably outnumbered their 
opponents along the main front of the battle, and perhaps, as Polybius suggests, received 
an impetus of desperation from the attacks on their flank and rear. It was still an 
impressive display of Roman steadiness and Hannibal took due note of their performance 
as is clear &om subsequent battles. 
For the Romans, defeat at Trebia spread from the edges inward. After throwing 
back the outnumbered and tired Roman cavalry, Polybius seems cynically to comment on 
this fact when he writes that: 
'Vhen the Roman cavalry fell back and left the flanks of the infantry exposed, 
the Carthaginian pike-men and the Numidians in a body, dashing past their own 
478 Polybius, The Histories 3.73.8-74.4. 
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troops that were in front of them, feH on the Romans from both flanks, damaging 
them severely and preventing them from dealing with the enemy in their 
jC_ - front... [Here follows the mention of indecisive heavy infantry action. ] But now 
the Numidians issued from their ambuscade and suddenly attacked the enemy's 
centre from the rear, upon which the whole Roman army was thrown into the 
utmost confusion and distress. At length both of Tiberius' wings, hard pressed in 
ftont by the elephants and all round their flanks by the light-anned troops. turned 
and were driven by their pursuers back on the nVer behind them. "4'0 
The reference to Hannibal's Aovvooopot [pikemen] is confusing; here the are Iy 
referred to as though they are light troops, operating in conjunction with the cavalry, 
though if the translation as "pike-men" is valid, it would imply that these were heavy- 
armed phalangifes. This is especially interesting for it implies Hannibal used the same 
tactics as at Cannae, placing his best heavy troops on the inner flanks to box in the Roman 
centre. However, neither Polybius nor Livy specifies such a disposition. Rather than 
480 pol YbiUS, The Ffistories., 3.73.7-74.2. 
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, 10ý(DVCOV, F-Tpoc7MCroCV KOCt 7[Cptý 
66 KOU KOLTCC TCCq CK TOW 7E40CytO)V 67r1ý0LMOCq 1)7ro T(J)v 6 
"OV6000OVIO ICala'COV (5t(J)YPLOV 7EPOq TOV 1)7[OKFtW-X, ()v ROMýWV. " & F. W. Walbank, A Historical 
Commenl4iy on Polybi , Vol. 1. page 407. For more on Hannibal's use of elephants at the Battle of the 
Tirebia, see H, H. Scullard, The ElcpbgRt in the Greek and Roman World pages 159-161. 
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accept this view we see the ancient historians write o the flank attacks being 
characterized as carried out primarily by cavalry, supported by fight infantry. If true, the 
Roman forces in the flank and rear were thrown into disorder, then slaughtered in droves. 
Mental acuity was surely a factor. Although these troops had been subjected to less sheer 
intensity of combat than those in the front lines of the heavy infantry action, they were 
exposed to greater confusion and uncertainty. 
Had the Roman army fought in phaIanx order, the catastrophic effects of attacks 
in flank and rear would require no further explanation; locked into place in their close 
order and encumbered by long spears, phalangiles were nearly defenseless if put under 
sudden attack other than from the ftont. Potentially, the open manipular order should 
have increased the Roman army's ability to respond to attacks at flank or rear. Even if all 
formal order dissolved,, the legionary with his short sword could fight more effectively in 
a general melee than a phalangite armed with a spear as primary weapon. Although the 
size of the forces, which attacked the Romans in flank and rear at Trebia were 
considerable, they were not so large as to gain overwhelming local superiority except on 
the extreme flanks. In particular, the ambush force under Mago was relatively modest - 
1,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. Could it have been a foregone conclusion to Hannibal 
that the Roman formations to these attacks would disintegrate as they did? 
If we consider Hannibal's point of view, to avail themselves of their potential 
strengths, it was necessary for the Romans - from centurions to individual soldiers - to 
quickly respond to the sudden, alarming threat. Tired, hungry, and cold they could still 
prevail in a straight-ahead fight, even against troops in better physical and mental 
condition, but these same Romans would probably be unable to cope with the additional 
elements of confusion and surprise. The essence of Hannibal's tactics maximized those 
elements. The strength was disproportionately in cavalry, which was suited primarily to 
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flank and rear attack. Hannibal further relied on the Roman generals to prepare his work 
for him by thrusting their armies into a situation where the legionaries were caught off 
balance, their strengths at least partly negated, and their vulnerabilities maximized. 
Seeing the Numidians' missile attack as a more unnerving threat to the encamped 
army than a direct infantry assault, Hannibal used them merely to draw the Romans out. 
Sempronius' mistake lay in deploying the troops at all in such an unfavourable situation. 
Secure in their camp from any serious threat, the Romans were free to prepare and deploy 
at their leisure. Or, as Scipio had advised, they could avoid a general engagement entirely 
until they could fight one in conditions more favourable. Why, then, did Sempronius fight 
when he could easily have avoided action? The explanations offered by Polybius and 
Livy center on his character, and on Hannibal's success at reading him. Sempronius, a 
bold, active commander, 481 had originally been assigned an important but secondary 
theatre in Sicily. He had a gift for fast movement, as well as the confidence of his men. 
Both can be seen when he ordered his troops at Lilybaeum to make their way individuaUy 
to Aritninium, passing the length of Italy in just forty days. 482 He also had an appropriate 
concern for defending Roman allies when under attack by Hannibal - exactly what the 
Roman Senate had failed to do the year before when Hannibal attacked Saguntum, an 
error which if repeated would surely increase the danger of fracturing the Roman Alliance 
System. If cities were to accept subordination to Rome, and send their young men to fight 
in its armies, the least they could expect was their defense by those armies. To insist that 
Hannibal be confronted rather than allowed to continue his depredation was not without 
481 Which may be why the Roman Senate chose him initiatly for what was intended to be their primary 
offensive stroke of the war - the sea bome invasion of Africa. 
482 polybius, The Histories. 3.61 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commeptaly on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 
395-397. 
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reason; on the other hand, these considerations do not justify the excessive risks 
Sempronius took at Trebia. The danger to Roman armies in fighting Hannibal was not the 
army they saw in fi7ont of them, but what might appear on their flank and rear. Earlier 
reference to society 
Hannibal's tiniing and position were both flawless at Trebia. As with other great 
generals, from Alexander to Schwarzkopf, Hannibal's ability to make his plans work out 
as intended was extraordinary. Many officers can draw up battle plans based on 
envelopment - his crucial ingredient was the ability to transmit these plans to his 
subordinates in such clear and vivid terms that those subordinates could execute them 
with precision in the heat of battle. 
When examining the ancient sources it appears the Roman commanders 
experienced an incompetence, which led them Into traps that, however brilliantly 
executed, could have been avoided. Although Roman society was militaristic in nature, as 
we have discussed earlier, we must consider that at least in the first part of the war, 
consuls were elected only for one year and thereafter could not be re-elected again for 10 
years in order to prevent any form of tyranny. As chief magistrates the consuls convened 
and presided over the Senate and assemblies, initiated and administered legislation, in 
addition they served as generals in military campaigns and represented Rome in foreign 
affairs. Consequently, due to the many civil duties of the office, military leadership was 
only a temporary part-term function in Rome, whereas Carthage had professional generals 
with long-term commands and no civil responsibilities. 48-3 Later in this chapter I %ill 
discuss in depth how the change of the Union generals can be studied to appreciate how 
the yearly change of consuls led to an incoherent military plan and administration. 
483 Though some Carthaginian generals needed to govern Provinces, but this was rare outside the Barca 
filmily 
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Perhaps the sophistication of the Roman army had the effect of tempting Its 
generals to a lack of caution. The simple, inflexible classical phalanx discouraged both 
imagination and risk-taking; battles were fought in effect by mutual pre-arrangement, 
with as little as Possible left to chance. A Roman manipular army could be trusted to deal 
with a certain amount of disorder on the battlefield. A small-scale flank or rear attack by a 
few cavalrymen or light troops - and the Romans must have often encountered such in 
their frequent battles with irregular "barbarian" enemies - could be handled by centurions 
on the spot, turning their maniples as needed to meet the immediate threat. Roman 
generals perhaps felt little need to worry about tactical contingencies, and less anxiety 
than most of their contemporaries about pushing onto unfamiliar ground. They were 
particularly ill. prepared to deal with Hannibal, who used flank and rear attacks on an 
unprecedented scale, and found the Romans only too willing to march all too confidently 
into unseen dangers 
With the assistance of Gallic mercenaries Hannibal defeated the 40,000-strong 
Roman army, which lost three quarters of its men, In the first major engagement of the 
war, Polybius highlights Hannibal's strength at about 20,000 infantry and more than 
101) 000 Cavalry. 
484 Although Livy gives Hannibal 10,000 cavalry, among the infantry he 
lists only 8,000 Balearic slingers, deployed in front of the main heavy infantry line, the 
, A85 latter described only as "... the strength and flower of his army- Though the ancient 
sources estimate the Roman losses at 15,000, the suggest Hannibal's dead as slight, and 
mostly suffered by the Gauls. Though additional evidence suggests aH but one of the 
484 po"iUS, The Histories, 3.72 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical ConnnegIM on Polybius Vol. 1, pages 
404-407. 
48ý, Livyý Ad Urbe Condita. 21.55.2. "... quod virim-n quod roboris erat,... - 
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elephants and many men and horses died from the cold soon after the battle. 486 Of the 
Romans at least 10,000 escaped in mass to Placentia, where other stragglers joined them, 
totaling 15,000 in all out of an original 40,000 - the rest having been Wed or taken 
prisoner. 
A rl- 
After learning of the disaster at Trebia, the Romans grimly set to work raising new 
armies- in the vivid expression of Polybius, "For the 11 Romans both 
in public and in private 
are most to be feared when they stand in real danger. , 
487 Between the survivors and the 
newly raised forces, the Romans started out with a field force in Italy of as many as 
60,000 men if they were divided equally between the two new consuls, Gnaeus Servius 
and Gaius Flaminius. We know the latter had 30,000 men in his army because he 
proceeded to lose ahnost all of them. 
Lake Trasimene488 
A rk- 
Aner the battle of Trebia, Hannibal contemplated his options as the battle season 
closed. Deciding to winter in the Po valley where his Celtic allies could supply his army, 
he would bide his time until spring before moving south. In early spring, Hannibal did so, 
486 Polybius, The Histories,, 3.74.11 & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's Aar, page 57. 
487 Polybius, The Histories, 3.75.88. 
QGTOTS, y(Xp glEyt ýoßrMTOCTotP(OffltOt KOtt KOtTIV KM KOLT' t810tV, OTOLV (11)TOUý IWPtaT71 ýOßOý 
ockTjolvoq. - 
488 See Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The Struggle for Power m the Medite pages 189-197; 1 Briscoe, 
"The Second Punic War", The Cambridge Ancient Histo! y: Vol. VIII Rome and the Mediterranean to 13 3 
B. C., Second Edition, page 49; B. Caven, The Punic pages 115-123; A. J. Church, Carthage, pages 
206-211, L. Cottrell. Hannibal, pages 99-112. T. A. Dodge. Hannibal, pages 298-314, A. Goldsworthy. The 
Punic Wars, pages 181-190; D. Head, Armies of the Maccdonian and Punic Wars 359 B. C. to 146 B. C. 
page 76*, S. Lancel. Hannibal, pages 92-96 & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, pages 60-67. 
203 
ý. 4 Observing that the Celts were dissatisfied at the prosecution of the war in their 
own territory, but were eagerly looking forward to an invasion of that of the 
enemy. professedly owing to their hatred of the Romans, but as a fact chiefly in 
hope of booty... "4"9 
Again we must remember a more fundamental explanation: Hannibal's plan to 
break up the Roman Alliance System could only be put into execution in peninsular Italy. 
Given the unreliability of the Gauls, Cisalpine Gaul was not even of particular value as a 
base area. For that reason, Hannibal lost no real assets as he continued in pursuit of his 
war objectives in the south. 
Hannibal chose a route, which led down into the valley of the river Amo in 
Etruria. Here too emerges Hannibal's comprehension of the obvious advantages this route 
provided to him. The approach allowed him to select one of half a dozen passes across the 
mountains into the region; and the uncertainty of the route he would choose made it 
unlikely the Romans could react quickly enough to block his descent. In this way he 
selected a route that Flaminius would least suspect. Flaminius knew, as did Hannibal that 
the valley of the Amo, through which Hannibal and his army would have to pass after 
crossing the Apennines, was still flooded from melting snows and heavy spring rains. 
While Flaminius presumed it to be impassable, Hannibal's guides informed him the 
ground under foot was firm. Risking a daring march, Hannibal's army passed over the 
mountains and entered the flooded valley during early to mid-May. For four days they 
waded through the waters and laboured through the marsh. He had taken particular steps 
489 Polybius, The Histories, 3.78.5. 
"or, opov 6crouý KFXTOI)q 60(: FXF-POCtVOVTOtq 67Et TO TOV 7EOXSýLOV EV Til 7roCp' OCIL)Trj)V X(j)poC 
koc4p()CN'C, tv TljV Tptpllx" 07mt)&-)VT(Xq 6C K(Xt ýW-TMPOOq OVToLr_ P-tq Tll\, no4gtoLV, 7Epoýa(ygt ýISV 61()C 
TTIV Irpo; lpwýtatol)q opnv, To 
86 nkctov 6toL T(xq 
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to prevent the Celts from deserting at the first sign of difficulty; and indeed they suffered 
most severely of all from the privations on this part of the march. Conditions were so bad 
the soldiers resorted to sleeping on the bodies of pack animals that had died in the waters 
and Hannibal contracted ophthalmia, loosing the sight in his fight eye . 
490 But after four 
491 days and three nights the Carthaginian army emerged from the swamp on to dry land . 
Both Polybius and Livy treat Flaminius with exceptional harshness. Polybius calls 
him "... a thorough mob-courtier and demagogue, , 
492 
a point expounded upon at much 
greater length, complete with horrific omens, by Livy. 493 Flaminius, particularly incensed 
by Hannibal's campaign of destruction through Etruria, 494 set out in hot pursuit of 
Hannibal instead of waiting to join forces with Servilius. On the hills surrounding the 
Chiana Valley, Hannibal outflanked and overtook his army. When the Roman army, 
which had been expecting to block him, was forced to march after him as he plundered 
every town on his way, Hannibal decided to lure Flaminius' army to the plains of Tuoro, 
an ideal site for an ambush. Because of his scouts' accurate information, Polybius 
describes the dispositions as Hannibal prepared the trap-. 
"The road led through a narrow strip of level ground with a range of high hills on 
each side of it lengthwise. This defile was overlooked in front crosswise by a 
steep hill difficult to climb, and behind it lay the lake, between which and the 
hillside the passage giving access to the defile was quite naffow. Hannibal 
490 Comehus Nepos, Grcat Generals of Foreigg Nations Hannibal, 4.4.3. 
491 Polybius, The Histories, 3.79 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical QOS-m9! c-=!! Y on P-olly-bius, Vol. 1, page 413. 
492 Polybius, The HistorLes, 3.80.3 . ..... OXXO'cOltOv Rcv 'coct 8'rl4(xYO)Yov etvat TOxtov, " & F. W. Walbank, 
A Historical Commepigg on Polybius, Vol. 1, page 413. 
493 Livy, Ad Urbc C 21.63. 
494 Polybius, The Histories, 3.82 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentgy on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 
414-415. 
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coasting the lake and passing through the defile occupied himself the hill In front, 
encampmg on it with his Spaniards and Africans; his slingers and pikemen he 
brought round to the front by a detour and stationed them in an extended line 
under the hills to the right of the defile, and similarly taking his cavalry and the 
Celts round the hills on the left he placed them III a continuous line under these 
hills,, so that the last of them were just at the entrance to the defile, lying between 
the hillside and the lake. 1-A95 
Thinking he was in hot pursuit of Hannibal, Flan-ýinius broke camp early and 
pressed the Roman troops forward into a rough section of the country. 496 Hannibal had 
advanced into the Tuoro through the narrow Malpasso road in the early morning under a 
thick layer of fog. He positioned his light cavalry and the Celts at the entrance to the 
valley to block any possible Roman retreat; the Libyans and Iberians protected his camp, 
the Balearics and Asiati closed the way to the hill of Montigeto. As the Roman vanguard 
495 Polybius, The Histories, 3,83.1-4. 
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V on Polyb- Historical Comment4il iu , Vol. 1, pages 418-419. 
496 Polybius, The ffistories. 3.83 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical. Commen! M on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 
418419. 
206 
began its climb up into the pass, Hannibal - positioned on the high ground all around - 
gave the signal to close in on the Romans fi7om all sides. From the surrounding hills the 
Carthaginian cavalry and infantry came down with an enormous impact, engaging the 
enemy army from all sides. 
'Ile sudden appearance of the enemy took Flaminius completely by surprise, 
and as the condition of the atmosphere rendered it very difficult to see, and their 
foes were charging down on them in so many places firom higher ground, the 
Roman Centurions and Tribunes were not only unable to take any effectual 
measures to set things right, but could not even understand what was happening. 
Tley were charged at one and the same instant from the front, from the rear, and 
ftom the flanks, so that most of them were cut to pieces in marching order as they 
were quite unable to protect themselves, and, as it were, betrayed by their 
commander's lack ofjudgment. "' 
From the preceding passage by Livy it is clear the Romans did not even have time 
to draw up in their usual battle array. Caught in marching order and laden with packs and 
gear, they hardly had time to drop their gear and draw their swords . 
498 The fighting 
497 Polybius, The ffistories,, 3.84.24. 
"Ol 6c 7mpt -cov VxL41. vtov ltmpu&)ýOx) -r"Voýlsv-qq oLmo-Lq -cqq F, 7cl, *VF-mq, F. T1,6g &)c5m)VCY7rCO. O -C-9(; 
KaTOC TOV CCCPOL IC6Pt(TTOV7TSO)q U7EOLPYOD(YQq, KOLt TOW WýZRMJOV KOLTOC 7EOkk0Dq T07EOUq 6ý 07MP&ýWU 
KOCT(XOCPOýL9V(j)V K(XI 7t()0(T7tl7ETOVT(j)V, OUX OtOV 7totoOLOOTIOEtV 945t)VOCVTO 7rpOq Tt TOW (560ýLCVOW Ot 
0 
't4tanot lcat xlktocpxot Trj)v TO) P. (Xt(J)V, (Xkk' OIL)66 (TDVVOT]a(xt -co ytvollcvov. apa YoLp ot gzv Ka-COL 
7EPOCWItt7tTov, 8to Koct C7j)vsoq -COI)r. 7tpocT(J)7EOV, Ot (5, ()c7t' Ot)P(YC,, Ot (3, CIC TOW 7EkOcytov ()cuTC)t- 
70XIMOUq EN! CLOUD T(O "q ROPCIOLq (TXTjjJaTI"KCLT(XK07E1jVCLI, Ril 61)v(xWVoI)q ()Lt). Totq po-nOCINý, 
Ot), X'O)q OCV St 71PO6660ýLSVOI)q V)IEO'E71q'cc)') 7EPOF-mOYTOý OLrPl, (Y'OL; -" & F. W. Walbank, A Historical 
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quicidy became an entirely disordered meiee, with Hannibal's forces having the 
invaluable double advantage of surprise and visibility. Positioned on the higher ground, 
above the mist, they could see the Romans while the Romans could not see thern. The one 
exception was the Roman vanguard: 
"About six thousand of those in the defile, who had defeated the enemy In their 
front, were unable to render any assistance to their own army or to get to the rear 
of their adversaries, as they could not see anything of what was happening, 
although they might have been of very material semce. They simply continued to 
press forward in the belief that they were sure to meet with someone until the), 
found themselves isolated on the high ground and on reaching the crest of the hill, 
the mist having now broken, they perceived the extent of the disaster, but were no 
longer able to help, as the enemy were now completely victorious and in 
occupation of all the ground. "499 
Now we see the Celts,, in particular the Insubres, take the opportunity to vent their 
anger in revenge for the defeat inflicted on them by Flan-ýinius in 223. Indeed the 
Insubrian cavalryman, Decurius, killed Flaminius by hacking his way through the triarii 
drawn up around him and running him through with his spear. 500 By midday 15,000 
499 pol y bjUS' The Histories, 3.84.11-13. 
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Romans were dead and about 10,000 made prisoner. Other Romans may also have made 
some organized effort to break out, these being the only ones in a position to do so,, 
presumably they had passed most of the ambush force before the trap was sprung. They 
retreated a few miles to an Etrurian village where they were surrounded the next day. The 
following day the 6,000 who had escaped surrendered. In all Hannibal disposed of a force 
of about 301,000 men - some 15,000 were kiRed or captured. With a loss of only 1,500 of 
his own men, Hannibal inflicted a devastating defeat that left Rome without a field army, 
half the Roman army of 30,000 men were killed, and most of the rest taken prisoner. 501 
What a faultless feat Hannibal must have experienced. 
Again, we must ask what led Flaminius to send his men into such an utterly C? 
dangerous situation? By marching, through mist into a natural wnbush ground a certain 
mind-set seems to have been at work here. Flaminius, in hot pursuit, and perhaps fearing 
any delay in getting his army on the march would allow Hannibal to gain ground on him, 
made a serious error in judgment and led his men into a perfect trap. He or his advisors 
must have weighed the possibility of an ambush; it was always a possibility when any 
army moved through this sort of terrain. Undoubtedly if they anticipated an ambush they 
must have presumed the risk only a small-scale action; the Roman army would lose less 
time by hazarding the danger, and fighting its way through than by waiting for the mist to 
clear and sending out patrols to reconnoitre the road ahead. What Flaminius did not 
anticipate was the large-scale trap Hannibal executed by the entire army Carthaginian 
anny. 
The severe consequences of Flaminius' defeat allowed Hannibal to bring his 
strategic plan into action. He had smashed one Roman consular army and annihilated 
50' Polybius. The Ifist 3.851 F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommepLaa on poj3tjýus Vol. 1, page 420 & 
S. Lanccl. _Hannibal. page 
95. 
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another. Now, it is crucial to emphasize once again that defeating Roman armies in the 
field was only a means to his end, not an end in itself. Had Hannibal's objective been 
simply to defeat Roman armies, he no doubt could have beaten any number of them in 
Spain, close to his bases of support and in a position to move directly to the defense of 
Carthage if need be. The experience of the Is' Roman War had shown him the Romans 
had nearly inexhaustible reserves of manpower and could make good enormous and 
repeated losses as long as their own city and their recruiting base remained intact. 
Hannibal had come to Italy to attack either or both and now he was in a position to do just 
that. 
The Winter of 217/216 B. C. 
Working his way gradually south along the Adriatic coast, Hannibal devoted 
much of his effort to reconditioning his army. He had begun his campaign very early in 
the season; he and his troops had suffered considerably from the cold weather as well as 
from the march through swamps. The easing of any immediate military pressure after the 
one-sided victory at Lake Trasimene gave him opportunity to restore his troops, which 
Polybius describes as suffenng ftom Atpovwpoý- ["hunger-mange" j. 502 This condition III 
may have been scurvy, though since it afflicted horses even worse than men, general 
malnutrition is more probable. We are told they cured their itching skin by bathing them 
in old wine (vinegar? ). 503 Once more we must note Hannibal's concern for his men and 
the time he allowed them to recoup. 
As the campaign progresses Polybius writes, "He also re-armed the Africans in 
the Roman fashion with select weapons, being, as he now was, in possession of a very 
502 Polvbius, The Mstorics 3.87.2 & F. W. Walbaik A Historical Commentary on Pol-, bius,, Vol. 1, page 
422 
sw Polybius. The Histories. 3.88.1. 
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large quantity of captured arms. -)504 This raises the question of the organization and 
tactics of Hannibal's heavy infantry. If these troops were phalarotes, it would be a 
questionable decision to arm them in the Roman fashion. The armour would have been 
largely interchangeable with the Roman swords usable by phalangites as a secondary 
weapon, while the Roman triarii were armed with spears suitable for Carthaginian 
phalangites. Yet the oblong Roman shields would not be the shield of preference for 
phalangites, and in general the proportions of the captured weapons and equipment would 
be suitable to re-arming manipular troops rather than phalangites. 
From Polybius' account of the re-arming we discover that Hannibal's African 
regulars must have been trained to fight using something similar to Roman manipular 
tactics.. If this is the case, they had done so from the outset or Hannibal reorganized and 
retrained them. Possibly, having observed the exceptional performance of Roman troops 
at the battle of Trebia, he concluded that manipular tactics w, ere superior to phalangite 
tactics, and already had begun to train his heavy infantry in Roman methods. As veteran 
regulars, they doubtless had the discipline and experience to make such a change. Though 
a change such as this would have been exceptionally difficult and risky to carry out while 
on campaign in hostile territory, when the surviving Roman army under Servilius might 
appear at any time. The alternate possibility we must consider being that at least some of 
Hannibal's heavy infantry already were trained in Roman-type tactics at the beginning of 
the war. 
We might consider at this point Hannibal's policy regarding prisoners of war. 
A Ok 
After Lake Trasimene he took action that resembled what he had done earlier after 
I, 0A 
", Polybius, The Historiesl 3.87.3. 
" ý=aicaOontktm 8c'rouq Atpml: ll 
Ftq ToVP(I)P. UtKOV TPOROV COXKTotq o7Ekotq, rj)q (IV MOVO); 
& Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 22,46.4. 
211 
505 Trebia, releasing prisoners who were from Rome's allies. After Trasimene, the Roman 
captives were put under close guard, but Polybius explains, in "... setting all the allies 
free, sent them to their homes, adding, as on a previous occasion [i. e., after Trebia], that 
he [Hannibal] was not come to fight with the Italians, but with the Romans for the 
freedom of Italy. , 506 What better way to show the Italian confederation his dispute was 
only with the citizens of Rome? 
Once more he crossed the Apennines, this time moving from west to east, lead his 
army into southern Italy. For here, among the Samnites and other peoples whose 
opposition to Roman rule was still a thing of recent memory, Hannibal sought his 
potential allies and the means to secure Rome's undoing. After resting at Pescara, later in 
the summer they resumed their march and moved south into Apulia, devastating the 
fertile countryside as they went. 
How is this policy of destruction to be squared with Hannibal's treatment of allied 
prisoners of war, or with his broader political objective of driving a wedge between Rome 
and her Italian allies? To some degree, devastation was the inevitable consequence of the 
passage of an army that had as yet no means to supply itself except by foraging - the 
forcible requisition of provision fi7om the countryside. The process almost inevitably 
produces violent encounters between the foraging troops and local population attempting 
505 Polybius, The Histories 3.77 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CormnepLan lybius Vol. 1, pages K on Po_ _ 
410-412, 
501 Polybius, The Histories 3.85.34. 
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to defend food stores. To this must be added the impulse of soldiers to loot, rape, kill, and 
to destroy what they cannot carry off when passing through territory perceived as hostile. 
Perhaps Hannibal felt a need to assuage the impulse of the Gauls toward plunder, given 
their disorderly reputation and the fact that they -unlike the troops who had come with 
him from Spain - had a realistic prospect of deserting and returning home if they grew 
dissatisfied. 
When Fabius caught up with the Carthaginians in Apulia, Hannibal immediately 
drew up his army for battle. 507 But we are told Fabius, in accord with his new strategy, 
ignored the challenge and deliberately kýept his army to the mountainous terrain above 
Hannibal's line of march. Although he periodically sent out small detachments to attack 
Carthaginian foraging parties, he would be drawn no further-, this served to deplete 
Hannibal's forces and to gradually rebuild the Roman military's confidence . 
508 Hannibal 
had no option but to supply his army by foraging, which meant a continual attrition so 
long as the Roman army was able to descend in force on isolated parties of his foragers, 
he had to keep his army on the move. 509 Such a stratagem was a new development and 
clearly not in accord with Hannibal's need to draw the Romans into another pitched 
507 See J. Briscoe, "The Second Punic War", The Cambridge Ancient flistojy: Vol. VIII Rome and the 
Mediterranean to 133 B. C., Second Edition, pages 49-51 & A. J. Church, CaTthage, pages 212-217. See B. 
Caven. The Punic Wars, pages 122-132 and S. Lancel, Hannibal pages 97-101 for a detailed examination 
of Fabius' actions. 
508 Polybius, The Histories 3.89. 
" While on the march, Hannibal targeted Roman lands for devastation, ostensibly to feed his troops, but 
also to demoralize the Romans. As stated by Machiavelli, "Thus when Hannibal had ravaged and burned all 
the towns and country around Rome, he spared the estate of Fabius Maximus alone;... " to raise the aire of 
the Romans against the Dictator. N. Machiavelli, The Art of War, rev. trans. of E. Farneworth (New York, 
1965), originally published In 152 1. page 173 
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battle. Above all, he needed to force confrontation as frequently as possible to exploit the 
tactical superiority of his own army and prevent the developing situation of an exhausting 
war of attrition. Nonetheless, "the Romans continued to hang on their rear at a distance of 
one or two days' march, refu sing to approach nearer and engage the enemy. "5 10 
Next we need to consider the aspect of the mere size of the Carthaginian force. 
Equivalent in numbers to the population of a fair-sized city and coupled with the 
numerous cavalry horses Hannibal's contingent required a enormous and continual supply 
of food and fodder. The population density of the Italian plains at this period in time was 
on the order of 100 people per square rnile; "' this is broadly equivalent to saying that one 
square mile of typical land produced enough to feed 100 people for a year. Hannibal's 
army, with a strength at that time of some 30,000 men, would quickly exhaust the 
products of about one square mile of farmland each day, to which we must add grain or 
pasture for as many as 10,000 horses -a nearly equivalent burden. The actual supply 
problem would be even greater through much of the campaign season since until the 
harvest supplies would have to come from the previous season's stores, more than likely 
already consumed through the winter by the local population. Theoretically, in a single 
week Hannibal's army could fully denude the supply capacity of over seven square miles 
of land; in a couple of months, more than sixty square miles of land - in practice, as much 
as two or three time that amount; hence, in the short term, the need to send foragers, to a 
considerable distance., and in the longer term to move on into a new district. Hannibal's 
army exacted an enormous cost on the lands it passed through. 
5'0 Polybius, The Histories 3.90.9. 
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Hannibal, with Fabius in distant pursuit, reached the wealthy plain of Capua, only 
to be frustrated in his hopes of breaking any of the cities there loose fi7om Rome. Fabius 
did not descend into the plain to meet Hannibal, but kept his army in the surrounding 
foothills. Hannibal determined to withdraw from the plain of Capua since it was not 
suited for winter quarters given that its agricultural mix was not particularly well suited to 
maintaining an army. Describing the difficulties Hannibal faced Livy describes Capua, 
" -though a land of plenty for the time being, could not support him permanently, being 
taken up with orchards and vineyards, and planted everywhere writh agreeable rather than 
necessary frUitS.,, 
512 
Fabius guessed correctly that Hannibal intended to withdraw toward Sarnnium, 
following the same route by which he had entered the plain. For Fabius the idea that he 
could set up a large-scale ambush in hilly country became his plan of action. It is obvious 
that he hoped to use the rough ground to minimize Hannibal's superior cavalry force. If 
Polybius' depiction is accurate his disposition is strikingly similar to Hannibal's at Lake 
Trasimene. 
-Seeing that owing to its narrowness the place was exceedingly favourable for 
delivering an attack, [Fabius] stationed about four thousand men at the actual 
pass, bidding them act at the proper time with all spirit, while availing themselves 
S12 Li-,, -v, Ad Urbe Condita 22.15.2. "... quia ea regio piraesentis erat copiae, non perpetuae, arbusta 
et consita onmia magis amoenis quam necessariis fructibus. ý, For a very full treatment on the 
subject of supplying an army witb its essentials, see P. Erdkamp, HgMer and the Sword: Waffare and Food 
Supply in Roman Rcepublican Wars (264-30 B. C. ) (London, 1998) 
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fully of the advantage of the ground. He himself with the greater part of his army 
encamped on a hill In front of the pass and overlooking it. 
!, 7513 
Polybius further asserts Fabius hoped at least to recover some of the booty, 
"... and possibly to put an end to the whole campaign owing to the great 
. 
advantage his position gave him. He was in fact entirely occupied in considering 
at what point and how he should avail himself of local conditions, and with what 
troops he should attack, and from which direction. 
More than likely Polybius used the description of Fabius' plan to evoke 
Hannibal's masterful use of terrain, as well as to state Polybius' conception of good 
generalship. Against a lesser general, the plan might have succeeded, but Hannibal was 
no lesser general. In a deviously brilliant ploy he selected two thousand cattle - part of 
the booty taken in the campaign - and tied bundles of dry wood to their horns. That night, 
as the cattle were driven into the narrows of the pass, Hannibal's light infantry 
accompanied them followed by the rest of his army. As they approached the ambush 
point, they set the wood on the cattle's horns alight and then stampeded the cattle through 
51 
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the pass. "But when [the Romans] got near the oxen they were entirely puzzled by the 
lights, fancying that they were about to encounter something much more formidable than 
the reality. -)-)515 Some confused skirmishing fol-lowed between Hannibal's light troops and 
the ambush force. But for whatever reason Fabius held back his main force, whether it 
was fear of a trap or the uncertainty of its possible nature, Hannibal's entire army broke 
throUgh. 
516 
Having been informed that the region around the town of Geronium was highly 
suitable to winter, Hannibal struck out for northern Apulia. 517 Subsequent political 
tensions in Rome and within the Roman army came to a head. Although Fabius had been 
successful in preserving the Roman army from another disastrous defeat and by 
maintaining a Roman presence in the regions attacked by Hannibal, he had dissuaded 
restive allies from rebellion by demonstrating that Roman power was unbroken, he had 
done little to check Hannibal. Although summoned back to Rome ostensibly on religious 
matters, in reality Fabius had been recalled to face a Senate becoming vocal in its 
condemnation of his strategy. It was at this time that the pejorative epithet Cunctator 
5111 [Delayer] first surfaced to describe Fabius. 
M. Minucius Rufus, Fabius' Magister Equitum [Master of Horse] had been left to 
trail Hannibal's army as it attacked and took the town of Gýronium. 
Polybius, The Histories, 3.94.2. 
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"On reaching Geromum, which is two hundred stades from Lucena, he at first 
sent messages to the inhabitants asking for their alliance and offering pledges of 
the advantages he promised them, but as they paid no attention to them he began 
the siege. He soon took the city, upon which he put the inhabitants to the sword, 
but kept the walls and most of the houses uninjured, intending to use them as com 
magazines for the winter. "' 19 
At Geronium Hannibal's again offered Rome's ally the choice to join him. When 
they refused he proceeded to lay waste to the population as a warning to other cities. 
Although he had a base and supply of provisions, Hannibal continued foraging operations 
presumably to avoid as long as possible the need to draw down his stores on hand. When 
the Roman army, now under the Minucius, drew near "Hannibal, seeing the approach of 
the Romans, left the third part of his army to forage, and taking the other two-thirds 
advanced sixteen stades from the town and encamped on a hill with the view of 
overawing the enemy and affording protection to the foragers. "'2" With the arrival of 
519 Polybius, The Histories, 3.100.3-4. 
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Nfinucius, for the first time since arriving in Italy, Hannibal allowed himself to be 
uncharacteristically be drawn into a severe skirmish, which netted the Roman Master of 
Horse a minor victory. 52' By the time the news reached Rome it had become inflated into 
a major success. To a population grown weary of defeat and disenchanted with Fabius' 
strategy they seized upon his success, particularly those who advocated an offensive 
policy. As a reward, and no doubt as a deliberate attempt to impair Fabius, Minucius was 
raised to equal Fabius. 522 Livy gives an extended account of these political 
developments, 523 with his usual anti-populist rhetoric directed at Gaius Terentius Varro, 
the supposed author of the bill making Minucius co-dictator. 
Polybius expresses in a noteworthy observation, "When Minucius was informed 
of his popularity at home and the office given him by the people's decree, he grew twice 
as eager to run risks and take some bold action against the enemy. , 
524 In any event, the 
Roman commanders now cooperated uneasily. Contrary to the usual Roman practice of 
alternating in command, they divided the army into two sections, one commanded by 
Fabius, the other by Minucius, and encamped a couple of miles apart. In an attempt to 
take on Hannibal near Geronium, Minucius and his half of the army were nearly 
destroyed, being saved only by the timely intervention of Fabius. Minucius agreed to 
521 Livy, Ad Urbe Co 22.18.10. 
522 Polybius, The Histories,, 3.103 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommcpLtM on Pojybjusý Vol. 1, page 
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reunite the forces and as the year was now advanced beyond the campaigning season, 
both armies retired to their fortified camps for the winter. "' 
Altogether to campaign year 217 B. C. must have been seriously disappointing to 
Hannibal as a military commander wit access to much of the Roman alliances in Etruria. 
Although he had followed up his initial success at Trebia at the beginning of the 
campaign season by inflicting a shattering defeat on the consular army at Lake 
Trasimene, the Romans tenaciously remained in the field. This was perhaps partly 
because while he had evaded the trap Fabius had attempted to set, he was unable to turn 
the outcome to his positive advantage. It is nonetheless true that Minucius at one point 
demonstrated the grave perils potentially facing Hannibal's army in a hostile country 
without real allies or a secure base. Even if Minucius subsequently blundered, the 
persistent image of Fabius rescuing him without any serious Roman loss is an influential 
impression. Above all, Hannibal's operations were so far without the desired political 
effect. Except in Cisalpine Gaut, the spectacle of his victories to date had not produced 
any fissures in the Roman Alliance System. However, all of these circumstances pale 
with the battle to come. 
INIS Polybius, The Histories, ' 3.105.8-11 
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526 Cannae 
Early in the summer of 216, the shortage of provisions was probably decisive in 
determining Hannibal's move ftom his camp at Geronium south into an area where the 
harvests had already begun to ripen. As he moved into the area he proceeded to occupy 
the citadel of a town called Cannae, a Roman collection point for corn, grain, produce, 
sheep and other supplies from the district around Canusium. Although the town had been 
reduced to ruins the year before, the supplies stored in the citadel were conveyed to the 
527 Roman camp as needed . Hannibal's capture of the citadel couple with the Roman loss 
of these much-needed supplies caused great concern for the Roman army. But most of all 
the real concern for Rome came from the fact that Carthage now controlled the 
surrounding district. 
Campaigning specificallY on the promise of a brilliant plan for achieving a swift, 
decisive victory over Hannibal, L, Aen-iiliUs Paullus and C. Terrentius Varro won the 
consular elections of 216. The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, 
which had never been done before, with each legion consisting of five thousand men with 
an equal number of allies. The Romans usually enrolled four legions per year, each 
consisting of about four thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry and when necessity 
526Among the dozens of books and hundreds of accounts of the Battle of Cannae, the following are of 
particular use: G. P. Baker, Hannibal pages 128-149; Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The Sjmggle for Power in 
the Medite pages 209-217; B. Caven, The Punic Wars, pages 133-141; A. J. Church, Carthage, 
pages 218-224; L. Cottrell, Hannibal pages 126-145; H. Delbriick Warfare in AqtAiWly trans. W. J. 
Renfroe (Lincoln, NE, 1990), originally published in 1920, pages 315-335; T. A. Dodge, HgplIfti, pages 
360-380; A. Goldsworthy, The Pwitic Wars pages 197-214; D. Head, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic 
Wars 359 B. C. to 146 B. C.,, page 77, M. Healy, Cannae 216 B. C.. Campaign Series No. 36 (London, 1994), 
Pages 67-85; S. Lancel, Hannibal, s 103-109 & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal, s War, pages 74-86. 
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arose, they raised the number of infantry to five thousand and cavalry to three hundred. 
Of allies, the number in each legion was the same as that of the citizens, but of cavalry 
three times as great. Of the four legions thus composed, they assigned two to each of the 
consuls for whatever service was ongoing - most of their wars were decided by one 
consul and two legions, with their quota of allies (thus two citizen legions and two allied 
legions combined); and they rarely employed all four at one time and in one battle. Yet, 11 
on this occasion, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field (eight 
citizen legions and eight allied legions combined - about 90,000 men. 528 Although Livy 
considers Polybius to have exaggerated the number, 529 they both agree the consuls 
promised the overwhelming force would carry the day. 
Ancient sources as noted above often disagree as to the accuracy of the numbers 
involved in various engagements where evidence is scanty, which makes Polybius 11 
figures subject to question: "The Carthaginian cavalry numbered about ten thousand, and 
their infantry, including the Celts, did not much exceed forty thousand. , 530 Though in this 
instance Livy agrees with his figures. "' Polybius is quite clear that Hannibal had 8,000 
slingers and javelineers in his skirmishing line, 20,000 infantry in his main line, and 
10,000 cavahy on the flanks. The only doubt. is whether Mago's 1,000 foot and 1,000 
horse are to be added to the total or not. If they are, over 9,000 Celtic infantry and 5,000 
528 Polybius, The ffistories 3.107.9 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Cqmmentqy on PoMius Vol. 1, page 
441. 
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cavalry had joined him, allowing for some losses in previous operations. Nevertheless, 
the ancient historians agree the odds were almost two to one in favour of the Romans. It is 
also important to note, the consuls assumed the Carthaginians could not beat the Roman 
army in open combat; this time they would bring the battle onto an open field. At Cannae, 
the field was indeed wide open - with no possibility of surprise. With Roman front so 
much wider than the Carthaginian front, Hannibal must surely be flanked. The idea that 
they would bring the fox out into the open where they could decide the play of battle 
seemed to have brought the desired results. 
Dawn of that August morning in 216 B. C. found Hannibal peering down at the 
plain separating his vantage point from the Adriatic Sea some three miles away. The 
Romans faced southwest, with their right wing resting on the Aufidus River and with the 
sea about three miles to their rear. 532 Determined to crush Hannibal's center,, the Romans 
formed exceptionally deep battle lines in order to bring maximum pressure to bear against 
the middle of the Carthaginian line. On the Roman right, the legion cavalry, some 2,400 
strong, faced Hannibal's Iberian and Celtic horse, totaling 7,000. This match would prove 
a decisive element in the battle's surprising outcome. On the Roman left, the 4,000 allied 
cavalry faced an equal number of Numidians- 
But Hannibal had a design of his own. He proceeded to relying on the elasticity of 
his formation, he first masked his moves as he drew up his army and aligned his infantry 
in an unusual manner, placing his light stingers and spearmen at the front. The center of 
his position was convex, facing outward toward the advancing Romans. The wings bent 
back-ward from the center. Alternating units of Spanish and Celtic gwordsmen held this 
convex line, and they were greatly outnumbered by the oncoming Romans. Hannibal 
positioned himself at the left end of the line, and his brother Mago held the right. Each 
. page 
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end of the line was anchored by a dense square of African infantry, the location of which 
ensured that they would not be engaged until long after those at the center. On his left 
wing he stationed his Celtic and Spanish heavy cavalry, on the right he stationed his light 
Numidian cavahy. Preparing the battle, he now ordered his light troops at the front to fall 
back and act as reserves. 
The Romans unaware of Hannibal's intentions acted as usual and drove in hard, 
using their superior infantry to best advantage. The velites or leveS533 were positioned at 
the front to cover their position. Behind them, in the center the main body of the legion 
took its position, with allied Italian infantry on either side of it. They had their velifes or 
leves fall back and ploughed into the enemy with their heavy infantry. The crescent of 
Celtic and Spanish swordsmen buckled and retreated. On the Roman right wing stood the 
Roman cavalry, on the left wing was the allied cavalry. As the Romans advanced, a hot 
west wind blew dust in their faces and obscured their vision. At a range of about 35 yards, 
the Romans hurled their light javelins, causing Spanish and Celtic casualties. These pild 
often caused problems even if they only penetrated a man's shield, because the shaft was 
difficult to remove and weighed the shield down, making the man vulnerable to an 
oncoming legionary. 
At closer range, the heavy pilum was thrown, and then the infantry lines crashed 
together, the agile Celts and acrobatic Spaniards against the disciplined Roman masses. In 
time, the weight of the Roman assault began to take effect on Hannibal's troops, and the 
center of the Carthaginjan line receded. As Hannibal's men were forced back, they found 
themselves slowly backing up a slope. The top of the slope formed a "U' if viewed from 
above, the Spaniards and Celts now formed a concave line that confonned to that "U', 
ý13 It is not known for certain whether the Romans had changed the leves to velites by the Battle of Cannae. 
Both were skirmishers so the difference is only semantics for my purposes. 
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with the African squares still anchored to their original position at the tips. Due to the 
nature of the terrain, the Romans fought uphifl as they advanced and at the same time 
were restricted into a narrowing front as their mass of men entered the "U'. To the 
Romans this appeared to be due to their powerful drive into the opponents lines. In fact 
the troops had been told to retreat. When the Romans advanced, with most of their 
strength in the center, Hannibal gave way before them. The Roman front closed around 
the Carthaginian infantry and it indeed looked as though Rome would win. 
The Roman infantry kept on driving into the Carthaginian lines- Forcing them 
back, they still felt confident that they were winning. Although the Roman infantrymen 
did not know it, their fate was all but sealed by this time. Hannibal had ingeniously 
planned for his cavalry to strike the decisive blows while his infantry fought a large-scale 
delaying action. As the battle opened, Hannibal launched the Spanish and Celtic cavalry 
on his left against the outnumbered Roman horse. The consul Aemilius accompanied 
these cavahymen, who could not withstand the weight of the Carthaginian assault. 
Aemilius was wounded and the bulk of the Roman horse was driven fi-om the field, 
uncovering that flank of the Roman army. While this occurred on the Carthaginian left, 
the Numidians, on the right had been inconclusively engaged with the horsemen of 
Rome's allies. But as they shunted forward the opponent withdrew, the light infantry on 
the Carthaginian side, though staying stationary, as it was not withdrawing, began to 
emerge on the Roman flanks. 
The Carthaginian light troops pulled back at the beginning had by now taken 
position at the rear of the crescent as weH to each side of the crescent. Hasdrubal. ) 
Hannibal's Carthaginian cavalry commander on the left, reorganized his units and 
proceeded to ride behind the Roman infantry to the far side of the battlefield, where the 
stalemated cavalry fight continued between the Numidians and Rome's allies. No sooner 
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had the Roman front lines commenced their attack on the Carthaginian center than the 
Carthaginian heavy cavalry commanded by Sosylos rushed the horsemen on the Roman 
right flank. The Roman infantry had continued to drive forward, and had driven itself into 
an alley formed by the light Carthaginian infantry stationed at the sides. Shielded by these 
Carthaginian troops, Sosylos' cavalry went around the rear of the Roman infantry; joined 
the Numidian cavalry commanded by Maharbal; and engaged the enemy's left-flank 
cavalry. 
Faced with Carthaginians on all sides, the Roman and allied cavalry fled the field. 
Though their commander, consul Varro, escaped most of the Roman horsemen rode 
sluggish mounts and were unable to dodge the repeated Carthaginian attacks. At this point 
A -MiliUS I-I. VW was dead or dying., and Varro, the other commander, no longer was with the 
Roman army. The Roman and allied cavalrymen had been killed, captured or driven from 
the field. The Numidians were in pursuit of the allied horsemen, leaving the Celts and 
Spaniards as the only effective cavalry force in the area. The Roman right flank was left 
defenseless. 
By that time, the Roman infantry had fought its way up the slope and into the 
enclosed end of the "U', the point. As the men became more tightly paced into a confined 
space, fewer of them could use their weapons effectively. Romans in the rear ranks 
continued to push forward, but found they had little room to manoeuvre. The prevailing 
winds continued to blow dust in the faces of the advancing legionaries, making it difficult 
for them to appreciate their danger. Stripped of both its flanks, the Roman infantry 
formed a wedge that drove deeper and deeper into the Carthaginian semicircle. At this 
moment, the Affican square anchoring the Carthaginian flanks turned inward and 
advanced to further constrict the Roman infantry. Hasdrubal assaulted the Roman rear 
with his heavy cavalry, assisted by the Carthaginian light infantry. The encirclement was 
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complete. Hannibal's infantry surrounded its enemy on three sides - and the Carthaginian 
cavalry closed the circle in the Roman rear. Rome's doomed legions were encircled and 
being attacked from all sides. 
Many Romans first discovered the danger when they felt the searing pain of being 
hamstrung by the knives and swords of the Balearic sfingers. The courage of the Roman 
soldier was amply demonstrated - the legions fought on even though all hope was gone. 
Pressed tightly together and hence unable to properly use their arms, the Romans were 
surrounded; trapped, with nowhere to retreat, the Roman lines dissolved into chaos. It was 
no longer a fair fight: the trapped Roman soldiers were massacred. 
Of the original force Polybius estimates the dead at 70,000 and prisoners at over 
10,000; Livy acknowledges 47,000 dead among the infantry, 2,700 in the cavalry, and 
estimates the number of prisoners at 19,000.534AboUt 17,000 Romans took refuge in two 
fortified camps nearby, but after further resistance cost 2,000 more fatalities, the 
remaining 15,000 surrendered. In all, over 72,000 Romans were dead or captured - 80 
percent of the entire army. Carthaginian losses were less than 6,000,4,000 of them 
suffered by the Celts, no great loss as others could be persuaded to join Hannibal's army 
as a way to avenge their fallen comrades. 535 The survivors were placed in two special 
legions and forced to remain under service for the duration of the war as a punishment for 
their failure. 
536 
For a reassessment of how analogous battles such as Cannae can have a 
comparable outcome when led by an accomplished general, we turn to 'Lee's 
534 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita -59. , 22.51 
S35S. Lancel. Hannibal, page 108. 
536 Polybius. The Histories. 3.113-116 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commeqt4ij on Pol ius. Vol. 1. yb 
pages 443-448. Livy. Ad Urbc Condita 22.42-50 and IF Lazenby, Hannibal's War, pages 77-86. 
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Masterpiece', Chancellorsville. Just as the Roman Senate decided to send an 
overwhelming force against Hannibal at Cannae, General Joseph Hooker reorganized the 
Union Army of the Potomac, trained it, and grew it to 130,000 men to strike Robert E. 
Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Hooker would not hurl his massive army head-on 
against the formidable Fredericksburg defenses; instead, he would deploy about one-third 
of his forces under General John Sedgwick to make a diversionary attack across the 
Rappahannock above Lee's Fredericksburg entrenchments, while he personally led 
another third of the army in a long swing up the Rappahannock, coming around to attack 
Lee on his vulnerable left flank and rear. Except for about 10,000 cavalry troops under 
General George Stoneman, who would disrupt Lee's lines of communication to 
Richmond, the remainder of the Army of the Potomac would be prudently held in reserve 
in Chancellorsville, ready for use to reinforce either Sedgwick's or Hooker's wings as 
needed. 
The plan seemed certain to send Lee falling back to Richmond in defeat. The first 
part of the plan unfolded beautifully. By April 30,1863, Hooker had established about 
70,000 men in Chancellorsville and had set up headquarters in a plantation home outside 
of town called Chancellor House. Hooker then dispatched his cavalry to cut the 
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad. 
The trouble with Hooker's plan is that Robert E. Lee immediately grasped it and 
understood it as well as Hooker - maybe better. Like Hannibal, Lee ýcommanded less than 
half the number available to Hooker. He did not direct his attention to Hooker's cavalry; 
instead, he used his own cavalry under General J. E. B. Stuart to control the roads in and 
out of Chancellorsville. Unable to send patrols out, Hooker was effectively blinded; he 
could not tell where the Confederates were. Worried and confused,, he deployed his mýen 
defensively instead of advancing to his chosen battlefield about 12 miles east of town. In 
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the meantime, having concluded from Stuart's reconnaissance that Hooker intended to 
attack him from the flank and rear, Lee sent 10,000 men under Jubal Early to delay the 
Union troops at Fredericksburg, while he led the remainder of his army against Hooker at 
Chancellorsville. 
Then Lee hit on an even bolder and riskier plan. As he had done against Pope at 
the Second Battle of Bull Run, Lee flouted accepted military doctrine by dividing his 
army in the presence of the enemy. He proposed to divide his army, giving 26,000 men to 
Jackson for the surprise attack against Hooker's flank and retaining 17,000 to hold attacks 
against Hooker's front. Early's portion would continue to hold the Union troops at 4z;;, - 
Fredericksburg. 
In broad daylight, Jackson had to move 26,000 men across the Union front, no 
more than two-and-a-half miles away. Even with Stuart in control of the roads, pickets 
with the Union Corps under General Howard saw Jackson's movement; nevertheless, 
they were unable to persuade Howard or Hooker that this represented any great danger. 
Just two hours before dusk on May 2, Jackson attacked Howard, in command of Hooker's 
right flank. The results were devastating. 
This was just the beginning of a battle so brilliantly planned that military 
historians have called it "Lee's Masterpiece. " Fighting went on through May e, by 
which time Hooker, in full retreat, had withdrawn all of his troops north of the 
Rappahannock. The cost to Hooker was staggering. He had faced an army less than half 
the size of his -a ragtag army. tired, ifl fed, and poorly equipped. Against this force, he 
lost 17,000 men., as well as the chance for a decisive Union victory. Union morale 
plummeted. Lee saw that the victory of Chancellorsvifle had raised the spirits of the 
South, even as they continued to lose food, money, and men. 
229 
As demonstrated in the above scenario, it is my assertion that Rome had relied 
solely on the superiority of its legionnaires, having fined them up and told them to 
advance. No use had been made of the superior numbers, other than to simply add more 
ranks onto the back of the advancing columns. As the Carthaginian units manoeuvred, 
nothing was done to counter their actions- One simply did what one had always done - 
advance. Hannibal thus turned the Romans' usual strength in battle against them, not only 
on the large-scalýe level of overall tactical deployment and movement, but on the micro- 
level of the tempo of action and the Roman soldiers' ingrained assumption of what they 
expected to happen in battle. One part of Hannibal's tactical genius lay in realizing that 
this very steadfastness, the fact that Roman battles were won by outlasting the enemy 
rather than sudden shock, made them more vulnerable to surprises sprung on them when 
battle was already underway. The Battle of Cannae served as a classic example of a 
double-envelopment manoeuvre, a way for an inferior force to defeat a superior force on 
onen teffain- r, 
The Battle of Cannae was a blow to Rome's military in the largest possible scale 
and can be partly attributed to the Roman practice of rotating consular command on 
alternate days. The implication by both Livy and Polybius being Varro, and Paulus never 
discussed the possible battle plan for they have the two consuls falling out over exactly 
these matters within sight of the enemy. Polybius tells us that Varro broke camp and 
ordered an advance on the enemy in spite of strong protests by Pauflus. 
537 paUjUS, the tWo 
proconsuls, Servilius and Atilius, were Hled, as was Minucius, eighty senators, two 
quaestors, and twenty-nine tribunes in the ensuing battle. 538 Cannae left Rome effectively 
537 Polybius, The -Iistories, 3.113 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical ConmienýM on PoLybius, Vol. 1, pages 
443-445. 
538 Livy, Ad Urbe Condi 22.49.6-11. 
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without an army in the field; the Romans had thrown practically everything they had a 
Hannibal, and he destroyed nearly all. Terentius Varro, together with a thousand allied 
cavalry escaped to Venusia some thirty miles from Cannae. Polybius comments "... [he] 
disgraced himself by his flight and in his tenure of office had been most unprofitable to 
his country. )-)539 Astonishingly when Varro ultimately reached Rome, a crowd solemnly 
thanked him "... because he had not despaired of the state. , 
540 
By the time of the battle of Cannae, it is clear that Hannibal had succeeded in 
welding together these disparate horsemen into a highly trained and disciplined body of 
cavalry. Testimony to this comes in the battle itself when in the midst of combat he could 
rein in his Celtic and Spanish cavalry and redirect them to another part of the battlefield. 
The encirclement was a remarkable feat in itself for Hannibal had little more than 40,000 
men while Rome had close to 90,000. About 60-70,, 000 of the Roman force was killed out 
right another 10,000 fought their way out of the trap while the rest were taken prisoner. 
Hannibal had lost 4,000 Celts, 1,500 Spanish and Aftican troops and about 200 Numidian 
cavalry. -541 
The Carthaginian army reached Italy reduced to 20,000 infantry and 6,000 
cavalry; since it fights at Trebia with 30,000 infantry and over 10,000 cavalry, Polybius 
implicitly assumes that at least 10,000 infantry and four thousand cavalry had been 
539 Polybius, The Histories 3.116.13. 
"... 0 T(OV TCOýLOUOW (77'CPOL'CTIYO;, OLVtlp ataxpow ýIzv TTJV ýXyyqv, mki)(5rce)"n 8z Tqv oLPXTI\, 't'Tlv axnm 
T'n naipt& =7toi7lWvoq. " & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CollillientM on pol3tus, Vol. 1, page 448. 
540 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 22.61.14. 
541 Polybius, The Histories, 3.117.6. On the dramatic differences in casualties, see P. Sabin, "The 
Mechanics of Battle in the Second Punic Wai", The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, BICS Supplement 
67,1996, pages 64-77. 
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aintry strength had grown to 40,000 recruited from the Cisalpine Gauls. By Cannae, the inf, 
requiring at minimum an additional 10,000 recruits, plus enough more to make up losses 
in the earlier battles. Hannibal"s infantry at Cannae would be at least half made up of 
Cisalpine Gauls. Livy gives no overall strength for the army at Trebia; only that it 
included 10,000 cavalry - one of the more consistent figures in this whole reckoning - 
and supposedly 8,0: 00 Balearic slingers. The last is surely an error, since it is implausible 
that slingers, light infantry, would have made up such a large proportion of Hannibal's 
non-Gallic forces. Most likely, Livy n-ýsinterpreted Polybius' assertion that the army as it 
entered Italy had 8,000 Iberian infantry of all sorts. 542 In any case, by the time of Cannae, 
Livy agrees with Polybius that Hannibal's army totals 40,000 infantry and 10,000 
cavalry. However, if he takes seriously Cincius Alimentus' figures, then the Gauls 
recruited in Italy may have almost melted away again; at least, the army has been reduced 
from 80,000 infantry to 40,000. 
Although the ancient historians provide discrepancies in deterraining the strength 
of Hannibal's army, it is simply too important to be brushed aside. Hannibal commanded 
an army whose main motive had initially been the acquisition of Plunder, an army without 
emotional or ideological commitment to the Carthaginian cause. He earned the fidelity 
and love of his men by his personal qualities alone. Considering the heterogeneous army, 
the extraordinary hardships it underwent, the struggling against certain defeat, the toils 
and privation, that Hannibal was able to hold together this army for such a length of time 
was perhaps even more remarkable than his battlefield victories and testifies to the 
intense charisma he possessed. With his mercenary army he achieved some of the most 
dramatic victories in military history. It was not that Hannibal's soldiers were better 
512 Polybius. The Histories. 3.56 & F. W. Walbank. A Historical CommentM on PoLybius, Vol. 1, pages 
391-393. 
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fighters than the Roman, but that Hannibal possessed extraordinary ability both as a 
tactician and a leader. 
543 
News of the catastrophe at Cannae shook Rome to its very core. Even so the 
Roman Senate moved rapidly to assert social discipline by forbidding public mourning or 
demonstrations of distress within the city. Taking the defeat as evidence of divine 
disfavour, they ordered a Celtic male and female along with a Greek male and female 
buried alive to placate the gods. Of most immediate concern was the need to create a new 
army and the Senate took unprecedented steps to provide troops for this new army. They 
raised two new legions from an emergency levy, two more being manned with purchased 
slaves; the Senate released 6,000 debtors and criminals from prison, their military service 
to be taken in lieu of sentence. However., when Hannibal offered to ransom Roman 
prisoners taken at Cannae, the Senate stated it had no use for such men. Survivors of 
Cannae who had retreated to Canusium made up the equivalent of two additional legions. 
These were then marched to join a legion dispatched earlier to guard northern Campania 
and act as a blocking force should Hannibal choose to move to attack Rome. 
In Hannibal's finest hour, he forced the Romans to learn a painful lesson. The 
Battle of Cannae in the summer of 216 B. C. remains a milestone in ancient history for it 
is after Cannae that Rome began to recognize the necessity for continuity of command 
against Hannibal. As Hannibal met Rome's strongest army on this site, Rome's vaunted 40 
tenacity and soldiery were expected to prove decisive despite the Carthaginians' recent 
victories. The Roman legions were perhaps the finest military units of their day. Yet 
although their methods of fighting, training, and equipment were highly sophisticated and 
543 T. A. Dodge, The Great CapWns: The Art of War in the C4mpaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, 
Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and Nappleon (New York, 1995), originally published in 1889, 
page 71. 
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equally effective, an army alone, no matter how devastating, will not win battles. It stands 
or falls with its commander and the long line of brilliant Roman military leaders largely 
rose from the lessons learrit against Hannibal in these first two years of war. Had Rome 
not lost in such an overwhelming disaster the changes necessary for their eventual victory 
over Carthage may never have been implemented thereby changing the outcome of 
Roman history far beyond the immediate need for defense. 
Despite the outcome of Cannae, the Roman military potential remained 
profoundly impressive. It had taken the loss of nearly 100,000 Roman and allied troops 
since 218 to realize even the first defections from the confederacy, What Hannibal really 
needed were more battles like Cannae. Unfortunately for Hannibal, the Roman Senate 
made this possibility very unlikely- Cannae had served to vindicate the Fabian strategy 
and from 216 until 203 the Romans refrained ftom fighting pitched battles against 
Hannibal, exploiting to the fullest Rome's advantage of inexhaustible provisions and 
manpower by using delaying tactics-544 
Changing of the Consuls Compared with the Change of Union Generals 545 
The issues of who was to command the legions and which from among the 
competing strategies would be employed to prosecute the war against Hannibal were 
matters th -at lay at the heart of the internal pofitics of Rome between 218 and 216, 
Although the Republic was organized so that its resources were harnessed to serve its 
544 Rome's reaction to Hannibal. particularly Fabius' involvement can be found most clearly and concisely 
in H. H. Scullard, A I-listo! y of the Roman World 753 to 146 B. C., 4hEdition, pages 219-224. See J. 
Briscoe, "The Second Punic War". The Cambridge Ancient flistoly: Vol. VIII Rome and the Mediterranean 
to 133 B. C., 2"dEdition, pages 67-70 for more on the changing of the Consuls. 
s4s See R. F. Vishnia. State, Sociply, and PpTular Leaders in Md-Republican Rome 241-167 B. C. (London, 
1996). pages 49-114 for a thorough discussion of the selection of Magistrates and their effects on the 
Roman state. 
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defense, the nature of its constitution operated to prevent the emergence of a ryfilitary 
professional. The command of the army lay not with professional soldiers, but with two 
annually appointed consuls who were not permitted early re-election. Although the 
imperiUl, n. 
546 
vested in the consulship carried with it supreme command of Rome's legions 
and responsibility for the prosecution of war, 547 those elected to the office were rarely 
chosen for their military ability, but instead a candidate from a distinguished family. In 
consequence, the military experience of Roman generals, particularly those in command 
of large forces, was more limited compared to the professional expertise gained by 
Hannibal and his officers over many years of continuous service. 
The election of Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus as the 
elected consuls for 218 and the allocation by the Roman Senate of their areas of service - 
Spain and Affica - serve to vindicate Hannibal's belief that Rome intended to prosecute 
the war against Carthage by initiating an offensive strategy overseas. 548That they were 
tardy is derived from their conviction that the strategic initiative lay in their hands. 
If Hannibal's first major victory at Trebia had been a matter of serious alarm for 
the Romans, the catastrophe at Lake Trasimene raised matters to the level of a national 
emergency. Within days further bad tidings arrived when news of an ambush of a Roman 
cavalry with afl 4,000 kiRed or taken prisoner reached Rome. -49The Senate deemed the 
matter so dire they resorted to the ancient device of appointing a dictator to ensure the 
546 Supreme executive authority, military, civil, and judicial, the most important power to command an 
anny. 
547 L. Keppic, The Making of the Roman AM From the Republic to ELnpire, page 102. 
548 pol YbIUS, The Histories,, 3.40 & F. W. Walbank, A flistorical Commenin on Polybius, Vol. 1, pages 
374-377. 
5'9 Polybius, The Histories 3.86 & F. W. Walbant A Historical Commenim on Polybius, Vol. 1. pages 
420-422. 
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most efficient coordination of the war effort. This office combined the imperium of two 
consuls, and the nominated indiVidual would supersede all the other magistrates for a 
period of not more than six months. Rome appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus the 
PoSt. 
550 According to Livy, there was an element of irregularity to the appointment 
because normally one of the consuls would nominate a suitable individual. But with 
Flaminius dead and Geminus unable to reach Rome, due to Hannibal's eastward march 
across the Apennines, they dispensed tradition and the dictator was elected by popular 
vote. 55 1 Hence, the appointment of Fabius was evidently ratified only by a popular 
election of the assembly, though surely on the advice of the Senate. 
Not only had Fabius to contend with the opposition in his own camp, he also had 
detractors in Rome. His strategy was clearly anathema to powerful elements in the Roman 
Senate who still believed, notwithstanding the disasters at Trebia and Trastmene, that 
Hannibal could be defeated in an all out baffle. 152 They connived to restrict Fabius' 
freedom of action by denying him the right to choose his own second in command, 
instead they foisted one of their own A Minucius Rufus, the former consul, as Magister 
Equilum [Master of Horse], an officer who would prove to be of far more hot-headed 
temperament than Fabius. 
553 
Although no n-filitary genius, Fabius' unique contribution to saving the Republic 
lay in his perception that the Romans were facing a prodigious military talent in 
Hannibal. He concluded that as long as they continued to accept battle they would 
550 Polybius, The I-hstories 3.87.6 & F. W. Walbank, A ffistorical CommeptM on pOL)I&S, Vol. I, page 
422; See also, J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's Aar, pages 68-73. 
ssl Livvý Ad Urbe Condita. 22.8. 
552 S. Lancel, Hannibal, page 97. 
-s'; 
3 S. Lancel, Hannibal, pagc 98. 
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inevitably lose. He employed his dictatorial powers to initiate a new strategy predicated 
on the refusal to take risks or to fight pitched battles against the Carthaginian army. He 
would merely exhaust Hannibal by using delaying tactics. To a population grown weary 
of defeat and disenchanted with Fabius' strategy, his detractors advocated an offensive 
policy and as a reward, and no doubt as a deliberate attempt to impair Fabius in the 
exercise of his authority in the closing months of his dictatorship, Minucius was raised to 
equal that of Fabius. On his return to Apulia, Fabius suggested to Minucius that either 
they each took command of the whole army on alternate days or they split it, each taking 
command of one half Minucius opted for the latter. However, when Hannibal destroyed 
half of Minucius' army at Geronium, a humbled and contrite Minucius agreed to the 
reunion of the army. 
554 
In December 217 the six-month period of the dictatorship came to an end and 
command of the legions reverted to the two consuls for that year - M. Atilius Regulus 
elected to replace the dead Flaminius. 555 Rome now became a hotbed of intrigue as 
factions within the Senate manoeuvred to ensure their candidates would be elected to the 
consulship for the following year. It is clear that as the war progressed the tnilitary 
strategy adopted by the Senate and exercised through the consuls was linked to whichever 
faction held influence at the time. In the face of the disenchantment with the Fabian 
strategy and the false optimism generated by Minucius support returned to an offensive 
strategy to defeat Hannibal. 
In 216 the Roman Senate elected Gaius Terrentius Varro consul in the first round 
of votes. 556 Varro's champion in his quest for the consulship, the tribune Q. Baebius 
ý'54 
Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 22.25.11. 
5,; 5 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 22.31.7. 
S 56 Livy. Ad Urbe Condita, 22.25.19. 
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Herennius, came from a family with long established links to the plebeian Metelli. 557 
Together with the group they constituted the most vocal and influential faction in the 
Senate in support of resuming the offensive against Hannibal. 58 It is possible to discern a 
very determined attempt by this faction to prevent the reappointment of Fabius as consul 
at any cost. Their overwhehning conviction that Hannibal could only be defeated in the 
field explains their support of Varro, who was undoubtedly fronting their cause. Their 
victory was further enhanced by the election of L. Aemilius Pauflus as fellow consul. 
With Varro and Paullus in place, the Fabian strategy was promptly abandoned and, with 
the support of the majority in the Senate, the decision taken to resume the offensive 
against Hannibal with a view to forcing a decisive battle with him in 216. C 
Deliberate steps were taken to ensure that when Rome came to do battle in 216 it 
would have the initiative. The Roman Senate decreed the extension of the imperium to 
Servilius Geminus and M. Atilius Regulus as proconsuls under the direct authority of the 
two consuls along with the injunction they should not under any circumstances attempt to 
559 
engage Hannibal in battle. Such a decision when it came would be at a time and on a 
ground of Rome's choosing -a situation unlike that of her two previous defeats. In a step 
the Romans had never taken before, the Senate moved to put eight legions in the field for 
the specific task of crushing the Carthaginian. army by overwhelming force. In total 
Polybius claims the Romans levied eight legions of close to 90,000 infantry and 6,000 
cavalry. 
557 Livy. Ad Urbe Condita 22.43.3-11. 
558 J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War. page 74. 
559 Polybius, The Historim 3.106.2-5; F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentan, on Polybius Vol. 1. page 
435 and S. Lancel, Hannib, -d page 103. 
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To validate my postulation that the policy of yearly collegial consuls hindered 
ID - 
-Rome until after 
Cannae we need only to observe the problems facing the Union 
command during the first few years of the war. Much of the problem faced by the Union 
forces lay with President Lincoln's unwillingness to entrust one competent general with 
ultimate control of the Union command. Even though the circumstances may be inexact, 
the outcome remains constant throughout the ages . 
Sun Tzu says it best in Ae Art of 
War, ... when there are no consistent rules to guide the officers and the men ... the army 
is 
in disorder 
... When one treats people with 
benevolence, justice and righteousness, and 
reposes confidence in them, the army will be united in mind and all will be happy to 
server their leaders. , 560 Although the Union had no constitutional requirement to change 
leadership, by 1962 Lincoln relied on a military junta, consisting of himself, Edwin M. 
Stanton, General Henry Halleck, and retired General Ethan Allen Hitchcock. In 
consequence on many occasions Lincoln personally ruined the initiative of his generals, 
as revealed in the following examples. 
561 
Depressed by the Union defeat at Bull Run, Lincoln looked to George B. 
McClellan, a dashing young general, as the commander who would win the war. Of 
Lincoln's commanders'. McClellan showed evidence of understanding the art of war. He 
built the Army of the Potomac into a well-organized and disciplined body - but it seemed 
he was forever organizing rather than using the well-oiled machine he had created. 
Although a brilliant administrator and organizer, McClellan lacked the initiative and 
resolve to be an effective military leader. After ordering the preparations, which 
McClellan had so long solicited, Lincoln relapsed into hesitancy and insisted that the 
general-in-chief submit his project to the examination of a council of war. Twelve 
560 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. T. Cleary (Boston, mA, 1988) X. 14; 1.4. 
561 J. F. C. Fuller, Grant and Lee: A Stu4y in Personalily and Gencralship (Bloomington, IN, 1957), page 30. 
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generals assembled not to receive the instructions of their chief, but to constitute a 
tribunal for passing judgment on plans. 562 This interference and his chronic hesitation 
caused McClellan to bungle the Peninsular Campaign greatly prolonging the war. 
In March 1862 Lincoln had had enough. Rather than replacing McClellan he 
reorganized his command when he relieved McClellan as general in chief and rather than 
replacing him,, created the War Board, composed of himself, 14itchcock, Stanton, and 
Halleck. 563 He called on General John Pope, who had shown such leadership as 
Commander of the Army of the Mssissippi, to take command of the new Army of 
Virginia (a consolidation of several forces). By July 1862 Lincoln unsatisfied with the 
war's progress again reorganized his command system calling on Henry Halleck to 
become general in chief of Union Armies. His decision reflected both the need for public 
support of a popular general and the failure of the War Board to supply sound strategic 
advice. 564 Halleck had written a book about war and had an academic understanding of 
strategy and tactics, but the realities of combat showed this to be as much a liability as it 
was an asset. Additionally, though ambitious and full of bravado, Pope lacked people 
skills - in a word he was obnoxious. Because of Pope's terrible defeat at the Second 
Battle of Bull Run, Lincoln reinstated General George B. McClellan to command the 
Army of the Potomac. By the time McClellan finally moved in late October 1862, the 
president replaced him with Ambrose E. Burnside over Burnside's own self doubts. 565 
Burnside was well liked and brave, but he proved sorely deficient in strategic and 
tactical sense. He conducted his first campaign at Fredericksburg, disastrously bringing 
562 J. F. C. Fuller. Grant and Lee page 30. 
563 A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy, page 79. 
564A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy page 81 & B. Catton. The Civd War. page 85, 
i6c A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy page 102. 
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on December 13,1862 the worst single defeat yet suffered by the U. S. Army. Lincoln 
then replaced Burnside with Joseph Hooker, a new general receptive to the ideas 
developed by Lincoln and Halleck. Although he did much to restore and improve the 
battered Army of the Potomac, he faced the prospect of battle against Robert E. Lee. 
Hooker was an able strategist and tactician, but Lee was abler. Even though he revitalized 
and rebuilt the Army of the Potomac and formulated an excellent plan of battle, at 
Chancellorsville, by his own admission, Hooker simply lost his nerve. 566 When Hooker 
resigned on June 28,1863, Lincoln and Halleck replaced the commander with General 
George Mead. 567 
Of all the men who commanded the Army of the Potomac, George Meade was 
probably the most satisfactory. Almost immediately after assuming command from 
Hooker, he led the army to victory at Gettysburg, the tuming-point battle of the war. Yet 
he, too, fell short when he allowed Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia to limp away, 
causing Lincoln particular anguish. 
568 
Only after three full years of war and numerous changes in command, Lincoln 
gave Grant his vote of confidence and on March 9,, 1864, Grant received his commission 
as lieutenant general and supreme commander of aH the Union armies. Not until he 
discovered Grant did Lincoln cease to interfere with the day-to-day running of the war. 
Although he remained deeply involved in initiating and executing Union strategy, in 
Grant he had a field commander who appealed to a public, which tended to see war as 
little more than battles. 569 When the Younger Publius Cornelius Scipio [Africanus] 
566 A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy page 156 & B. Catton, The Civil pages 122,127-128. 
567 A. Jones. Civil War Command & SipleM. page 168. 
568A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy, page 169 & B. Catton, The Civil War, pages 140-14 1. 
569 J. F. C. Fuller, Grant and !, ý, page 30. 
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entered into the Roman political fray, he did so as the son of a soldier killed on the 
battlefield and as a participant in the first major clash with Hannibal in Italy. As one of 
the few survivors of Cannae he presented himself at the Forum for election where he won 
tremendous support from the people, tired of defeat, and yearning for an inspirational 
leader who would offer hope. It is only this continuity of leadership that created change In 
Rome's military proficiency. 
From the beginning of the war, Grant grasped the common denominator at the 
root of the war: the South had fewer men, less money, and fewer resources than the 
North. The South could not afford to lose what it had while the North could afford to lose 
more because it had so much more. Grant came to command prepared with a strategy as 
simple as the equation that drove this war: destroy Robert E. Lee's Army and force the 
570 South into total subýnission through a "total war"' against the civilian population. 
Chapter Conclusions 
As discussed in this chapter Lee's victory at Chancellorsville led the South to 
have hopes for a peace settlement. As well, by Hannibal's victory at Cannae the 
Carthaginians began to have high hopes that Rome itself would capitulate. Polybius tells 
us, "The Romans on their part owing to this defeat at once abandoned aH hope of 
retaining their supremacy in Italy, and were in the greatest fear about their own safety and 
that of Rome, expecting Hannibal every moment to appear. ""' Although Lee had no 
illusions about conquering the Union states, he hoped to demolish the Union's will to 
5-'0 A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy page 230. 
571 Polybius, The Historigs, 3.118.5. 
"? P(04ouol 76 ýLljv TIjV 'ITo0, t(j-)T(O-l' 8"1*'(XC7TCtOLV 7COf-POCXPTjýLU (310C TTIV IITTOLV OL71F-'YVO)KF-I(TOCXI, 6V 
ýJýCCkotq 6C ýOpOtq KOLI KtV6X)VOtq II(TOLV 7tCPl T6 (TýWV OLUTOW KOU 7t6pt TOU TTjq 7EOLTpt6oC: 960LýoUq, 
0GOVOMEO ItPOCT80KO)VTCq'qýEIV OLUTOV'COV'Avvtpocv. - 
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continue the fight by invading the North. 572 Lee saw an offensive move at Gettysburg as 
his opportunity to crush the Army of the Potomac on Northern territory and thereby force 
the North to agree to a negotiated peace with an independent Confederate States of 
America. Hannibal, like Lee was a general of manoeuvre and position, getting his army 
bogged down in a prolonged siege of Rome cannot have been an attractive option. Some 
great generals win by a sudden stroke others win by thoroughness of preparation. All the 
indications are that Hannibal was a general of the latter type. None of his great victories 
were won by a single stroke, appearing suddenly before an unprepared enemy. Even at 
Lake Trasimene, where Hannibal achieved total surprise, he did so by drawing the 
Romans into a trap set in advance. Similar advance preparations were key to victory at 
Trebia, and in a different way at Cannae. Hannibal may have acted at the last moment in 
drawing his Spanish and Gallic troops forward into the "U', but the overall disposition, 
with the Afficans in columns at each side, was clearly planned in advance. 
Hannibal had other war aims and another plan. After the prisoners were sorted out 
and the Italian allies sent home, he addressed the Roman captives, whose ransom he had 
set at a high price. Hannibal told the prisoners on making the ransom proposal that "He 
was waging, he said, no war of extermination with them, but was contending for honour 
and dominion. , 
573 This sounds very close to being a preliminary feeler for armistice 
terms. If the Romans accepted the release and repatriation of their prisoners in turn for 
ransom -a sort of tribute - the groundwork would be laid, and a certain momentum 
established, towards a negotiated settlement, the ultimate terms of which might include a 
further tribute, and surely would include Roman abandonment of the war effort and of 
7 B. Catton, The CiAil War, pages 128-13 1& A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy, pages 157-158. 
-573 Liw. Ad Urbe Condita, 22.58.3 . .... non intemeci'vmm sibi esse cum Romanis bellumý de dignitate atque 
imperio ceftm. " & J. F. Lazenby, "Was Maharbal RightT, pages 22-58. 
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their alliance-system of control throughout Italy. In short, an agreement on return of 
prisoners would be the first step toward its hegemony (imperium]. Hannibal expected 
Rome to sue for peace. He wanted a victory recognized by a treaty that would be to 
Carthage's advantage and to reverse the humiliating situation that had arisen from the 
treaties of 241, the loss of Sicily and the obligation to pay a heavy indemnity, and 237, 
the loss of Sardinia and Corsica, plus the additional indemnity. 
5,74 
In dealing with Rome the whole concept of war, as Hannibal knew it was 
incorrect. It was no longer enough to dramatically defeat the enemy in battle and then 
dictate a peace settlement based on the winner's terms. By Rome" s refusal to yield even 
after resounding defeats, they introduced a new element to ancient warfare - total war. 
Rome had learned that a battle does not necessarily mean conquest. Hannibal arrived,, 
according to Clausewitz's expression, at the culminating point of victory: if victory does 
not lead to the total defeat of the enemy and the restoration of peace, it forms a basis for 
counteraction and retribution. His own peace envoy had returned to his encampment only 
to relate how the lictor of the newly appointed dictator had relayed the same words to 
him that the Romans had given to Pyrrhus sixty years before - "... Pyrrhus must first 
depart out of Italy, and then, if he wished, the Romans would talk about fi7iendship and . 
alliance; but as long as he was there in arms, they would fight him with all their 
might... "575 
5" L. Keppic, The Making of the Roman &gLiy From the Republic to the EMpire, page 28 & S. Lancel, 
Hannibal, page 109. 
57i Plutarck Parallel Lives Pyrrhus, 19.34. 
"... noppov CýF-Xoovm Tljý 'ITU, 
ý, taq, Ounoq, Ct 86otTo, =pt ýOtocq Kat cyoggay'laq 8to(XZYP-(70ocl, 
4EXpt 6C OU 71OLFCCFTtV CNI 07EXIC)tC, 710ýXWlMtV (XOTO) IPG)PatOL)q K(XT(X Kf)(XTOq ...... AJso, N. Machiavelli, 
The Art of War, page 20 1. "1 their wars with Hannibal, the Romans honoured nothing so much as their 
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To Hannibal this meant a change in the tactical objectives to achieve his goal. He 
simply did not judge the time ripe for a direct move against Rome, but planned a series of 
new campaigns to break up the Roman Alliance System thereby forcing Rome into a 
peace agreement. In the wake of Cannae Hannibal exerted intense diplomatic activity in 
the south, taking advantage of the destabilizing effect of his victory. A march on Rome 
would not accomplish his objective. He must have been confident that the Roman system 
could be broken and that Rome was more vulnerable to political dismemberment than to 
direct military assault. In the next chapter we will investigate how his approach begins to 
change course. 
unshaken firmness and constancy, for they never sued for peace nor showed the least signs of fear. even in 
L&ý A fh, - lowest ebb of their fortune. " 
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Chapter IV 
By the end of 216 B. C. all of Carthage yeamed for victory. The political hopes 
and aspirations for Carthage to once again rule the western Mediterranean guided 
Hannibal's decisions up to and including his resounding victory at Cannae and can best 
be expressed by the Clausewitzian doctrine, "war is a mere continuation of policy by 
other means. , 
576 Like all nobility of the time, Hannibal had been taught in the Greek 
tradition of Hellenistic warfare wherein a crushing victory in the field would bring the 
enemy to accept his peace terms. In ancient times this meant the destruction of the 
enemy's military machime and could easily be envisaged, when professional armies, once 
destroyed, could not be immediately replaced. It is highly unlikely that Hannibal's 
Spartan tutor, Sosylos, would not have discussed the Persian Wars with his student. He 
surely had access to the details of Persia's capitulation after their defeat by the Athenians 
at the Battle of Marathon in 490 B. C.; and yet again the terms for peace after the Greek 
victory over the Persians at Salamis and Plataea, which ended the second conflict in 
479.577 As an admirer of Alexander's accomplishments Hannibal knew of the campaign 
in India where Alexander defeated the local ruler Poros at the river Hydaspes in 326 B. C 
With the annihilation of the Indian army in this one decisive battle Alexander won all of 
the Punjab. 578 As late as 217 B. C., Alexander's successors operated on a much greater 
scale, with the ability to concentrate 80,, 000 to 100,000 men at a single battle, as did both 
576 C. von Clausewitz, On War page 119. 
5 -2 J. F. Lazenby, The Defence of Greece. 490-479 B. C. (Warminster, 1993), pages 259-261. 
5711 Plutarch. Parallel Lives, Alexander, trans. B. Perrin, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.. 1919). 
60. 
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Ptolemy IV and his Seleucid opponent Antiochus III at Raphia in 217 B. C., which 
resulted in Antiochus suing for peace. 
579 
Rome did not fight on these terms. Mobilization became not only a mobilization 
of soldiers, but also of the entire labour force available to Rome. With the appearance of 
massive citizen armies. ) the task of 
destroying a military machine became more difficult 
5811 because armies could continue to be replenished by mass conscription. In the three 
major battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae, Rome had lost over ten percent of 
the entire population of citizens over seventeen years of age and during the first two years 
of war nearly one third of the Roman Senate had been Hled in battle; 5"' yet not only 
were the Romans unwilling to ransom their prisoners or extend terms for a peace 
settlement, they appointed M. Junius Pera dictator who ordered the mobilization of all 
young men from the age of seventeen, and because there were not enough free men, the 
state paid for and armed 8,000 slave recruits. The strain on the Roman economy was so 
great that soldiers and sailors went unpaid, loans were raised, and heavy taxes were levied 
to help finance the war. 582 Even with these burdens Rome proceeded to form an army of 
four legions and 1,000 cavalry, reinforced by contingents of allies and Latins. 
Rome had every intention of continuing the war, and if anything were more 
determined than ever before; their soldiers and their city would end in triumph or be 
destroyed from the face of the earth. It was not just a matter of the advantages of a large 
population to draw from, but of sheer determination and will not to be defeated at any 
579 Polýbius, The Histories, 5.63.65. 
"" C. von Clausewitz, On War, pages 61-62, 
ý81 A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, page 217. 
582 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita. Vol. VU. trans. F. G. Moore, Loeb Classical Libmry (Cambridge, Mass., 1950). 
26,36. 
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cost. With Rome a new form of war developed - total war. A war where "... any person, 
entity or location is selected for destruction, inactivation, or rendering non-usable ... which 
will reduce or destroy the will or ability of the enemy to resist. -)-)583 Although Alexander 
waged something like total war against his opponents in the Far East, Rome on the other 
hand began a policy of total war that included harsh devastation against its own alliance 
system in order to inflict the most damage on Hannibal's ability to bring allies to the 
Carthaginian ýcause. 
Hannibal had no choice but to continue his political efforts among Rome's allies. 
To ensure victory, not only the immediate but also the potential military capacity of the 
opponent had to be destroyed. The demands of the war led him to a series of brilliant 
marches and strategic manoeuvres, whiých carried him to the south of Italy. He counted on 
his greatest support coming from the former Greek cities in southern Italy: Lucania, 
Bruttium, and Campania where he could assert a policy that would make Carthage appear 
as the restorer of their fonner liberties while establishing Carthaginian protection over the 
entire region. At Capua he established a new base of operations and set about to form an 
alliance with Philip V of Macedon for external support, along with encouraging actions 
for the home government to take against Rome in Sicily and Sardinia. Since it is 
unnecessary for my argument to describe every battle, march, and manoeuvre that took 
place during the long campaign, I shall therefore outline the broad pattern of events, 
highlighting those that are especially significant. A pattern does emerge when all of 
Hannibal's activities during this time are analyzed. Hannibal was attacking the Romans 
when they presented him with the opportunity. But more often than this, he was 
defending the Italian cities which came over to his side. Occasionally both of these 
i83 C. von Clausewitz, On War pages 62-63. 
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objectives could be combined in a counter-offensive. The final activity during the years 
215 and 203 was that of bringing more cities over to his side. 
Possible Strategies 
On the evening following the Battle of Cannae, Maharbal, the Carthaginian master 
of cavalry, believed Rome to be within Hannibal's reach. No aspect of the war has 
prompted more subsequent debate than Hannibal's rejection of Maharbal's advice. But 
from Livy's time on, the general consensus through the centuries - no doubt shaped by 
Livy's own epitome - has been that Maharbal was correct, or at least that Livy was 
correct in his judgment of events, if not by our standards of historiographical precision, 
then he put those words in Maharbal's mouth. Field Marshall Montgomery put it 
unequivocally "Maharbal, " he said, "was right. 1, -)584 However, recent writers have tended 
toward certain revisionism with respect to this traditional critique of Hannibal. 585 
Obviously, Hannibal knew he needed an end game for a commander cannot win a 
war with only an opening gambit. To date he had won three resounding victories. Yet as 
Livy tells the story, after the Battle of Cannae, Maharbal thought not a moment should be 
lost and declared that Hannibal could be dining in Rome within five days. He further 
584 ViS. Montgomery of Alamein, A Histoly of Warfare (London, 1968), page 98 and E. Bradford, 
Hannibal, pages 120-121. 
585 IF Lazenby, "Was Maharbal Right? ", pages 39-48. Most, though still hold to the notion that Hannibal 
did not attack Rome because he lacked a siege train, such as B. Alexander, How Great Generals Win (New 
York, 1993), page 48 and B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, Second Revised Edition (London, 1967). page 29. N. 
Machiavelli, The Art of page 120, makes a similar point by stating, I say, then, that when you have 
won a victory, you ought by all means to pursue it, and to imitate Julius Caesar rather than Hannibal in this 
respect-. the latter lost the empire of Rome by trifling away his time at Capua, after he had routed the 
Romans at the battle of Cannae. " Though he does not say how Hannibal could have accomplished such a 
C- ý ILICal. 
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equivocated, "you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal; you know not how to use 
one. ý-)586 Had Hannibal marched on Rome as Marharbal suggested, would the outcome 
have been different? 
Immediately following Cannae three factors come together to support a lightning 
attack on the city of Rome. With the vast majority of the Roman army either dead or 
captured the Romans were reduced to relying on a minimum army to defend the city. 
Next the overwhelming destruction and catastrophic loss of life created an atmosphere of 
fear within the common man's psyche that could have been exploited with little effort. 
Believing their own lives and the existence of their city to be in imminent danger chaos 
and panic swept the entire city. Even if the Romans did not capi II upon 
Hannibal's arrival., with the allies he now had in the South, he could have had a siege 
train built while supplies arrived for a prolonged encampment. 
Yet even considefing these pros for the attack, in the narrowest sense, what 
Maharbal called for was impossible. Cannae was some three hundred miles fi7om Rome, 
and neither Hannibal's army nor any other could march that distance in five days. 
Maharbal's cavalry might conceivably cover the ground in that time, but cavalry was the 
force least suited to an attack on a fortified city. Unless the cavalry arrived with such total 
surprise that they burst through the city gates before they could be closed, they could do 
nothing against the walls of Rome. Some fifteen centuries previously, 11ittite chariotry 
had achieved just such a total surprise against Babylon, but Hannibal most likely did not 
know of that, and would have had no reason to consider it a serious option if he did; 
conditions were too different. Rome was certainly on some sort of war footing, with a 
strong guard at the gates, which would certainly be closed at first sight of the dust cloud 
raised by a large force of approaching cavalry, 
S86 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita 22.51.5-6. For textý see ChaPtelr 1, Note 1. 
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Even if we ignore the narrow element of timing, the problems of making a sudden 
descent on Rome would be difficult in the extreme, and the outcome highly uncertain. 
The army might cover the ground in ten or fifteen days at a forced march, with the 
cavalry going ahead (as Maharbal suggested) to cut off the city, and perhaps lay waste to 
the areas immediately outside the walls, as a morale-destroying measure to signal to those 
within the enormity of their army's disaster and the imminence of worse to come. 
Hannibal's army, however, must have been scarcely in any condition to undertake 
a long forced march. The troops had just won a very hard-fought battle against an enemy 
who heavily outnumbered them. The number of wounded, though unreported, must have 
been very large; especially among the Spanish and Gallic troops who had borne the brunt 
of the Roman advance in the earlier stages of the infantry action. To the seriously 
wounded who could not march at all must be added a large number of walking wounded. 
Many would have been only lightly wounded, and would be ready for renewed action in a 
couple of days, but some rest would be needed for them to recover their strength. 
Overexertion at this point might well hamper their recovery, rendering them less battle- 
worthy than otherwise and slowing the army's march. 
Moreover, on the evening of the battle, the victory itself was not yet complete. 
Some fifteen thousand Romans remained in the two Roman camps, and about ten 
thousand more scattered through the countryside nearby. If Hannibal marched 
immediately for Rome, his more severely wounded men would have been at risk from a 
Roman counterattack. Poor as Roman morale was at that point, such an action could not 
be ruled out, especially as most of the surviving Romans had not been directly in the 
action, and they might not be My aware of the magnitude of the defeat. 
In addition to aH these considerations, there was the question of just what 
Hannibal could do at Rome once he got there. At the beginning of the war, Saguntum -a 
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very much weaker target - had withstood an eight-month siege before it finally fell. For 
Hannibal, a general of manoeuvre and position, getting his army bogged down in a 
prolonged siege of Rome cannot have been an attractive option. Certainly, it would be 
less attractive to him than the alternative of pressing forward with his political strategy of 
attemptmg to break up the Roman alliance system in Italy; though the latter had not been 
successful so far, its chances might improve (as in fact they did) in the wake of the total 
defeat he had inflicted on the Roman field army. 
587 
There did remain the option of marching on Rome with the intent of taking it by 
storm rather than by prolonged siege. Such an operation was possible; Scipio the Younger 
would achieve just that in Spain a few years later when he took Carthago Nova. Lightning 
descent on Rome would preclude use of the more sophisticated methods of storming a 
city, such as siege towers, since these could only be fabricated by extensive preparation in 
place. Ordinary scaling-ladders, however., could be quickly made and brought into action. 
Though scarcely a sophisticated method of assault, and a very hazardous one for the 
attackers, the prospects of a sudden assault were best against defenders who had little 
time to organize their defensive measures, who had little experience at such operations, 
and who were certain to be demoralized. 
Even so, an assault by storm was a high-risk option, and one that would leave 
Hannibal very much worse off if it failed. The failure of an initial assault would itself 
raise the morale of the Roman defenders, and give them a chance to shore up weak spots 
in the defense, both geographical and organisational. Each follow-up assault would be 
carried out under progressively less favourable conditions. If the city did not fall nearly at 
5117 A ftu-ther indication of not having a siege in mind, particularly of Rome, is the lack of any exidence of 
HanniM requesting aid from Syracuse, Carthage's new ally, in the form of Archimedes, the greatest 
engineer of his time and for many centuries to come. 
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once, Hannibal would be left with very disagreeable options- either to settle in for a 
prolonged siege, or to march away, further restoring Roman morale, and strength among 
other Italians, by allowing them to claim a victory in the successful defense of their city. 
Thus, the problems of both marching on Rome and of attacking it posed powerful 
arguments against Maharbal's suggestion of immediate attack on Rome- Yet, aH of this 
said, rejecting these arguments of caution and making a bold descent on Rome was by no 
means out of the question. Had Hannibal assembled his troops immediately after the close 
of action at Cannae and told them to be prepared to march on Rome at dawn, many of the 
problems outlined above would have vanished in a stroke. As for the lightly wounded, or 
simply exhausted, psychology would take a hand; even men who are bone-weary, 
limping, and bandaged, find themselves able to undertake a forced march when they have 
just won one great victory and the prospect of the ultimate victory is immediately before 
them. Once at Rome, the same psychology could well impel the men into the sort of 
furious, at-all-costs assault that would unnerve the defense, then shatter it. 
Additionally Hannibal's decision against a direct attack on Rome had nothing to 
do with his lack of a siege train - there is plenty of evidence that he could construct all he 
needed to take a fortified city. Livy mentions mantletts [vineael used in the attack on 
588 Casilinum in 216, machinations in the attack on the citadel of Tarenturn in 213 
212,589 and he specifically adds that although the Carthaginians did not bring siege 
equipment with them in 205, during the attack on Locri they made everything they 
needed on site. 590 Hannibal knew even with siege equipment sieges were a protracted 
operations, which would curtail his ability to manoeuvre freely. ffis successes against 
588 Li%ý, ', Ab Urbe Condita, 23.18.8, 
589 Livy. Ab Urbe Co 25.11.10. 
! ýät-aý 29.7.4. 59') Livy. Ab Urbe ýCgn, 
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Rome, coupled with his ability to march at will were more likely to impress the allies than 
the assault or capture of a few towns. Neither did a siege bring about a fiiendly or reliable 
ly. 591 
Livy fills his account for the phase of the war after Cannae with Hannibal setting 
siege to various cities, most of which were unsuccessful. How many of these were true 
sieges, as opposed to temporary military demonstrations on Hannibal's part is perhaps 
open to question. While it is true that most of the cities, which defected to Hannibal, did 
so only with the threat of his army. Twice in 216 he hoped to force Neapolis into 
submission; however, his army withdrew when it became obvious the city could not be 
broached and he went on -to starve Nuceria into submission and make further unsuccessful 
threats on Nola. Hannibal usually subjected only the smaller cities to direct attack, for an 
assault on a well-fortified city risked heavy casualties and damage to his reputation. The 
principal means for the Carthaginians to take a city were by stealth or blockade, rather 
than a full-fledged siege. The use of stealth required an offer of betrayal from inside the 
city; a blockade required the army to stay in place possibly for months. For Hannibal to 
use his main army in this manner usually signaled the importance to him of the City. 
5 92 
For example, if he could not obtain Neapolis, then Cumae would suffice as his much- 
needed seaport. Did Hannibal's poor success with nearly all of his sieges indicate he had 
neither the patience, nor the manpower and logistics necessary for a prolonged siege or 
was there another reason all together? 
591 For more on the art of sieges during the 2 nd Punic War and the years leading up to it, see P. B. Kern, 
Ancient Siege Warfare (London, 1999), pages 251-285. A good account of Hannibal's false move on Rome 
can be found in E. BradforcL Hannibal. 153-161. 
592 Attempts at Neapolis, Livy, Ab Urbe Condit 23.1.5-10,14.5,15.1-6; and on Nola, Livy, Ab Urbe 
Condita. 23.15.7-17.1. 
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Certainly, he had good reason not to become encumbered in a siege unless the 
prospects were very good, as with Petelia, or the objective particularly important, as With 
Casilinum. Every time Hannibal approached a Roman-held city only to march away 
again, it affected a moral victory for the Romans. Certainly for the inhabitants and Iýr-) 
garrisons of these cities, it must have been an intimidating experience to have Hannibal's 
invincible army march up to their walls, and a correspondingly emboldening and 
exhilarating sensation to see them march away again after a skirmish or two. By the end 
of 216, although Rome's situation was grave, it was clear that Roman troops could hold a 
fortified city against Hannibal, and even sometimes do well in a skirmish, even if they 
dared not meet him in a pitched battle. 
Although evidence is scanty, which makes it difficult to generalize about 
Hannibal's tactics and stance on sieges, it is possible that the most obvious reason for his 
not pursuing a strategy of protracted sieges is that besieging a city hardly endeared the 
people to the Carthaginian cause and would appear diametrically opposed to the premise 
that he was merely the liberator of Italy from the clutches of Rome. 593 Livy singles out 
that by Hannibal's order the Locrians were extended peace terms with Carthage and 
594 
allowed to live by their own laws, with the harbour remaining under Locrian control . 
Another example shows Hannibal's attempt to keep Carthage from seeming the oppressor 
by keeping the wealthy city of Croton from being sacked by the Bruttians. 595 The 
Hellenistic world used the common slogan "freedom of the Greeks7' to justify military 
manoeuvrings and policies by claiming to be liberating the Greeks from foreign 
domination. But for the most part Hannibal's rhetoric may not be as much a sign that he 
593 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.58.3. 
ý19-1 Livy. Ab Urbe CondiM 24.1.1,13. 
595 Livv. Ab rbe Condita, 24,1.1-8. 
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regarded the Italians as oppressed by Rome so much as he was appealing to them in the 
same diplomatic conventions used in the ýGreek world. 596 Once Hannibal won over a city, 
he then had to be able to demonstrate that he could defend it. The local people who 
supported Hannibal would have much to fear if they thought there was a real possibility 
of Rome retaking the city and punishing them. It is clear from what information remains 
of Hannibal's manoeuvres after Cannae that his decisions were based on presenting 
himself as their liberator, rather than oppressor, and then keeping the Roman forces away 
from those states he has won over. 
Hannibal's March on Rome Compared to Jubal Early's March on Washington 
When Hannibal finally marched on Rome in 211 B. C., the consequences proved 
similar to the attack by the Confederate general Jubal Early on the Northern capital- In 
June and July 1864 General Early led an astoundingly daring attack on Washington, D. C., 
that proved psychologically disastrous for the Union. Early met little resistance in his 
march toward Washington, crushing a tiny federal force near the Monocacy River in July. 
Riding up from the Shenandoah Valley his corps of 14,000 men seized and destroyed 
property throughout Maryland, collecting more than $200,000 in ransom by threatening 
to bum the towns of Hagerstown and Frederick. Within two days, he stood less than five 
miles from the nation's capital; however, federal reinforcements arrived in time to 
prevent Early from capturing the city. When Hannibal executed a similar manoeuvre he 
gambled. if he threatened the capital, the consular armies would be forced to march to the 
aid of the city, thereby relieving Capua. As Hannibal marched toward Rome he 
devastated the farn-dands of Fregellae, and destroyed the bridges. Upon encamping eight 
miles from Rome in the region called Pupinia, the Numidian horsemen caught and killed 
596K. Lomas, Roman Italy, 338 B. C. - AD200 page 15. 
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any fugitives in their path. 597 Every able-bodied male hastened to man the walls and the 
citadel of Rome while the Senate met in order to direct the two newly formed legions in 
their defense of the city. Hannibal could not hope to break the enormous towers of Rome 
- all he could do was to ravage the countryside around the city, carrying off the crops and 
cattle while the Romans watched helplessly. 
, As Hannibal planned, Rome detached Fulvius ftom the armies besieging Capua 
and with a small force he marched back to Rome. Careful to avoid Hannibal, Fulvius 
entered the city, however, Hannibal crossed the Anio and drew up his forces for battle. 598 
With the full agreement of the Senate, Fulvius assembled his army outside the walls of 
the city to meet Hannibal. However, according to Livy, 
'4 a great downpour mingled with hall so confused both battle-lines that, holding 
on to their arms with difficulty, they returned to camp, fearing everything more 
than the enemy. And the following day, when the Imes were drawn up on the 
same spot, the same bad weather parted thern. On both days, when they had 
retired to their camps, to their astonislunent there came a clear sky with a calm. 
For the Carthaginians it became a solemn warning... ir)599 
Hannibal's move is particularly significant because he planned only to threaten, 
not to stage a full-scale attack. He marched on Rome for the strategic purpose of drawing 
the Roman army away from his most important ally in Italy. 600 He had no intention of 
597 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 26.10. 
598 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 26.10. 
599 Livv, Ab Urbe Cgndi4 26.11.2-4. -... imber ingens grandiiie mixtus ita ulmmque aciem turbavit ut vix 
arniis retentis in castra sese receperint, nullius rei ininore quam hostium metu. Et postero die eodem loco 
acies instructas eadern tempestas diremit; ubi recepissent se in castra, mira serenitas cum tranquilfitate 
oriebatur. In religionem ea res apud Poenos versa esL... " 
60'0 J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page 86. 
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attempting major confi7ontation with Rome on this occasion, but appeared before its walls 
only to draw away the besiegers of Capua. The destruction of Rome formed no part of 
Hannibal's plans. 601 He made no attempt to besiege the city or to storm it. The 
psychological effect on the citizens of Rome is still felt in the phrase, "Hannibal is at the 
es 51 . 
Hannibal's Second StrategY602 
The Romans, in spite of the defeats they had suffered at Trebia, Lake Trasimene, 
and Cannae did not sue for peace. Accordingly historians have made the assumption that 
neither Carthage, nor Hannibal had alternate plans for ending the war. Can our sources 
give us any indication this is not the case? It is without doubt unclear that Hannibal 
thought of "strategy" in terms of one continuous approach. Rather than accept the 
outward assumptions of those who were writing chronicles to the greatness of Rome, 
there may be reasons - constraints of genre, for example - that have prevented other 
historians from revealing a less traditional approach to this question. As I shall argue by 
examining the evidence fi7om a Carthaginian perspective we are offered the opportunity to 
introduce a new interpretation of his plans and the object of the study becomes an 
analysis of the ancient sources to present a new understanding of Hannibal's brilliance. 
601 IF Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page 86. 
60' This is a new way of viewing the events Hannibal was involved in and the actions he took in the 
aftennath of Cannae. Those sources which were used the most are: E. Bradford, Hannibal pages 120-125, 
H. Delbriick, Warfare in Antiqui , pages 338-40; T. A. Dodge, Hannibal, pages 381-529. Such thinking is 
not unique to Hannibal. Napoleon is another general who apparently lacked or changed his strategy. "Such 
empirical evidcnce, suggests that Napoleon's ambition was not driven by any over-arching 'master-plan' or 
'grand design'. present from the start and systematically worked out, but that it grew by an evoA, ing process 
or pragmatic opportunism. which eventually over-reached itself. " G. Ellis, NWleon, Profiles in Power 
ý(Harlow, 1997), pages 6-7. 
258 
As mentioned earlier the mark of a great general is his willingness to change his strategy 
to accommodate the situation. Sun Tzu articulated, "The general must rely on his ability 
to control the situation to his advantage as opportunity dictates. -), 
603 And although 
Hannibal's first strategy was not ill conceived it did not successfully bring the war to an 
end. For that reason, it is my assumption Hannibal changed his strategy at least three 
times to accomplish not the destruction of Rome, but to remove the limitations imposed 
on Carthage after the First War for "honour and power". 
604 
For Robert E. Lee the best time to offer to negotiate is when done *om a position 
of strength and for Hannibal the time could not have been better. Let us examine the 
circumstance Lee considered to be his strong point. With two recent victories, Virginia 
virtually fi7ee of Union troops, and his army marching into Maryland, Lee proposed to 
President Davis the time was ripe for the Confederacy to offer peace negotiations. Lee 
felt, "such a proposition coming from us at this time, could in no way be regarded as 
suing for peace; but, being made when it is in our power to inflict injury upon our 
adversary, would show conclusively to the world that our sole object is the establishment 
of our independence. ..,, 
605 The Utfion showed no interest in peace. For Hannibal the 
tinýng could not have been better for peace negotiations than after Cannae when he 
allowed ten Romans to leave for their city with Carthalo. Yet as we have discovered with 
Lee whatever his expectations, he must have been sorely disappointed. While Hannibal 
had hoped by his magnanimity Rome would press for peace instead the Roman Senate 
decided they would show no weakness. It was up to Hannibal to draw up a new plan for 
bfinging the war to a close. 
603 Sun Tzu, The krt of War. VII - 10 - 9. 
Ab Urbe Condita, 22.58,3. 
605 A. Kaltman. The Genius of Robert E. Lee, page 227. 
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When the Boii ambushed and killed the praetor and consul-elect L. Posturnius 
606 Albinus in 215/4 along with two legi ns in Cisalpine Gaul Hanni al must have taken to ib 
this as an opportunity to escalate the war and therefore changed his strategy. His own aim 
was to seize Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily,, while he gained control of Southern Italy. He 
determined that even a smaH Carthaginian force might have the opportunity to not only 
take control of Sardinia and Corsica, and yet again raise all Gaul into active hostility. This 
condition would be of vast assistance to the Carthaginian effort and may induce 
additional allies to join against Rome. Such a situation could prove brilliantly favourable 
for Hannibal. 607 When this was accomplished he thought the war would be over. 
Consequently he decided to hold on in Italy for an indefinite time. If he could 
press Carthage to not only continue support for his actions in Italy and Hasdrubal's 
dealings in Spain, but to support uprisings on the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, he could 
convince Philip of Macedon to add naval support to the Carthaginian cause. As Syracuse 
opened to Carthage, the Macedonians held the Roman fleet in check at Brundisium. if 
Philip could be persuaded to descend in force on the Italian coast, it might turn the scales 
against Rome. No other time could have been better than immediately after Cannae when 
Hannibal was at the height of his repute. Meanwhile he would wait for the opportunity to 
strike another major blow against Rome such as at Cannae. Hannibal's status as General 
afforded him with a great deal of influence over the Carthaginian senate, for it was the 
political leaders in Carthage, not Hannibal who fashioned many of the major decisions of 
the war. If the war spread, Rome would be forced to disperse their focus from Hannibal to 
a variety of other areas, thereby scattering the troop strength concentrated in Italy. 
606LiNi,,. Ab Urbe-CondiM 23.24.11-12 & IF LazenbN,. Hannibal's War pages 94-95. 
607 T. A. Dodge, Hanniba'l page 403. 
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Hannibal's actions forced Rome into a defensive mode in Italy with the following 
objectives: to hold the Pyrenees forestalling any reinforcements from reaching Hannibal, 
to head off the Macedonian army and prevent its reaching Italy; to keep up 
communications with Sicily and Sardinia; and to step up actions in Spain. In 214 the 
Roman Senate decided to carry on operations with eighteen legions, not including allied 
contingents. Two legions each were assigned to Cisalpine' Gaul, Sardinia, and Sicily. 
A . 
01 
Mier subtracting these legions, no fewer than twelve legions remained on hand in Italy. 
Assuming the usual equal allied contingent, the Romans intended to mobilize 100,000 
men, a force approximately five times the size of Hannibal's army -a serious 
development. Moreover, the fleet numbers amounted to 150 vessels, not including forces 
engaged in Spain. 608 That is about double the number of Roman citizens available at 
Cannae. And Spain became Rome's key to success as will be discussed later in this 
chapter. In order to face expenses for the war the Senate doubled the rate of tax, causing 
continued problems in Sicily and Sardinia. 609 
A Sardinian delegation succeeded in persuading the Carthaginian government the 
island was willing and ready to revolt. Accordingly, the senate jumped at the opportunity 
for a Carthaginian victory in Sardinia would have been a strategic move: the Romans 
would have been out an army, and would have had to either send another - reducing their 
strength in Italy - or abandon Sardinia to Carthage. If Rome abandoned Sardinia, not only 
would it be a psychological and political gain for Carthage, but also would secure a 
much-needed base for naval operations. As previously noted, oared warships were highly 
dependent on bases- Sardinia provided a 11 suitable site for operations against Italy, 
60" Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.11.2-5. 
609 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.13.1. 
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particularly nearby Latium, for interdiction of Roman communications with their forces 
in Spain. Spain held a key threat to the safety of the homeland of Carthage. 
With the retirement of Aulus Cornelius,, as wefl as the Sardinians' increased 
restiveness due to increased taxes and requisitions of grain by Rome pressed the 
Carthaginians to send an expeditionary force to Sardinia. Carthage dispatched a fleet 
under the command of Hasdrubal the Bald, but it was forced to the Balearic Islands by 
bad weather . 
6'0 Due to the delay, Rome had enough time to reinforce their troops with a 
second legion of 22,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry under the command of Manlius 
Torquatus. 611 Manlius swiftly defeated Hasdrubal the Bald upon his belated arrived and 
the rebellion collapsed. 612 In two battles Manlius utterly overthrew the Carthaginians. 
With 5,000 men killed and captured, Rome again subjugated the island. Although the 
disastrous actions in Sardinia did not re-secure the island for Carthage, Octacihus" 
au absence from his base at Lilybaeurn enabled a Carthaginian fleet commanded by 
Botnilcar to slip safely through to Locri in southern Italy with troops, elephants, and 
supplies for Hannibal's army. 613 Although Bomilcar reached Italy, he did not bring the 
number of forces Mago had raised. 
614 
In a letter addressed. to the Carthaginian senate, Hannibal convincingly pushed for 
Carthage to re-conquer the island of Sicily. If the Carthaginians were to re-establish 
themselves in Sicily, its ports would allow them to support his army in Italy far more 
closely. The death of Hiero of Syracuse set in motion a series of events that might have 
61 0 Livy, Ab Urbe CýnAta, 23.32.8-12; 34.16-17 & IF Lazenby, Hannibal's %ar, page 97. 
61 1 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.34.10-15. 
612 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.40-41.7. 
613 Livy. AbUrbeCondi 23.41.10&J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page, 98. 
614 Livy. Ab Urbe Condilia, 23.32.11. 
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worked greatly to Carthage's advantage. Hiero, had been a reliable ally of Rome; the 
Roman connection helped preserve general peace in Sicily, as well as his own hold on 
power. With his death, Sicilot Greek politics briefly resumed its traditional turbulence and 
after a short treaty with Rome, Syracuse again allied with Carthage and declared war on 
Rome. 615 Many cities in Sicily followed by declaring war on Rome and with these 
defections the problem of manning the Roman fleet worsened for it was from these towns 
in Sicily that the soch navales were drawn. 616 This situation combined with Marcellus' 
ill-timed ruthlessness at Henna and Carthaginian ambitions to restore their position in 
Sicily, created a new front in the war. 
As with the Carthaginian attempt to support an uprising in Sardinia in 215, this 
larger show of support for the anti-Roman rebellion in Sicily appears to have been guided 
by politics as well as strategic considerations. Livy indicates Rome used Sicily repeatedly 
6 17 
as a way station for the Roman navy's war and attack on Africa. While the best use of 
the 281,000 troops sent to Sicily may have been in Italy under Hannibal's leadership, the 
return of Sicily to Carthaginian control would provide a strategic and logistical base from 
which operations in Italy could be supported far more effectively than directly from 
Carthage, or from any alternative staging base suých as Sardinia or Spain. As the war 
exploded in Sicily, Hannibal never failed to realize how important to his cause could be a 
Carthaginian triumph in Sicily. 
Precisely because of its strategic value, the Romans could hardly abandon Sicily 
without a major struggle, stretching their resources both in manpower and financially, 
Even if the Carthaginians could secure only part of the island, that portion would still 
61 5 T. A. Dodge, ILaRgibal, page 442. 
616 J. F. Lazenby. Hannibal's- War, page 170. 
617 Livv. Ab Urbe Cýondill 29.35.3-5. 
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serve as a staging base, opening an opportunity previously lacking for some sort of 
coordinated action. In short, from Hannibal's point of view, a Carthaginian campaign in 
Sicily was a sound strategic initiative. 
in fact the struggle for Syracuse was crucial and much more important to 
Hannibal's success than Capua . 
61 8 The main event in Sicily had been I-Eeronymus' 
declaration for the Carthaginians - only to be almost immediately murdered by the pro- 
D- 
Roman party. This in its turn provoked the Syracusans who favoured Carthage to kill 
and/or expel the rich merchants and others who favoured Rome. The popular party in its 
hatred of those who had grown wealthy through their Roman connections favoured 
Hannibal. The poor and dispossessed saw him as the leader who would free them from 
the heavy hand of Rome, but also as the leader who would not be concerned as to how 
they governed their cities. It is interesting to see this despotic warlord welcomed by the 
plebians. 
By persisting in the prolonged siege of Syracuse the Romans were kept in a firm 
grip for nearly two years by commitments in Sicily. Marcellus commenced operations 
against Syracuse in 213 with an all-out assault by land and sea . 
619 Archimedes ingenious 
machines designed to hurl stones and other missiles to various ranges, caused severe 
casualties as the Roman ships approached. He also designed beams intended to swing 
over the walls and drop lumps of lead onto the sambucae, which seized the prows of the 
ships lifting them into the air . 
620 Archimedes' efforts forced the Romans to set siege to the 
618 J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page 115. 
619 polybiUS, The -liStoriCS, 8.3.2; F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommenLary on Polybius, Vol. H, page 70 & 
IF Lazenby, Hannibal's War, pages 106-107. 
620 polybiUS. The Histories, 8.4-6.6 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentq! j on Polybius Vol. 11, pages 
71-77. 
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city to force its capitulation through starvation rather than by direct assault. The only 
hope for the Syracusans lay in the Carthaginian fleet, which could get supplies into the 
beleaguered CIty. 121 
Unfortunately for Syracuse, this did not happen. The Carthaginian navy made a 
genuine effort although Rome's fleet was twice the size of Carthage's, with 100 Roman 
warships operating near SiCily. 
622 Botnilcar was back in 212 B. C. with 90 ships leaving 
55 to help the Syracusans. 623 After an outbreak of disease in Syracuse, Bornilcar returned 
to Carthage with 130 warships, escorting 700 merchant vessels loaded with SUPPI, eS. 
624 If 
Bomilcar won Syracuse would receive these much-needed supplies and if his victory was 
decisive, he could, perhaps, recover Sicily for Carthage. But when he saw the Roman 
fleet bearing down on him, "Bomilcar, alarmed by something unforeseen, made sail for 
open water, and after sending messengers to Heraclea to command the transports to return 
thence to Affica, he himself sailed along the coast of Sicily and made for Tarentum. , 625 
Epicydes, seeing the Carthaginians sail away, gave up hope and when the news reached 
the Sicilian troops gathering near Syracuse, they submitted to Rome. 626 
A r%piUS Claudius remained in command of the city's blockade with two-thirds of , -LF 
the Roman forces while Marceflus took the remaining troops to try to recover the other 
621 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi it, a 24.36.3. 
622 Polybius, The Histories 8.15, F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommegIM on Polybius, Vol. U, pages 93- 
94 & Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.27.5. 
623 Livy, Ab Urbe ýondita, 25.25.11. 
624 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 25.27.2-4. 
625Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 25.27.12. "... Bomilcar vela in altum dedit missisque nuntiis Heraclealn qui 
onerarias retro inde Afticarn repetere iuberent, ipse Siciliain practervectus Tarentum petit. - & IF Lazenby, 
liballs War. page 118. 
626 Livy. Ab Urbe Condita, 25.31.9-10. See also, G. P. Baker, Hannibal pages 173-195. 
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towns in Sicily, which had gone over to Carthage. 627 Syracuse fell towards the end of 212 
and although some Carthaginian forces remained in Sicily, they were of no 
consequence. 
628 
In 209 Rome dispatched thirty ships from Sicily to support Fabius in Tarentum 
and Laevinus retained seventy ships to protect the island due to rumours of Carthaginian 
naval preparations against Sicily. 629 Further speculations caused the Roman Senate to 
increase the number of warships commissioned in 208 B. C. to 281, restoring the Sicilian 
fleet to 100 warships commanded by Laevinus off Clupea in the largest naval battle of the 
2 nd Roman War 
. 
63" The Romans captured eighteen ships, leaving Laevinus to raid Utica 
and Carthage on his way back to Sicily. On the return trip he encountered seventy 
f Ur. 
63 Carthaginian ships, capturing seventeen and sinking 01 Livy asserts, "from then on 
the sea became safe, enemy ships having been driven off it, and great supplies of corn 
,, 632 were brought to Rome. However, these successes led to Rome's complacency and 
633 
they reduced their naval contingent at Sicily to thirty ships in 206 , resulting in 
reinforcement reaching Mago. 634 Although success in Sicily might not have brought 
victory, it would have further enforced a sense of confidence amongst the Roman allies if 
627 Polybius, The Histories,, 8.7.12 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommentM on Polybius, Vol. H, page 
78 
118 For a good sununary of the events concerning Sicily see E. Bradford, , pages 147-152. 
629 Livy, Ab Urbe Co 27.7.15-16; 8.17. 
630 Livy" Ab Urbe Cgn Ata, 27.22.9. 
631 Livy. Ab Urbe Condita, 27.29.7-8, 
632 'Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 28.4.7. "Tuto inde mari pulsis hostium navibus magni conmeatus frumenti 
Rlxovmam subvecti. " 
633 Livyý Ab Urbe Condita, 28.10.16. 
634J. F. Lazenby. Hannibal's War, page 197. 
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the lines of influence could be brought back to that of before 270 B. C. and Rome's 
conquest of southern Italy. 
635 
Hannibal Divides His Army 
Following the Roman catastrophe at Cannae, Hannibal's attempt to pick up where 
Pyrrhus had left off, now appeared to be coming to fruition. He admired Pyrrhus and 
knew of his campaigns against the Romans in southern Italy sixty years previously. 
According to Livy, Pyrrhus, Hannibal stated, was so well versed in the art of winning 
over people that the Italian states would rather be governed by him, a foreign king, than 
636 by the Romans., even though they had long been under Roman control. Hannibal based 
his assumptions on his knowledge that Pyffhus was not only invited by the Tarentines to 
command the war against Rome, but on behalf of many of the Italian states- the 
Lucanians, the Samnites, the Etruscans, the Messapil, and possibly the Bruttians joined in 
the appeal to Pyrrhus for help against Rome. They went so far as to assure Pyrrhus that 
his arrival would spark off a general uprising among the Italian cities. Plutarch 
specifically states the Tarentines guaranteed that Pyrrhus would have at his disposition an 
allied army of 350,000 infantry, and 20,000 cavalry"... gathered from Lucania, Messapia, 
Samnium, and Tarentum... ),, 
637 
It appears on this first invitation Pyrrhus rejected the request from Tarentum and 
only relented when they begged him to hurry to their rescue. Hannibal reasoned he would 
receive no less a warm reception from the Tarentines; however, he must have been aware 
Pyrrhus had been surprised and deeply disappointed upon his arrival to find the 
635 J. F. Lazenby, 
-Hannibal's 
War, page 115. 
636 Livy, Ab Urbe. Condita. 3 5.14.9 & S. Lanccl, Hannibal, pagcs 110- 111. 
63- Plumch, Pamilel Lives. Pvrrhus, 13.6. 
1.1 I)nOLpý, -OUal ýL"(Xkat nOCPU TF. AFuic(xxO)V KOU 
MECT(TOMMOV KOU F, (Xt)VtTO)V KOU ToLpocvrtvo)v... " 
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Tarentines had made no serious arrangements at all. Not only was the army of 350,000 
men non-existent, there had been no concerted effort to co-ordinate the efforts of the 
enemies of Rome. 
Not content to rely on the dependability of internal support, Hannibal for the first 
time makes a decision to dividýe his army. After first establishing a base at Compsa, he 
entrusted a portion of his army to his brother Mago, with the mission to go south and to 
bring the Greek cities along the coast into submission through whatever means'necessary, 
49 
and ordered Mago either to take over such cities of that region as were deserting the 
Romans or to compel them to desert in case they refused. , 638 While Mago began his 
march through southern Italy Hannibal led the main force of his army through Campania 
to Neapolis in hopes of obtaining a seaport, and thereby opening communications with 
Carthage, 
Although the control of the Italian states by Pyrrhus had been short lived, 
Hannibal - unlike Pyrrhus - was not acting for his own personal gain and could therefore 
hope to be better received politically. flis invitation into the land of the Hirpini resulted in 
Compsa, being immediately turned over to him without resistance, 639 and he subsequently 
receiVed alliances with the regions of Lucania and Bruttium, and much of Samnium and 
Ahpulia. 
A 01. 
After the battle of Cannae and the capture and plunder of the cwnps, Hannibal 
had moved at once out of Apulia into Sanuuum,, being invited into the land of the 
Hirpini by Statius Trebius, who promised that he would tum over Compsa to 
him... After the news of the battle of Cannac, and when the coming of Hannibal 
638Li%-v, Ab rbe Condita, 23.1.4. "exercitu partito Magonem regi()nis eiUS urbes aut deficielltis ab 
D- Romanis accipere aut detractantis cogere ad defectionem jubet,..., - 
639 Livy, Ad Urbe Condita, 23.13, 
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had been made known by utterances of Trebius, since the Mopsil had left the city, 
it was handed over to the Carthaginians without resistance and a garrison 
admitted. "640 
The indication that Hannibal moved into Samnium "at once, " and in response to 
Statius' invitation, suggests that Hannibal may have been in contact with Statius, and 
perhaps with other disaffected figures among the affied states. If this is the case, his 
decision to continue pursuing his politico-military strategy may have been based on 
specific prior indications that disaffected elements in some cities were ready to come over 
once he defeated the Roman field army. This point is crucial. The Italian allies had even 
longer experience of Roman determination than Hannibal. So long as Roman anfffies 
remained at hand, rebellion continued to be a risky prospect; no one could be certain that 
in the next battle the Romans would not prevail against Hannibal as they had so often 
against other enemies in the past. In contrast, after Cannae, the Romans were reduced to a C) 
purely defensive posture. The risk of rebellion eliminated, at least for the time being; 
moreover, in the face of three crushing defeats in a row at Hannibal's hands, the prospects 
of the Romans rallying to overcome him in the foreseeable future appeared slim. 
Disaffected elements throughout southern Italy may have made it clear to Hannibal that 
once he disposed of the Roman army, they would be ready to act. 
In order to continue the momentum for his offensive operation against the Roman 
army while he garrisoned men to protect any defecting allies, it became clear Hannibal 
needed reinforcements. As mentioned previously, the Carthaginian senate held the key to 
640 Lvvy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.1.1 & 3. "Hannibal post Cannensem pugnam castraque capta ac direpta 
confestim ex Apulia in Sanuiium moverat, accitus in Hirpinos a Statio Trebio pollicente se Compsam 
traditunun... Post famam Cannensis pugnae volgatunique Trebi sennonibus adventum Hannibalis cuni 
Mopsiani urbe excessisscnt, sine cenamine tradita urbs Poeno praesidiumque acceptum esL" 
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conscripted troops and mercenaries ftom Africa and Spain. Without the senate's support 
Hannibal had to rely only on those allies he had made along the way in Gaul and Italy for 
manpower. If Carthage continued to maintain its defensive stance, these much-needed 
additional forces would be sent to Spain to protect Carthaginian interests there rather than 
to supplement his initiatives in Italy. Realizing only a first-hand persuasive plea to the 
senate n-ýight achieve his purpose, Hannibal sent his younger brother Mago directly to 
Carthage. 
While it is not viable to establish the validity of Livy's set-piece speeches between 
Mago and Hanno, it is undoubtedly clear there were major differences of opinion between 
the two factions controlling the senate. According to Livy when Mago addresses the 
Carthaginian senate in late summer 216, to emphasize the scale of Hannibal's victory 
, q(yainst the Roman arrynes at Cannae and as a more visual demonstration he pours onto 4-: ) 1ý 
the floor of the senate the mass of golden rings taken from the hands of dead or captured 
D- 
Romans of the equestrian class; "... when measured, they filled as some historians assert, 
three pecks and a half -)ý)641 Only then does Mago make Hannibal's request for support 
including the need for "... reinforcements ... money to pay them 
[the troops], and grain. , 642 
It is obvious Hannibal understood that perception was occasionally more 
important than reality. Good leaders pay as much attention to how their actions are 
perceived as they do to what they have accomplished. Robert E. Lee demonstrated his 
belief in perception after the battle of Antietam [Sharpsburg]. On September 11ýh the 
Confederates lost over 10,000 men. All of Lee's officers favoured an immediate retreat; 
however, Lee wanting to search for stragglers and move his wounded men, decided to 
stay put. flis decision- if McCleflan wants to fight the foflowing morning, so be it. 
641 Livy, Ab UrbeCondita, 23.12.2. ". -. 
fama tenuit, quae propior vero est, haud plus fuisse modio. -' 
642 Livyý Ab Urbe Condita, 23.12.5 . .... nüttendam in stipendiuln pecunialn frulnentwnque... 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McClellan had no interest or intention in fighting the following days as he concluded, 
"... the success of an attack on the 18 
th 
was not certain. , 
643 Lee reported to President 
Davis that he withdrew after nightfall on the 18fl' after "... finding the enemy indisposed to 
make an attack. 7. )644 Lee's first invasion of the North had ended in failure, but, by refusing 
to accept Lee's challenge to renew the battle, McClellan gave the Confederates the 
"perception" of at least a partial victory. General Lee issued the following to his army- 
"On the field of Sharpsburg, with less than one-diird his numbers, you resisted 
from daylight until dark the whole army of the enemy, and repulsed every 
attack ... 
The whole of the following you stood prepared to resume the conflict on 
the same ground, and retired next morning without molestation across the 
Potomac 
... 
flistory records fewer examples of greater fortitude and endurance 
than this army has exhibited, and I am comnussioned by the President to thank 
you In the name of the Confederate States for the undying fame you have 
won. ý--645 
In spite of the successive Roman disasters, and the spreading revolt in southern 
Italy, none of the Latins had broken away', and there had been no sign of disaffection or 
defeatism in Rome itself. So long as the Romans and their Latin co-ethnics held fast, 
D- 
-Rome still 
had a vast pool of manpower to drawn on, and plainly their defeats to date had 
not driven the Romans to sue for peace - the rejection of the prisoner ransom being at 
least in part an implicit rejection in advance of any settlement offer. The I" Roman War - 
as Hanno goes on to observe - gave ample evidence of Roman resilience even in the face 
643 A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robert E. Lee, page 232. 
644 A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robert E. Lee, page 232, 
645 A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robert E. Lee page 233. 
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of disastrous setbacks. 646 Again, Livy set the scene to show that Hannibal had not 
effectively accomplished these events by using Hanno as the voice of reason, "Therefore, 
we have the war intact, as truly as we had on the day on which Hannibal crossed into 
Italy. "647 But under the circumstances, this argued precisely in favour of sending the 
reinforcements Mago, sought. Whatever Hanno, thought of the war policy, Carthage was 
now drawn in far too deeply to do anything other than press forward, and there could 
hardly be a better time to do so. 
However as with Lee the perception Mago presented with the mass of golden 
rings proved far more influential than what Hannibal had actually accomplished. The 
Carthaginian senate voted to send 4,000 Nurnidians and 40 elephants to Hannibal, along 
with a large amount of money, as well as further money to hire reinforcements in 
Spain. 648 In the spring of 215 to the first reinforcements would be added a second more 
substantial number: 12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 20 elephants, and 60 warships, which 
Mago would direct to Italy. 
649 
While Mago remained in Carthage the absence of an efficient seaport in Italy 
continued to upset Hannibal's entire operation. Although he must have had little 
expectation that Neapolis would capitulate, he used a perfect exercise in intimidation 
tactics against the Neapolitans. Upon arrival he divided a force of Numidians, ordering 
one group to make a display of captured booty before the walls of the city while he placed 
the others in wnbush positions. If the Neapolitans were not swayed by the initial display 
646 Livy. Ab Urbe Condita 23.13. 
647 Livy, Ab Urbe Co 23.12.15-13.2. - 'Cum id quoque negasset, 'Bellum igitur, inquit tam integnIm 
habemus quam habui mus qua die Hannibal in Italiam est transgressus. 1- 
648 Li-v N'. Ab Urbe Condita, 23.13. 
649 Li-vyý Ab Urbe Condi 23.32.5-6. 
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of plunder, they rnight be by the defeat of their cavalry. When a body of the Neapolitan 
cavalry ventured outside the walls of the city against the visible Numidians, - Hannibal 
ordered their ambush by the rest. 650 Even so their defeat did not produce the expected 
result: the Neapolitans held firm. Having no desire to become bogged down in a siege 
attempt, Hannibal chose to decline. He certainly had no reason to attempt a siege against 
a purely secondary objective such as Neapolis when he had rejected that option against 
the city of Rome itself. 
His failure to secure a seaport certainly set back his plans for the arrival of 
reinforcements from Carthage. Therefore, having gained the defection of Capua and other 
cities, Hannibal again made an effort to secure Neapolis as a landing, - point for 
Carthaginian assistance. 651 Yet again, they showed no more dispositions to defect from 
the Roman alliance than on his first approach. The situation probably would have been 
very different if a Carthaginian flea carrying a reinforcing army had appeared off the 
harbour of Neapolis at any point during this phase of the campaign. No such fleet 
appeared. It was not until the following year that Carthage assembled the second of the 
expeditionary forces promised to Mago with the intent of reinforcing Hannibal. A 
combination of setbacks in Spain and potential opportunities in Sardinia arose, causing a 
redirection in the priorities by the Senate to negate their promises to Mago and the force 
was sent to Spain instead. 652 As a result Hannibal remained on his own resources. 
Hannibal depended entirely on Carthaginian readiness to take energetic action at 
sea. The previous Carthaginian raids against Italy had been feeble attempts, turning back 
almost at the first sight of a Roman fleet. But Cannae potentially changed the naval 
65() Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.21. 
651 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.14-15. 
652 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.32. 
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situation almost as dramatically as it changed the situation on land. As noted in the 
previous chapter, after the battle, the Romans reassigned large numbers of marines to 
653 their depleted land army. As many as fifty quinqueremes must have been stripped of 
troops and rendered useless for service or a larger number drawn down, with their 
fighting value severely impaired. The opportunity was certainly open for Carthage to send 
an expeditionary force, which the Romans would have found much harder to block at sea. 
Hannibal indeed took measures to encourage them to do so. With Rome contained north 
of Campania they could no longer benefit from the fleet's valuable relay points - the 
ports of Puteoli and Neapolis on the Tyrrhenian Sea, Rhegium in the Straits of Messina, 
Brundisium and Tarentum on the Adriatic. 
The Alliance with Capua 
Hannibal ventured north to Capua in 215, where although the ruling classes 
resisted his overtures, he knew the plebians remained in a state of unrest since Rome's 
defeat at Lake Trasimene. Because the Capuan nobility was linked to Rome through 
intermarriage, 654 Carthage held 300 of their sons who had served Rome in Sicily as 
hostage 
. 
655 The political machinations of the local ruler Pacuvius Calavius, the son-in-law 
of Ap. Claudius Pulcher and the father-in-law of M. Livius Salinator, consul for the year 
656 219, resolved this situation, By persuading the people's assembly that when the new 
elections were held they could choose no better representation, he sealed his authority on 
the forcible reconciliation of both sides, allowing him to procure a settlement with 
653 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.57. 
65' Note the importance of the family links between Capuan elite and Roman Senators - an increasing 
phenomenon. 
65 5 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita. 23.4.8. 
656 Livy, Ab Urbc Condi 23.2; and notc I on page 
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657 In the wake of Cannae defection firom Rome was npe, however, under 
pressure from the families who were the most pledged to Rome, they sent a delegation to 
the surviving consul, Varro, seeking Rome's assistance. 
Varro told the delegates quite bluntly that with the Roman armies in their present 
state they could no longer rely on any other than their own forces if they were to avoid 
Ming into the hands of the Carthaginian forces. 
" 'For what has been left to us at Cannae, so that, as if we had something, we 
may wish what is lacking to be made up by the allies? Are we to requisition 
infantry from you, as though we had cavalry? Are we to say that money is 
lacking, as if that alone were lacking? Nothing has fortune left us, even to 
supplement. Legions, cavalry, arms, standards, horses and men, money and 
supplies have vamshed either in the battle or in the loss of two camps the next 
day. And so you, Campanians, have not to help us In war, but almost to undertake 
A- - Stead. -""658 Ene war M our 
The Capuans only heard Varro's admission of Rome's powerlessness, causing 
these same delegates to seek out Hannibal. They, 
"... made an alliance with him on these terms: that no general or magistrate of the 
Carthaginians should have any authority over a Campanian citizen, and that no 
657 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita. 23.3. 
658 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 23.5.5-7. " 'Quid enim nobis ad Cannas relicturn est, ut, quasi aliquid habcatnLn, 
id quod deest expleri ab sociis velimus? Pedites vobis imperemus, taniquan, equites habeamus? pecuniam 
deesse dicamus. taniquam ea tantuni desit9 Nihil, ne quod suppleremus qwdem, nobis rehquit fortuna. 
Legionm equitatus, arma. sugns, equi -Orique. pecuilia, com-meatus aut in acie aut binis postero die amissis 
castris perierunt. itaque non iuvetis nos in bello oportet, Campani, sed paene bellum pro nobis suscipiatis. "' 
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Campanian citizen should be a soldier or perform any service against his will; 
5-, 659 that Capua should have its own laws, its own magistrates;... 
Capua had no reason to rebel against Rome only to be ruled by either Hannibal or 
Carthage; in turn Hannibal had no interest in establishing a Carthaginian empire in Italy - 
only in overturning that of Rome. The same may be said of the provision that no 
Carthaginian civil magistrate should have authority over Campanian citizens. The 
military provisions were problematic however. Carthaginian generals - including 
Hannibal - were barred fi7om having any authority over Campanians in the field, 
precluding unified command of any allied army. The very existence of an allied army was 
placed in doubt, since if "no Campanian citizen should be a soldier ... against his 
Will,,, 
660 
this provision ruled out a military draft. Presumably it did not bar the Capuan authorities 
from drafting their own citizens, but they made no commitment to do so; and certainly no 
commitment was made to put an army at Hannibal's disposal. In short, the terms of the 
"alliance" allowed Capua to enjoy the full fruits of Hannibal's successes against Rome 
plus his protection, but did not obligate positive support for their common cause. Capua 
became something more than a friendly neutral, but less than an active ally. Strategically, 
apart from its value as a secure base, the "affiance" with Capua operated only in the 
negative sense; the manpower resources of Capua and Campania were subtracted from 
those available to Rome., without being added to those available to Hannibal. 
The agreement with Capua set an implicit precedent; having agreed to terms with 
Capua that offered him less that active support in the war effort, Hannibal could not 
659LiN-v, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.7.1-2. "... pacemque cum co bis condicionibus fecerunt, ne quis imperator 
inagitratusve Poenomm ius ullum in civem Campanum haberet, neve civis Campanus invitus militaret 
muniisve faceret, ut suae leges, sui magistratus Capuae essent;... " 
6'50 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.7.1-2. 
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expect other cities who broke away from Rome to offer him more. If excessive demands 
on Hannibal's part dissuaded the Capuans from making a breach with Rome, other cities 
might follow their negative example. Hannibal would be left scarcely better off than he 
had been after Lake Trasimene, with only the district around Compsa as a base, no 
significant erosion in the overall Roman political position, and little prospect of recruiting 
enough soldiers to make good the attrition of campaigning, 
If Hannibal accepted the Capuan semi-alliance, even on the less than satisfactory 
terms offered, their rebeRion might weU trigger a wave of further defections from Rome. 
The Romans would then be compelled to use whatever strength they recovered to try and 
quell the rebellions. And, any city attacked by the Romans would necessarily become a de 
facto military ally of Hannibal, even in the absence of any agreement to that effect. 
Hannibal might then be able to let the Italian rebels bear the main brunt of the war, 
employing his own army as a strategic reserve, marching to the support of rebel cities, 
who found themselves particularly hard-pressed. Some such calculation - the combined 
effect of sheer necessity, the prospect of triggering a domino effect of defections from 
Rome, and perhaps the continuing hope of direct support from Carthage - must have 
underlain Hannibal's acceptance of the limited Capuan offer. 
To seal the agreement, Hannibal sent a garrison to occupy and protect Capua. 
Although severely restraining his future options, in the long run the agreement proved 
much worse for Capua than for Hannibal. In seeking to enjoy his protection with minimal 
effort on their part, they did nothing to ensure victory, however, they would still bear the 
full brunt of defeat if the war should turn in favour of Rome. 
In the aftermath of Cannae, there must have been a real concern among the 
Romans and their remaining allies whether Roman troops could challenge Hannibal's 
under any conditions. If they could not, the Roman political collapse might have become 
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uncontrollable. As it was,, Roman capabilities were so depleted that they could offer no 
support to many allies, and Hannibal was able to gain some without a battle. 661 
Hannibal Continues to Solidify His Base in Southern Italy 
A ifl 
Auer securing Capua as a base, Hannibal moved in the direction of the coast. 
Instead of moving north into Umbria, Hannibal moved south. He did not think he needed 
to go into the North because he already had most of the Gauls as allies, plus the Etruscans 
and Umbrians would not have wanted battles fought on their own territory. They would 
have been more upset by the devastation to their land than he could possibly have gained 
in allies. In addition the political situation in Nola potentially favoured Hannibal; as 
described by Livy, "The senate and especially its leading members stood loyally by the 
alliance with Rome. But the common people, as usual, were all for a change of 
-)-)662 government and for Hannibal... Livy presents a picture of fierce factionalism in most 
of the cities of southern Italy between those who wished to dominate the state and the 
established political elite. Flis claim that in the majority of the cities it was the poorer 
classes, which favoured rebellion against Rome and the wealthier citizens who hoped to 
preserve their alliance, is more than likely influenced by his lack of sympathy for 
politicians who relied on the common masses for support. Stifl, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that the leaders wishing to remove the existing elite were the most likely to 
661 Further pertinent information on the aRiance with Capua can be found in Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The 
Struggle for Power in the Mediterranean, pages 218-222 & 243-248; E. Bradford, Hannibal pages 126-131 
T. A. Dodge, Hannibal. pages 476-492. 
662Livy, Ab Urbc Condita, 23.14.7. "Senatus ac maximc pnmores eius in societate Romana cum fide 
perstare-, piebs novamm, ut solet. rerum atque Hannibalis tota esse... " 
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appeal for popular support, and also to favour an agreement with Carthage. 
663 The actual 
divisions in Nola were somewhat more complex, and the same was very probably true in 
other cities as well. 
The cities of the Hellenized south of Italy, having a long history of resistance to 
Roman subjugation and having a powerful non-Latin regional sense of identity, were far 
more vulnerable to Hannibal's overtures than the central core of Latins and loyal Italian. 
In Livy's description of the defection of the Greek cities of Locri, Croton, and Tarenturn 
he stresses the strong network of local contacts and alliances who were independent of 
D- as well as a high level of internal political conflict and instability 
664 It 
Rome, is clear 
Hannibal provided the opportunity and impetus for internal political dissention. within 
these cities to crystallize. For example, at Capua, though Pacavius Calvius had close 
kinship ties with the Roman nobility, he used Hannibal as an opportunity to bring his 
faction into power through an advantageous treaty with Carthage. 665 At Croton, Hannibal 
exploited the long-standing animosities between the Greeks and their Bruttian neighbours 
to persuade the city to secede to Carthage. And there is a clear indication by Livy that the 
defection of Croton led to the events at Loch. 
666 
Upon the Nolan senate's request for support, Rome sent a detachment under the 
praetor Claudius Marcýellus, causing Hannibal to turn temporarily aside and attack 
663 For the desire of the poorcr classes for change and the loyalty of the aristocracy to Rome see Livy, 
3.14.7-12,24.13.8-, 24.2.8-11; For examples of aristocratic leaders forcing defection see Livy, 23.30.8; 
24.47.6. 
664 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.1.1-3; 25.8.3 -13.10; 25.15.2-5. 
66-% Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23,1,1-4. 
666 K. Lonias, Roman Italy, 336 B. C, - AD 200, pages 24-26. 
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Nucera. With no hope of holding out, the entire population of Nucera abandoned the 
town, leaving it open for Hannibal's troops to plunder. 667 
Abandoning the siege of Nola as unprofitable - he plainly could no longer count 
on internal disaffection to deliver over the city - Hannibal moved on to Acerrae. Here the 
population, or at least the upper classes, simply abandoned the city, as at Nucera, 
allowing Hannibal another opportunity to plunder. 668 When town of Petelia appealed to 
D- 
Rome for help, the Romans sent word they could offer none, and in effect told the 
Petchans their surrender would not be held against them. Petelia attempted to hold out 
and did so successfully for some months, largely because Hannibal was too committed to 
other operations to deal With it at once, however the next year it fell to hiM. 
669 
Returning again to Nola, Ham-fibal hoped that in spite of the Roman, garnson in 
place, internal political divisions might deliver the city to him. Livy's subsequent story 
portrays the nature of the political and personal dynamics operating in cities across 
southern Italy. Marcellus held on in Nola 
not more by confidence In his force than by the good-will of the leading 
citizens. He was apprehensive of the common people and above all of Lucius 
Bantius, who was impelled by the consciousness of an attempted revolt and by 
fear of the Roman practor, now to betray his native city, now, if fortune should 
not favour him in that, to desert. -, 
670 
667 Livv. Ab Urbe Coqchta, 23.15. 
'%" Livye Ab Urbe Condita, 23.17. 
4itg, 23.30. 669 Livy, Ab >rbe Cgn 
670 Livy, Ab Urbe_Condita, 23.15-7. "... non sui magis fiducia pracsidii quam voluntate principum habebat; 
plebs timebatur et ante omnis L. Bantius, quem. conscientia temptatae defectiOrlis ac metus a praetore 
Romano nunc ad proditionem patriae, nimc, si ad id fortuna. defuisset, ad transfugiendum stimulabat. - 
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Bantius, most certainly not a commoner, is described as "... a young man of spirit 
and at that time almost the best-known horseman among the allies, ""' hence presumably 
an aristocrat, the equivalent at least of equestrian rank. After being wounded while 
serving with the Roman allied cavalry at Cannae, he had been well treated and sent home 
by Hannibal. Hannibal's intent, as with his lenient treatment of allied war prisoners in 
general, was precisely to create potential foci of rebellion against Rome. Such foci might 
well be disaffected nobles rather than commoners; indeed, it would be nobles, whether or 
not as leaders of populist factions, who would be in the best position to foment a 
rebellion. 
Marcellus correctly assessed Bantius' disaffection as due to personal ambition 
and restlessness rather than to either anti-Roman or populist sentiments. 
since he had either to be restrained by pumshment or else won over by 
kindness,, Marcellus preferred rather to gain for himself a brave and energetic ally 
than merely to take such a man away from the enemy, and summoning him 
addressed him Idndly... " Under me you wifi have every advancement and every 
reward, and the more constantly you are with me, the more you will feel that it is 
a distinction and an advantage to you. ' The youth was delighted with the 
promises, and Marcellus gave him a fine horse and ordered the quaestor to pay 
him five hundred denarii. The lictors were bidden to allow him access to the 
commander whenever he wishod. "672 
671 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 23.15.8. "Erat iuvenis acer et sociorum ea tempestate prope nobilissünus eques.  
672 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.15.10 & 14-15. "Cetenim cum aut poena cobibendus esset aut beneficio 
conciliandus, sibi adsunipsisse quam hosti aden-tisse fortem ac strenuum maluit socium, accitumque ad se 
benigne appellat: .. - apud me tibi omnis 
honos atque om-ne praemium erit, et quo frequentior mecum fueris. 
senties eam rem tibi dignitati atque emolamento esse. ' Laetoque iuveni promisSis equum exinüum dono dat, 
bigatosque quingentos quaestorem numerare iubet*. lictoribus imperat ut cum se adire quotiens velit 
281 
These blandishments proved fully effective: "By this kindliness on the part of 
Marcellus the high spirit of the young man was as so tempered that thereafter none of the 
allies more bravely and loyally aided the Roman cause. 
, 673 
Although Rome won back Lucius Bantius to the Roman cause, disaffected 
elements in the city continued to negotiate with Hannibal. An arrangement was reached to 
close the gates of the city after the Roman force deployed for battle, but the plan was 
revealed to Marcellus, 
674 
and as Hannibal's force drew up in battle order, the Romans 
failed to appear. Hannibal correctly guessed that the rebels' plan had failed, ordering part 
of his force "... back to the camp, with orders to bring up in haste to the front fine all the 
equipment for besieging the city. He was quite confident that,, if he should press the 
hesitating, the common people would stir up some outbreak* in the City.,, 
675 In context, 
"equipment for besieging" must have meant scaling ladders, battering rams, and other 
gear for a direct assault on the walls, rather than for a siege. In the face of an assault by 
Hannibal's army, even unorganized disaffection within the city might well lead to a 
collapse of the defense. 
Similar processes of personal influence must have been at work in cities across 
southern Italy in the post-Cannae environment, whether or not acted upon directly by 
either Hannibal or the Romans. The political status quo in the cities had been decisively 
patiantur. Hac comitate Marcelli ferocis iuvenis animus adeo est mollitus ut nemo inde socionun rem 
Romanam fortius ac fidelius iuverit. " 
673 Liw!, Ab Urbe Condita. 23.16.1. "Hac comitate Marcelli ferocis iuvenis animus adeo est mollitus ut 
nemo inde sociorwrn rem Romanam fortius ac fidelius iuveirit. " 
674 Livy, Ab Urbe Condija, 23.16. 
675 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.16.11. "... in castra remittit iussos propere adparatwm omnem oppugnandae 
urbis in priinam aciem adferre. satis fidens, si cunctantibus instarct, tumultum aliquem in urbe plebem 
moturam. " 
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upset, openmg the way for ambitious men to promote themselves by offering their 
support to one side or the other, ") if the side they chose won, they could expect to reap the 
rewards of their service. 
A more complex series of events took place at Casilinum. A force of Roman allied 
troops from Praeneste had not joined the main Roman army in time for the battle of 
ýCannae; after that disaster they took refuge in Casilinum. The city was divided into two 
sections by a river with the Praenestine troops quartered themselves on one side. After 
word reached the Praenestines that the city might be delivered over to Hannibal, they 
killed or expelled the citizens from their quarter, placing themselves in a state of 
defense. 676 When Hannibal laid siege to this half of the city, the Praenestines mounted an 
active defense; "When they actually sallied out once, he almost cut off their retreat by 
ý, 677 
sending a column of elephants against them, and drove them in alarm into the city... 
As the siege dragged on, Hannibal sent most of his army into winter quarters at 
Capua. To end the siege the Romans paid a considerable ransom for the Praenestine's 
release and Hannibal allowed them to withdraw from the city. The Romans granted the 
Praenestines double pay for the time they had been besieged and a five-year exemption 
from further military service, along with an offer, which was declined, of Roman 
citizenship. 
678 
The Romans had refused to pay ransom for the prisoners of war at Cannae, but the 
circumstances were now entirely different. The prisoners at Cannae were considered to 
676 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.30. 
677 Livy, Ab rbe Condi 23.18.6. "Semel ultro erumpentis agmine elephantorum opposito prope 
interclusit trepidosque conpulit in urbem... " The mention of elephants suggests that reinforcement from 
Canhagc had in fact reached Hannibal by this time. 
678Livy, Ab Urbe ConAita 23.19. 
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have surrendered at a stroke; the Praenestines had put up a prolonged and heroic 
resistance. It was in the Roman interest to reward their service, even to pay ransom for 
their release. No implicit hint of capitulation in ransoming them out could now be 
assumed. Offering and accepting the ransom was the simplest way for Hannibal to 
eliminate a Roman strong point that otherwise might hold out some time longer, 
meanwhile tying down badly needed troops for other operations. 
Petelia held out without Roman assistance until 215 when Hannibal found himself 
involved in campaigns against Croton and Locri in Magna Graecia . 
679Here he discovered 
a complicated new set of problems . 
68() Each city that failed to rebel and come over to his 
side constituted a potential Roman strong point. Roman armies might operate against the 
rebels while using these loyal cities as safe bases upon which they could fall back in order 
to avoid direct confrontation with his army. Hannibal's means of dealing xNith these 
potential Roman bases varied. In the weakest cities, such as Nucera and Aceffae, a 
threatening move proved sufficient; the inhabitants merely abandoned the towns. 
Whereas in Nola, Hannibal attempted to combine a military assault with political support 
from disaffected factions within the town; the attempt failed when the political support 
did not materialize. A siege of such a wefl-defended city would have cost too much time 
and too many resources; Hannibal had to leave it under Roman control. Petelia, pro- 
Roman, but without access to direct Roman support, he besieged, presumably with a 
limited detachment of his forces, and eventually captured with Roman approval. 
Casilinum, with its scratch garrison of Praenestines, Hannibal also besieged, eventually 
allowing the Praenestines to withdraw when Rome paid his ransom demands. 
679 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.20.4-8. 
's8OLivy. AbUrbe-Condi 23.30. 
284 
With the political dynanuc now changed, many who had hesitated before were 
now ready to act. up until this point what Hannibal accomplished had been in absolute 
accord with his original plans. In the year 214/13 Hannibal should have been particularly 
delighted when a small group of noblemen from Tarentum approached him. They 
indicated they represented a pro-Carthaginian faction in the city who would readily 
surrender the city if he would bring his army within sight of Tarentum's walls. 
Tarentuni, the largest seaport in Southern Italy, was ideally situated for the 
Carthaginians. It would serve as a base of operations from which a fleet could sail from 
North Affica; the city could be used as a supply point as well as a disembarkation port for 
incoming reinforcements. But, once again, as with Pyrrhus the Tarentines proved 
681 
unreliable. Unsuccessful. ) 
Hannibal retired to winter on the Adriatic Coast . 
Unlike their 
fellow Greeks of Neapolis and Cumae, the Romans suspected the Tarentines - probably 
in view of their earlier conduct - of being untrustworthy allies. For this reason they had 
been forced to send hostages to Rome as surety of their good behaviour. Some of the 
hostages attempted an escape and, when recaptured by the Romans, were put to death 
with great cruelty - something, which made the anti-Roman party in Tarentum even more 
hostile. They must have reached the conclusion that they would fare better under the 
Carthaginians, whose generosity to other towns and cities such as Capua was well known. 
Yet it was at this time that his forces suffered their first, and only serious blow on 
Italian soil. Hannibal sent orders for Hanno to march his Carthaginian reinforcements and 
682 
newly recruited troops from Bruttium north to join him in Campania. No doubt 
Hannibal intended to take the ports of Neapolis and Cumae with this enlarged army, but 
Hanno, was forestalled by the arrival of Tiberius Gracchus and heavily defeated in the 
'581 Livy, Ab Uirbe Condita, 24.17.8; 20.9-14. 
! La, 24.15.2. 682 Livy, Ab 
_Urbe 
CCondi 
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ensuing battle. 683 Although Hanno escaped, the relief army Hannibal so badly needed was 
largely destroyed. The Romans proceeded to attack a number of small towns in 
LuCania684 and SarflniUM685 with their penalty for defection to the Carthaginians paid with 
many lives and the confiscation of their property. 
Hannibal Defends His Allies 
Hannibal never envisioned he would be required to command an army of 
occupation. His strength rested in offensively led open-group battles, where he proved 
unbeatable. Once the Roman generals realiZed his tactics, they stayed among the 
mountains or behind walls where they could maintain the advantage. At first the cities 
siding with Hannibal were a strong point to his cause; they provided him access to the 
towns and supplies he sorely needed, but as Fabius reinitiated a "scorched earth" policy, 
he enforced stem laws designed to prevent Hannibal from obtaining cooperation and/or 
supplies. He set about to ravage the countryside around Capua destroying or carrying off 
crops, and laying waste to much of southern Italy. The new allies brought additional 
responsibilities since Hannibal had to provide garrisons for protection of the civil 
populations, wealth, supplies, and the ultimate source, the land with his diminishing 
army, for without control of the land - or at least enough land - the cities could 
eventually be starved out. 
Additionally, Hannibal had to turn aside &om his own operations to come to the 
rescue of ineffectual allies' intrigues. At one point, "... the Campanians attempted without 
assistance to reduce the state of Cumae to subjection, at first tempting them to revolt from 
683 Livy, Ab Urbe ConLdftg, 24.14-16. 
684 , Ab Urbe Condita. 24.19. 2ý- 
685 Livy, Ab_Urbe _Condita. 
24.3-6. 
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the Romans, When that failed they contrived a ruse to entrap them. 
. )686 The ruse involved 
inviting the Cumaean leadership to a pan-Campanian religious festival, at which they 
would be seized. The Curnaeans evidently got wind of the plan. They sent word to the 
Romans, who sent an army under the new consul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. 
Gracchus succeeded in ambushing the Campanians as the latter lay in wait to ambush the 
Cumaeans. Hannibal was forced to come to retrieve the situation, which he could do only 
687 
partially-, he laid siege to Cumae, but abandoned the effort, again presumably because a 
siege against determined defenders would take too long and tie down too much of his 
army. 
The I-Erpini and Samnites also revolted against Rome, only to find themselves 
688 
under pressure from a Roman counteroffensive. They sent a delegation to Hannibal to 
ask for assistance, and to complain of having received none previously. Hannibal's reply, 
as reported by Livy, hints at his frustration at such calls for aid: 
"... Hannibal replied that the Hirpini and Samnites were doing everydiing at 
once, reporting their losses, and asking for troops, and complaining that they were 
undefended and neglected. But they ought first to have reported, then asked for 
protection, finally, if this was not obtained, they should then, and not sooner, 
have complained that help had been besought in Vain: i689 
686 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.35.2. "Campani per se adorti sunt rem Cumanam suae dicionis facere, primo 
sollicitantes ut ab Romanis deficeremt; ubi id parum procmit, dolum ad capiendos eos comparant. " 
'58'Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.35-37, 
, 
23.41 688 Livv, Ab Urbe Condita -42. 
689 Livy, Ab fbe Condita, 23.43.1-2. "... Hannibal respondit, omnia simul facere Hirpinos Samnitesque, et 
indicare clades suas et petere praesidium et queri indefensos se neglectosque. Indicandum autem primum 
fuisse, dein petendenique querendum frustra opem inploratam. " 
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This passage in itself reflects Hannibal may have felt he was being dragged into 
defensive operations on behalf of affies, operations in which the Romans had the 
initiative- As well as attempting to clear out Roman strong points, Hannibal had to deal as 
well with the ally's own military inefficiency. In some cases, such as the Hirpini and 
Samnites, the problem was unavoidable. However much Hannibal might be annoyed by 
their complaints, rebellions such as theirs were precisely what he had come to Italy to 
foment. The natural role of his army was to reinforce those rebellions, though as he 
pointed out to the f1irpini and Samnite representatives, this was more effectively done by 
taking the war directly to the Romans and their remaining allies than by rushing about in 
response to Roman counter-offensives. 
Yet in the Campanians' misfired attempt against Cumae, Hannibal paid the price 
of the terms of alliance he had concluded with Capua. The Campanians were able to raise 
several thousand men for this operation, although most were killed or captured . 
690 These 
men, if enrolled in Hannibal's own army, under his discipline and leadership, doubtless 
could have been forged into good soldiers, a valued addition to his force. Instead, the 
Campanian rebel leaders squandered them, giving the Romans a badly needed victory,, 
and generally leaving a mess for Hannibal to clean up. 
Instead of snowballing the rebellion had stagnated, confined essentially to 
Campania and neighbouring areas where Hannibal's army operated. The areas in 
rebellion were far too limited to cut critically into Rome's manpower base, Rome could 
still raise armies,, indeed larger ones than it had risen before. Moreover, the terms of 
alliance Hannibal accepted with Capua meant that even though their manpower was 
subtracted from Rome he could not add it to his own support base. Far from providing a 
69" Livv. Ab Urbe Condita, 23.35. 
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steady flow of recruits to Hannibal's force, the Capuans responded to the Roman 
mobilization of 214 with a cry for help - 
"Accordingly, they sent legates to Hannibal to beg him to bring his army to 
Capua. New arnues, they said, were being enrolled at Rome for besieging it, and 
the defection of no city had more embittered the Romans. Since they reported this 
with such excitement, Hannibal, thinking he must make haste, lest he be 
anticipated by the Romans, set out from A-Mi and established himself by Tifata M 
his old camp above CapUa., 691 
Hannibal's Plan of campaign had to be set aside to guard the Capuans. Capua and 
the other Campanian rebel cities, which had for generations been part of the Roman 
alliance and military system, must have had a great many men who had been trained in 
the Roman method of warfare., and centurions and cohort commanders capable of leading 
them. In spite of Livy"s structures about Capuan decadence, the performance of Roman 
allies throughout the war gives little reason to suppose that the Capuans, and Campanians 
in general, could not have been as effective as soldiers as those who remained loyal to 
Rome, and Campania should have been able to raise the equivalent of several legions 
with which to defend themselves, with all the advantages of fighting on their own ground, 
with numerous fortified strong points available to them. Instead, Hannibal had to detach 
691 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 24.12.2-3. -... perpulisse inagnain partem se iuventutis Tarentinae referunt ut 
Hannibalis amicitiam ac societatem quam populi Romani mallent, legatosque ab suis missos rogare 
Hannibalcm ut exercitum propius Tarentum admoveat: si signa eius, si castra conspecta a Tarento sint, haud 
ullam intercessuram moram quin in deditionem veniat urbs; in potestate iuniormn plebern, in manu plebis 
rem Tarentinam esse. " 
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part of his army, good Numidian and Spanish troops, to help guard Capua . 
692 
making 51 
those troops unavailable for his own operations. 
And these operations did not prove productive. The psychological state of 
Hannibal's troops reached its peak at Cannae, where they faced the climactic encounter 
with almost the entire military power of Roman, an army that vastly outnumbered them. 
After the battle, the extreme intensity of their pitch could hardly be sustained. In addition, 
the new course of the war must already have become evident to Hannibal's troops by the 
end of the campaign season in 216. Rome was not going to collapse; the war would 
continue. For the soldiers it was no longer a stark matter of conquer or die, but of hoping 
to survive rather than falling protecting an ally or surviving a minor skirmish against the 
Romans. Hannibal's army continued to suffer a steady attrition from skirmishes against 
the Romans or their loyalist allies. 
Troop morale and efficiency may also have dýeclined somewhat from the high 
noint of Cannae, though at worst Hannibal's army went from being an outstanding one to 
merely a very good one. Nevertheless, Livy's account of Capua mentions a tnckl e of 
desertions, something that can hardly have been a problem previously, when deserters had 
no ffiendly haven in reach. Even if desertions were modest, they were stifl another form 
of attrition of a force increasingly stretched thin by the commitments it had to meet. I-Es 
allies, the cities that had rebelled against Rome, were of doubtful military value, more 
likely to call on him for rescue than to assist him effectively in opening new fronts against 
the Romans. 
It was not merely a matter of maintaining food and supplies, but of finding men to 
replenish and strengthen the ranks of the Carthaginjan army. He did receive some 
reinforcement from Carthage, even if far less than he had hoped or been promised. There 
692 Livv, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.12. 
290 
were two instances in which Carthage succeeded in breaking the Roman stranglehold, and 
both of them were by sea- in 215 when they landed 4,000 Numidians and 40 elephants at 
693 Locri and in 205 when 12,000 infkntry and 2,000 horse reached Liguria. Hannibal had 
gambled that he would receive support from the disaffected people of the Italian 
peninsula and later his army included large numbers of Italian "deserters" as the Romans 
regarded them. 
The central and southern Italians, with the exception of those in the major city of 
Capua, never switched sides in great numbers or for long stretches of time. Hannibal 
tended to act as a conquerorof the Italian cities that he took away from Rome and he felt 
increasingly compelled to use diplomatic skill against them when the Romans' superior 
skill in siege warfare allowed them to re-conquer these cities easily once Hannibal's 
troops departed. Moreover, Hannibal did not have enough men to provide garrisons for 
the cities that had come over to his side, This meant that they were open to Roman re- 
conquest and revenge and thus less prone to follow HannibaJ's cause. 
The Use of Terror in the War 
Carl von Clausewitz's, On War, published shortly after Clausewitzs death in 
183 1, presented the concept of total war: combat waged against the civilian population as 
well as military targets, with the object of reducing a people's will to fight. Hannibal used 
the principals of total war effectively to shift opinion to his favour. AlthoUgh he laid 
waste to the countryside as Rome laid siege to Casilinum, he did not plunder the lands of 
his allies either in Samnium or Lucania; however, when he marched near the Latin colony 
of Venusia he laid waste to those districts belonging to the Roman colonists. The terrorist 
693 The troops, %N110 landed at Liguria never reached Hannibal who by then was bottled up in Italy's southem 
region. 
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calls forceful attention to his presence, his power, and his cause, and can generate support 
by demonstrating the price of failure to give support. 
As noted earlier, the Carthaginian army had scarcely come down fi7om the Alps 
before Hannibal inserted himself into a local dispute and found or manufactured a pretext 
to attack the Taurini. That action brought him support from other Gauls, a support that 
accelerated after he demonstrated military success against the Romans as well. In 
peninsular Italy, he had further to contend with the likelihood that pro-Roman factions 
were established in control of allied communities. Hannibal needed to extract real costs 
for failing to rebel against Rome before local leaders would be induced to change sides, 
or local rivals to overthrow them and break off ftorn the Roman Alliance System. 
During the War Between the States, Gen. Grant's orders to Sherman were equally 
simPle- he was to get into the interior of the enemy's country and inflict as much damage 
as possible against their war resources. The first part of the mission he accomplished 
merely by engaging Johnston 1) s army; the second part included a new took at what 
constituted war resources. While Clausewitz would have agreed with Grant that victory 
requires destruction of the enemy's army, he also believed victory was a matter of 
destroying the will of the enemy to fight. That meant waging war against the civilian 
population and their property as well as against military targets. To Grant, the city of 
Atlanta and its railroads qualified as war resources, but Sherman convinced Grant to 
allow him to wage war on the people of the South, not only hitting military objectives, but 
cities, farms, and other civilian property as well. Shennan needed just three words to 
explain how he would wage total war in the Atlanta campaign and in the March to the Sea 
that followed it - he would "... make Georgia howl. 
)-)694 In Sherman's own words, "War is 
all cruelty, and there is no use trying to reform it- the crueler it is, the sooner it vvill be 
694 B. H. Liddell Hart. Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American (New York, 1929), page 358. 
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ended. War is Hell. -)1695 On the Roman side, when it was realised that Hannibal could not 
be defeated in the field, they adopted a corresponding scorched earth policy and 
avoidance of pitched battles, which came to be known as the 'Fabian tactics. Cities who 
defected or submitted to Hannibal subsequently came under severe retribution from Rome 
once given the opportunity - whether to provide an example of the consequence to other 
cities or in abject brutality. Fabius Maximus carried out wanton destruction against the 
Samnite and Campanian regions. To complete the overturning of the Italian rural 
landscape, there then followed massive confiscations by Rome, which hit the city-states 
and peoples who sided with Hannibal. Such was the case of Capua's territory, and a large 
part of Saninium, Lucania, Apulia, and Bruttium. Upon exan-fination we find Sherman 
thought the South should suffer, especially South Carolina, since that is where the war 
began. He in fact declared, "The whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreck 
vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble for her fate but feel she deserves all that 
seems m store for her. , 
696 
In addition, the occupation of Roman and Italian land by Hannibal's armies 
accomplished another, even more important objective in that the gigantic depredations 
committed by them added to the losses in tax revenues to the Roman treasury, which 
created an unprecedented econon-k shockwave in central and southern Italy. Hannibal 
produced a situation so severe Rome was compelled to make rapid adaptations in order to 
ward off the consequences. In the March to the Sea, while the Union soldiers lived off the 
land, they wrecked and burned whatever they did not need, thereby adding to the 
Confederacy's economic ruin and to its psychological destruction. This is exactly the 
same goal Hannibal had in mind, though he did not envision such devastation. His was 
695B. H. Liddell Hart. Shennan. page 360. 
696B. H. Liddell HaM 
-S-hgeEM49, 
page 366. 
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more of a "selective war" rather than "total war". The value of such actions can be seen in 
Vegetius, 
"It is the mark of a skilled general to sow seeds of discord among the enemy. For 
no nation, however small, can be completely destroyed by its enemies, unless it 
devours itself by its own feuding. Civil strife is quick to compass the destruction 
of political enemies, but careless about the readiness of (the nation's) own 
defense. -ý7697 
At Capua, a majority of the local senate, believing themselves to have been 
deserted by Carthage in 212, and still trusting the clemency of Rome, opened the town 
gates to the Roman army. The resulting destruction was merciless- they beheaded several 
notables, sold all Campanian citizens of Capua, Atella, and Calatia into slavery, and 
turned the city into an agricultural township, deprived of its lands and buildings. The year 
following the Praenestine abandonment of Casilinum the Romans under the consuls 
Marcus Marcellus and Quintus Fabius set siege to regain control of the city. When the 
Campanian inhabitants attempted to abandon the city, Marceflus massacred a number of 
them, the surviVors fleeing to the protection of Quintus Fabius. 
Through policies not unlike Sherman's, Fabius and Marcellus demonstrated to the 
people of Italy that the Carthaginian anny and Hannibal were powerless to defend their 
lives, homes, and property. Sherman argued that the swath of destruction his troops 
wrought on the South was a military necessity, but many historians have called the 
"March to the Sea" nothing less than a campaign of terrorism and have accused Sherman 
of the equivalent of war crimes. At the very least he did not restrain his troops from 
looting and arson. On the usefulness of total war, Bevin Alexander states, 
697 Vegetius, LEpitome of Milit4g Science page 88. 
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"'The Civil War ended, and Shennan's strategy of indirect attack had gained the 
victory. Unless he had seized Atlanta before the presidential election, Lincoln 
would not have been reelected. And the march through Georgia and the Carolinas 
destroyed the South's will to continue the war. -)1698 
During the siege of Casilinum and the siege of Vicksburg, we observe the citizens 
of both responding with equal courage and determination. At Vicksburg they dug caves in 
the yellow-clay hillsides, then furnished them With finery dragged out of their ruined 
houses. Weeks crawled by under pounding shells. The cave dwellers fought lice, rats, 
disease., boredom, and despair., eating their emaciated mules, horses, and dogs when all 
the food ran out. The siege so ingrained the citizens of Vicksburg that for over 80 years 
they would not celebrate the 4th of July because the surrender of Vicksburg came on 4 
July 1863. We see the defenders of Casilinum reduced to eating dogs, rats, bark, and 
boiled leather. Some supplies were gotten to the garrison by floating amphorae filled with 
grain down the river on the current until Hannibal discovered the scheme. Even then, nuts 
were floated down on the current, a truly desperate measure. Hannibal, like Grant waged 
total war; they both used the civilian populations of the cities under siege to expedite their 
initiatives. 
In addition Rome successfully used teffor to hold cities against possible defection 
as in Lucius Pinarius' ruthless actions in Sicily. As commander of a garrison in Henna, 
fearing a defection of the inhabitants, Pinarus ordered his soldiers to infiltrate and 
massacre the inhabitants. Livy reports, 
"So by an act, it may be criminal, it may have been avoidable. Marcellus, without 
reproving the act, allowed the soldiers to plunder Hennensians, thinking the 
frightened Sicilians had been deterred from betraying their garrisons. And as was 
698 B. Alexander, How Great Generals Wi page 167, 
295 
natural in the case of a city in the heart of Sicily and famous, whether for the 
remarkable natural defense of its site, or as hallowed everywhere by the footprints 
of Proserpina, long ago camed away, news of the massacre made its way over the 
whole of Sicily almost III a single day. And then in truth, since they thought that 
the abode, not of men only but also of gods, had been desecrated by an atrocious 
massacre, even those who till then had wavered went over to the 
Carthagimails. "699 
By the time of the Henna massacre and the general Sicifian uprising, the 
Carthaginians had already actively intervened. In a similar action when Union soldiers 
began arresting and threatening Confederate civilians, Lee wrote General McClellan, 
"... Should your government treat ... such service 
by these persons as a breach of parole 
and punish it accordingly this Government will resort to retaliatory measures as the only 
means of compelling the observance of the rules of civilized warfare. ), '700 Later, upon 
learning that a Union general had threatened to kill civilians in retaliation for the 
Confederate guerilla activity, Lee responded by stating he would immediately hang a 
captured Union officer for each murdered civilian. Lee explained his actions as follows: 
He would wage "... war on the terms chosen by our eneniies until the voice of an outraged 
humanity shall compel a respect for the recognized usages of war. , 701 
699 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.39.7-9. "Ita Henna aut malo aut necessario facinore retenta. Marcellus nec 
factmn inprobavit et praedwn Hennensium mihtibus concessit, ratus timore deterritos proditionibus 
praesidiomm Siculos. Atque ea clades, ut urbis in media Sicilia sitae claraeque vel ob insignem munimento 
naturali locum vel ob sacrata omnia vestigiis raptac quondam Proserpinae, prope uno die omnem. Siciliam 
pervasit-, et quia caede infanda rebantur non hominum tantum sed etiam deorwn sedem violataim esse, tum 
vero ctiam qui ante dubd fuerant defeccre ad Poenos. " 
700 A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robe! j E. Lee, page 216. 
701 A. Kaltman. The Gcnius of Robert E. Lee. page 216. 
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Before Scipio could begin his African campaign, he first had to complete the 
subjugation of Spain, for both he and the Roman Senate realized the greater bulk of 
702 Hannibal's cash and materials were at located at Carthago Nova , 
besides the city was 
home to many of the craftsmen necessary to create additional weaponry Hannibal so 
desperately needed. And for Scipio underlying the logistical initiative lingered the desire 
for punishment to those tribes who had sided with Carthage after the death of his father 
and uncle. He avenged the treachery of Illiturgis in a manner so drastic as to be an object 
lesson of its requital, the inhabitants put to death, and the city itself razed to the ground. 
Scipio made no attempt to subdue or refrain the fury of the troops. In aflowing the 
obliteration of Illiturgis he had a direct purpose for the news so shook the defenders of 
Castulo that the Spanish commander secretly capitulated. 703 Again a similar example can 
be seen when after Gen. Early attacked the outskirts of Washington, Gen. Grant ordered 
ý' C Sheridan, Ao devastate the whole area so thoroughly that a crow flying across over the 
valley would have to carry its own rations. ,. )704 Bridges, railroads, machine shops were 
burned or dismantled. Barns were burned, with their contents; food to feed the army and 
its animals was taken - three to four times as much as the army needed spoiled. Lee's 
soldiers were forced to starvations rations. Wholesale destruction the point of both 
actions. 
D- 
. Rome continued a policy of ruthlessness and massacres throughout the conflict 
with Hannibal and used brutality to punish those who - by Roman terms - were guilty of 
-02 Regarding cash found by P. Scipio in 209 at Carthago Nova, see Polybius, The Histories, 10.19.1-2. On 
weaponry and craftsmen to make them, see Polybius, The Histories 10.17.9 and Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 
26.47.5-10.. 
703B. H. Liddcll HaM Scipio Africanus: Greater than NWleon (New York, 1926), pages 69-70. 
704B. Catton, BKCivil War, page 224. 
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treachery to Rome. Polybius seems, cynically, to comment on this fact when he writes 
that the Roman capture of Carthago Nova in 209 B. C. gives a horrifying picture of the 
behaviour of Roman troops if they were compelled to take a city by StorM. 
705 It seems the 
Roman Senate even condoned actions such as those by M. Claudius Marcellus and his 
troops for the cruel acts they inflicted upon the people of Syracuse in 212 B. C. 706 If a 
community had been guilty of treachery to Rome, the sentence could be as lenient as in 
210 when the Phocian Anticyra was looted by the Romans and the free population sold 
into slavery, 707 or as brutal as the execution of 53 members of the Capuan senate followed 
by the murder of 172 notables by the proconsul Q. Fulvius Flaccus in 211 and 2 10 B. C- In 
204 - even though the population had been taken by surprise by Hannibal's cavalry and 
had not turned hostile to Rome - according to Livy robbery and rape were committed by 
the Roman troops upon re-taking the city, with personal atrocities against the citizens by 
the commander, Plen-ýnius at LoCri708 
Hannibal's Alliance with Philip V of Macedon 
At the outset of Hannibal's invasion of Italy, Rome was directly involved with the 
Greek power nearest Italy when Demetrius of Pharos was forced to flee to the king of 
Macedon, Philip V in 219 B. C. Hearing of Rome's difficulties in Italy, and the disaster at 
Lake Trasimene in particular, Philip decided on a direct attack to overrun Rome's Ifflyrian 
allies. Encouraged by Demetrius in the summer of 216 Philip built and directed his fleet 
to intercept the Roman ships en route to support their Illyrian allies; however, news of the 
705 Polybius, The Histories. 10.15. 
y: The Hannibalic War's Eff 706A. Toynbee, Hannibal's Leg4c ects on Roman Life, Vol. 11 (Oxford, 1965), 
pages 608-609. 
707 Livy, Ab Urbe CondiM 26.26 & Polybius, The Histories, 9.39. 
,. 08 Livy. Ab Urbe Condi 29.6.17-18. 
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approaching warships caused Philip to panic. Later, Hannibal's overwhelming victory at 
Cannae, further encouraged Philip of Rome's current vulnerability and in 215 - allied 
with Hannibal - he launched an attack on Illyria, initiating ten years of inconclusive 
warfare against Rome. 
What did the treaty of mutual assistance mean for Hannibal? How did the alliance 
play into Hannibal's second strategy? What did Hannibal expect Philip to do? Naturally, 
Philip regarded the Roman expansion with the gravest distrust. Later, Philip decided that 
the Roman defeat at Cannae in August 216 presented the perfect opportunity to check 
their advance. For Hannibal Macedonia possessed the resource that had led to 
Alexander's victories. manpower. The Macedonians were a fierce and warlike people 
who could put a large army into the field with a potential strength equal to Rome. 
Additionally Philip was a successful commander who had raised Macedonia to its greatest 
power since Alexander. 709 Philip represented an opportunity to further destabilize Rome 
through a political conflict with Macedonia and the possibility for Hannibal to attain the 
manpower and supplies his Carthaginian army needed to succeed in Italy. 710 
If we look at the circumstances following Lee's victory at Second Manassas, the 
British Foreign secretary in a response to the Prime Minister wrote., 
"I agree with you that the time has come for offering meditation to the United 
States Government, with a view to recognition of the independence of the 
Confederates. I agree ftuther that In case of failure, we ought ourselves to 
recooze the Southem States as an mdependent state. 
709 Livv, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.33.4. 
710 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita. 23.33.1. 
ill A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robert E. Lee, page 234. 
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Later, after learning of Lee's advance into Maryland, the Prime Minister 
added: 
"It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the northwest of 
Washington... If the Federals sustain a grave defeat, they may be at once ready 
_r_ -- tor mediation ... If on the other hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait 
f IIOWS. a while and see what 0 
A well-publicized triumph or failure, even one that does little harm to the enemy, 
can produce incalculable success or harm in the minds of the world community. Among 
those so influenced by Cannae was Philip V, King of Macedon who, because of his 
proxinýty to Italy, 
"On first learning by report that Hannibal had crossed the Alps, although he had 
rejoiced at the outbreak of war between the Romans and Carthaginians, still, as 
their resources were not as yet known, he had wavered, uncertain which of the 
two peoples he Wished to have the victory. Now that a third battle, a third victory, 
favoured the Carflia&mans, he mclined to the side of success and sent 
ambassadors to Hamibal. 
When Hannibal and Philip's ambassadors negotiated their mutual alliance against 
Rome, the terms clearly anticipated that Rome would still exist in a weakened state after 
their joint victory. The treaty pledged mutual protection between Philip V, Macedonia 
and its allies in Greece and Hannibal,, Carthage and its future allies in Italy, Gaul, Liguria, 
712 A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robert E. Lee, page 234. 
713 Livy. Ab Urbe Condita, 23.33.3-4. "Is ubi primum fama accePil Hannibalem Alpis transgressum, ut 
bello inter Romanum Poenumque orto laetatus erat, ita uthus POPuli mallet victoriam esse incertis adhuc 
viribus fluctuatus animo fuerat. Postquain tertis iam pugna., tertia victoria cum Poenis erat, ad fortunam 
inclinavit icgatosque ad Hannibalem nxisit- -" 
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and North Africa. Each was to deal fairly with the other; and in particular, they were to be 
allies in the war with Rome until victory was achieved. The treaty called for Philip to gain 
the following: once victory over Rome had been assured any peace treaty would forbid 
the Romans to make war against Philip and provide that "the Romans should no longer be 
masters of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnos, Pharos, Dimale, the Parthinoi, or 
Atintania. -)-)714 The treaty makes no mention of any specific undertaking by Philip to aid 
Hannibal although Philip agreed to fight "on land and sea with all his might, "' the force 
actually specified is only for two hundred ships. Hannibal knew the time was ripe for 
naval support since Rome's naval forces were greatly under manned. If safe lines of 
transport could be opened by sea, Carthage could send reinforcements - the recruiting 
grounds in Affica and potentially in Spain could provide him with troops once the sea- 
lanes were clear. 
716 
Livy certainly believed the Romans feared a direct Macedonian invasion of Italy, 
for in the autumn of 215., Marcus Valerius Laevinus was sent to Brundisium to protect the 
coast against war with Macedonia. Rome's Illyrian allies lay almost directly opposite 
Brundisium, separated by the narrowest part of the Adriatic Sea. 717 Philip clearly assumed 
Rome's preoccupation with Hannibal in Italy would free him in Myria and his threat to 
the Illyrian protectorate led to a permanent Roman presence at Ocricum where Laevinus 
714 Polybius, The Histories 7.9.13. 
ý'.. *Tj& SIVOCI TOýLOUOIL)q KL)ptox)q KFPKX)POLIO)V 4718' 'Anokkowwacov icou 'Em8aýLvtwv ýM& 
(Dapou pj& AtýLakijq KOU rlOLPOtVO)V gT16F 'Artv-cavtaq. " & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentan, 
on Polybius, Vol. 11, page 56. 
'15 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 23.33.10. "... sua terra marique gereret-,...,, 
716 Polybius, The Histories, 7.9, F. W. Walbank, A HiSlOrical CDmmeutarv on Polybius, Vol. 11, pages 42-56 
& Livy, Ab Urbe CondiLa. 23.33.10-11, 
717 Livy. Ab Urbe Condita 23.38.8-10; 23.48.3 & 24.10.4. 
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718 and his squadron wintered in 214-213 . For two years 
Laevinus did nothing to deter 
Philip. Nevertheless, the presence of the Roman fleet precluded any attempt by Philip to 
cross the Adriatic. 
Although it is doubtful Hannibal ever seriously anticipated an invasion of Italy by 
Philip even though Livy indicates that Tarentum would have made a suitable port for a 
Macedonian disembarkation after Hannibal captured it in 212,719 there is some evidence 
by Livy that Syracuse hoped for aid during the siege of the city by Rome. 720 Philip did not 
render assistance at once. As his ambassadors returned from Italy, a roving Roman patrol 
intercepted their ship. Upon reports of the ambassadors' capture, Philip sent another party 
of envoys, which again made contact with Hannibal. This time they managed to make it 
back, reporting Hannibal's terms, "but the summer was over before the king could make 
any active preparations. So effectual was the capture of a single ship and ambassadors in 
postponing a war which threatened the RoManS. -)-)721 Whether or not Philip had serious 
intentions of coming into the war at all, his participation ended with nothing more than 
his embarrassment and no assistance for Carthage. Likewise, when Gen. Lee' s wife 
expressed the hope that Great Britain and the Union would go to war, Lee commented, 
"You must not build your hopes on peace on account of the United States going 
into war with England. She VVIII be very loath to do that, notwithstanding the 
118 Livv, Ab Urbe Condi 24.40.17. 
719 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 24.13.5. 
72" Livv. Ab Urbe Condij4,25.23.8-9 & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page 16 1. 
7" LMýý Ab Urbe Condita 23.39.4. "sed priUS SC aestas circumegit qum niovere ac moliri quicqum rex 
posset: tantum navis una capta cum legatis momenti fecit ad dilationem immincntis Romanis befli. " 
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bluster of the Northern papers ... 
We must make up our minds to fight our battles 
and wm our independence, no one will help US. 
37722 
At the beginning of the Italian campaign season in 213 B. C. Tarenturn again 
informed Hannibal of a pro-Carthaginian party inside the city. Using commando tactics, 
Hannibal secured the great city, though his success was somewhat nullified by the Roman 
garrison that still held the citadel. With all the Tarentine ships bottled up in the inner 
harbour, it looked as if they were trapped since the Roman fleet could reinforce their 
garrison from the open sea. Hannibal solved this by having the ships brought onto land 
and then moved through the city on wheels until they reached the outer harbour where 
they were again launched. The capture of the city and the method of freeing the ships all 
speak to Hannibal's genius. The year proved favourable to Hannibal even without the 
assistance of Philip with Brundisium on the Adriatic coast and Rhegium on the Messina 
Straits the only ports remaining in Roman control below the Bay of Neapolis. 723 
The Importance of the War in Spain 
724 
It seems the Carthaginian home government determined early on in the conflict 
that to loose Spain was by far higher in importance than actually defeating Rome in Italy, 
They continually supplied resources for the actions in Spain, but their directives were 
occasional with most of their decisions based on reactions to Roman moves rather than 
722A. Kaltman, The Genius of Robert E. -Lee, page 
166. 
Lbal, page 143-144. 
723 E. Bradford, Hanm 
724 A good summary of the events in Spain can be found in Sir G. de Beer., Hannibal: The Struggle for 
Power in the Mediterranean, pages 250-255; E. Bradford, Hannibal, pages 169-175; H. H. Scullard, A 
Histo! y of the Roman World 753 to 146 B. C, 4hEdition, pages 211-214 & 225-229, while a detailed 
account can be found in B. Caven, The Punic Wars pages 193-207 and T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudley, Rome 
AgLaýlRg-CAMI-hl-age, pages 95-118. 
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concerted objectives of their own . 
72' While both Hannibal and the Carthaginian senate 
must have agreed that subjecting Rome to Carthaginian rule was not an option they hoped 
to pursue, Rome certainly grasped Spain's importance to Carthage as the true reservoir of 
its military might as well as the strategic location of their greatest city in Spain, Carthago 
Nova. With the wealth of Spain behind Carthage the treasury flowing into Carthage 
remained stable. 
For these reasons coupled with the influence Hasdrubal held as Hannibal's 
successor in Spain, not only did Rome not recall their forces in Spain after their disastrous 
defeat at Cannae, they increased the Roman detachment with twenty additional ships, 
eight thousand men, and a great quantity of supplies. 726 In contrast to Carthage's desire to 
control Spain, Polybius believes the Roman Senate's decision to reinforce the army 
sprang from their desire to weaken Hasdrubal's influence and position among the Iberian 
tribes in hopes he would be unable to recruit reinforcements there for Hannibal. 727 Even 
though Hasdrubal managed to recruit troops in Spain there was disaffection among 
Carthage's Iberian allies, "... for the majority were Spaniards, who preferred to be 
vanquished in Spain, rather than as victors to be dragged to Italy. 
-)728 
A fl- 
Auer the news of Hannibal's victory at Cannae reached Carthage the senate sent a 
small reinforcement of soldiers and orders to mount an expedition to join his brother in 
Italy from the north while they sent another detachment directly to Hannibal in the south 
22 ff, A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars page 246. 
726 Polybius, The Histories, 3.97.1; Livy, Ab UThe Condita, 22.22.1 & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page 
127 
-2- '' Polvbius, The Histories, 3.97.3. 
Ab Uirbe Condita, 23.29.8. "Nfinus pertinaces viros habebat attera acies; nam maxima pars HispaYU 
erant, qui vinci in Hispania quam victores in Italiam trah, malebant. " 
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of Italy by sea. 729 While the Roman predominance at sea off the coast of Spain precluded 
any reinforcements from reaching Hannibal by sea from Spain, Hasdrubal was convinced 
he could duplicate Hannibal's march over the Alps. In the spring of 215 he moved north 
with some thirty thousand troops, half African regulars and half Iberian tribal warriors 
while Carthage sent Hamilco to Spain to succeed Hasdrubal. To block his march, the 
Scipio brothers, Gnaeus and P. Cornelius amassed nearly thirty thousand Romans and 
Italians along with a few auxiliaries at the Ebro. Hasdrubal unsuccessfully attempted a 
double envelopment similar to that which his brother executed the previous year at 
Cannae, but the Carthaginian's center broke before his cavalry could overcome their 
opposition. Consequently, Hanno and Hasdrubal Barca were driven back to the Ebro 
while Rome assumed command of the sea around the Spanish coast, the Pyrenees, 
securely severing Spain from Italy. In the wake of their defeat reinforcements intended 
for Italy the Carthaginian senate diverted to Spain. More importantly for Hannibal, a 
disproportionate number of Carthaginian resources had been drawn to Spain and another 
invasion of Italy prevented. 
For several years P. Cornelius and Gnaeus Scipio continued to win repeated 
successes until, caught divided, the two brothers were defeated and killed in the course of 
a series of battles at the Guadalquivir. 730 Only the negligence and incompetence of the 
Carthaginian commanders kept the shattered remnants of the Roman army from being 
driven out of Spain. By late autumn of 211 only ten thousand legionnaires held the Ebro 
line against three Carthaginian armies totaling more than forty-five thousand men. 731 
Additionally, many of the Iberian tribes had forsaken the Romans for Carthage. The 
729 LiVy, Ab Urbe Copdita, 23.27. 
730 LiVy. Ab Urbe 'ondita, 25.33 & 34. 
731 J. F. Lazenby, HanniLb-alrs War, page 1320-132. 
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timing could not have been better to push Rome out of Spain, allowing the Carthaginians 
the luxury of sending reinforcements to Hannibal. 
This was not to be for while the Carthaginian generals quarreled amongst 
themselves over control, the immensely influential Scipionic faction managed to persuade 
a majority in the Roman Senate of the necessity to continue the conflict in Spain- As the 
winter of 210/209 progressed serious disaffection arose against Carthaginian rule as the 
Carthaginian commanders continued to bicker. 732 Because Carthago Nova was almost the 
only city in Spain with a harbour suitable for a naval force and the fact that it was situated 
on a direct sea-run to Carthage, made it of utmost strategic value to both Carthage and 
Rome. Additionally, the Carthaginians kept most of their treasure and war material, as 
well as hostages from the Spanish tribes in the city. In order to pacify the Iberian tribes, 
the Carthaginians divided their armieS, 733 leaving only one thousand troops to guard 
Carthago Nova. 734 Their separation, and the fact that none resided less than ten days' 
march from the city left it open to attack by Scipio . 
735 
In a daring action, Scipio led a breaching column through a lagoon on the 
landward side to capture the City. 
736 With his subsequent victory Rome had taken the 
greatest Carthaginian city in Spain, captured an immense treasure, and delivered a great 
732 Polybius, The Histories 10.7.3 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commeqtary on Polybius, Vol. H, page 
202 
733 Polybius, The Histories, 10.7.3 & Livy, Ab Urbe Con&ta, 26.20.6. 
734 polybUS, The ffiStorieýS. -4. 10.7.2 
735 polybiUS, The fistories, 10.7.5-7; F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommejjtM on poMius Vol. K page 
202 & IF Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page 134. 
736 polybiUS, ne HiStorieS 10.14 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commeataff on Polybius, Vol. 11, page 
215 
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blow to Carthage. The capture of Carthago Nova marked the beginning of the end for the 
Carthaginians in Spain. 737 
With orders to keep Hasdrubal ftom reaching Italy at all costs, Scipio assaulted 
the army of Hasdrubal Barca at the Baecula the following year. 738 Realizing he had been 
outmanoeuvred, Hasdrubal immediately withdrew for his goal remained to reach 
Hannibal with an army from the north. He managed to extricate his treasure, his 
elephants, and almost two-thirds of his army. And made for the Tagus determined to aid 
his brother . 
739Hasdrubal led his army cast along the path taken by Hannibal ten long 
years previously. After a march conducted with great judgment and little loss through the 
interior of Gaul and the passes of the Alps, he appeared at the head of his troops, which 
he had partly brought with him from Spain and partly levied among the Gauls and 
Ligurians on his way. 
740 By letting Hasdrubal escape Scipio allowed his country to be 
more exposed to danger than at any time since Hannibal had crossed the Alps. 
737 It is interesting to note that Scipio's strategy is very much the same as Hannibal's in Italy. As stated in B. 
Alexander, How Great Generals Win, page 300, "The Carthaginians in Spain believed Scipio Afric. -anuS 
would strike at their armies and left unguarded their capital and principal port New Carthage. Scipio seized 
the city in 209 B. C., cut off the main sea connection with Carthage, caused several Spanish tribes to come 
over to the Romans, and abruptly threw the Carthaginians on the strategic defensive. " 
738 Polybius, The ffistories, 10.3 9.1; F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commeptag on Ppffibius Vol. 11, page 
, 27.18.7. 250 & Livy, Ab Urbe Cop&ta 
739 J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, Page 142. 
740 Not all of the events in Spain taken by Scipio are directly related to the topic at hand, so I have used on]-, - 
that Infonnation which is pertinent. A good ftdl account of the events can be found in B. H. Liddell Hart, 
Scipio Africanu , pages 
20-105. 
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Chapter Conclusions 
By 211 Hannibal had been fighting in Italy for eight years, though his later 
campaigns had not been marked by any great victories as evidenced the first years of his 
invasion. The stem spirit of Roman resolution, ever highest in disaster and danger, had 
neither bent nor despaired beneath the merciless blows dealt in rapid succession at Trebia, 
Lake Trasimene, and at Cannae. For Hannibal the whole achievement of Cannae in purely 
manpower terms, had been negated. All that remained of Cannae was the effect on 
morale. For in spite of Rome's overwhelming numbers, the Romans dared not simply 
close in on Hannibal with their massive armies for fear the results would be the same as 
before. Rome's population thinned through repeated slaughter in the field; nevertheless,, 
the Roman armies fielded in 214 demonstrated that in spite of his victories In the opening 
phases of the war, Hannibal had so far failed in his strategic object of denying Rome its 
manpower base. 
Poverty and actual scarcity ground down the survivors, through the fearful ravages 
that Hannibal's cavalry spread through their crops, pasturelands, and vineyards. Livy 
makes considerable mention of the necessity to find adequate food supplies at this time 
saying that: Fulvius Flaccus as commander at Capua, in 210 exacted grain in lieu of rent 
for the confiscated lands,, 74' that comnussioners were sent to buy grain for the garrison at 
Tarentum, the embassy to Egypt may also have something to do with food supply, 742 and 
the Roman Senate decided to use some of the gold reserves kept in the sacred treasury. 743 
Many of the Roman allies went over the Hannibal's side, and new clouds of foreign war 
threatened Rome from Macedonia and Gaul. But Rome did not recede. Rich and poor 
741 Livy, Ab Urbe CO 27.3.1. 
742Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 2 7.4.10. 
Ata, 27.10.11-3. 7-13 LiNyý Ab Urbe C2n 
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among her citizens vied with each other in devotion to their country. The wealthy placed 
their wealth, and all placed their lives, at Rome's ýdisposal. And, although Hannibal could 
not be driven out of Italy, and though every year brought suffering and sacrifices, Rome 
felt that her constancy had not been exerted in vain. If Rome was weakened by continued 
strife, so was Hannibal. 
With the capture of Capua, the tide began to turn against Carthage. Hannibal was 
still very much in the field. Though he held parts of Apulia, Samnium and Lucania, along 
with most of the Greek cities in the south, and all of Bruttium, he had not been able to 
shake the loyalty of the Latin states or Rome's hardcore allies in the center of the 
peninsula. Now with Rome's recovered control of most of Sicily, Hannibal had little hope 
of receiving reinforcements directly fi7om Carthage. One chance remained - if his 
brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago, could bring or send him help from Spain. However, when 
the Carthaginian army led by Hasdrubal finally reached Italy from Spain four years later, 
it came not in victory but as the Carthaginian cause in Spain met disaster. 
Hasdrubal commanded the Carthaginian armies in Spain for some time with 
varying but generally unfavourable fortune. He did not have the full authority over the 
Carthaginian forces in Iberia, which his brother and father had previously exercised. The 
Hanno faction in Carthage succeeded in fettering and interferin with his power; and they 91 
sent other generals to Spain, whose errors and misconduct caused reversals Hasdrubal had 
to deal with. In 208 although Hasdrubal out-manoeuvred Scipio, whose objective was to 
prevent his passing the Pyrenees on a march to Italy, it is clear Scipio's victories awarded 
Rome control of Spain. Scipio expected Hasdrubal to attempt the nearest route along the 
coast of the Mediterranean, where he carefully fortified and guarded the passes of the 
eastern Pyrenees. But Hasdrubal passed these mountains near their western extremity, and 
then, with a considerable force of Spanish infantry, a small number of Aftican. troops,, 
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some elephants and much treasure, he marched - not directly towards the coast of the 
Mediterranean, but in a northeastern line - towards the center of Gaul. He halted for the 
winter in the territory of the Arverni, and conciliated or purchased the good will of the 
Gauls in that region so far that he not only found ffiendly winter quarters among them, 
but great numbers of them enlisted under him; and, on the approach of spring, marched 
with him to invade Italy. 
By thus entering Gaul at the southwest, and avoiding its southern maritime 
districts, Hasdrubal kept the Romans in complete ignorance of his precise operations and 
movements. All they knew was that Hasdrubal had baffled Scipio's attempts to detain 
him in Spain, that he had crossed the Pyrenees with soldiers, elephants, and treasure, and 
that he was raising fresh forces among the Gauls. The spring was sure to bring him into 
Italy, and then would come the real tempest of the war, when from the north and from the 
south the two Carthaginian armies, led each by a son of Hamilcar Barca were to combine 
forces against Rome. If jointly the two brothers could inflict a massive defeat on the 
Roman armies, Rome would be forced to sue for peace or face the very real threat of a 
protracted siege with no allies as most, if not all, would be sending troops to Hannibal and 
not to Rome. 
310 
Chapter V 
At the onset of winter in 208 B. C. Hannibal must have felt a sense of impending 
crisis. Either a way had to be found to win the war in Italy within a short time, or all hope 
of a success on Italian soil must be abandoned and another new strategy formulated. The 
only reasonable strategy for winning the war within a short time was to reinforce the 
army on a large scale. Ms first strategy had included the substitution of a new Italian 
confederation under the nominal leadership of Capua, dominated by Carthage. With 
Capua now recaptured by Rome the idea that the Italian allies might view a siege as 
contrary to his proposed "'fiberatiolf' no longer applied. With sufficient manpower a long 
siege was a possibility and such a large army could be split into three groups each with a 
separate task. One to conduct the siege, another could occupy any Roman armies still 
afield, and the third could continue to bring new allies into Carthage's influence, by force 
or the threat of force. 
Hannibal realized Carthage had been less than forthcoming with reinforcements in 
the past, so he turned to his brother Hasdrubal in Spain. The possibility of troops loaned 
from Macedonia ended up being a dead letter. There were few other options. I-Es 
remaining brother Mago, untried in battle and forced to gain troops from a reluctant 
Carthaginian senate, was unlikely to provide significant support. Knowing Hasdrubal had 
been instructed by the senate as early as 215 to cross the Alps and join with his army in 
the north - with Spain all but lost - the time was now or never. If Hasdrubal proved 
unsuccessful in the task, he must then implement a new plan as quickly as possible. The 
only remaining option open to him would be a retreat to Carthage, or African territory, to 
fight a defensive war in the hope that Rome would tire of a foreign war and call off the 
conflict with reparations, which might not be too harsh. In the end, as will be seen 
Hannibal was forced to implement this third strategy after Hasdrubal's death and Scipio's 
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invasion of Mica. Peace would be on Roman terms no matter how great his victories 
might be against Scipio. 
Hannibal and Hasdrubal Plan to Combine Their Armies 
Livy records a conference between Hasdrubal and his fellow generals, Mago, 
Masinissa, and Hasdrubal Gisgo, at which they decided he should advance to Italy with 
an army made up of Spanish troops. 744 It is interesting to note that in the previous section, 
Book 27.19, Livy indicates Hasdrubal has already made plans to send his elephants on in 
advance and to get his money together for a hasty departure "before the battle" of Baecula 
and definitely before the clandestine meeting of the generals. " There is, indeed, the 
possibility that Hasdrubal had already been in touch with his brother and had decided to 
make haste to his assistance prior to and without giving battle to Scipio- But for whatever 
reason whether the Carthaginians' recent defeat or that many of the Spaniards were 
individually and collectively going over to the Roman cause, even without official 
instructions from the Carthaginian government, Hasdrubal left to meet Hannibal "... for 
Italy was the main theatre of the war and his going there would take all the Spanish troops 
out of Spain and at the same time far away from the sound of Scipio's name. , 746 
To continue the protection of Spain, the generals decided Mago should turn over 
his forces to Hasdrubal Gisgo while Mago went to the Balearic Islands to hire auxiliary 
troops. 747 Although most of Livy's narrative of 207 B. C. is devoted to operations in Italy, 
he does record minor operations in Spain. He indicates a new general, Hanno, has been 
sent to replace Hasdrubal Barca, and we must assume the Carthaginian Senate is 
744 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita -20.3-8. , 27 
745 Livvý Ab Urbe Condita, 27.19.1. 
-46 Livy. Ab Urbe C 27.20. 
747 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 27.20.3-8. 
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responsible for his disposition to Spain . 
741ý The fact that neither side forced an important 
engagement until Ilipa in 206 suggests the Carthaginian policy was to prolong the war in 
Spain until they could ascertain the outcome of events in Italy. But the most likely reason 
for the delay is that to the Carthaginian. goverment and to its generals in Spain the 
previous two years' increased naval activity off the coast of Africa looked like a prelude 
749 
to an invasion of the homeland . 
The dispositions made by Rome in the winter of 208-207 B. C. reflect the added 
danger perceived from the imminent arrival of Hasdrubal in northern Italy. The Senate 
appointed Gaius Claudius Nero and Marcius Livius as consuls with Livius to intercept 
Hasdrubal in the north, while Nero contained Hannibal in the south, "... each of them 
should keep anenemy in his province, and not allow them to come together and combine 
their armies in one. ), 
750 Similar conclusions seem appropriate when we discover the 
consuls completed the levy of their troops with all possible speed and left for their 
provinces earlier than intended when word reached Rome that Hasdrubal was already on 
his way over the Alps. The northern army consisted of two legions with an equal force of 
Italian allies. The southern army was of the same strength, with each consular army 
supported by another two. The praetor Lucius Porcius Livinus commanded an army to 
assist Livius while T. Varro, led a second army into Etruria to further subdue the region. 
Quintus Fulvius Flaccus supported Nero in Bruttium and another army under the 
command of Gaius Cato remained in Tarentum. 751 In Italy alone fifteen legions, 
148 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 28.1-4.4. 
1-19 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 27.29.7-8 & 28.4.7. 
, r, 0 2- Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 27.3 9.3 . ..... uterque 
hostem in sua provincia contineret neque coniungi aut 
conferre in unum vires pateretur. " 
751 Li-, ýy, Ab Urbe Condita. 27.35. 
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representing 75,000 Roman citizens were under arms, with an equal number of allies 
752 
available or nearly four times the number Hannibal faced in 218 . 
"The setting out of the consuls from the city in opposite directions, as though for 
two wars at the same time, had drawn men's anxious thoughts both ways, while 
they not only remembered what disasters the first coming of Hannibal had 
brought into Italy... But now that two wars had been admitted into Italy, tNNo 
generals of the greatest celebrity were circling the city of Rome, and upon one 
spot the whole mass, the entire weight of the danger had settled. Whichever of 
them was the first to win a victory would within a few days unite his camp with 
the other's. 
ý, ý753 
No one expected Hasdrubal - least of all Hannibal - to cross the Rhone and then 
754 
the Alps as quickly and easily as he did . 
Considering the Alps had now been open to 
twelve years of constant use and the inhabitants had been hearing stories of the war 
between the two cities for more than eleven years, it is not surprising that Hasdrubal 
755 found the trip easier than that experienced by Hannibal . 
Partly because of the ease with 
which Hasdrubal crossed, both Livy and Appian believe he used the same route as his 
752 Livy, Ab Urbe C 27.36.10-13. 
753 Livy, Ab Urbe 27.40.1 & 6. "Consules diversis itineribus profecti ab urbe velut in duo pariter 
bella distenderant curas hominum, siinul recordantiurn, quas primus adventus Hannibalis intulisset Italiae 
clades,... Nunc duo bella in Italiam accepta, duo celeberrimi nominis duces circumstare urbem Romanam, 
et unum in locum totam periculi molem, omne onus incubuisse. Qui corum prior vicisset, intra paucos dies 
castra. " 
754 Polybius. The Ifistories. 1 1.1 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Coniment4a on Polybius Vol. 11, pages 
267-272. 
5 ý, Livy, Ab) UrbeCondita, 27.39. 
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brother. 756 Once he crossed the Po in 207 he advanced on Placentia, setting siege to the 
city. Most likely he wished to impress the Celts of the region in hopes of adding to his 
army. Waiting only long enough to recruit sufficient Gauls and Ligurians, before pressing 
on southward toward Arin-finum, Porcius retreated before the mighty Carthaginian forces. 
Even after Livius arrived with his two legions, the Romans could not resist Hasdrubal's 
advance. The Romans fell behind the river Metaurus on the coast and camped under the 
walls of Sena. 
757 
The main argument for supposing that Hannibal coordinated his plans with the 
news of Hasdrubal's arrival can be interpreted from his efforts to break fi7ee from the 
Roman forces in his vicinity. First he set out to augment his numerically inferior force by 
gathering all his garrisons into one army. Assuming he would have to go north to meet 
Hasdrubal, he was well aware of the advantage to the Carthaginian cause and the 
destabilization their combined victory in central Italy or Umbria would wreak on Rome. 
He must have weighed the risks posed by leaving Bruttium defenseless even for a few 
months - the possible loss of Bruttium, if not all, at least the seaports of Locri and 
Crotona. These ports were essential if he hoped to receive aid from Carthage, maintain 
links with the Macedonians, and, as a last resort, to re-embark for Africa with his men. 
From Livy's account we know he took the time to assemble the detachments scattered in 
the various garrisons in Calabria and marched his army into Lucania. 758 
In two subsequent engagements with Nero, Hannibal reportedly suffered more 
losses than his adversary; however, as stated earlier it was Roman tradition to magnify 
enemy losses. Hannibal not only gave Nero the slip under cover of night, he reached 
7 ý; 6 Livy, Ab Urbe Condim 27.39.4ff & Appian, Hannibalic War, 52. 
757 Li-%rv, Ab Urbe Con&tý 27.46.6 & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal, s Aar, page 184. 
758 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 27.4 1.1. 
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Metapontum, adding its garrison to his troops. Next he ordered his lieutenant and nephew, 
Hanno, the commander of Metaponturn, to form another army in Bruttium- Hannibal's 
ensuing movements described by Livy, from Apulia into Lucania, back into Apulia and 
from there into Bruttium show an uncanny sense of movement used to baffle Nero's 
pursuit and further hold off Rome's attacks until he amassed sufficient forces for the 
759 If we view the events E march north. rom Hannibal's perspective, upon closer 
examination his devices become obvious. No effort to conceal all traces of such a large 
army's movement is possible, by doubling back on his tracks, his actual movements 
would become obscured and confusing to Nero's pursuing army. Nevertheless, Nero 
dogged his footsteps, while summoning the pro-consul Fulvius Flaccus from Capua into 
Lucania to join forces: in total 40,000 foot soldiers and 2,500 cavalry. 760 With his army 
increased Hannibal returned to Venusia where he took up a position at Canusium in 
Apulia to await news from Hasdrubal. 761 It is at this point according to Livy that the -FLF 
762 Romans intercepted Hasdrubal's message to Hannibal . 
The Plan Discovered 
With little to no access for communication with Hannibal, Hasdrubal sent a 
written dispatch, which outlined his planned southeastwards march to combine their 
forces "in Umbria" . 
763 Sending six messengers south - four Gaulish and two Numidian 
horsemen - they traveled at night careful to avoid any area where the Romans were 
known to be concentrated. The messengers crossed nearly the entire length of the Italian 
759 Livýý, Ab Urbe CgpdLitp, 27.41-42 & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's 
-M 
ýar, page 207. 
760 Livy, Ab rbe Condita, 27.40.14 & 7.42.15-7. 
761 Livv, Ab Urbe Condija, 27.42.15-17. 
762 Livy, Ab Urbe. Co-ndita, 27.43.1. 
63 LiN-N. Ab Urbe Condita, 27.43.8. 
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peninsula before their safe arrival in Apulia, only to find Hannibal had moved on to 
Bruttium. As they attempted to follow him, foragers from the army of Quintus Claudius 
Flamen quite fortuitously captured the six near Roman-held Tarentum. Forced to speak 
under threat of torture, the message was turned over the Claudius Nero, who read the 
letter through an interpreter. 764 It is important to note that Hasdrubal's intentions must 
remain uncertain for tragedy began to unfold for Carthage from this point. Though 
Hannibal had received no word from his brother, Hasdrubal in turn had no idea the march 
north to meet him had not begun. Nero forwarded the captured document on to the Senate 
along with a plan of action to crush Hasdrubal at the Metaurus river before Hannibal had 
the opportunity to know where to find his brother's Carthaginian anny. 765 
If we again build on the historic text offered from the War Between the States, we 
can further evaluate how captured documents might damage a well-intended plan. Lee's 
Special Order 191 provides a kind of detail not available from the 2nd Roman War and yet 
the outcome is consistently analogous. In another of Robert E. Lee's astoundingly bold 
moves, on 5 September 1862 Lee led his Army of Northern Virginia across the Potomac 
into Maryland with an invasion force of 60,000 men. Lee understood only to well that the 
South could not win a long war of attrition. The North, with far more men, money, and 
supplies, would surely prevail if the struggle went on long enough. Just as Hannibal knew 
he needed to win over the Italian allies, Lee saw that the best hope for the South was to 
win over the border states - of which Maryland was the most important - gain 
international credibility, and in the process, destroy the North's will to continue the fight. 
Then something inconceivable happened. After Lee drew up Special Order 19 1, 
detailing his plan for opening the invasion of the North, he distributed copies of the 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condit 27-43 & NIE. Austin and N. B. Rankov, ELcploratio page 35. 
-6S 
Livy, AbUrbeCondi 27.43 & S. Lancel, Hannibal, page 147. 
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document to his chief generals, including General Daniel Harvey Hill. On September 13'h 
Union troops occupied the campground Hill had just vacated. There, Union Private W. B. 
Mitchell, of the 2 7h Indiana Regiment, found the discarded document wrapped around a 
packet of cigars. Realizing he had found something of importance, Mitchell passed the 
papers to his superiors, who sent it to Union general George McClellan- An officer on 
McClellan's staff recognized the handwriting of Lee's assistant adjutant general, which 
convinced McClellan the note was genuine. 766 Obviously, Nero considered the letter 
carried from Hasdrubal to Hannibal as genuine as well for he sent Hasdrubal's letter to 
Rome with a dispatch, which revealed his own intentions. 
767 
Here too emerges the Roman plan of action- if Hannibal could be contained in the 
south while a concentration of troops was brought to bear on Hasdrubal, Rome might 
defeat each brother separately. Speed became the essential element in the plan and 
Claudius Nero executed a manoeuvre Hannibal-like in skill and audacity. Nero advised 
the Senate to call forth all Romans who could bear arms and move the two home legions 
forward to defend the narrow gorge of the Flaminian road at a strategic point between 
Sabinum and Umbria . 
768Having arranged for provisioning along his route, Nero chose 
7,000 men, including 1, , 000 cavalry; then leaving his lieutenant Quintus Catius to guard 
his camp with the bulk of his army - approximately 30,000 men - he marched with the 
7,000 to join his co-consul Marcus Livius. The life or death of the Republic depended on 
the stealth and speed of the march. Day and night they moved north until in seven days 
they arrived to join Livius' army under cover of darkness. We might put it this way, even 
if Hannibal had gotten wind of Nero's manoeuvre, with the force left under Catius he 
766B. Catton, The Civil War, page 95. 
4ita.. 27.43.8ff. 767 Livy, Ab Urbe Cgn 
'u LiN3 Ab UrjrbeCondita, 27.43.8-9. 
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lacked the capability to hurriedly follow in pursuit. Although McClellan saw that Lee's 
plan was a hazardous one - to split his forces in two, with Jackson heading towards 
Harpers Ferry and Longstreet towards Hagerstown - he now held the key that would 
change the course of American history. With Lee's army split, McClellan was closer to 
the two than they were to each other. Provided he could move fast he might destroy one 
force then the other - the crux of Claudius Nero's plan. 
The Battle of Metaurus 
769 
The idea that Hasdrubal "was not UnWilling7)770 to accept thechallenge offered by 
Porcius and Licinus brings up the question as to why he did not make every effort to 
avoid battle and continue his march south. Could it be he imagined he held the advantage 
with his enhanced numbers, the ease with which he had forced Lucinus and Porcius back 
to the river Metaurus., and the added confidence Hannibal would surely have received his 
message? Even if all of these aspects are true the most compelling argument is the 
psychological concept of pride. Trying to duplicate his brother's earlier success, he not 
only crossed the Alps with considerably less difficulty, he immediately set siege to 
Placentia in order to, like Hannibal, win support from the Celts before he proceeded. His 
recent losses in Spain farther suggests he may have felt compelled to accept a pitched 
battle early on just as Hannibal had in his three resounding early victones in order to re- 
establish his authority. 
769 For more on the battle of the Metaurus, see Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The Struggle for Power in the 
Mediterranean, pages 264-268; L. Cottrell, Hannibal, pages 196-207; T. A. Dodge, Harmib4 pages 546- 
560 & H. H. Scullard, A Histoly of the Roman World 753 to 146 B. C. 4h Edition, pages 229-232. 
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Livy indicates upon noticing the enemy's numbers seemed greater than they had 
the day before, Hasdrubal had the recall sounded immediately. 77' Additionally, his scouts 
reported that the trumpets had sounded twice that morning at the consul's tent. Anxiety 
ridden that one consul had gotten away from Hannibal and that he faced both consuls, 
Hasdrubal made the crucial decision to break away, intending to re-cross the Metaurus by 
night with his army. 
772 (. f Least of all could he suspect the fact ... 
Surely he had been 
deterred by no common disaster and had not dared pursuit. Hasdrubal greatly feared that 
after all that the Romans would have the same good fortune in Italy as in Spain. , 
773 
Because Hannibal might have already realized the missing Roman troops in the south, 
Nero insisted Livius and Porcius offer battle immediately. 774 Deprived of his guides who 
had fled, pursued by the Roman army, Hasdrubal was forced to give battle, his back to the 
Metaurus in the worst possible conditions. 
775 
14asdrubal deployed his army to take as much advantage as possible of the local 
terrain- his left wing rested on the river Metaurus alon a stretch too deep to cross, he 9 
formed the Gauls along a ravine, covering their front; he placed the Ligurians in the 
center with his best troops; and he personally led the right wing of Spanish soldiers. I-Es 
elephants were placed in front of the Ligurians and Iberians. What seems clearly Missing 
is the position of his cavalry - no account of their placement is available. Livius faced 
Liw, Ab Urbe Co 27.47. Iff & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War page 187. 
'72 Polybius,, The Histories 11.1-3 &F. W. Walbank, 
-Al-listorical 
CommentglyonPolybius, Vol, H, pages 
267-274. 
713 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 27.47.6 & 7. "Nfinime id quod erat suspicari poterat,... profecto haud mediocri 
clade abstcrritum inSequi non ausum; magno operc veren ne pcrditis rebus serum ipse auxfllum venisset 
Romanisque eadem iwn fortuna in Italia quae in Hispania esset. " 
774 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita. 27.46 & J. F. LazenbY, Hannibal's 3Kar, page 207. 
775 S. Lancel. Hannibal. page 148. ýL_ 
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him with about the same number of men, plus Nero with his 7,000. Livius deployed his 
legions opposite the Ligurians and Spanish; Nero positioned facing the Gauls. 
Hasdrubal attacked with his elephants, followed by his right Wing and center. The 
ensuing battle was hard fought and hung in the balance. Nero, finding he could not get at 
the Gauls because of the ravine, took 2,000 infantry and marched them across the Roman 
rear to fall on the Spanish flank. With Hasdrubal's Spaniards and Ligurians now 
encircled, the battle was decided. Realizing all was lost, Hasdrubal spurred his horse into 
the Roman lines., sword in hand, he died. Polybius states, 
"But Hasdrubal, as long as there was a reasonable hope of his being able to 
accomplish something worthy of his past, was more careful of nothing in action 
than of his own safety, but when fortune had robbed him of the last shred of hope 
and forced him to face the last extrenuty, though he neglected nothing in his 
preparations for the struggle or m the battle itself that might contribute to victory, 
nevertheless he took thought how if he met with total defeat he nught confront 
that contingency and suffer nothing unworthy of his past. , 776 
The Carthaginian dead amounted to 57,000, the prisoners to 5,400. This number 
may be inflated for propaganda purposes to compare it with the losses of Rome at 
Cannae. Never in one day had so many Carthaginians been killed in a single action. 777 As 
776 Polybius, The Histories, 11.2.9-10. 
"'Aa6poupaq 6', scoq 49V TIV Fk7tlq SK TOW ICOL'EOL kOYOV TOU 60VOLGOOLt 7EPUTTCIV OLýtOV TIrG)V 
7tpopspl(j)w, v(t)v, ou&voq ýLoLkkov 7EPOEVOCtTO KOLTOL'EOUq KtV&)VOUý G)ý, rTjq (XI)-COV) Cy(j), UTpLoLq. 2;, Rpl 
8C XWTOCý OC06,0ýt6VTJ M; 61q'10 ýW-kkOV F-k7Ct6()L; 71 TUXTJ CTI)VF-K-ýZtM 7CPOq TOV SCTZOLTOV IC(XtpoV, 
01-)&, v 7totpakt71ü)V OUTF- IMPI TTIV 7[Otf)("0K21)TIV (-)IM KotTot TOV KIVÖI)VOV 7ipc)ý -ro VIKOCV 
777 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 27.49. Polybius, The Histories 11.3.3 puts the Carthaginian and Gauls at 
10,000 killed in the battle & F. W. Walbank, A Histoncal Coinimen1gy on Polybius, Vol. H, pages 273-274. 
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well, American historians call the battle of Antietam Creek "the single bloodiest day of 
the war. -, -)778 Union casualties numbered 12,000 while Confederate losses were close to 
14,000. Hasdrubal. had proven himself on many battlefields and was worth far more to the 
Carthaginian cause alive. But for whatever reason, whether it was despair from the 
overwhelming defeat, or the assumption that Hannibal lay dead in the south of Italy 
Hasdrubal "... having done all that a good general should, fell in the thick of the fight. , 779 
Thus the ancient sources give us the impression that before Hannibal realized the 
Roman troops had gone, Nero returned south to face him. Evidence further suggests he 
learned of Hasdrubal's defeat only when Nero had his severed head thrown into the 
Carthaginian camp. Seeing Affican soldiers in chains, the consul allowed two of the 
Numidians to cross the lines to bring news of the disaster. "Hannibal, under the blow of 
so great a sorrow, at once public and intimate, is reported to have said that he recognized 
the destiny of Carthage. "780 The loss of Stonewall Jackson produced a comparable 
response in Lee. 
Returning to his own lines in preparation for launching a night attack, Confederate 
pickets mistook General Jackson and his party for Union cavalry. Jackson's wounds 
forced the surgeons to amputate his right arm. Although the Confederates drove the 
Union troops from their positions the next day at Chancellorsville, they failed to win a 
decisive victory. After the battle, Lee sent Jackson the following message: "Could I have 
directed events, I would have chosen for the good of the country to have been disabled in 
B. Catton, The Civil. War page 95. 
Polvbjus, The Histories, 11.2. 
'80 UNý, ý 
Ab Urbe Condita, 27.51.12. "Hannibal. tantio sirnul PublicO familiarique ictus luctu. agnoscere se 
fortunam Carthaginis fertur di-xissc 
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your stead. I congratulate you upon the victory, which is due to your skill and energy. 11781 
While recuperating Jackson contracted pneumonia and died. The day after his death, Lee 
wrote his son, Custis, I have lost my right arm ... 
it is a terrible loss. I do not know how to 
replace him. 7,782 Even though no person is irreplaceable, the sudden an unexpected loss of 
a key player and close relationship proved a devastating blow to both Hannibal and Lee. 
The vulgarity of Nero's gesture shows more thoroughly than the barbarity of the 
act. Hannibal's respectful treatment of the bodies of Aemilius and Marcellus attest to the 
fact that he would never have done such a deed. After Cannae, as after the battle of 
Trasimene, Hannibal sought among the slain bodies of his distinguished opponents and 
gave ceremonial burial With military honours to Lucius Aemilius Paullus and others. 
Likewise,, as soon as Hannibal learned of Marceflus' death, he himsýelf rode the woods 
until he found the body and had it cremated with due honours to be sent in a silver urn to 
the dead man's son. Hannibal had respected Marcellus as an opponent, and as was his 
custom with Men opponents, he paid him the marks of respect due to a man worthy of 
honour. 783 
We might put it this way, the battle of Metaurus halted any Carthaginian attempt 
to defeat the Romans in their homeland just as clearly as Hasdrubal's severed head 
signaled Hannibal had lost the initiative for the first time in twelve years. The temptation 
to return to Carthage must have been nearly irresistible. In one complicated instance he at 
least showed that the blow had struck home. He gathered aR his men, including the 
Metapontum garrison and took refage in the extreme tip of Bruttium where he still 
'81 A. Kaltman. The 3enius of Robert E. Lee page 255. 
782 A. Kaltman. The Genius of Robert E. Lee, page 255. 
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784 
retained the two small seaports of Croton and Locri . It 
is possible that Hannibal's sole 
concern may have been the safety of his men because at this stage in the war manpower 
must have been far more important than the retention of hostile towns. The apparent 
problem that Spain would soon pass out of Carthaginian control indicates the next action 
by Rome would be an invasion of the Carthaginian homeland- Thus Hannibal must have 
already anticipated the need for him to bring as many seasoned soldiers with him in case 
of a recall to Carthage. 
Through our examination of the battle of Antietam we find the confrontation 
tactically a draw; however, strategically, just as Metaurus was to Rome, it was a Union 
victory of unsurpassed importance. The Southern invasion failed, the North regained the 
initiative, and European statesmen failed to recognize the Confederacy. 785 Hasdrubal's 
northern invasion of Rome ended in total collapse, creating an advantage never before 
achieved by Rome. Yet even though McClellan drove Lee out of Maryland, he missed the 
opportumty to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia and, possibly, end the war. Nero's 
failure to bring Hannibal to battle created the same missed opportunity for Rome to 
destroy the Carthaginian army on the Roman home ground. When McClellan allowed Lee 
to escape with what remained of his army, the Maryland campaign had failed - the war 
would go on. And go on it did for Rome. Although for another two years Hannibal was 
never beaten in a pitched battle on Italian soil, from 207 onward, Hannibal's guiding 
principle must have been not merely how to preserve his army, but how to preserve 
Carthage itself If Rome mounted a significant invasion of Africa, forces in Italy might be 
so weakened that he could again be a threat. For a short time to retain this small patch of 
'8" Livy. Ab Urbe Condita. 27.5 1; S. Lancel, Hannibal, page 149 & E. Bradford, Hannibg pages 193 -194. 
B. Catton, T-htle CiNil War, Page- 96. 
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territory in Italy seemed the best way for Hannibal to protect Carthage. Ultimately, the 
situation was a standoff neither side could afford to maintain- 
Carthage Sends Reinforcements 
At the beginning of the spring 206 B. C., Rome assigned the two new consuls to 
Bruttium; however, after being ambushed by Carthaginian troops, they withdrew to 
Lucania. Livy asserts, 
"With Hannibal there was no campaigning that year. For neither did he invite 
attack, owing to his very re=nt wound, a blow national as well as personal, nor 
did the Romans provoke him so long as he remained inactive, such power they 
believed to be present III that one commander, even though everything else 
around him crashed. -), )786 
l he epidemics raging in the camps of the Romans and Carthaginians in Bruttium T 
further prevented Hannibal ftom undertaking any special operations. 787 He continued to 
wait; conducting a defensive posture, again hoping his brother Mago might have better 
fortune than Hasdrubal. He continued to base his hopes on Mago's arrival, patiently 
holding his ground, eager to seize any opportunity to join forces and once more become 
active offensively. 
In the autumn of 206, with no hope for Carthage to retain its presence in Spain, 
Mago prepared to withdraw to Africa. Before his departure Livy states he received orders 
from Carthage to take his fleet to northern Italy and recruit as many Gauls and Ligurians 
786 Livy- Ab Urbe Condita, 28.12.1. "Cum Hannibale nihil eo anno rei gesttlm est. Nwn neque ipse se 
obtulit in tqam recenti volnere publico privatoque neque lacessienmt quietum Romani: tantam Inesse vm, 
etsi omnia alia circa eum ruerent, in uno illo duce censebant. " 
187 e T. A. Dodge, HanmLbal, page 577-578. 
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788 
as possible and then to try to join Hannibal . At this time the 
Carthaginians persisted in 
the chance that Mago's arrival in the Po Valley in concert with Hannibal's continued 
presence in Bruttium Rome might be swayed into a peaceful settlement. After an 
unsuccessful raid on Carthago Nova, Mago augmented the funds sent by the senate with a 
ransom from the inhabitants of Gades and set sail for Ibiza. ) a 
Carthaginian territory. 789 
From there he pushed on to Majorca, retreating to Minorca to spend the winter. 790 In the 
spring of 205 Mago, along with thirty warships and a transport fleet carrying 12,000 foot 
soldiers and 2,000 horsemen, made the journey fi7orn Mnorca to the Ligurian coast 
without a break -a nautical feat in antiquity. 
79' He took Genoa without difficulty. After 
reaching an agreement with the Ligurian Inguani, Mago stored his treasure securely in 
Savona and sent all but twelve of his ships back to Carthage. During the summer of 205 
Mago received reinforcements from Carthage, 792 as well as additional troops from among 
the Ligurians and the Gauls of the Po Valley. Here too in 205 emerges an incident where 
Livy says some eighty Carthaginian merchant ships were captured off Sardinia, and 
according to his source, Coelius Antipater, they were carrying supplies to Hannibal. 793 
794 Even if the fleet was really on its way to Mago , 
if accurate, the Carthaginian policy 
makers had finally begun to focus their attention on Italian mainland. 
To bar Mago's access into central Italy, the Roman Senate effected large-scale 
troop movements, blocking both sides of the Apennines. Although our sources indicate 
788 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 28.36.1-2, E. Bradford, Ha--n m-b-al, page 200. 
789 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 28.36.3. 
790 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 28.36-7. 
791 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 29., 5.2, 
-. 92 Livyý Ab Urbe Co ý 29.1.14. 
793Li, %, -N Ab Urbe Condita, 28.46.14. 
794 IF Lazenby. Is page 196. 
326 
most of Etruria was ready to go over to hirrý795 he waited almost the two years, until the 
summer of 203, before launching a move against the Roman legions near Milan. The 
battle, which soon went against the Carthaginians, turned into a rout when Mago fell from 
his horse with a lance through his thigh. Even though critically injured he was able to 
retreat to the Ligurian coast where ships awaited him with a message fi7om the 
Carthaginian senate to return at once to Carthage. Possibly some of his ships did reach the 
Affican coast however, Mago died at sea off the coast of Sardinia. 796 
Although it is unclear whether Hannibal had heard of his brother's successful 
landing in Liguria, it would have mattered little except as moral support, for his 
diminished forces were subjected to a tight blockade in Bruttiurn by at least 40,000 men. 
The chance of combining his army with Mago's forces, even if Mago had been able to 
defeat the four legions blocking his entry, would have been even more difficult than the 
earlier task of joining Hasdrubal. He was literally cut off from any help. 
The Roman Invasion of Africa 
797 
On a broader scale we must examine the political climate in Afhca to understand 
the situation Carthage now faced. In the third century B. C., with the exception of 
Carthage, three kingdoms shared North Affica: the kingdoms of Massyli, Masaesyli, and 
Mauri. Baga ruled the Mauri (modem Morocco), the largest of the kingdoms was 
'95 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 29.36.10-12. 
796 S. Lancel, Hannibal, pages 154-155 & T. A. Dodge, Hannibal, page 571. 
For more on the invasion of Africa, see N. Bagnall, The Punic Wars pages 267-285; G. P. Baker, 
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280-285; B. Caven, The Punic Wars, pages 230-248; T. A. Dodge, Hannibal pages 561-595; T. A. Dorey 
ýnst Carthage. pages 134 and D. R. Dudley, Rome Aga -143, A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pages 286- 
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Masesyli, covering half of modem Algeria, ruled by Syphax, while Gaia controlled the 
southern territory of Massyh all the way to the Tunisian coast of Gabes down to the lesser 
Syrtis. 
These indigenous Numidian princes did not remain passive spectators in the 
struggle between Rome and Carthage. Both the Romans and the Carthaginians realized 
their importance and aggressively courted each. Siding with one or the other, they 
alternated their loyalties. Gaia supplied Carthage with troops sent to Spain under his son 
Masinissa, who fought alongside the Carthaginians between 212 and 206- Nevertheless, 
after 206 Masinissa contributed to the Carthaginian downfall in Spain. Only in Spain did 
the year 206 see a decisive battle, Ilipa, and the final withdrawal of Carthaginian forces 
there. Sensing a change in the balance of power after the crushing defeat suffered by the 
Carthaginian army at Ilipa, Masinissa sought an interview with Scipio in 206, offering his 
support to the Roman general if Rome should bring the war to Africa. Scipio, realizing 
the value of the Massylian cavalry, and fearing the possibility of engaging combat with an 
798 
army that was vastly superior in number on its home gTound, accepted . 
For several years Syphax had been courting the Roman's favour, thinking they 
would help free him from Carthage's yoke; however, in 206 Syphax was still committed 
to the Carthaginian alliance. In the summer of 206 Scipio crossed from Carthago Nova to 
Siga for a visit with Syphax. By chance Hasdrubal Gisco, embarking at Gades to return to 
Carthage made landfall at Siga at the same time as Scipio. Syphax urged both sides to 
enjoy his hospitality. Syphax and Scipio concluded a treaty with Scipio believing he had 
won the Numidian king's alliance, but he was wrong. Hasdrubal Gisgo managed to 
798 Lv, ý,, Ab Urbe Condit-q 28.35 & Polybius, The Histories. 14.1.3. 
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reclaim Syphax's loyalty to the Carthaginian cause by giving him his daughter, 
Sophonisba, in marriage, plus Syphax was not anxious to have Carthage as an enemy. 799 
At this time two factions in Rome had opposing ideas of how to continue the fight 
against Hannibal. Scipio proposed that he carry the war to Africa, while Fabius, ridiculed C) 
Scipio's plan. Fabius held the doctrine that the enemy's main army should be the primary 
objective; there should be no assault on Carthage in Affica as long as Hannibal remained 
in Italy. Instead, Scipio should bring the small army of Hannibal in Bruttium into battle 
and defeat him directly. Scipio, not unlike Sherman, saw beyond Hannibal's army, stating 
the main deterrent to peace was the will of the enemy to continue. An expedition to 
Afiica,, as Sherman's later march through South Carolina, might break this will and 
achieve a Roman victory. Further, if the result were not a victory, but merely a threat to 
Carthage, the Carthaginian senate would surely recall Hannibal to Affica, which would 
involve no further loss in Italy. 800 The Senate ultimately gave his proposal a lukewarm 
assent, and at the end of the year 206/205, Rome elected Scipio consul along with P. 
Licitýus Crassus. 801 
By declaring Sicily a consular province Rome set in motion the first step towards 
the invasion of Africa. The Roman Senate awarded Scipio proconsulship of Sicily, with 
pernussion to cross to Affica if he judged it to be in the best interest of Rome. 802 As 
discussed in Chapter Ul by awarding Scipio proconsulship, of an area in need of a strong 
nulitary presence, the senate allowed Scipio as proconsul to continue his preparations for 
an attack on Africa. Scipio saw an urgent need to build a strong cavahy force to counter 
, 99 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 28.18.9. 
80" B. Alexander, How Great Generals Win,. pages 57-59. 
'8'91 Livv, Ab Urbe Condita, 28.38.6. 
"')- Livy, Ab _Urbc 
Condita=, 28.45.1-8. 
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what he realized to be Hannibal's decisive weapon in battle. Hannibal's use of cavalry 
shows a striking ability to use his highly-trained forces to make the best use of its 
different components - the lighter Numidians to screen an advance at Tarentum, 
803 as a 
provoking influence at Trebia, 804 as a holding force at Cannae, 805 while the heavier, Celtic 
806 
and Spanish cavalry delivered the final blow against Rome at Cannae. Following 
Hannibal's example, Scipio set out to build up the Roman cavahy. 807 Meanwhile 
Hasdrubal insisted Syphax send a delegation to inform the Roman consul that he would 
find himself confronting Syphax as well as Carthage if he pursued his plan of landing in 
Africa. 808 The Romans knew that a war could not be waged on Carthaginian territory with 
any likelihood of success without the reliance on the neutrality, or better still alliance of 
the native princes; therefore, it became essential that Scipio should hurry his preparations 
for the Affican campaign. 
During the summer of 204 a Roman invasion force of 30,000 men led by Scipio 
disembarked on African shores near Utica, twenty miles northwest of Carthage, and set 
siege to the city. In response by late spring 203, Hasdrubal Gisgo assembled 30,000 
Carthaginian infantry and 3,000 cavalry while Syphax arrived with 50,000 foot soldiers 
and 10,000 horsemen. Feigning fear, Scipio prevented his army fi7om being overwhelmed 
and entered into negotiations to evacuate Affica in return for Hannibal's evacuation of 
Italy. However, his purpose was not to retreat, but to prepare for attack. Determining 
903 polybiUS, -Me Histories., 8.26.4 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Comme on Pql bius, Vol. H, page Ptaff y 
104. 
804 polybiUS. The I-Estories, 3.7 1.10. 
8115polybius, The tstories 3.112.3-4. 
806 IF Lazenby, dbal's War, page 256. 
80' B. Alexander, How Great Generals Win, page 58. 
808 Livv. Ab Urbe Condita, 29.23. 
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Syphax's camp the more vulnerable of the two, Scipio set fire to the flammable material 
of the huts encircling the camp. Soon the whole camp was ablaze. The Numidians and the 
Carthaginians assumed the fires were accidental and rushed out unarmed, only to be 
massacred by the Romans as they attempted to flee. Hasdrubal and Syphax managed to 
flee with only 2,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. 809 Much earlier in Lee's career a 
comparable situation took place while fighting in Mexico. 
A n. 
After the American victories at Contreras and Churubusco, the Mexicans 
requested an armistice. Gen. Scott agreed, and hostilities ceased on 24 August 1847. The 
purpose of the armistice was to give the American and Mexican negotiators the 
opportunity to conclude the peace treaty, however, by September 1th it was clear that 
Scott had been deceived. Instead of negotiating in good faith, the Mexicans had used the 
opportunity to regroup and strengthen their defenses guarding the approaches to Mexico 
City. 810 Many times throughout history we can see a ceasefire used as a manipulative 
tactic and each time it seems to take the agreeing faction by surprise. 
Scipio immediately struck the new enemy army before they could reorganize. Five 
days' march from Utica in the middle valley of the Medjerda Scipio met Hasdrubal Gisgo 
and Syphax once again. Of his two legions, he placed his cavalry on the right, Masinissa 
and his Massaesylians on the left. The Carthaginian forces were cut to an inadequately 
trained army of 35,000, plus an additional 4,000 Celtiberians recruited in Spain by 
Hasdrubal, which sustained the brunt of the battle. Hasdrubal fled to Carthage and 
Syphax took advantage of their resistance to retreat to his capital Cirta. In Carthage's 
senate, the consequences of the defeat were immediately apparent: after Utica it would 
bring the city of Carthage into the front line. The frightened Carthagiman senate 
809 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 30.5-7 & B. Alexander, How Great Generals Win, page 60. 
8") A. Kaltinan. The Genims of Robert E, Lee, page 65. 
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frantically made a decision to recall Hannibal from Italy without further delay, while also 
ordering Mago to return with his Gaufish recruits. 811 Upon hearing the envoys pleas, 
Hannibal exclaimed in frustration- 
" 'It is no longer obscurely but openly that I am being recalled by men who,, in 
forbidding the sending of reinforcements and money, were long ago trying to 
drag me back. The conqueror of Hannibal is therefore not the Roman people, so 
often cut to pieces and put to flight, but the Carthaginian senate by carpMg and 
envy. And over this mglorious return of mine it Will not be Publius Scipio who 
wildly exults, so much as Hanno, who, unable to do so by any other means, has 
,, 812 ruined our family by the downfall of Carffiage. 
Carthage Reacts to the Invasion and Hannibal Implements His Third Strategy813 
During the summer of 203, thirty Carthaginian senators traveled to Scipio. After 
prostrating themselves before him, they acknowledged the wrongs done to Rome by 
Carthage and laid the entire responsibility for the war upon Hannibal and his clan. 814 
They finished by appealing to the generosity of their victor. 
"" Polybius, The Histories 14.5.15; F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commegig! y on Polybius Vol. H, page 
430 & B. Alexander, How Great Generals Win, page 62. 
812 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 30.20.2-4. " Iara non perplexe' inquit, 'sed palam revocant qui vetando 
supplementum et pecuniam mitti iam pridem retrahebant. Vicit ergo Hannibalem non populus Romanus 
totiens caesus fugatusque, sed senatus Carthaginiensis obtrectatione atque invidia. Neque hac deformitate 
reditus mei tam P. Scipio exsultabit atque efferet sese quam Hanno, qu' domum nostram, qua-ndo alia re non 
poluit, ruina Carthaginis oppressit. "' 
"' For more on the Carthaginians reaction to the Roman invasion, see N. Bagnall, The Punic Wars pages 
286-289. 
814 polybUS, TIle 41stories, 15.1.6-7 & F. W. Walbank, A 1-fistorical CommeptM on Pol bius, Vol. II, LY 
pages 442 & 443. 
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"When they reached the Roman camp and headquarters they fell to the ground 
after the custom of courtiers, having derived that ceremony, I suppose, from the 
region from which they sprang. Such humble obeisance was matched bv their 
discourse, as they did not try to clear themselves of blame, but shifted the original 
blame to Hannibal and to those who supported his power. They craved pardon for 
a state now twice overthrown by the rashness of its citizens, to be saved a second 
time by the favour of its foes. ""' 
Later in the autumn of 203 a Carthaginian delegation arrived in Rome with the 
task of arranging a treaty clearing Carthage of all responsibility for the conflict, stating 
that their mission was purely and simply to ask for a return to the conditions of the peace 
treaty concluded in 241.816 Although the ancient historians agree Hannibal was blamed 
for the war rather than the Carthaginian people, they are not in concurrence regarding 
whether or not the treaty had been ratified. 817 The Roman Senate first rejected any 
discussion of a treaty as long as the Carthaginians still had armies on Italian soil, but after 
the departure of Mago and Hannibal, the conditions set by Scipio were adopted. The 
Roman Senate and people probably ratified the treaty on the terms laid down by Scipio 
815 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita,, 30.16.4-6. "Qui ubi in castra Romana et in praetorium pervenerunt, more 
adulantium - accepto, credo, ritu ex ea regione ex qua oriundi erant - procubuerunt. Conveniens oratio tam 
humili adulationi fuit, non culpam purgantium, sed transfcrentium initium culpac in Hannibalem 
potentiaeque eius fautores. Veniam civitati petebant civium temeritate bis iam eversae, incolurni futurae 
iterum hostium beneficio... ." 
816 Livv. Ab Urbe Condita, 30.22.6. 
817 Cassius Dio. Ro in Higo-a Vol. 1. trans. E. Cary, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.. 1914), 
17.74 & poj, ýbjus. The Histories, 15.1.34. 
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during the winter of 203-202 B. C. 818 Flistorians are not in agreement regarding whether or 
not the treaty had been ratified. 819 
It is impossible to reconcile these conflicting accounts, but we should be satisfied 
that the negotiations allowed Hannibal the time necessary to return from Italy and, 
hopefuHy, reverse the current situation in Affica. The idea being any truce and/or treaty 
allowed Hannibal the time necessary to arrange the disposition of his troops and their trip 
to Africa. Both Livy and Appian report claims of Hannibal butchering his Italian troops, 
horses, and pack-animals to be left behind, this would have been unusual for when he 
landed in 202 he must have had at least 12,000 troops if we examine the numbers at 
Zama. 820 Once he landed some hundred miles southeast of Carthage at Hadrumentum, the 
Carthaginians regained their confidence and broke off negotiations; though we see his 
mistrust of the Carthaginian senate led him to remain some distance from the city. Even if 
the delegation to Rome merely tried to delay the treaty long enough for his return, 
Hannibal certainly knew they had tried lay the blame for the war solely on him. In order 
to keep his distance from the Carthaginian government he took up winter quarters at 
Byzacena, which aflowed him to put enough space between his forces and Scipio's army 
yet maintain fi7eedom to manoeuvre. Remaining on his own properties, assured his 
personal safety while he continued to obtain reinforcements and supplies. He made 
provisions of wheat, bought horses, and turned to Syphax's Numidian relative, Tychaeus, 
8"' Polybius, The Histories, 15.1.3 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical CommeRtary on Polybius, Vol. 11, page 
442 
819 Polybius. The Histories. 15.1 ý34& 
Cassius Dio, Roman Histo! y 17.74. 
820 Livy, Ab Uirbe Condita, 30.20.5-6. Appian, Hannibalic War, 58-9 & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, 
pages 214-215. 
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for assistance . 
82 1 Although Mago died during the voyage to Carthage, his army of 12,000 
joined Hannibal, along with 2,000 cavalry ftom the still-loyal Tychaeus, and 4,000 
Macedonians, sent by Phifip v. 
822 
By the time the Carthaginian envoys, accompanied by a Roman delegation, 
returned to Carthage to witness the countersigning of the peace treaty by Scipio and the 
Carthaginian senate, they found themselves once again at war. A fortuitous incident for 
Carthage occurred when two hundred Roman transports escorted by thirty warships 
encountered a storm. Blown off course they entered Carthaginian territorial waters where 
the crews abandoned the transports. Subsequently those senators remaining in Carthage 
decided Hasdrubal Gisgo should salvage as many vessels as possible, along with the 
supplies contained onboard. The Roman ships were then towed to Carthage, where they 
were retained as captured war materials. 
823 
Fate had given Carthage the supplies they so desperately needed due to the 
shortages inflicted by the Roman army's presence. Scipio sent three envoys to 
remonstrate the Carthaginians, but the envoys' words only enflamed them. The majority 
saw no reason to surrender the windfall of ships and supplies; moreover, treaty 
obligations notwithstanding, Hannibal's return now opened the way for the restoration of 
their fortunes. 
Despite the threat Scipio posed, or possibly swayed by the excitement of 
Hannibal's return, the Carthaginians plotted the destruction of the envoys on their return 
trip. They attacked the Roman quinquereme in which they were traveling and although 
121 Polybius, The Histories, 15.3.5 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentga on Polybius, Vol. IL page 
444 
822LiN, N1, Ab Urbe Condita, 30.26. 
823 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita. 30.24. 
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824 
severely damaged the ship escaped with the envoys. Whether as a desire for revenge or 
as a message to the Carthaginian government, Scipio no longer accepted the submission 
of those cities offering to surrender, but took each by storm, laid the territory to waste, 
and reduced their inhabitants to slavery. For the council and the city, Rome's actions 
brought new and devastating consequences since this devastation was the first that had 
been unchecked. The loss of the tribute-paying cities and townships, which for centuries 
had maintained the great mercantile city, and the destruction of the fertile land, upon 
which Carthage depended for its grain and other food, was more than they could bear. 
At Hadrumentum, Hannibal received a delegation with orders from Carthage to 
march and challenge Scipio before it was too late. Hannibal marched west in the direction 
of Zama, and at once recognized the need to bring Scipio into battle before Masinissa had 
time to arrive 825 He sought a meeting with Scipio and two days later the two commanders 
rode out from the ranks of their armies, each accompanied by an interpreter and escorted 
by twelve horsemen. Both Polybius and Livy provide us with an idea of what took place 
at the meeting, but no record was kept of the encounter. Nevertheless, in the version by 
Polybius Hannibal broke the silence first, stating: 
" 'Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted any possessions outside 
Italy, nor the Carthaginians any outside Africa; for both these were very fine 
empires and empires of which it might be said on the whole that Nature herself 
had fixed their limits. But now that m the first place we went to war with each 
other for the possession of Sicily and next for that of Spam, now that, finally 
refusing to listen to the admonition of Fortune, we have gone so far that your 
native soil was once in imminent danger and our own still is, what remains but to 
82" Livv, Ab Urbe Condita, 30.25. 
82-1 pojNýbjus. The HistQn-ýP-S-, 15.5.3 & Livy. Ab Urbe Co 30.29.2. 
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consider by what means we can avert the anger of the gods and compose our 
present Contention? "826 
He continued on a more personal note: 
"But I fear that you, Publius, both because you are very young and because 
success has constantly attended you both m Spam and in Africa, and you have 
never up to now at least fallen into the counter-current of Fortune, will not be 
convinced by my words, however worthy of credit they may be. Consider things 
by the light of one example, an example not drawn from remote times, but from 
our own. 1, then, airn that Hannibal who after the battle of Cannae became master 
of ahnost the whole of Italy, who not long afterwards advanced even up to Rome, 
and encampmg at forty stades ftom the walls deliberated with myself how I 
should treat you and your native soil. And now here I wn in Africa on the point of 
negotiating with you, a Roman, for the safety of myself and my country. Consider 
this, I beg you, and be not overproud, but take such counsel at the present 
826 Polybius, The Histories, 15.6.4-7. 
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Juncture as a mere man can take, and that is ever to choose the most good and the 
leaSt evil. "827 
Hannibal then outlined his proposals, as follows: 
" 'I propose that all the countries that were fonnerly a subject of dispute between 
us, that is Sicily, Sardinia, and Spam, shall belong to Rome and that Carthage 
shall never make war upon Rome on account of them. Likewise that the other 
islands lying between Italy and Africa shall belong to Rome. Such ternis of peace 
would, I am convinced, be most secure for the Carthaginians and most 
honourable to you and to aff the Romans. )n, 
828 
827 Polybius, The Histories. 15.7.1-5. 
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Again, although these passages are set-piece narratives by Polybius, they illustrate 
the sacrifice Hannibal was willing to assume to realize his third and final strategy 
regarding the war with Rome - damage control in the defense of Carthage. If we take into 
consideration Grant's recollections in 1879 of the events leading up to Lee's surrender at 
Appomattox we can grasp how two warring generals can exhibit a distinct mutual respect 
for the abilities of his foe. And even though the campaign may be all but won the victory 
does not diminish the honour of the defeated general or the welfare of his country. 
"The object of my campaign was not Richmond, not the defeat of Lee in actual 
fight, but to remove him and ]us army out of the contest. You see the war was an 
enormous strain upon the country. Rich as we were I do not see how we could 
have endured it another year, even ftom a financial point of view. So with these 
views I wrote Lee ... 
he does not appear well Hi that correspondence, not nearly so 
well as he did in our subsequent interviews, where his whole bearing was that of 
a patriotic and gallant soldier, concerned alone for the welfare of his army and his 
state. "" 
KocpXT16ovtot;, 6V8OýOTOLTOLq 66 GOt KOU nocat'Po)ýtatotq. " & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentga 
on Polybiu_, Vol. H, page 452. 
829 J. R. Young, Around the World With General Grant Vol. 2 (Washington, DC, 1879), page 546. 
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Hannibal's Defeat at Zarna830 
Although Hannibal offered terms far less favourable than those agreed upon by 
Carthage previously, for the senate had agreed to surrender Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia, 
return their prisoners without ransom, hand over most of their warships, and pay the 
Romans five thousand talents, they violated the peace- The attempt to negotiate a peace 
settlement failed. Scipio ended demanded that Hannibal either place Carthage at Rome's 
mercy, or to fight. 83 ' The two generals parted and returned to their lines in preparation for 
the coming battle. 
832 
Why did Hannibal take the time to negotiate when he knew he must fight Scipio 
before Masinissa and his cavalry arrived? Masinissa's 6,000 foot and 4,000 forniidable 
Numidian cavalry strengthened Scipio's already superb Roman horsemen and for once 
Rome had the better cavalry force. What drove the battered, hungry men on of the 
Confederacy: the glory of the Southern Cause? Could it be the honour of their country? 
The answer lay not in these things, but in the confidence and faith General Lee continued 
to inspire. But what must Lee have felt on April 8thwhen he concentrated the remnant of 
his ragged, hungry army between Appomattox Station, on the rail line, and Appomattox 
830 For more on the battle of Zama, see Sir G. de Beer, Hannibal: The Struggle for Power in the 
Mediterranean,, pages 285-290; B. Caven, The Punic Wars, pages 249-252; L. Cottrell, Hannibal, pages 
226-239; H. Delbrfick, Warfare in Antiquily pages 370-376; T. A. Dodge, Hannibal pages 596-612; A. 
Goldswortky, The Punic Wars pages 300-307; S. Lancel, -C-a-rt-ha-g-e: AA 
HistoM pages 400-401; S. Lancel, 
Hannibal, pages 172-176, IF Lazenby, Hannibal's War, pages 216-226; A. Santosuosso, Soldiers, Citizens 
& the Symbols of War: From Classical Greece to Republican Rome 500-167 B. C. (Boulder, CO, 1997), 
pages 190-198 & H. H. Scullard, A Histo! y of the Roman World 753 to 146 B. C. pages 236-239. 
831 Polybius, The Histories, 15.8 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Cqmmen us Vol. 11 ges RtM on Pol bi 'y , pa 
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Court House, a few miles to the northeast? In both instances, how much farther could 
Hannibal or Lee lead the men who put their lives in each man's hands? 
In Hannibal's case facing the Roman infantry, he placed a line of eighty elephants. 
Behind them he placed Ligurian and Gallic infantry with some Moorish and Balearic light 
troops. Drawn behind the infantry stood the Carthaginian and African troops. FinaRy, in 
the rear he placed the veterans of his Italian campaigns, under his personal command. The 
cavalry occupied the wings, the Carthaginians on the right facing Laelius, and the 
Numidians on the left facing Masinissa. 833 Hannibal's total force numbered 55,000 men, 
Scipio, with the addition of Masinissa's 10,000 men, commanded at most 36,000 troops. 
Scipio placed Masinissa and his horsemen on his right wing. The fleet commander 
Laelius commanded the Italian cavalry on the left wing. In between the cavalry wings, he 
placed the heavy Roman infantry in the usual three lines, placing them one behind the 
other to leave clear lanes between each cohort running through the troops from front to 
rear. 
Hannibal sought to compensate for his cavalry's deficiency by releasing his war 
elephants against the Roman infantry to break their formation, but Scipio was well 
prepared for his tactic. When the elephants char ed, Scipio had his troops spread in 19 
normal battle formation with the men re-formed into columns, leaving wide afleys 
between. He further instructed the men to blast war trumpets, accompanied by shouts, 
banging metal on metal, as much noise as possible to cause the elephants to shy away 
from the noise and into the alley ways. As they passed, archers shot at their handlers. 
Other elephants, met by a shower of javelins from the Roman front line, turned about and 
trampled into the Carthaginian cavalry's left wing. Before they could recover, Masinissa 
charged them furiously. The massed charge, which Hannibal had depended, proved 
, 
30.33. 833 Livy. Ab >rbe Condita 
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utterly ineffective. Thus,, Livy states, "On both sides the Punic battle-line had been 
strippe of its cavalry when the infantry clashed, no longer matched either in their hopes 
or in their strength. 1, )834 Now the real battle began. 
Hannibal's African and Carthaginian troops who formed the second line had not 
moved. As the hastati came to grips with the troops forming Hannibal's second line, the 
wearied Gauls and Ligurians who formed the fi7ont line were forced back upon them. 
Now he ordered the second line into action. Seeing their comrades in difficulties, the 
principes and triarii of the Roman second and third lines began to waver, but they 
responded to their officer's call. The Roman infýntry now outnumbered the second fine of 
Carthaginians so that their line flowed around the flanks of their enemy, hemming them 
in. Gradually, the second line of Hannibal's troops was overcome. Those who survived 
fled back to where the third fine waited to attack. When the remnants of the second fine 
tried to force their way back they were met by a row of spears and forced to retreat 
toward the flanks. "And by this time there were almost two battles in one, since the 
Carthaginians were forced to engage with the enemy and at the same time with their own 
men. "835 So began the final phase of the battle. The Romans had penetrated to their real 
antagonists, Hannibal's veterans from the Italian campaign, under the personal command 
of their leader. As Polybius saw Hannibal's use of his third fine of veterans as a reserve 
836 
was possibly the first example of the use of a true reserve in ancient warfare. 
834 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 30.34.1. "Utrimque nudata equite erat Punica acies cum pedes concurrit, nec spe 
nec viribus iam par. " 
835Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 30.34.7. "Et prope duo iam pemiixta proelia erant- cum Carthaginienses simul 
cum hostibus. simul cum suis cogerentur manus conserere. 
836 Polybius, The -jjstorig5,, 15.15.3 & J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page 256. 
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Faced with this moving wall, Scipio allowed his infantry to give way while his 
cavalry executed a flanking manoeuvre. Indeed Polybius says that "... the contest was for 
long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination, until Masinissa and 
Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper 
moment. -)-)837 The triumphant Romans and Masinissa's forces turned the battle into a 
massacre. And, though most of Hannibal's veterans fought grimly on they were cut to 
pieces. At the end of the day 20,000 Carthaginians lay dead, and nearly 20,000 captured 
in what was the last engagement of the 2 nd Roman War - the war was over. 
How did Lee handle the final struggle of the War Between the States and how do 
his actions compare to Hannibal's? Beginning in the confusion after Richmond's fall, Lee 
hoped to join his forces with those of Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina in order to 
prolong the war. 838No one knew better than Robert E. Lee that Union victory was now 
inevitable. At this point, motivated by a sense of obligation, Lee felt it his duty to 
continue to fight while he still could to preserve as much a chance as possible to negotiate 
surrender terms that were at least something more than abject and unconditional. Lee took 
his diminished army, slighter fewer than 50,000 men and marched west. With the Union 
army in chase, he tried to reach Amefia Courthouse where he expected to find supplies 
and gain access to the Danville and Richmond Railroad, which would take his army to 
Johnston. Obviously, Lee found himself in much the same situation as Hannibal on this 
occasion. 
831 Polybius, The Histories, 15.14.6-7. 
"... 6V OCUTOCtq ToCtq X(j)PCCtq 6V(X7EOOVTI(TKOVT(J)V TOV OCV8pWV 8tot ýtkort4toCV, 6(J)q Ot 7ECf)t TOV 
MOLCYOWNIOLCTOW KOU AoLtXtov outo Tot) 6t(J)YgOLTOq TOV t7E7EM)V CCV(XK(Xý17EToVT6q [Kott] &CtýLoVt(j)q 61ý: 
8F, OVT(X ICOLIPOV GIL)-%, TI%FoL%'. 
" 
838 A. Jones, Civil War Command & StratM page 217. 
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No one had dispatched the promised rations -a fact that hit the half-starved army 
particularly hard. Sheridan sent a brigade to reconnoiter in the direction of Lee's retreat, 
and, at Amelia Springs, attacked a wagon train attached to Lee's army. Having failed to 
connect with rations and supplies at Amelia Court House and unable to make a rail 
connection there, Lee turned to the southwest, bound for Rice Station, where he could get 
supplies by rail, then push south to fink up with Johnston. Grant, however, ordered 
attacks, and pursuing Federal forces hit the Confederate wagon train, 839 Confederate 
general Richard S. Ewell counterpunched, driving back the Union center; but the arrival 
of more Federals soon checked his efforts. As Federal strength continued to build, the 
Union forces were able to counter attack and surround -a double envelopment - Ewell's 
badly outnumbered command. Although three confederate commanders escaped, Ewell 
remained behind in an effort to lead his troops out of the trap. The hand-to-hand-fighting 
proved fierce, but hopeless. Ewell's men were engulfed, and he was captured, along with 
five other Confederate commanders, including George Washington Custis Lee, Robert E. 
Lee's eldest son. As for Gen. Lee, the commander in chief witnessed the battle from high 
ground in the rear. At 10: 00 p. m. that night, Lee received a message from Gen. Grant, 
requesting the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee refused. 840 
By April 5'h, the bulk of Lee's army was concentrated at Amelia Courthouse, 
about 30 miles west of Petersburg, blocked by Sheridan and others from making a break 
to the Richmond and Danville Railroad. When Gen. Custer's division moved rapidly 
against Appomattox Station, they drove off two Confederate divislons, and captured their 
supply train, as well as thirty pieces of artillery. Custer then pressed on toward 
Appomattox Court House where he discovered the Confederate defenses just to the 
839 B. Davis, Gray 
_rF02;, 
pages 357-376. 
840 B. Davis, Ggy Fox, pagc 389. 
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southwest of the town. Sheridan, with the main body of troops, caught up with Custer and 
prepared to launch an attack the next day. However, it was Robert E. Lee's generals, John 
Brown Gordon and Fitzhugh Lee who attacked first on the morning April 9,1865. While 
Gordon and Lee assaulted the hastfly constructed Federal breastworks, the Union cavalry 
and infantry pressed from the northeast - from Appomattox Court House - and, having 
gotten across Lee's line of march, also closed in fi7om the southwest, Appomattox Station. 
At this point, Lee was down to 30,000 soldiers, of whom only little more than half were 
arme . 
841 He saw that his broken army lay within the jaws of a vise. The army could not 
go forward, nor could it retreat. It was time to end it, for Lee knew that his entire army of 
thirty thousand men were willing to die if he did not choose to stop the fighting now. 
". 
.. there 
is nothing left for me to do but go and see Gen. Grant, and I would rather die a 
thousand deaths ... How easily I could 
be rid of this, and be at rest! " Lee said, "I have only 
to fide along the line and all will be over. But it is our duty to live. What will become of 
the women and chiddren of the South if we are not here to protect them? "842 This too must 
have been in Hannibal's mind when the battle of Zama came to an end: what will become 
of Carthage if I am not here to protect her? 
Hannibal managed to escape the scene of his defeat with a small escort and retired 
to Hadrumentum. To return at once to the city of Carthage in a state of emergency, 
directly after the disaster alone and without support invited crucifixion. Hannibal would 
have been placed at the mercy of his enemies. Many Carthaginian generals had been so 
harshly punished by the Council of Hundred and Four when a war or battle had been 
unsuccessful. Stopping at Hadrumentum allowed him enough time to obtain guarantees 
for his safety and enabled him to present himself in Carthage with an adequate escort. 
841 B. Davis, GM Fox. pages 397-401. 
y Fox, page 40 1. 
842 B. Davis. GLa 
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Before the Council he reported he had lost not only the battle, but also the war. He had no 
choice now but to advise the Carthaginians to accept the best terms they were offered. 843 
For the first time in his long career he had met his match not so much by a general, but by 
a lack of sufficiently trained cavalry. "44 Even now other Numidians, under a son of 
Syphax, were being mustered to come to his aid, but they reached Carthaginian territory 
too late. 
According to Livy, as Hannibal addressed the people's assembly, a single hard- 
line voice rang out against the treaty. Hannibal exasperated, hurled the man down from 
the platform. After apologizing for his manners, he urgently advised that they should 
agree without argument to conditions, which, bearing in mind the relative forces C) 
involved, could have been worse. 845 And Polybius concludes they voted to make the 
treaty with the conditions set out by Scipio. 
Seeing their great general and last army defeated, Carthage lay defenseless. Even 
though a siege would have been long and hard, Scipio's conditions for peace were 
reasonable: all deserters, prisoners of war, and slaves were to be handed over to Rome, 
Carthage's warships were to be reduced to no more than 10 triremes; Carthage was to 
retain its former territory in Affica, and its own laws, but Masinissa was to have 
completed control of his kingdom; Carthage must never make war on anyone, either IP 
within Affica or beyond without Roman permission; and since they had broken the truce, 
the original war indemnity was doubled, although they were allowed to pay in annual 
installments over a 50-year period. AJI war elephants were to be surrendered and no more 
, 30.35.11. 
843 Livy, Ab Urbe ýond 4ta 
844 polybiUS. -Me I-IiStoEiCS, 15.13.2 & 15.15.7-8 & F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentgxy on po s lybiu 
Vol. 11, page 464. 
845 15.19.1 & Livy, Ab Urbe Cogd Polybius. The -listories. lita, 30.37.7. 
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trained, while at the same time one hundred hostages were to be delivered to Rome as 
insurance against further treachery. The Carthaginians were to supply grain for the 
Roman army for three months, along with its pay until Rome ratified the peace treaty. 846 
The terms of the treaty Grant wrote for ending the conflict with Lee were generous as 
well. He would take no prisoners, but simply secure the paroles of officers and men not to 
take up arms until properly exchanged; for while the principal Confederate army had been 
vanquished, the war was not yet over. Officers were permitted to retain their sidearms, 
and officers and men could keep their horses and their personal effects. Everyone would 
be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long 
as they observed their paroles. 
847 
Considering all the tragedy Hannibal had inflicted on the Romans over so many 
years, it is surprising that Rome did not demand the surrender of Hannibal himself. It can 
only be concluded that Scipio must have had a great admiration and respect for his 
opponent as confirmed earlier by Grant for Lee. He may have also seen that Carthage 
needed a strong leader at the helm or they would collapse in ruins. To ensure that 
Carthage fulfilled the terms of the peace treaty, paid the reparations, and settled quietly 
agwn in North Affica, Carthage needed a man who fully appreciated how fortunate the 
city was to have been allowed any acceptable terms at all. This man was Hannibal. 848 The 
respect Scipio possessed for Hannibal is shown again in Robert E. Lee's adversary, 
General Ulysses S. Grant. Lee was particularly grateful for the generous treatment he 
received at Appomattox and Grant even threatened to resign his commission in the Army 
846 Polybius, The Histories 15.18.2; F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentgy on Polybius Vol. H, pages 
467 &, 469 and Livy, Ab Urbe Condita. 30.37.2. 
134 - ' B. Catton, The Civil War, page 266. 
"" E. Bradford, -Hannibal, 
page 228. 
347 
if Andrew Johnson continued to persecute Lee. Indeed Scipio's opposition in the senate 
considered the lenient terms proposed by him for the peace treaty between Carthage and 
Rome not enough to extract from Carthage for the seventeen years of desolation inflicted 
by Hannibal. Further, they viewed Scipio as a young man who achieved his victory far 
removed from the suffering in Italy. However, instigated by Scipio's supporters, the 
decision was referred from the Senate to the popular assembly. The common man wanted 
peace and the treaty was ratified by the spring of 201 B. C. 849 
Hannibal: Exile and Death 
850 
An 
Auer the traumatic spectacle of the five hundred warships making up the 
Carthaginian battle fleet, which seems to have worried Scipio far more than Hannibal's 
presence, being towed out to sea and set on fire, Scipio and the Roman army embarked 
for Rome. Hannibal was allowed to retain his military command and was additionally 
appointed civil magistrate. With Hannibal's new duties he set about the massive task of 
reconstruction. Apart from the warships, the town's vital parts had not been affected and 
of the twenty years of war, Carthage had only suffered two on its home ground. They 
waged the war mainly using African, Spaniards, Gauls and Italiots, and comparatively 
few of its own sons died in the fighting. Despite years of war, the city's commercial 
prosperity survived, even after the loss of Spain- Additionally, during the war the Romans 
had done little to suppress the trade between the Levant and the Western Mediterranean 
as it continued to flow along the North Affican coast. 
"19 E. BradforcL Hannibal pagcs 228-229. 
"5; 0 For a detailed account of Hannibal's activities after the battle of Zama. see G. P. Baker, Hannibal. pages 
277-328, Sir G. dc Beer, Hannibal: The Struggle for Power in the Mediterra pages 290-302 and 
especially S. Lancel. Hannibal pages 176-2 10. 
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The end of the War Between the States brought dramatic change to Lee's life. The 
Custis-Lee fortune was greatly reduced and Arlington was lost. fEs military career 
terminated, he was barred from public office, for which he was eminently qualified. 
Although he was among the first to accept the result of the war and to apply for amnesty, 
his petition was not acted upon until more than a century after his death. However, Lee 
held no bitterness, ) nor did he indulge 
in self-pity. Determined to set an example for 
fellow Southerners, he hoped the emotions of war years would be forgotten and the work 
of rebuilding the South and creating a great, unified America could be accomplished. His 
superb dignity, courage, and noble character in the difficult post-war years intensified 
admiration for him, earning him the respect of even his former enemies. In defeat, Lee 
achieved his highest level of greatness. 
Based on this assessment of Lee's post-war years we can appreciate that from the 
end of the war and for the following seven years Hannibal devoted himself to the affairs 
of his country and to rebuilding the trade prosperity of Carthage. No longer an expatriate, 
he devoted himself exclusively to Carthaginian home affairs and to ensuring that his 
country kept faith with the Romans. It was Hannibal's financial skill that helped insure 
that Carthage met the war reparations Rome had expected to go unfulfiRed- Without the 
payment as the terms proscribed, Rome would have been given the opportunity to invade,, 
causing the Roman hatred of Hannibal to revive. From the beginning of his task, Hannibal 
ran up against the hatred of his old enemies - the former peace faction that had declared 
trade, not war, the business of Carthage. They remained deliberately ignorant of the fact 
that as Rome expanded it never would have left their city in peace. A report by Livy 
states Hannibal burst into bitter laughter during the unrestrained lamentations and 
weeping when it came time to pay the first annual installment to Rome. When Hasdrubal 
Haedus rebuked Hannibal for his laughter, Hannibal revýealed his contempt for those 
349 
shopkeepers who had remained unmoved when their homeland was placed under Roman 
supervision, but now wept, incapable of understanding that they were bewailing the least 
of their misfortunes. 85 1 He had many enemies among the rich citizens of Carthage, for he 
had denounced a number of highly placed officials whose dishonestly he had uncovered. 
Since the people's assembly began to encroach on the prerogatives of the senate, the 
power of the sqffete and his influence in the state strengthened. Polybius places this 
"democratic" development at the start of the Barcid era when in 196 Hannibal was elected 
su le. 
852 
When Hannibal entered office he made use of a disagreement relating to financial 
matters with a magistrate to attack the powerful class of judges. He sent for the offending 
magistrate to give an account of his actions. The latter who belonged to the Barcid 
opposition ignored the summons, whereupon, Hannibal had him arrested and brought 
before the people's assembly. He proposed an immediate vote on a law whereby the 
judges would be elected annually, and none able to hold the office two years in 
succession. 853 It is not surprising that Hannibal did everything in his power to keep the 
senators in check. Among them were the same men who had been opposing the Barcid 
policies for over forty years and whom he did his best to force to restore their ill-gotten 
gains, in order to alleviate, if not abolish, the contributions of the ordinary citizens to 
payment of the war indemnity. His act of checking the accounts enabled him to assess 
how much of the public finances (land and sea taxes) were lost due to misappropriation of 
funds by these officials. He declared before the people's assembly that by demanding the 
8-" Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 30.44.4-11. 
852 pDlybius, The Histories, 6.51 & F. W. Walbank. A Historical Commeptary on Po Vol. 1. pages 73 5 
736. 
853 LiNy, Ab Urbe Condita, 33.46.3. 
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repayment of all the sums embezzled the state would be rich enough to acquit itself of its 
financial obligations to Rome without the need to tax private individuals. And according 
to Livy, he kept his word. 854 In his years of public service he undertook administrative 
and constitutional changes to end the existing oligarchic system of government. IFEs fate 
was sealed. 
During his year as suffete, Hannibal created many enemies in high places. A 
faction hostile to Hannibal in the senate wrote letters to the Roman senate denouncing the 
secret contacts, which according to them, Hannibal was having with Antiochus. "' Scipio 
addressed the Roman Senate as follows; "... it was undignified for the Roman people to 
become parties to the animosities of Hannibal's accusers, to lend the support of official 
prestige to party strife at Carthage... -)-)856 I-Es words went unheeded. There were many in 
the Roman Senate who watched with suspicion and jealously the commercial success of 
Carthage under Hannibal's direction and leadership. 857 Cato and his followers seized the 
opportunity as a pretext to act against him and sent an embassy to indict Hannibal before 
the senate and bring him back to Rome. Attorney General James Speed knew personally 
of General Grant's involvement in saving Lee from imprisonment and was convinced that 
it was Grant alone who saved Lee from this fate -a fate, which Johnson passionately 
wished to enforce. Speed recalled, "Grant expressed his unalterable determination that the 
terms he had written at Appomattox not be violated. He said, 'That is the way General 
854 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 33.47.2. S. Lancel, Hannibal pages 181-182. 
855 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 33.45.6. 
856 Livy, Ab Urbe Condi 33.47.4-5. "... qui parem ex di tate popu i Rom 
w 
gni 1 aiü esse ducebat subscrib,. --re 
odfis accusatortim Hannibalis et factionibus Carthaginiensiuni... " 
857 more infonnation on Hannibal's terin as suffete can be found in S. Lancel, Carth4gq, pages 401-404 & S. 
Lancel. Hanni , pages 
180-182. 
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Lee and I understood it at the time, and I will be drawn and quartered before they shall be 
violated. "858General Grant thwarted the jealousy and vindictiveness of President Johnson 
through his overwhelming popularity among both northern and southern citizens. 
Confederate general Joe Johnson relates, "... Grant declared that if any Federal official 
molested Lee, then he would surrender his commission in the United States army. I have 
always felt that General Grant should be entitled to the gratitude of all Confederate 
soldiers for this act. , 
859 
Hannibal had no such champion within his own people and soon realized he had 
been betrayed. Having foreseen the possibility of having to flee without warning, he 
established an escape plan. After being seen in public, at nightfall instead of returning 
home. 
) 
he was met by two servants with horses at the gate of the town. Riding throughout 
the night he traveled over 150 kilometers to the property he owned on the edge of the sea. 
There ready to cast off was a ship to take him to the isle of Cercina. From Cercina he 
reached Tyre and in 195 B. C. fled to the court of Antiochus. 860 When the Carthaginian 
senate learned of Hannibal's escape they proceeded to confiscate his property, demofish 
his home from its foundations, and declare him an outlaw. 861 In a similar action the 
confiscation of Mary Custis Lee's home after the conclusion of the War Between the 
States is a testament to a parallel hatred by the Union. I am sure Hannibal's property 
passed from generation to generation as did Mary Lee's home. 862 
858 J. G. Wilson, Life and Public Services of General Ulysses S. Grant (Washington, DC 1885). page 98. 
859 j. G. Wilson, Life and Public Services of General Ulysses S. page 98. 
860 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 33.45.6 & Comehus Nepos, Hannibal, 23.7. 
861 Comehus Nepos, Hannibal, 23.7. 
86-2 J. E. Peters, Arlinglon National Ccmcte! y, page 26. General Lee technically never owned the propem- - 
his wife Mary Anna Randolph Custis inherited the estate upon her father's death in 1857 - nevertheless, the 
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For the remaining thirteen years of his life Hannibal moved among the courts of 
the princes of western Asia who were still hostile to Rome. In 191 B. C. he convinced 
Antiochus to march upon Rome with his armies. However, Antiochus, unwilling to 
follow his advice in the conduct of the war, sent Hannibal to Phoenicia to raise and 
command his navy. 863 Although Hannibal must have seen that many of the king's plans 
were unwise, he never deserted his cause. 
In 190 B. C. Hannibal left Phoenicia in command of a fleet of ships, while Rome's 
ally, the Rhodians left Regellus at Samos to intercept him. The prytaneis had two days 
before his arrival at Rhodes and sent Pamphilidas with thirteen ships south, in the face of 
intelligence reports of Hannibal's immediate arrival. Hannibal did not disappoint the 
Rhodian navy. He may weff have been training his crews as he moved north fi7om 
Phoenicia. flis delay in putting to sea forced his fleet to fight its way north against 
opposing Etesian winds, the voyage Livy notes, usually ruled out at this time of the 
year. 864 The mid-summer climate also affected the Rhodian commander Eudamus badly 
for Phaselis was near a malarial swamp and growing illness among the Rhodian crews 
forced their commanders to shift the site of their ambush to the mouth of the Eurymedon 
symbol of the Confederacy that he represented became inextricably fiised to the house. Heavy fighting in 
northern Virginia produced a constant strewn of wounded and dying Union soldiers flowing into 
Washington. By 1864 the escalating body count caused Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to direct 
Quartennaster General, MontgomerY C. Meigs, to find a new spot to bury the endless influx of corpses. 
Meigs chose Arlington House, which looked down upon the Federal capital and was considered "a 
defiance" to many passionate Unionists in the city. The first soldiers were buried there in mid-May, 1864, 
roughly coinciding with the carnage of the Wilderness Campaign, and by the end of June 2,600 bodies had 
been buried there. 
863 Livy, Ab ýrbe londita, 37.8.3. 
8's4 Livv. Ab Urbe Condi iý 
37.23.4. 
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river. Both fleets were in cruising formation when they sighted each other at daybreak. 
Livy's figures for the battle give the Rhodians 32 quadriremes and four triremes. 
Hannibal commanded 37 larger, very heavy vessels, surrounded by 10 tfiremes. 865 
Hannibal's uncanny ability to mold any sort of troops into supremely functional 
units had made him the terror of Rome for years. His great skiH as a commander aflowed 
him on this occasion to convert his own cruising formation into a proper line of battle 
before Eudamus could match his move. Hannibal undoubtedly had planned his tactics 
with Apollonius who commanded the landward wing of the Syrian line. Hannibal's 
superior speed in forming a line of battle caused the Rhodian fleet to begin the battle in 
the gravest danger. 
The Rhodian admiral rushed his own attack before Hannibal could flank his line 
by engaging the seaward wing of Hannibal's fleet with his flagship and four escorts. 
Although throughout the battle the Rhodians' seaward flank remained in danger of 
collapsing under the press of Hannibal's superior numbers and larger warships, it did not 
collapse. It is a testament to Hannibal that even in this engagement off Side in Paphylea 
where the smaller more maneuverable Rhodian ships defeated the Syrian navy, Hannibal 
remained victorious on the wing where he fought in person. 866 
With the defeat of Antiochus by Scipio Africanus and his brother Lucius in a land 
battle at Magnesia, Rome called for the surrender of Hannibal in their terms of 
settlement. 867 Again accounts of his subsequent actions vary. In one story he joined the 
rebel forces in Armenia, helping to found the new royal city of Artaxata. Another story is 
that he fled via Crete to the court of King Prusias H of Bithynia in northern Asia Minor. 
865 Livv. Ab Urbe Condita, 37.23,5-10. 
866LiN-N7ý Ab Urbe Condita-, 37.24.2-10. 
86 7 Livy- Ab Urbe Condita, 37.23-4. 
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Either way, he eventually took refuge with Prusias, who at this time was engaged in 
warfare with Rome's ally, King Eumenes H of Pergamum. At his court Hannibal spent his 
entire attention to the arming of the king and training his forces to meet Eumenes. 868 
Seeing that Prusias did not have the personal resources to wage a successful war against 
Rome, Hannibal set out to win the friendship and alliance of other kings of the region, 
however, Eumenes') due to his alliance with Rome, remained stronger than Prusius. For 
that reason Hannibal fashioned a plan to assassinate Eumenes. 
Clearly Hannibal had not lost any of his cunning; resorting once again to a ruse. 
Hannibal gave orders to collect venomous snakes and put them alive in earthenware jars 
to be stored aboard his ships. On the day of the battle he bade his troops to concentrate 
their attack on Eumenes' personal ship. Furthermore, he promised a generous reward if 
they succeeded in either capturing or killing the king. Hannibal then sent a messenger 
with a letter for Eumenes. Once he located Eumenes' personal ship, the Bithynians did as 
Hannibal ordered and fell upon the ship in a body. When the other Pergamene ships 
began to press, Hannibal's marines launched the snake-filled earthenware. Terrified by 
the strange weapons, the Pergamene's turned their ships and retreated. As a result, 
Hannibal overcame the Pergarnum navy by cleverness as his strategy. "' in fact, Hannibal 
may have used the first example of biological warfare. 
Believing that while Hannibal lived they would never be free from his plots, 
D- 
Rome dispatched an envoy led by Flaminius to dissuade Prusias fi7om this campaign and 
to express their concern that the king had given shelter to Hannibal. After the conference 
with Flaminius, Prusias posted a military guard over Hannibal) s house, placing Hannibal 
Comehus Nepos, Hannibal, 23.9.2-3. 
869 ComeliusNepos, Hannibal, 24.10. 
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under house arrest. Hannibal had little doubt as to what was taking place. 870 When he 
leamt of the presence of soldiers in his home, he called for a draft of poison, set aside just 
for such an event . 
871 As he drained the cup he said, 
"Let us free the Roman people from their long standing anxiety, seeing that they 
I, - . - find it tedious to wait for an old man's death. It is no magnificent or memorable 
victory that Flaminius will wm over a man unanned and betrayed. This day will 
surely prove how far the moral standards of the Romans have changed. The 
fathers of these Romans sent a warning to king Pyrrhus, bidding him beware of 
poison - and he was an enemy In arms, with an army in Italy: these Romans 
thcmsclvcs have sent an cnvoy of consular rank to suggcst to Prusias the crimc of 
murdenng his guest. -)-)872 
"Thus that bravest of men, after having performed many and varied labours, 
entered into rest. ..,, 
873Hannibal 
probably died in 182 or 183 B. C. Most modem historians 
eschew hero-worship. It is understandable, therefore, that they should find it hard to 
attribute effects of such worldwide significance as the course of our western history to 
one individual. There have been many attempts to limit Hannibal's achievements and 
subject them to a distinctly slanted viewpoint. With Livy we are repeatedly told of 
"Punic faith" which passed among the Romans as an expression of dishonesty and 
faithlessness. Yet we find no grounds for the charge. A general situated as Hannibal could 
only be stem and even merciless in his dealings with the enemy. Of Hannibal's character 
we have to judge from the narratives of his enemies whereas his military skill is without 
Comellus Nepos, Hannibal, 23.11.3. 
871 Comehus Nepos, Hannibal, 23.12.5. 
872 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 39.51.7-12. 
873 comelius Nepos. Hannibal, 23.13. 
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question. His courage also was never in doubt, yet the chief charges that remain to this 
day against him are cruelty and avarice. A general who must not only win in battle, but 
must also feed, clothe, and even pay his army wIthout supplies or replacements from 
home is truly extraordinary. For thirteen years he waged war, not with an army of his own 
countrymen but with men gathered fi7om many nations - men who had neither laws, nor 
customs, nor language in common, differing in costume, arms, and even gods. And yet he 
kept them together by so close a tie that they never fought among themselves. His 
obvious sentimentality and patriotism for his homeland were witnessed not only in his 
success as a general, but also in the very fact that after he lost the war as a statesman 
during the reconstruction period. That he was both a visionary and a realist is the very 
combination., which so greatly attributed to his success. 
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Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters I have covered the course of Hannibal's career from the 
period leading up to the 2 ndRoMan War until his death in 183/82 B. C. to ascertain why 
and under what circumstances these events occurred. A key assumption from my 
exarmnation of Hannibal's ideology and strategies with those of Robert E. Lee convinced 
me that the art of war is susceptible to at least two points of view. One relates entirely to 
the brilliance of the general and the other to the perception of the victor. Although the 
memory of Hannibal continued to haunt the Romans long after the destruction of 
Carthage, it is especially significant that we have as evidence only the testimony of those 
who wrote from the victor's viewpoint. Given the impossibility of truly understanding the 
2'd Roman War without looking at it from Hannibal's position, my re-qxamination of the 
ancient historians' accounts is with a clear understanding of the intensity of their 
prejudices, which obviously influenced their perception of events. For that reason this 
enquiry is a novel attempt to interpret the facts fi7om the Carthaginian perspective 
because, "Many of the truths we cling to are greatly dependent on our point of view. 
r-874 
I have followed alongside one of the greatest generals in history and have 
compared him to another 'great captain' 2,000 years after Hannibal's death by suicide. 
However varied the arms they employed, however disparate their mobility, the armies of 
these two eras followed commanders who had to overcome virtually identical obstacles. 
By gathering fragments of information, the totality can be discovered-) however, until now 
the data has not been offered in an inclusive format. In order to clearly convey these 
truths I have divided the study into five chapters, each of which contains several sections. 
874 Star H'ars: Return of the Jedi, G. Lucas (20"' Century Fox, 1983). Obi-wan Kenobi, 
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The first chapter of the study provides basically a foundation setting all the pieces 
on the board to show the starting positions. After the poor performance of the 
Carthaginian navy in the I" Roman War, along with the weakened condition of the 
Carthaginians due to war reparations and the subsequent Mercenary War, Rome chose 
this moment of weakness to seize Sardinia and Corsica, a concern to both the politicians 
of Carthage and Hannibal. Carthage needed the ports of call for continued trade 
expansion and Hannibal understood the strategic significance of the islands as a 
springboard for military operations between Italy and Affica. While Hamilcar looked to 
Spain as a replacement of power and for the territories lost to Rome, the politicians on the 
other hand found risk uncomfortable. As noted, some aspects of the conflict remain 
constant during the period covered by the study. 1) although the people of Carthage elect 
the general and he has command and control over operations in the field, essentiafly, 
everything he needs to win the war; i. e., money, manpower, and materials, is furnished to 
him by the will of the senatorial anstocracy; 2) Hannibal learned from the I" Roman War 
for the first time in history a general could not depend on his country to support him to 
win the war. ffis father's lesson clearly stated he needed to rely on his own resources and 
on his own strength of will. It appears implicit that Hannibal's fundamental attitude that 
of his deep-seated mistrust of Rome as well as his profound patriotism and concern for 
sound decisions were nurtured by the prevailing climate of his early years. In the last 
section of the chapter, I assert Hannibal's role in the instigation of the war consisted of 
being merely manoeuvred into a position where he had no choice but to attack Saguntum. 
By using a comparison with Fort Sumter I lay out the premise to be discussed fully in the 
following chapter. 
In Chapter 11 after a discussion of the various possible causes for the 2dRoman 
War, including the Ebro Treaty and Sagunturn versus the loss of Sardima and Corsica, I 
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further elucidate a new hypothesis based on Fort Sumter that by setting an impossible 
situation in place, a faction of Roman senators used Saguntum as a devise for starting the 
war and placing the blame on Hannibal. The true reason for the many discrepancies as to 
the location of Saguntum in reference to the treaty is because the ancient historians were 
writing the findings from a Roman perspectiVe based on the assumption that Rome should 
not appear the aggressor. In essence the true reason is the Romans forced the 
Carthaginians to the wall. Carthaginian ideas and practices of warfare prior to Hannibal 
hinged on defending what they already held, not in conquest or offensive strategies. Yet 
at the very time when Rome was causing an upsurge of animosity in Carthaginian hearts, 
Hannibal was explicitly demonstrating a new concept of warfare that prior to him had not 
existed: the blitzkrieg. He based his plans on the advantages of the offensive, a 
concentration of force, the effort to achieve surprise, and the necessity for speed. Three 
distinct factors are crucial in assessing the sound strategic logic Hannibal used in his 
decision to invade Italy by land: 1) an alternative would have been to stand on the 
defensive and resist Roman attacks in Spain and Aftica; 2) the problem of Roman 
preclonfinance at sea; and 3) the knowledge that he would find allies in Northern Italy. 
Hannibal began the conflict with a political strategy based on influencing foreigners. Just 
as the South had expectations for British and/or French intervention on behalf of its quest 
for independence, Hannibal offered members of the Italian confederation freedom fi7orn 
the yoke of Roman domination. It is my view that Hannibal must have drawn intelligence 
from a variety of sources on the political mood in Italy that led him to believe more than a 
few allies needed little incentive to defect ftom the Roman Alliance. Following a 
discussion on the make up of Rome's political system it became obvious that through 
Pyrrhus Hannibal would have known how the Roman Alliance System functioned as well 
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as how the consuls as generals performed in the field. The chapter concludes with the 
disposition of Hannibal5s mercenaries prior to leaving Spain. 
Chapter III begiris with a discussion of the composition of the various mercenaries 
comprising the Carthaginian army compared to Rome's potential manpower. In assessing 
the offensive stance Hannibal took against the overwhelming manpower available to 
Rome I determined Hannibal had no desire to conquer Rome. This interpretation is 
inspired by a comparison with Lee. The fact that Lee had no illusions about conquering 
the Union; that if he could stage a massive, swift, and punishing raid into Union territory 
he could thereby force a favourable negotiated peace. We have now reached a period in 
the 2nd Roman War for which there is important first-hand evidence. Before crossing the 
Pyrenees, Hannibal saw to it that Spain and Africa were well garrisoned, and his route 
had been well prepared by diplomacy and reconnaissance. The march over the Alps is 
epic; even in Livy's narrative, Hannibal emerges as a hero. His ascent on the north side of 
the Alps met with opposition and treachery, he sustained fi7equent loses of men, animals 
and supplies, but by his indefatigable courage and resource he repeatedly extricated his 
army ftom traps which man and nature placed in its way. Hannibal is recorded as having 
reached Italy with a figure of 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, a loss of at least half his 
entire force. In the subsequent battles of Ticinus through Cannae, Hannibal time after 
time demonstrates his tactical genius. 
At the northern tributary of the Ticinus Hannibal's cavalry proved its superiority 
with the defeat of Publius Cornelius Scipio in 218, bringing the Gauls quickly to his side. 
In bitter winter conditions the following December, the Romans faced an attack by 
Hannibal at the Trebia. Dividing his army a picked Carthaginian cavalry and infantry 
force under Hannibal's brother Mago descended on the rear of the Roman army, 
shattering the Romans. In yet another manoeuvre, operating on the line of least 
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expectation - Hannibal took his army through the formidable swamps of the Arnus River 
in 217 rather than face the Roman army directly. Not expecting such a move, the Romans 
left the route open, permitting Hannibal to emerge behind the Roman army with a clear 
road to Rome. This forced the Romans to abandon their strong position and rush after the 
Carthaginians. Hannibal ambushed the dislocated Romans at Lake Trasimene and 
destroyed nearly their entire army, including the consul Flaminius. Rome, feeling the 
need for emergency measures, appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus dictator. Meanwhile 
Hannibal continued his efforts to find allies among the southern Italians. He ravaged 
Apulia and Campania in hopes of provoking Fabius to battle, with no success. The Senate 
decided that Hannibal must be brought to battle, so four new legions were mobilized and 
ordered to join the four already shadowing Hannibal in Apulia. At Cannae, the 
Carthaginian infantry overlapped the Romans as they pressed forward and assaulted them 
on the flanks. Using a classic double envelopment manoeuvre, Roman losses included 
45,500 infantry and 2,700 cavalry, including the consul Paullus, and proconsuls Servilius 
and Minuclus. Capitalizing on Lee's Masterpiece at Chancellorsville. ) it is my assertion 
that Rome relied solely on the superiority of its legionnaires. As the Carthaginian units 
manoeuvred, they could do nothing to counter their actions. Over and above the 
immediate positive outcome of the battle, I maintain as a result of Cannae Rome learned 
its most valuable lesson: continuity of command. By comparing the problems caused by 
the yearly collegiality of consuls with the continuous change of Union generals I validate 
my postulation that had Rome not lost in such an overwhelming disaster, the changes 
necessary for their eventual victory over Hannibal may never have been implemented. 
A iM 
After such an overwhelming victory at Cannae the question arises as to why 
Hannibal did not march on Rome. As Chapter IV opens Hannibal is confronted with 
various strategic possibilities for continuing the war and chooses to continue his efforts to 
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bring about the dissolution of the Roman Confederation. f1is alliance with Capua further 
necessitates the need for a solidified Carthaginian base in Southern Italy while he 
continues efforts to bring those cities along the coast into subýnission. Not only did he 
have a need for a seaport to open communications with Carthage, those allies who had 
come over to his side must be defended against Roman reprisal. Wherever Hannibal 
decided to campaign offensively, the Romans would go on to the defensive, but when he 
was not present, they would take the offensive against former allies who had deserted 
them. The only solution was to divide his forces in order to maintain this double 
initiative. Now it becomes obvious Hannibal adjusted his course of action as the war 
proceeded to meet changes in circumstances. More accurately, Hannibal planned each 
subsequent strategy after the first based on the current knowledge he possessed. He 
clearly illustrates a second strategy at this point when he switches from an offensive 
posture to a defensive stance designed to outlast the Roman military until reinforcements 
could reach him. From a treaty drawn up between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon we 
know Hannibal had hopes of foreign assistance or intervention. While it was doubtful 
Philip would send reinforcements directly to Italy, he might bring diversion to the war 
through an additional fi7ont in Macedonia. Undaunted by his difficulties, Hannibal still 
managed to conduct a robust campaign which denied any prospect of early victory for the 
war-weary Roman population. As we have seen much of their strength was being diverted 
to reinforce Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and Myria. However, the alliance came to naught 
when Rome checked Philip with its own navy and Aetolian allies. Although the Romans 
achieved a decisive victory at Syracuse 212 B. C., the Carthaginians had made strenuous 
efforts for the support of Sicily and sent two reinforcing armies, together numbering 
nearly 40,000 men. For me the parallelisms between the Union general William 
Tecumseh Sherman's actions and those of Fabius and Marcellus led to a remarkable 
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discovery ending the war meant changing the rules by ending the protection of civilians 
who helped to support the Carthaginian effort. Consequently, through the use of terror, 
which they learned from Hannibal, Rome was able to retake Capua and Syracuse even 
though their resources were heavily stretched by Hannibal's diplomatic efforts. Realizing 
the importance of Spain to the Carthaginian war effort, the Romans took offensive 
operations geared to strip Hannibal of his power base of wealth and possible manpower. 
Yet until 208 B. C. neither Hannibal nor the Romans had gained the ascendancy, but in 
that year Tarentum was captured by the Romans while Hasdrubal wintered in Gaul with 
his 20,000-strong army. The tide had changed. 
In Chapter V the reality of Hannibal's situation becomes clear: without 
reinforcements he cannot retake the offensive measures needed to win the war. Since the 
politicians had not complied with his repeated requests for support, Hannibal had no 
choice but to depend upon his own resources to provide the needed troops. With Scipio's 
victories in Spain, hope of additional supplies reaching Italy came down to Hasdrubal and 
his army; the brothers had to meet in Italy. After crossing the Alps in 207 B. C. ý, 
Hasdrubal, not knowing Hannibal's whereabouts, sent scouts to locate him In what 
proved an unwise move, the men carried a letter for Hannibal giving his proposed route. 
After having ridden the entire length of Italy, the Romans picked up the men near 
Tarentum and the plan was revealed. These captured documents provided Nero the 
opportunity to destroy Hasdrubal's army at the Metaurus. The totality of the 
inconceivable misfortune of the enemy acquiring such crucial information is clearly 
illustrated when Union troops discover Lee's Special Order 191. Still expecting help from 
Hasdrubal, Hannibal learns of his brother's defeat when Nero has his severed head 
thrown into the Carthaginian camp. Only the death of Gen. Andrew Jackson conveys a 
realistic interpretation of his grief. Lee faced the death of not only a close ffiend but, as 
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had Hannibal, one of his most important officers. However, the real blow to Hannibal 
came from the knowledge that he was without hope of reinforcement. For the rest of the 
Italian campaign he was generally restricted to Bruttium for he remained at a decided 
disadvantage without additional men and provisions. In 204 B. C. Carthage finally sent 
reinforcements to Italy by Hannibal's other brother Mago. Although there is no proof for 
my assumption, I believe Mago used the remaining wealth of the Barca family to bring 
these reinforcements to Hannibal. 
Prior to 205 the Carthaginians had held the strategic initiative, but now it was the 
D- 
Romans' turn to contain Hannibal in Italy while Scipio took the offensive to Affica. Once 
ashore the Romans set about raving the fertile Bagradas valley and after defeating a 
Carthaginian army, besieged Utica. The military reverses brought about a realignment of 
political power in Carthage; the Barcid faction was ousted by the wealthy landowners and 
merchants who had always wished to avoid war with Rome in favour of their commercial 
interests. Thirty senators sued for peace all the while blaming Hannibal for the war. 
Meanwhile Hannibal had been recalled to Carthage. It is my contention Hannibal enacts 
his third strategy at this time in an effort to preserve as much of Carthage as is possible. 
The two armies met at Zama in 202. ) 
in a battle that decided the outcome of the war. 
Scipio had drawn Hannibal away from his own secure base into a hostile interior where 
he had to fight on ground and conditions not of his own choosing. By taking the strategic 
decision to transfer the war to Affica, Roman victory was achieved. What Hannibal 
accomplished at this point is truly amazing for he was able to exert a moderating 
influence on those who argued against accepting Scipio terms of peace. The consideration 
Grant afforded Lee in his surrender at Appomattox, gives credence to the regard Scipio 
showed Hannibal in the peace terms ending the 2dRoman War. 
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The following section in Chapter V deals with the political dedication and 
commitment with which Hannibal served Carthage after his defeat at Zama. His attack on 
the position, power, and corruption of the aristocrats proved so successful that they 
accused him of scheming with Antiochus III of Syria to wage another war with Rome. 
When Rome sent an investigation commission to Carthage, Hannibal knew it was aimed 
at him and made his way to Antiochus. He became a member of the Syrian court and 
served as a mercenary advisor to the King. After Antiochus' defeat, Hannibal went to 
Prussia in 183 B. C., but the Romans demanded his surrender. Unable to escape arrest, 
Hannibal took his own life rather than suffer further humiliation. 
Although the maxims of war are simple, the application of each principle requires 
much care, skill, and caution. Here I propose to summarize the lessons learned in the 
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previous chapters and demonstrate how the prmciples of strategy remained unchanged . 
This will show us there is a unity of genius that transcends eras and technology, a unity 
that makes the tasks of Hannibal Barca in 218 B. C. practically the same as those of 
Robert E. Lee in A. D. 1861. We have seen both Hannibal and Lee recognize when one 
rule of strategy is applied in a specific situation it can bring victory. For example- faced 
with the destruction of the Confederate army if it remained united and inactive, Robert E. 
Lee violated the rule of concentration of force and divided his army in order to exercise 
another dictum, the unexpected descent of a portion of the army upon the rear of the 
enemy, permitting him to win an overwhelming victory at Chanceflorsvifle. In December 
218 B. C., Rome and Carthage fought a battle near the Trebia. After a personal 
875 PolvbiusvNTote a separate work on tactics, which is now lost. A. M. Eckstein, Moral Vision in the 
Histories of PoMiUs (California, 1995), 160T argues that Polybius sees the task of the general as primarily 
imposing order on potential chaos. Because of the unknown quality of Polybius' lost work. I will those 
sources which are most respected by generals themselves. 
366 
reconnaissance, Hannibal divided his army and cleverly used the country to mask a 
cavalry and infantry force, which descended on the rear of the Roman army, causing the 
Romans to loose almost two thirds of their army. In example after example in this study 
we can see how Lee and Hannibal applied the salient principles of war and demonstrate 
that the principles do not change, although the circumstances under which they can be 
employed vary profoundly. 
By examining the proliferation of surviving information about Lee, the general 
and the man, we can extrapolate his genius to fill in the blanks where information is 
missing regarding Hannibal. Through a juxtaposition of Southern and Carthaginian 
culture to provide a societal basis and an investigation of Lee as the missing Carthaginian 
viewpoint, we can then use the chronology of the original sources as the glue to the bring 
the disparate pieces together into a completed mosaic of Hannibal's Grand Strategies. 
Once Hannibal's background, including his family, his education, the I" Roman War, the 
Mercenary War, his education, along with the political and cultural enviromnent prior to 
the War Between the States and the policies of the Carthaginian goverment, are 
interchanged with Lee's background, including his family, his education, along with the 
political and cultural environment prior to the War Between the States a portrait of 
Hannibal's true character begins to emerge. 
But did Hannibal's character match that needed by a great general? According to 
Sun Tzu leadership is a matter of intelligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage, and 
stemness. "' Intelligence involves the ability to plan and to know when to change 
effectively. Courage means to seize opportunities without vacillation; and humaneness 
means love and compassion for people, being aware of their toils. Trustworthiness and 
sternness are the two virtues of leadership that wins both loyalty and obedience of the 
876 Sun Tzu. The Art of War, page 44. 
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troops. It is my allegation that great leaders inspire extraordinary performance. Their men 
admire and respect them so that they would do anything rather than disappoint them. 
While it is true historians have differed in their views as to the effectiveness of a 
mercenary army, some claim mercenaries had no long-term concern for the well being of 
those they served, yet there is no evidence of instances where Hannibal's men deserted or 
showed cowardice. To fully comprehend the extraordinary troop preparations made by 
Hannibal prior to leaving Spain, I set up Lee's arrangements for the Confederate troops 
upon taking command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Since we have only the 
logistical measures Hannibal took, such as sending Spanish troops to Africa and Afficans 
to Spain, an exan-fination of Lee's accomplishments as established by A. L. Long provides 
us with an image of Hannibal's army of properly trained and equipped men, capable of 
maximum performance as needed. Even accounting for the long time it must have taken 
to recruit, train, and deploy a large mercenary army, what really mattered was the 
magnetism of Hannibal's leadership. The Army of Northern Virginia, composed of 
ordinary men, accomplished the seemingly impossible just as Hannibal's men did time 
after time. The admiration and respect Lee's men felt for their commander was so great 
that they would do whatever he asked of them or literally die trying. Even his defeat at 
Gettysburg, did not diminish their devotion, as one soldier tells him not to worry, 
"General, we'll fight them till Hell freezes over, and then we'll fight them on the ice. , 877 
Later when one of Lee's staff was asked, "Does it not make the General proud to see how 
these men love him? " He replied, 'Not proud. It awes 
hiM. "87" To both Hannibal and Lee 
may be applied the spirit of the following words- 
A. Kaltman- The Genius of Robert E. Lee, page 244. 
878 A. Kaltman. The Genius of Robert E. Lee, page 245. 
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-As soon as difficulties anse - and that must always happen when great results 
are at stake - then things no longer move on of themselves like a well-oiled 
machine; the machine itself then begins to offer resistance, and to overcome this 
the commander must have a great force of Will... As the forces in one individual 
after another become prostrated, and can no longer be excited and supported by 
an effort of his own will, the whole inertia of the war gradually rests its weight on 
the will of the commander: by the spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the 
spark of purpose, the light of hope, must be kindled afresh in others: m so far as 
he is equal to this he stands above the masses and continues to be their master; 
whenever that influence ceases, and his own spirit is not longer strong enough to 
revive the spirit of all others, the masses, drawilig him down with them, sink into 
the lower region of animal nature, which shrinks from danger and knows not 
ShaMe. "'879 
Of generalship in the field Napoleon once said, 
"The first quality of a General-in-Chief is to have a cool head which receives 
exact impressions of things, which never gets heated, which never allows itself to 
be dazzled, or intoxicated, by good or bad news. The successive or simultaneous 
sensations which he receives in the course of a day must be classified, and must 
occupy the correct places they merit to fill, because common sense and reason are 
the results of the comparison of a number of sensation each equally well 
considered. There are certain men who, on account of their moral and phys1cal 
constitution paint mental pictures out of everything; however exalted by their 
reason, their will, their courage, and whatever good qualities they may posses, 
879 C. von Clausemitz. Q-n -W4E, 
pages 54,55,57. 
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nature has not fitted them to command armies, nor to direct great operations of 
war. "880 
"In war, " writes Clausewitz, "it is only by means of a great directing spint that 
we can expect the full power latent in the troops to be developed. "881 That Hannibal and 
Lee did possess such genius in totafly different forms is beyond question, and that neither 
was aware of it, and hence its mysterious driving force, is also beyond doubt. Of 
Hannibal's tactical dispositions, he suited the order of his troops to the existing conditions 
with great ability. His habit was to campaign only in the summer months, foraging and 
collecting rations in strong camps or towns for the winter season. That he never failed to 
provide bread for his men is a remarkable feat. His extraordinary influence over men is 
perhaps his most wonderful trait. He earned the devotion and love of his men by his 
personal character alone. When the composition of his army is considered and the 
hardships they underwent, that there was never a desertion from his ranks, and that he 
eventually transported his anny - composed mostly of Italians - back to Affica, and to 
fight with him as they did at Zama, it may be said that Hannibal's ability shows the most 
amazing command over men ever possessed by a man. 882 Again in Lee we find another 
general able to animate an army as Hannibal. Whether it was Lee's self-sacrificing 
idealism that animated the Army of Northern Virginia or Hannibal's force of personality 
that kept the loyalty of his disparate troops for so many years both held their army's 
captive by some degree of personal charisma. After Lee defeated the Union army that 
outnumbered his two to one at Chanceflorsville, one of his aides described the scene as 
Lee rode to the front - 
J. F. C. Fuller, Grant and Lee. pages 278-279. 
881 C. von Clausewitz. On War, page 77. 
882 T. A. Dodge. The Great C4ptains page 7 1. 
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"One long, unbroken cheer ... 
hailed the presence of the victorious chief. He sat in 
-the full realization of all that soldiers dream of - triumph; and as I looked on him 
in the complete fruition of the success which his genius. courage, and confidence 
in his army had won. I thought that it must have been. from some such scene that 
men in ancient days ascended to the dignity of gods. ""' 
Of courage, morale, physical endurance, self-reliance, resolution and self- 
command, "Courage above all things is the first quality of a warrior, , 884 whether a simple 
soldier in the ranks or a general-in-chief, for courage is of both and it unites both. A man 
of courage, a man who fears not to die, a man who is possessed of something superior to 
mere living, this is the type of man who has always ennobled war. Such was the fightning,, 
which fired Hannibal's Carthaginian army and Lee's Amy of Northern Virginia. 
Again it is important to note that without personal leadership there can be no full 
manifestation of personality. Napoleon realized this when he said: "The personality of the 
general is indispensable, he is the head, he is the all of an army ... It was not 
before the 
ore Hannibal... Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to tremble, but bef 
-).; 885 
Hannibal's genius when it comes to strategy, the movement and tactical deployment of 
great arn-ýies on the battlefield is impossible to fault. He had been bred for war and the 
world of the soldier was natural to him. In the early years of his campaigns in Italy he 
enjoyed the benefit of the divided Roman military command and quickly exploited 
differences between the two consuls who opposed him. He was fortunate to possess so 
fine a mechanism of warfare as his Numidian horsemen, whose speed and adaptability 
increasingly confounded the Romans, and in the early stages of the war contributed 
883 A. Kaltman. The Genius of Robert E. Lee page 244. 
88-1 c. von Clausewitz. On ýKar. page 47. 
88-1 J. F. C. Fuller. Grant and Lee. page 282. 
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largely to his victories at Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae. Ffis handling of the 
cavalry, both light and heavy proved masterly, and it was not until Scipio learned ftom 
Hannibal that the Romans were able to face the Carthaginians In victory. Hannibal 
possessed a fine team of officers who taught the world war is for professionals. His 
genius for leadership is proven by the fact that he held his army of mercenaries together 
for sixteen years on a foreign soil without once experiencing a mutiny. Hannibal was a 
general with a quick, adaptable mind. His every battlefield became an opportunity to 
create a new masterpiece. Making the land work for him, he drew upon it his grand 
design. 886 Writers in modem times have used Hannibal's campaigns to illustrate 
practically every known principle of war. His advance planning and bold strategic 
manoeuvres in broad sweeps fi7om Spain across the Alps and Italy showed an appreciation 
of strategic problems most unusual for his age. Military officers through the ages - as late 
as General Norman Schwartzkopf of Gulf War fame - have studied Hannibal's genius 
and used his tactics. 
887 
Great leaders see beyond individual battles to the entire conflict, and make their 
decisions accordingly. In fact, the ultimate victory belongs to the general who is able to 
continuaffy reassess the scope of the conflict and keep pushing on to the next 
At a crucial moment, leaders must rely on something beyond their intellect, engagement. At 
beyond their factual analysis of the situation. That something has to come from within. 
Robert E. Lee has taught me that at the heart of leadership lay conviction. The leaders in 
ýins, page 71; T. A. Dodge, For more on Hannibal's character. see T. A. Dodge, The Great Cqpta 
Hannibal. pages 613-641 & J. Peddie, Hannibal's War, pages 189-200. For an excellent comparison of the 
qualities of Hannibal to those of Alexander the Great and G. Julius Caesar, see T. A. Dodge. Caesar 
(Boston. 1892), pages 755-767. 
887 Timewatch, BBC. Interview with Normal Schwartzkopf (September 13,1996). 
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the War Between the States had to call upon a reserve of courage. Physical courage, 
certal y, but also personal courage built upon a deep conviction. There can be no doubt 
whatsoever that Hannibal possessed the qualities of leadership. However, relying on the 
political aristocracy of Carthage more than on reflection his assumptions frequently 
misled him. Nevertheless, Hannibal's success as a realistic and innovative strategist, as 
well as his appreciation of the opponent's military possibilities and superb operational 
skills, give him a valid claim to greatness. 888 
Then if Hannibal did everything correctly, why did he fail to subjugate Rome? In 
a military sense you cannot have a perfect general and still fail; however, it is my 
assertion that Hannibal was a perfect general, but failed because of the political 
interference and lack of support he received from the Carthaginian government. In terms 
of The Art of War, victors are those generals who are not constrained by government. 
This point is a very delicate one; Sun Tzu says civilian leadership that interferes 
ignorantly with the general in the field "takes away victory by deranging the military. -)7889 
For Carthage the importance of political strategy overshadowed the economic and 
strategic initiatives for the war developed into contest between the politicians of two 
capital cities rather than a conflict between generals in the field. To ensure that my logic 
is correct it seems important at this point to outline the complexity of Hannibal's grand 
strategies as proof of its multiplicity and that he did everything correctly. 
Based on von Clauswitz's four maxims of how to accomplish a grand strategical 
plan, let us begin with an analysis of Hannibal's first line of attack. According to von 
888 A. Jones. Civil War Conunand & Strategy pages 227-228. 
889 Sun Tzu. The Art of War. ClasSICs of Strategy and Counsel, Vol. 1, trans. By Thomas Cleary (Boston, 
2000). page 82. 
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Clausewitz first you must destroy the enemy's plans . 
890 As presented in Chapter 11, by 
crossing the Ebro in early summer of 218,1 believe Hannibal anticipated the declaration 
of war already resolved in Rome. While the Roman invasion force in route to Spain 
clearly indicates Rome's intention to fight an offensive contest on Carthaginian soil, 
when the Scipio brothers deployed their forces only to find that Hannibal had already 
crossed the Rhone and eluded them, rather than shift the army to Italy to meet the 
Carthaginians, Publius sailed alone for Pisa to alert Northern Italy. By crossing the Alps 
in a blitzkrieg, Hannibal found the Italian defenders weak, "because a surprised opponent 
in an unready one. , 891 The speed and success with which he took the offensive into Italy 
overwhelmed Publius Scipio, now in command of two legions in the area, causing the 
recall of Scipio's fellow consul, Tiberius Sempronius from Sicily - and the impending 
invasion of Affica - to reinforce him at the Trebia. Sempronius' subsequent defeat at the 
Trebia closed the first year of the conflict with the Carthaginians commanding most of the 
territory north of the Apennines. Additionally, Hannibal's strategy of foreign assistance 
began to bear ftuit. as a host of anti-Roman Celts as well as a number who had formerly 
served Rome came to his side. Above a he had fulfilled the strategic purpose of averting 
an offensive against Carthage by concentrating Roman forces in the north, placing Rome 
on the defensive in Italy. The following year he continued to baffle the Romans as he 
eluded two of their arn-ýies posted to check his advance south, and defeated them soundly 
at Lake Trasimene. 
The second maxim presented by Clausewitz states you must undermine the 
enemy )s economic strength. 
1192 As seen with the rise in taxes and the problems facing 
C. von Clausewitz. On War, pages 209-210. 
A. Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy. page 140, 
892 C. von Clausewitz. On War, pages 209-2 10. 
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Rome prior to Cannae, Hannibal accomplished this dictum early in the conflict. When 
news of the defeats at Ticinus and Trebia reached Rome, after the initial outbreak of 
panic, boys and even slaves were enlisted to replace the shattered armies, taxes doubled to 
save the sinkcing treasury, and the Roman Senate appointed Fabius Maximus dictator in 
the cfisis. 
Next Clausewitz affirnis you must win victories which depress the national 
mor e 893 - Cannae could have been no more devastating to the Romans. The battle 
represented Hannibal 1) s greatest hour. Although the Italian confederation remained intact, 
it took Cannae to begin to break the Greek cities in southern Italy fi7om their alliance with 
Rome. First Arpi, in northern Apulia defected then a group of Lucanian and Bruttians 
broke away. Lastly Capua came to the Carthaginian side. Had he been fighting against 
any other nation in the ancient world there is no doubt that his overwhehning victories at 
Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae would have brought them to an early capitulation. 
Hannibal had destroyed the enemy army in three major battles; yet, Rome would not 
initiate terms for a peace settlement as long as Carthaginian troops under arms remained 
in Italy. Instead, the Romans responded to Cannae with grim resilience. 
The final maxim of grand strategical design requires the occupation of the 
enemy's capital, which disorganizes the government, and is a visible sign to all that its 
cause has failed. 894 Although Hannibal came within five miles of Rome's walls, he did 
not allow himself in the ardour of victory after Cannae to be led in a pursuit beyond what 
the circumstances warranted. He was as cautious after victory as other leaders after defeat 
for it is my contention that Hannibal had no desire to destroy Rome at any time in the 
conflict. To understand my conviction, let us examine his actions up to this point. In his 
891 C. von Clausewitz, On War pages 209-2 10. 
894 C. N, on Clausewitz. On War. pages 209-2 10. 
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eagerness to win Italian ftiends, Hannibal had promised the defecting cities freedom ftom 
military service. Thus, he could enfist men locafly only by volunteers. Hannibal was 
obliged to attempt further inroads into the Italian confederacy, at the same time protecting 
the cities in Campania and Apulia that had defected. The responsibility for his newly 
found allies diminished his offensive flexibility, substituting a defensive posture unlike 
his earlier years of success. In response the Roman government readopted the strategy of 
Fabius, and this time it brought results. Rome's capacity at least to win back towns in one 
theatre while Hannibal was in another improved morale. To fight these tactics Hannibal 
was compelled to divide his troops rather than act in a single well-concentrated body; at 
Compsa he established a new base of operations, while he sent Mago south to bring the 
Greek cities along the coast into submission. It became imperative for Hannibal to find 
alternative support for his campaign. 
It is at this time I assert his plan for a second strategy emerged. In a letter to the 
Carthaginian senate Hannibal pushed for Carthage to re-conquer Sicily in hopes of 
allaying Rome's ability to use it as a staging point in an attack on Aflica. In addition, if 
the home government in Carthage could open new fronts outside of the Italian mainland 
much of the pressure in Italy would be relieved. It is clear from Hannibal's point of view 
the idea of Carthaginian campaigns on multiple fronts was a sound strategic initiative. By 
signing a treaty with Philip V Hannibal further expected external support from 
Macedonia- The remaining thirteen years of the 2dRoman War,, Hannibal's second phase 
of strategy continued to match Lee's struggle against the Union forces. If he could 
frustrate the enemy's designs in Sardinia,, Corsica, and Spain, along with the threat from 
Macedonia, the Roman legions would be forced to mount troops in all the areas in 
contest. This would ease the defensive posture Hannibal now had to assume. Just as Lee 
he sought to impress upon the minds of the Roman people the conviction that they must 
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prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifice of life and treasure, with the possibility 
that all might at last be of no avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the 
Carthaginians as to the Confederacy. 895 
Having planned a land war, Carthage never regained command of the sea. 
Nevertheless, after Cannae two expeditions were fitted out in Africa for Italy, one limited 
to cavalry reinforcements and elephants. While the smaller expedition under the 
command of Bomilcar slipped through to Hannibal, the larger force was diverted to 
Spain. Other Carthaginian troops were sent on to Sardinia and Sicily. The death of 
Rome's ally, 1-fiero of Syracuse produced widespread rebellions in Sicily, which the 
Carthaginians sought to exploit. With the treaty signed, hopefully, to bring Philip V of 
Macedon into the conflict it looked as though Hannibal's second strategy would bring 
success. Although the conflict continued for nearly a decade after Cannae, he remained 
singularly apt at guessing what his enemy would do. His marches were quick, covert, and 
shrewd; he acted with speed and effect. It is a tribute to Hannibal's extraordinary ability 
that he maintained his undefeated record in Italy as he waited for Carthage to continue its 
efforts on the various fronts. Basically Hannibal did follow the maxims of war; therefore 
the only conclusion can be that Carthage failed Hannibal not that Hannibal failed 
Carthage. I believe Hannibal recognized this after the battle of Metaurus because 
Hasdrubal was the only reinforcement possibility he had and he failed. At this point 
Hannibal knew he would have to return to Affica; no reinforcements for his second 
strategy would be forthcoming so his third strategy came into play in order to allow 
Carthage wanted to keep what they had. The Carthaginian government made Hannibal do 
exactly what they wanted him to do because they did not reinforce him. 
895C. Marshall. An Aide-de-CM of Lec ed. F. Maurice (New yoric, 1965), pages 30-32. 
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While it is arguable that Rome was bound to defeat Carthage in the end, was 
peace really a viable alternative? Only those nalve enough to think that the 2"dRoman 
War was merely a war of revenge can seriously imagine that another war between 
Carthage and Rome could have been avoided in the long term. When Hannibal was 
ordered back to Africa, every chance of saving Carthage or redeeming the fortunes lost 
after the I' Roman War were lost. At this point his only option was again to change his 
war strategy to one of political diplomacy to reach the best possible resolution for 
Carthage. In an effort to protect his home fi7om the devastation he had inflicted on Rome 
Hannibal asked for a personal conference with Scipio where he queried, according to 
Livy: 
"So in discussing teirms of peace, it is you [Scipio] who can negotiate from 
strength - which is precisely -%vhat you most want, and we find most unfortunate. 
You and I have the most to gam by peace, and our respective governments will 
ratify whatever tenns we decide on... We do not object to leavmg you in 
possession of everything for which we went to war - Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and 
all the islands between Africa and Italy; let us be confined within the shores of 
,, 896 Affica... 
Although Scipio refused the conditions of Hannibal's peace proposal and the final 
battle of the 2dRoman War ensued,, Hannibal managed to set the tone for future dialogue 
between him and Scipio. Had Hannibal won Zama, the results would have more than 
likely been the same, for Carthage had lost the battle years before. It was only the genius 
of Hannibal, which prolonged the struggle and enabled Carthage to request a more lenient 
settlement for peace. 
897 
ý'96UNrv. Ad Urbe Condita. 30.30. 
'397T. A. Dodge. Hannibal, page 64 1. 
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Had Carthage conquered Rome the history of the Western World would have been 
irretrievably changed: there would have been a Semitic heritage rather than a Graeco- 
Roman culture permeating the Mediterranean basin and Europe. The Carthaginians were 
not an imperial minded people; they were a small group of merchants, craftsmen, and 
seafarers. Though prosperous and powerful fi7om their trade, they had never sought 
territory to colonize other than in Spain where Hamilcar Barca laid the foundations for 
resuming the war with Rome. If Rome had sought peace with Hannibal, it is almost 
certain the terms would have been merely to return Carthaginian influence to that which 
existed before the I' Roman War. Hannibal and the Carthaginians both felt betrayed by 
the Roman expansion efforts that proved detrimental to the trading interests of their 
country. Whatever his enemies may have said, it is clear that Hannibal did not desire the 
destruction of Rome. However, like Pyrrhus, Hannibal hoped to destroy Roman 
hegemony in Italy. He would substitute a new Italian federation under the nominal 
leadership of Capua dominated by Carthage. Rome would have been rendered powerless 
I 
while Carthage again became the leader of the Mediterranean, an idea far removed from 
the narrow mercantile ambitions of the traditional Carthaginian policy of his opponents 
within the senate. 
Later in life Hannibal's ability as a diplomat and statesman equaled his 
generalship. Without his influence the Carthaginian senate almost certainly would not 
have accepted Scipio's terms for peace. He continued to serve his country, being its 
leader and devoting his great energy and skills to reconstruction. Greatness derives from 
heroism. Without personal contact of the commander with his men such enthusiasm 
cannot be fired and such heroism created. This heroism, whether 'in peace or war, is the 
anchor of a people. Hannibal and Lee possessed it, not only in the height of battle but in 
their devotion to their country during and after the wars. From the siege of Saguntum in 
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Spain in 219 B. C. until his death in 183 B. C. Hannibal had honestly, through decades of 
struggle, kept the oath that he had swom when a boy. He pursued his aim with a 
steadfastness and singleness of purpose that makes him a real hero. Many people fall, 
collapse, and ultimately yield. Hannibal was able to overcome adversities until his last 
breath. 
It is a pity that many to this day are unacquainted with Scipio's admiration for 
Hannibal, Lee's high regard for Grant, the sacrifices Grant made for Lee when Andrew 
Johnson clamoured for his imprisonment, or the Roman scorn Scipio faced after the 
seemingly lenient peace terms with Carthage. On his deathbed, Ulysses S. Grant wrote , LI 
would like to see truthful history written, , 898 and that sentiment is as true today as it was 
2,200 years ago with Hannibal. 
Despite Roman claims, Hannibal never lost a battle until his defeat at Zama. 899 
Robert E. Lee's struggle against devastating odds seems to pale when compared to thý 
strategic skill, tactical genius, and force of personality Hannibal maintained in his sixteen- 
year struggle against Rome, for the situation in Italy could have changed even as late as 
207 if Hasdrubal had succeeded in meeting Hannibal in Umbria. Even in his last battle at 
Zama, Hannibal lost none of his boldness or talent. For the first three years Hannibal's 
skill was brilliant, the remaining thirteen an achievement in strength and purpose. 900 It 
can be argued that it is a mark of a great general to be able to rethink radically his 
strategies. Although his first two strategies ultimately failed, only Hannibal could have 
changed his position from an offensive to a defensive posture with such ease. With his 
final strategy he brought not only peace to Carthage, but dignity in their failure. Finally, 
898 J. G. Wilson, Life and Public Services of General Ulysses S. Grant, page 130. 
899 polybius, The -hstori 15.16.5. 
I" Polybius, The Histories 8.18.1-2 & IF Lazenby, Hannibal's War, page 256. 
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at 64 years of age, Hannibal eluded the Romans once more by taking poison, saying as he 
did so, "Let us free the Roman people from their long standing anxiety, seeing that they 
find it tedious to wait for an old man's death. "901 So ended the life of the man T. A. Dodge 
called, "the Father of Strategy. -)-)902 
901 Lix-%,. Ab Urbe Condita. 39.51.7. 
902 T. A. Dodge, The Great Cn-tains. page 71. 
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